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Low external input sustainable agriculture is an important focus of the international 
development sector and is often presented as a solution to ‘agrarian crises’ in 
developing countries. It is a project that has been taken up by formalised non-
government organisations (NGOs) and less formalised social movements alike. 
There is a major focus in the literature on the value of participatory approaches to 
sustainable agricultural development that build alternative farming systems in a 
manner that reflects the immediate needs and perspectives of rural communities, 
particularly the rural poor. This thesis examines three sustainable agriculture 
organisations in India and theorises their potentials and limitations for promoting 
sustainable agriculture in a participatory, inclusive and democratic fashion. In 
particular, it considers the way that organisational structure, the middle class status 
of leading activists and the social relations in which they are embedded facilitate 
and/or limit organisations’ capacity to contribute to this kind of inclusive, pro-poor 
development. Data was collected on case studies over a five month period, from 
December 2009 to April 2010. Four main methods were used to collect data on each 
case: participant observation, interviews (103 in total), the collection of primary 
written materials and secondary sources.  
The data collected suggests that, while there is some scope for the participation of the 
rural poor in sustainable agriculture organisations, in practice, organisations tend to 
be directed and managed by middle class activists, who have access to the relevant 
resources to sustain projects over time. In order to maintain their initiatives, these 
activists not only forge relations with the rural poor, but also the state, donor 
organisations, dispersed activist networks and local elites. In the process, these more 
powerful groups come to have greater influence over the ideology, strategy and 
direction of sustainable agriculture organisations than do the rural subaltern groups 
who are most in need of change. I argue that sustainable agriculture organisations 
could be made more responsive to the needs of the rural poor if their leading activists 
take up facilitative (rather than leading) roles and adopt more flexible and expansive 




current institutional environment mean that it may be better to begin to theorise 
‘beyond sustainable agriculture’, abandoning pre-formulated development models 
and building the political capacity of the rural poor to formulate their own responses 
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Over the past few decades, sustainable agriculture has become a focal point for rural 
development strategies in various countries throughout the Global South. In this 
thesis, I examine sustainable agriculture initiatives in India and attempt to evaluate 
their impact, limitations and potentials. In India, advocates of sustainable agriculture 
often make ambitious claims about its potential benefits. They claim that reducing 
chemical inputs in farming has the potential to address a number of issues affecting 
contemporary rural India, including environmental toxicity and its associated impact 
on human health, as well as economic issues resulting from the rising cost of inputs 
and farmer indebtedness. For example, the Alliance for Sustainable and Holistic 
Agriculture (ASHA, n.d.), a coalition of sustainable agriculture organisations from 
throughout India, claims on its website that: 
ASHA was driven by a collective realization that the prevailing agricultural model 
and policies have resulted in an enormous crisis of many dimensions – soils are 
depleted of fertility and life itself; health is deeply affected due to poisoning of water 
and food; farmers are in deep distress, caught in a cycle of high risk and debt; 
distress migration is resulting in huge exploited population in urban areas. There is a 
sense of urgency that we need a whole revamp of our approach to agriculture… 
[M]any elements of a new paradigm for Indian agriculture have already been 
demonstrated, even on a large scale. India can and should chart a new course for 
building a pro-farmer, ecologically sustainable agricultural economy that will keep 
our rural economy thriving and the urban areas manageable even as we as a country 
are able to feed ourselves with adequate, safe, nutritious and diverse foods. 
In such statements, sustainable agriculture is positioned as the solution to a ‘crisis’ in 
rural India – a claim that is commonly made by the leaders of these organisations.  
The language of crisis is frequently used in academic discussions of contemporary 
rural India (Reddy & Mishra, 2009a; Walker, 2008; Lerche, 2011; Patnaik, 2003). To 
be brief, this crisis can be thought of as having two key moments. The first relates to 
the after-effects of the Green Revolution.
1
 Today, agricultural production in regions 
                                                 
1 The Green Revolution was an agricultural development model introduced in India and 
throughout much of the developing world from the 1960s onwards. It sought to rapidly increase 




that followed a Green Revolution development path have stagnated, while input costs 
have increased, reducing farmers’ income (Singh, 2009). Furthermore, the resource 
intensive approach has had adverse ecological effects, including a decline in the 
water table (Rodell, Velicogna & Famiglietti, 2009) and increased environmental 
toxicity (Tiwana et al, 2009), which has, in turn, had adverse effects on human health 
(Kochhar et al, 2006; Thakur et al, 2010). The second moment in the development of 
agrarian crisis has been the effects of liberalisation on India’s rural economy. 
Liberalisation has constrained access to rural credit, removed subsidies for inputs and 
lowered food prices, severely diminishing the viability of farming as an economic 
venture (Patnaik, 2003). As the growth in urban employment opportunities in India 
has severely lagged behind the loss of livelihoods in the countryside (Reddy & 
Mishra, 2009b), rural populations are in an increasingly desperate position. This 
makes the current approach ‘unsustainable’, in the sense that it does not provide rural 
populations with means of subsisting in the long term. It is in this context that 
farming systems that reduce production costs, decrease ecological and health burdens 
and offer means of value adding may be seen as ‘sustainable’ and desirable 
alternatives. 
I interpret the current agrarian crisis through a Gramscian lens. The value of a 
Gramscian approach is that it recognises that shifts to new social and economic 
systems do not occur simply on the basis of the technical merits of those systems. 
Rather, such changes occur as the outcome of complex social processes by which 
powerful social groups use a mixture of coercion and consent to bring other social 
groups into line with historical projects that are in their interests, a process otherwise 
known as hegemony. The argument that I develop in the early chapters of this thesis 
is that, at a political level, the crisis represents a breaking down of the established 
hegemonic constellation in rural India, which may be interpreted in terms of what 
Gramsci (1971: 210) refers to as a ‘crisis of authority’. The implication of this is that 
consent for the dominant approaches to rural development has broken down. The 
                                                                                                                                          
irrigation systems and mechanisation. Its implementation is discussed in greater detail in 




rural development discourses that have been prominent since the 1960s no longer 
hold a hegemonic grip on the popular imagination – they continue to be in place only 
for a perceived lack of viable alternatives. In this context, there is space for groups 
that had formerly been politically marginal to begin to articulate new development 
paths and build consent for these approaches in the domain that Gramsci refers to as 
‘civil society’. Sustainable agriculture can be seen as one such attempt to forge a new 
path. 
Since the 1980s, leadership for sustainable agriculture initiatives has come less from 
governments than from civil society (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993). Particularly 
prominent have been Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), which are 
organisations funded by the state or donor organisations. They are generally led by 
professionals, who introduce sustainable farming techniques in the form of 
development projects. Yet additionally, there have been several initiatives led and 
organised by members of rural communities, which focus on sharing knowledge, 
communal learning and mutual empowerment (Altieri & Toledo, 2011; Holt-
Gimenez, 2006). These initiatives may be termed ‘social movements’ or ‘grassroots 
movements’. Between these two extremes, there are a diverse range of groups that 
might be termed ‘hybrid organisations’ (Hasenfield & Gidron, 2005), which combine 
methods of organising from both NGO and social movement models. The case 
studies examined in this thesis belong to this ‘hybrid’ category. I consider some of 
the constraints and opportunities that their organisational forms pose to developing 
and promoting alternative, sustainable farming models in a manner that recognises 
and engages with the needs and perspectives of rural communities in the context of 
agrarian crisis. 
Through a detailed analysis of three case studies, this thesis investigates how 
sustainable agriculture is being constructed on the ground in rural India and, 
importantly, by whom. The participation of rural communities, particularly the rural 
poor, in the development of sustainable alternatives is important for at least two 
reasons. The first is ethical: people should have some agency in formulating and 
deciding on the kind of development models that will ultimately have a major impact 




concept for social movements in India, at least since the 1970s (Sheth & Sethi, 1991; 
Bakshi, 1996). Clearly, this spirit of participation should be reflected, wherever 
possible, in the organisational models of civil society organisations themselves. 
Second sustainable agricultural development is also an issue of efficacy. Rural 
communities directly experience agrarian crisis and are, therefore, well-positioned to 
know ‘what is to be done’. Further, much of the literature on sustainable agriculture 
has shown that agrarian classes often have intimate knowledge of local conditions, 
and therefore can play a key role in developing models that will be suitable (and 
sustainable) at a local level (Altieri, 2004; Pretty 2002). In short, farming models 
developed with the participation of rural communities are more likely to be seen as 
relevant and useful by those communities and thus more likely to spread. There 
would, therefore, appear to be some potential for sustainable agricultural 
organisations to play a role in challenging current hegemonic relations, by helping 
the rural poor to articulate sustainable development alternatives that explicitly 
recognise their needs. 
Despite this potential, there is also reason to be sceptical regarding the role of 
sustainable agriculture organisations in challenging hegemonic relations. This thesis 
is sensitive to the possibility that, while the authority of the state and ruling classes 
has been substantially undermined by current ‘crisis’ conditions, sustainable 
agriculture organisations may play a role in reconstituting state authority. Indeed, a 
consistent theme in Gramsci’s (1971) writing is how activities in civil society, rather 
than calling state power into question, instead serve to reinforce it, by direct or 
indirect means. Civil society is not a level playing field; not all people have equal 
opportunities to articulate (let alone implement) development alternatives. This is 
particularly the case in a country such as India, where stark economic inequalities 
and multiple social hierarchies greatly affect people’s access to the spheres in which 
public debate takes place (Chatterjee, 2004). It is possible that sustainable agriculture 
organisations may subtly reinforce the status quo, not necessarily through the 
conscious conspiracy of elites, but simply as an outcome of the uneven distribution 
of power and opportunities. Developing alternative social and economic systems and 
building consent for them amongst other social groups is contingent upon access to 




access to scientific expertise and skills in organisation and marketing, which have 
traditionally been the domain of the urban middle classes. The cases presented in this 
thesis show that, for this reason, middle class activists and professionals play a 
prominent role in leading and managing sustainable agriculture organisations. 
Previous studies in India have cast doubt on the capacity of middle class activists to 
adequately represent the poor (Shah, 2010; Baviskar, 2004, 2005). Indeed, studies 
from urban India have suggested that middle class activism is often overtly 
antagonistic towards subordinate classes and social groups (Anjaria, 2009; Fernandes 
& Heller, 2008; Baviskar, Sinha & Phillip, 2006). The role of middle class activists 
in sustainable agriculture organisations is of special interest to this thesis, as it would 
appear that their work is both crucial to the development of sustainable agriculture 
and a potential constraint on its inclusiveness.  
A further reason to be sceptical of the potential of sustainable agriculture 
organisations is their dependency upon donors. In particular, there is reason to be 
sceptical of the role of NGOs. The dependency of most NGOs on external funding 
makes them more accountable to their donors and/or the state than to the 
communities with whom they work (Grey, Bebbington & Collison, 2006). As 
Riddell (2007) demonstrates, a very large proportion of NGOs receive their funding 
in the form of aid from rich countries, bilateral agencies or multinational financial 
institutions. Of this funding, approximately three quarters is delivered to NGOs to 
implement projects that donors themselves have formulated, leaving NGOs very little 
autonomy. Since, in many cases, hegemonic powers are setting the agenda for 
development NGOs, it is unlikely that they are likely to be directed towards efforts to 
undermine their authority by empowering the poor. It is for this reason that many 
scholars see NGOs as agents of neoliberal hegemony, rather than a progressive force 
(Petras, 1999; Sahoo, 2013). It has been observed that NGOs promoting changes that 
are harmonious with the neoliberal agenda, such as facilitating entrepreneurialism, 
market integration and privatisation of commons, are more likely to receive funding 
than those that politicise development and give political voice to the poor (Ghosh, 
2009; Patel, 2006; Gerber & Veutheys, 2010).  Indeed, some studies indicate that 
NGOs, rather than empowering the rural poor, serve merely to pacify them and 




In this context, this thesis takes up the question: what is the role of sustainable 
agriculture organisations in sustaining and/ or challenging relations of hegemony in 
rural India? Do they facilitate the rural poor to challenge existing hegemonic 
relations and assert alternatives that better meet their needs? Or do they merely 
reinforce the status quo? To express this in another way, can their leading activists be 
considered exemplars of Gramsci’s ‘organic intellectuals’, who give voice to 
grassroots perspectives, build unity and educate, or are they rather ‘traditional 
intellectuals’, who reinforce existing imbalances of power? To address this 
overarching research agenda two interrelated issues are explored. The first issue 
pertains to the organisational structure and strategy of organisations and whether they 
provide suitable spaces for the participation of the rural poor. The second issue 
relates to the broader power structures and networks of social relations in which 
these organisations are embedded. Implementing sustainable agriculture projects 
requires activists to forge relations with various parties, in order to source funds, link 
to experts and build ties with the communities that they are hoping to change. The 
thesis explores how these relations affect organisations’ methods of operating and the 
outcomes of their work. If organisations are found to have stronger relations with 
donor organisations, corporations or the state than they do with the rural 
communities they claim to serve, then it is doubtful that they can challenge the 
current hegemony in any meaningful way. In this way, the thesis explores the ways 
in which sustainable agriculture organisations reflect and/or challenge existing forms 
of social power.  
These are not questions that can be answered in a definitive manner through use of 
quantitative research methods. They require attention to qualitative issues, such as 
the way in which activists conceptualise contemporary conditions in rural India and 
the benefits of the models they promote, the processes by which they engage with 
rural communities and the attitudes they take in doing so, the structure and class 
composition of organisations and the strategies they have adopted. To investigate 
these factors, I have built a rich data set for each of the three case studies, through 





The selection of case studies aims to reflect some of the diversity of agrarian 
conditions in contemporary India, in terms of their level of commercialisation and 
use of Green Revolution technologies. The first case study is based in Punjab, where 
a resource intensive, commercial approach to agriculture has been in place since the 
introduction of the Green Revolution in the 1960s. The second case is based in Tamil 
Nadu, which has a more complex history with commercial agriculture. The Green 
Revolution came to some districts of Tamil Nadu, specifically those with established 
irrigation facilities, but not others. Furthermore, due to the small size of average 
holdings, there was less potential for the Green Revolution to be profitable for 
farmers in the state. The third case study is based in Uttarakhand, which never really 
had a Green Revolution to speak of and whose farming is mostly oriented towards 
local subsistence requirements, rather than the market. Each of these regions 
experiences agrarian crisis in a unique way. Regions that have followed a Green 
Revolution path of agrarian development tend to be more affected by ecological 
issues, the rising cost of chemical inputs and indebtedness. In regions that did not 
follow this development path, farmers tend to be poorer, and are more sensitive to 
deflation of food prices and inflation of the cost of living. Furthermore, agriculture in 
these areas tends to be rain fed and is therefore more vulnerable to the impact of 
climate change. By examining organisations that are operating in such diverse 
conditions, I draw attention to the ways in which sustainable agriculture is being 
positioned as a solution to a range of contemporary issues, but also the unique 
development challenges posed by different experiences of crisis.  
The conclusions that are drawn reflect the complex position in which these 
organisations find themselves. While it is true that, in most cases, the most prominent 
leaders and managers of these organisations are members of the urban middle class, 
they are often aware of and responsive to this fact and attempt to develop means of 
facilitating rural classes (particularly farmers) to rise to leadership positions within 
their organisations. They are also reflexive on the fact that certain organisations, 
particularly internationally funded NGOs, have a disproportionate influence within 
Indian civil society, and seek to create models that give more voice to rural 
communities. I ultimately argue, however, that activists have a tendency towards 




activist networks in which they are embedded, taking input more from fellow 
activists than from the rural poor, in whose name they are working. This limits the 
potential development of sustainable farming models that adequately reflect the 
needs and perspectives of rural communities. Until this issue is overcome, more 
sustainable farming methods, despite the benefits they may offer, are unlikely to 
diffuse broadly throughout rural India. 
These conclusions, which are largely critical in nature, should be read in the spirit in 
which they are intended. The thesis proceeds with an interest in developing 
sustainable responses to agrarian crisis that empower the rural poor to meet their 
needs in a manner that reflects their own perspectives and interests, rather than those 
of elites. The critiques I present aim to provoke inquiry into ways that sustainable 
agriculture organisations could be more effective and inclusive, and are therefore 
offered, to an extent, as an expression of solidarity, acknowledging a mutual 
commitment to a common cause (see Scheper-Hughes, 1995). I acknowledge, from 
the outset, that such critique is much easier from the academic armchair. As Edelman 
(2009: 256) notes, activists in developing countries often operate in a ‘permanent 
crisis-response mode’. I have endeavoured to be sensitive to the fact that activists 
have to work under highly tight conditions, and indeed, much of my critique is 
directed more at this constrained, high-pressure context than at individual activists or 
organisations. 
 
1.1. Definitions  
Many of the key terms used in this thesis, such as ‘sustainable agriculture’ and 
‘social movement’ are contested in social and political life. Recognising the 
contested nature of these concepts, I use them in a flexible way, which recognises the 
multiple meanings that may be ascribed to them. Nonetheless, below I provide some 




I use several terms to distinguish between different kinds of agricultural systems. The 
terms ‘chemical agriculture’
2
 and ‘conventional agriculture’ are used to refer to the 
model of farming that was introduced with the Green Revolution. The distinguishing 
features of this model are the use of high-yielding variety seeds, chemical inputs, 
modern irrigation systems and, usually, heavy machinery. Chemical agriculture 
stands in contrast to ‘traditional agriculture’, which, quite simply, refers to the 
agricultural systems that existed prior to the introduction of the Green Revolution in 
the 1960s. ‘Sustainable agriculture’ is used partly as an umbrella term, encompassing 
more specific agricultural systems such as organic farming, natural farming, 
biodynamic farming, agroecology, permaculture and so on. As I explain in Chapter 
4, what these systems have in common is that they have arisen in response to crises 
within conventional agricultural systems. Taking a sociological approach, I argue 
that what is recognised as sustainable varies as a function of context and hinges 
particularly on experiences with the ‘unsustainable’ – i.e., features of agricultural 
systems that are interpreted as being unworkable in the long term.  
For the organisations studied in this thesis, the use of chemical inputs and hybrid 
seeds was clearly seen to be an unsustainable feature of contemporary agricultural 
systems. The models that they advocate as ‘sustainable alternatives’ may be 
described as ‘ecological agriculture’. This implies that instead of relying on external 
inputs, farmers build integrated ecosystems on the farm itself to meet all, or most, of 
their crops’ requirements. A key distinction organisations often make is between 
‘natural farming’ and ‘organic farming’, with the former typically being the preferred 
model. Where organic farming may entail the purchase of non-chemical inputs on the 
market, following the logic of what Rosset & Altieri (1997) call ‘input substitution’, 
                                                 
2 Chemical agriculture is the preferred term used by sustainable agriculture organisations to 
describe the Green Revolution model. It should be acknowledged that the term has negative 
overtones, and, to an extent, reduces complex farming systems to one component – i.e., the 
application of chemical inputs. Furthermore, it is technically imprecise, since the biosolutions 
used in natural and organic farming are equally ‘chemicals’. The term should, therefore, be 
considered shorthand for farming systems that make use of industrially manufactured, synthetic 
chemicals. It is only used in this thesis insofar as it reflects activists’ perspectives and highlights 





natural farming uses only materials available at the farm or village level. Because 
this distinction was seen to have some ideological significance within the 
organisations, I have used these terms in the same way throughout the thesis.  
There is also a need for clarity in the discussions of civil society and different types 
of organisations. Civil society is here interpreted in a Gramscian sense, as a space of 
social activity that is neither part of the market, nor the state, though it overlaps 
significantly with both. It is the space in which ideas, values, and, most importantly, 
political consent for major social and economic projects are developed and 
propagated. Within civil society, a distinction is made between hegemonic groups, 
who organise consent for social and economic regimes that align with their own 
interests, and subaltern groups, who lack political representation within the current 
establishment. Subaltern groups, therefore, can either be led by hegemonic groups, 
remain politically inactive, or work towards building consent for alternative 
arrangements.  
For the development of such consent to become active, some form of human 
organisation is necessary – hence the focus on ‘civil society organisations’ (CSOs). 
CSOs are defined as being not-for-profit (non-market) and formally autonomous 
from government agencies (non-state).
3
 While there are a broad variety of CSOs, in 
this thesis, I distinguish between two main types – ‘social movements’ and ‘Non-
Government Organisations’ (NGOs). NGOs are defined as formally registered 
organisations that receive funding, either from the state or donor agencies, typically 
to implement development-oriented project work or welfare programs. Social 
movements, by contrast, are less formalised, and tend to be more change-oriented. 
As Tarrow (1998: 22-23) posits in his popular definition, they pose challenges to 
specific groups or to established cultural codes, and are sufficiently organised as to 
allow these challenges to be sustained over time. I use the term ‘activist’ to refer to 
those who perform the work that sustains CSOs, including organising events, 
propagating information, interacting with media, speaking at rallies and so on. I use 
                                                 
3 Though, as is discussed in Chapter 3, informal connections between the state and civil society 




the term to refer to the active members of both NGOs and social movements. 
Frequently, I use the term ‘organisation’ as shorthand for civil society organisation – 
it is applied to both social movements and NGOs. A more comprehensive discussion 
of these categories is provided in Chapter 3.  
Following Ludden (1999), I use the term ‘agrarian’ to refer to social domains in 
which agriculture forms the dominant economic activity. In my writing, I make a 
classical anthropological distinction between ‘peasants’ and ‘farmers’. Put simply, 
peasants tend to own the land they cultivate and what they produce goes towards 
subsistence requirements, whereas farmers are more market-oriented and may 
employ labour to work the land that they own (Wolf, 1966). It is worth noting that 
this distinction is somewhat arbitrary, as the line that separates the two categories is 
decidedly blurred. It has no major analytical significance for this thesis, and is used 
simply as a matter of convention. 
Another human category that I frequently use is the ‘middle class’. This is a 
notoriously difficult category to define, yet I draw on Deshpande (2003) and 
Fernandes and Heller (2008) in positioning the middle class as constituting public 
sector workers, professionals and sections of the petit bourgeoisie, who maintain 
privilege chiefly through their control of cultural capital – particularly education. The 
majority of NGO workers and many social movement activists fall into this category.  
 
1.2. Thesis Outline 
Chapters 2-4 engage with theory and history in order to position Indian sustainable 
agriculture organisations within the context of agrarian crisis. Chapter 2 provides a 
Gramscian history of agricultural development in India from the time of 
Independence through to the post-liberalisation scenario. This chapter provides 
background information on contemporary issues in rural India, but it also advances 
the argument that the current scenario can be thought of as an example of a 
Gramscian ‘crisis of authority’, in which the leadership of currently hegemonic 
groups and ideas are breaking down. If this is the case, it suggests there is an opening 




one example. Chapter 3 begins by considering the ways in which the formation of 
‘alternatives’ is structured by power relations within civil society, emphasising that 
sustaining any kind of mobilisation requires access to certain resources. It engages 
with Gramsci and social movement theory to advance this at a theoretical level, but 
also examines research from India to consider the ways in which certain groups, 
notably the urban middle class and NGOs, have structural advantages within Indian 
civil society. Chapter 4 brings together the ideas developed in Chapters 2 and 3, to 
consider how sustainable agriculture organisations might engage with agrarian crisis, 
the kind of resources they require to do so and how their response may be structured 
by existing forms of social power.  
Chapters 5-8, present the case studies that form the empirical core of the thesis. In 
Chapter 5, I introduce the case studies and provide an outline of the methodological 
approach that was taken in the collection of data. Chapters 6-8 present the findings of 
each of the three case studies. As each of the organisations studied operate in unique 
regions, each of these chapters begins by providing regional context. I describe key 
features of the agrarian structure within each region and outline histories of agrarian 
struggle, which provide an historical context for the organisations that are 
subsequently presented. I go on to describe each case study in terms of their origins, 
development and methods of promoting alternatives in the context of regional 
agrarian crisis. In each of these chapters, I conclude with some reflection on the 
significance of each case. More substantial discussion, however, is left to subsequent 
chapters. 
Chapters 9 analyses the findings of the case studies in order to address the research 
questions, outlined above. It begins by analysing the examples of transformative, 
participatory moments within the organisations and considers ways in which they 
may be expanded upon. It then goes on to consider the more substantive limitations 
of these varieties of sustainable agriculture in terms of their capacity to formulate 
responses to agrarian crisis that meet the immediate needs of the rural poor. These 
relate particularly to the leadership of middle class activists and the influence of the 
state, donors, activist networks and local elites upon their work. The analysis 




which activists are aware of these problems and attempt to resolve them. It considers 
different strategies that organisations employ and their relative merits. In Chapter 10, 
the conclusion, I summarise the key findings and, based on the limitations of existing 
approaches, make suggestions regarding how things might be done better. I first 
consider improvements that could be made within existing sustainable agriculture 
organisations. Ultimately, however, I argue that it may be more productive for 
activists to move beyond sustainable agriculture, as a pre-formulated project, and 
instead attempt to expand upon existing patterns of resistance amongst the rural poor 
and build vertical power to challenge the institutional arrangements that have given 





2. INDIA’S AGRARIAN CRISIS: A GRAMSCIAN VIEW 
 
This chapter provides a historical background to India’s agrarian crisis, thereby 
clarifying the context in which contemporary sustainable agriculture movements 
operate. It takes a Gramscian perspective, highlighting the ways in which hegemonic 
groups have influenced India’s rural development trajectory since Independence. It 
outlines the factors that led to the modernisation of Indian agriculture under the 
banner of the ‘Green Revolution’ in the 1960s and 1970s and reveals how the 
approach taken to implementing this project both reflected and reinforced existing 
social and economic hierarchies. I then turn my attention to the longer-term impacts 
of the Green Revolution, revealing successive waves of concern regarding this 
approach to rural development on social, economic, political and ecological grounds. 
I then explore the impact of the liberalisation in the early 1990s on the agrarian 
sector and explain why the current scenario in rural India is described as an ‘agrarian 
crisis’.  
Discussions of India’s agrarian crisis tend to oscillate between despair and 
utopianism. The present scenario appears bleak, pervasive, deeply entrenched and 
degenerative, while solutions are only discussed in vague or abstract terms. As I hope 
to demonstrate with this chapter, this is precisely where a Gramscian perspective has 
value, as it draws attention to social processes already in motion that may lead to the 
development of alternatives (imperfect as these may be). In this chapter I argue that 
this situation can be understood not only as an ‘agrarian crisis’ – that is, a breakdown 
in the functioning of rural social and economic systems – but also as a ‘crisis of 
authority’. This implies that existing hegemonic structures that have maintained 
consent for a particular model of agrarian development have begun to break down 
and the leadership of those who established these hegemonic structures is being 
called into question. As the old hegemony loses its grip on the popular imagination, 
new ways of thinking about the future can emerge. It is thus possible for new 
alternatives to be articulated, as formerly subaltern groups begin to build alliances 




I begin, in 2.1., by providing a general outline of the concept of hegemony and the 
importance of civil society as the domain in which consent for existing social, 
economic and political systems is established. In Section 2.2., I show that a chief 
hegemonic challenge of newly Independent post-colonial states, including India, was 
to develop consent for large-scale and often inequitable transfers of resources from 
the countryside to the cities, in order to fuel industrialisation. Nehru attempted to 
facilitate this transfer through land reform, but this ultimately met an impasse, as the 
project was unable to win the consent of influential large landholding farmers and 
absentee landlords. In this context, the Green Revolution emerged and served an 
important hegemonic function, by generating food surpluses that helped to fuel 
industry, whilst allowing these influential farmers to become profitable, thus 
securing their consent. In time, I argue, this emergent class of wealthy capitalist 
farmers became politically influential, and shared in the articulation of hegemony at 
a national level. In Section 2.3., I show how this scenario became unhinged, starting 
in the 1980s, as the benefits of the Green Revolution began to expire and side-effects 
manifested, and even more so since the liberalisation of India’s economy, which has 
seriously undermined the profitability of agriculture. I argue that this has raised the 
spectre of a ‘crisis of authority’, as intellectuals and, seemingly, significant portions 
of the population have begun to withdraw consent for the dominant approaches to 
agrarian development.  
 
2.1. Civil Society, Hegemony and the Crisis of Authority 
The concept of civil society has been an important component of Western social and 
political theory, having been used extensively by Enlightenment philosophers such as 
Hobbes and Locke (Fontana, 2006). Since the 1980s, the concept has re-emerged as a 
central focus of academic debate in the English speaking world, as scholars 
attempted to explain the development of popular movements against dictatorships 
(Cohen & Arato, 1994). In this context, the term has been equated with the ‘public 
sphere’: a space independent of the state that balances state power and keeps it 
accountable (McLaverty, 2002). From this perspective, the development of a strong 




and the arbitrary exercise of state power. This approach, which defines civil society 
in terms of its non-state and anti-authoritarian characteristics, has become popular in 
contemporary readings of civil society in academic and activist circles.  
This view of civil society has been critiqued by Gramscian scholars. Buttigieg (2005) 
argues that such an approach, which paints civil society as simply an ‘an ensemble of 
popular progressive oppositional movements not formally or necessarily affiliated 
with a particular political party’ (Buttigieg, 2005: 34), has little value to political 
theory or strategy. These oppositional movements do not make up the entirety of 
civil society, and to focus exclusively on them would be to neglect civil society’s 
sociological and political significance. For Gramsci (1971), civil society is not only 
the space in which opposition is formed and expressed; it is also the ground on which 
consent for state activities develops. The state depends on civil society in order to 
operate with the consent of the general public and will at times intervene in civil 
society in order to establish such consent. Therefore, state and civil society should 
not be considered two distinct spheres: each presupposes and permeates the other, 
such that, from a Gramscian perspective, they can only be separated for 
‘methodological’ purposes (Buttigieg, 2005: 39). 
This closely relates to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony.  Indeed, as Benedetto Fontana 
(2006: 55) puts it, from a Gramscian perspective, civil society is ‘the locus of 
hegemony’. Hegemony can be best explained as an historical process by which a 
particular social group comes to occupy a ruling position in society and how they 
maintain that position once they have gained it. Gramsci’s (1971: 180-1) emphasis is 
on the way in which an aspiring hegemonic group must develop modes of 
cooperation with other social groups with whom it has common interests. But in 
addition to this, in order to be truly hegemonic, the group must learn to guide the 
interests of subordinate groups such that they become harmonised with its own 
interests. Hegemony thus refers to this process by which particular groups come to 
take on a leadership role, partly through the use of coercion or the threat of coercion, 
but, to a greater extent, through persuasion and consent building. While the central 
objective of the hegemonic group may be to gain control of the state and establish a 




way of enlisting the consent of other groups in the domain of civil society that this 
becomes possible. 
Thus, in civil society, the state ‘civilises’ the population, harmonising their thoughts 
and behaviour with the imperatives of the hegemonic group. Often this influence is 
subtle and indirect. The techniques used by the state to indirectly build consent have 
been the subject of much analysis by Gramscian scholars (see Lears, 1985). Kamat’s 
(2002) analysis of civil society groups in Maharashtra provides a clear example of 
such ‘indirect’ influence. Kamat shows how, through sponsoring and elevating the 
position of civil society groups whose perspective is non-threatening to hegemonic 
interests, the state scatters, neutralises and marginalises groups that are in 
fundamental opposition to the hegemonic perspective. Non-threatening groups 
thereby command greater influence over public opinion – they encourage forms of 
activity that are suitable to hegemonic interests. When these kinds of interventions 
into civil society are successful, the two entities, state and civil society, tend towards 
the formation of an organic whole – part of an ‘historic bloc’ that protects certain 
interests and promotes a particular form of economy, society and way of life.  
In concrete historical situations, however, state and civil society often fall short of 
this organic unity. While much of the emphasis in Gramsci’s writings is on how 
political society must build a framework of consent in civil society to operate 
effectively, it is also apparent that at times this framework is stronger than others. 
Indeed, Gramsci (1971) clearly recognises that, at certain historical periods, the state 
and civil society are fundamentally disconnected. This is most apparent in periods of 
‘organic crisis’ or ‘crises of authority’ in which dominant groups are only able to 
resort to coercion to maintain their rule – they are unable to play a leadership role in 
building consent through civil society. The situations in which this may take place 
are diverse, yet Gramsci (1971: 210) suggests two common causes: 
[E]ither… the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it 
has requested, or forcibly extracted the consent of the broad masses (war, for 
example), or because huge masses (especially of peasants and petit-bourgeois 





In a capitalist context, economic developments are also crucial in this process. The 
institutions that the hegemonic group develops in order to maintain consent for its 
rule are ultimately unable to constrain the disruptive effects of the uneven 
development of capital (Martin, 1997; Saull, 2012). In a period of crisis, the state 
lacks the means to respond to these effects through consensus (being constrained by 
the existing institutional framework) and hegemony is weakened. In the resulting 
power vacuum, formerly subaltern groups, who previously lacked political 
representation, are able to emerge in new leadership positions within civil society. 
During such times, disaffected groups are well positioned to begin a process of 
forming alliances and gaining the consent of other groups, leading to the formation 
of new hegemonic projects. In this way, civil society, while being the domain in 
which ruling groups legitimise their power, can also be the domain in which 
alternative constellations of power are formulated. Indeed, as subaltern groups come 
to articulate themselves in ways that challenge hegemonic worldviews, civil society 
can become the birthplace for a new socio-political ethic.  
 
2.2. Hegemony in Rural India 
Development, particularly industrial development, has been the chief hegemonic 
project of postcolonial states, such as India (Escobar, 1998, 1992; Sinha, 2003). 
Newly emerging developing nations have in almost all cases set themselves the task 
of rapidly shifting from an agrarian to an industrial economy, in order to become 
competitive with the advanced capitalist nations. From an economic standpoint, this 
task is challenging, as postcolonial states generally lack the savings to finance 
industrialisation. In this context, the agrarian sector is looked upon as a potential 
source of cheap, exploitable resources, in the form of capital, labour and food, to fuel 
the development of industry (Varshney 1995: 14-20). This is most commonly done 
either through taxation of agrarian surpluses or adjusting the terms of trade in favour 
of cities and to the detriment of the countryside (Byres, 1991). The problem was first 
formulated by Preobrazhensky (1965), in the Soviet Union, under the heading of 
‘agrarian question’, and later by Byres (1991), who described it as ‘agrarian 




they industrialise, but the form it takes varies dramatically, based on the local 
balance of class forces. This suggests that the challenge of facilitating agrarian 
transition is not only technical, but also hegemonic. It is highly difficult for the state 
to retain the consent of agrarian populations for such a large, often inequitable 
transfer of resources. Many states resorted to coercion – most notably the Soviet 
Union, in which peasants were forced onto state managed, collectivised farms and 
potentially resistant landlord classes were arrested, killed or deported (Conquest, 
1986). Consent is more challenging, since the reaction of agrarian classes to these 
policies has generally been antagonistic. One approach has been to ensure that 
certain agrarian classes receive benefits from agrarian reforms, thereby dividing the 
countryside and preventing the formation of a rural bloc that can coherently 
articulate dissent (Bates, 2005).  
India was no exception to this historical tendency. As is well known, after 
Independence, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sought to rapidly industrialise the 
national economy. At the time, there was broad political consensus within Nehru’s 
Congress Party that for this to occur efficiently, food prices needed to be kept low 
through increased production, as any increase in food prices would put upward 
pressure on wages and slow industrial accumulation (Varshney, 1995). The 
challenges of building consent for this ‘agrarian transition’ were particularly 
pronounced in India, due to the size and diversity of the rural population.
4
 
Furthermore, there were conflicting views on the processes by which food 
production should be increased. Nehru favoured a policy of land redistribution. It 
was hoped that providing land to the tiller would give peasants an incentive to invest 
more of their labour in production and thus increase per acre output. Yet this was not 
the view of other major factions within the Congress Party, many of whom were 
either from the landlord class or dependent upon this class. These factions favoured 
policies that provided price incentives and technology to boost productivity.  
                                                 
4 The first census of Independent India, conducted in 1951, found the rural population to be 82.7 
per cent of total (Census of India, 1954). The rural population in India remains high by global 
standards, at 68.8 per cent as of 2011 (Census of India, 2011), highlighting the ongoing 




Popular support for Nehru’s leadership ensured that his redistribution framework 
won out in the short term and attempts were made to implement it throughout the 
nation, though it was a fraught process. Byres (1981) notes at least two outcomes of 
land reform on the class composition of rural India. First, large absentee landlords 
were almost completely liquidated as a class, having lost considerable legitimacy 
through the social justice rhetoric of the Independence movement.
5
 Secondly, land 
reforms saw the consolidation of a class of capitalist farmers with small to medium 
sized holdings. Fearing the extension of ‘land to the tiller’ policies, a number of 
medium sized absentee landlords became direct cultivators, with a direct interest in 
expanded production. Byres (1981) suggests that, as these emergent capitalist 
farmers consolidated their position economically, they also developed their capacity 
to act in their own political interest: which in practice meant preventing further land 
redistribution. They added to the existing challenges in the land reform process, 
whereby influential rural elites within the Congress Party had managed to dilute 
Nehru’s policies and interfere with its implementation (Varshney, 1995), and larger 
landholders had used their connections at the local and state level to stall the process 
(Frankel, 1971). These factors prevented the success of the policy in its aims of 
increasing production, such that, after a modest increase during the 1950s, by the 
early 1960s output had stagnated and even dropped slightly (Varshney, 1995: 42-43). 
In policy circles it was felt that the subsequent inflation of food prices was stalling 
national economic growth (Frankel, 1971: 4-5).  
To express this in terms of hegemony, the land reform project failed to win the 
consent of influential rural elites and the emergent class of capitalist farmers, who 
used their power at the local level to stall and interrupt the implementation of 
reforms. With a few notable exceptions, small holding peasants and landless 
labourers, who stood to benefit from the reforms, did not organise as a powerful bloc 
in order to ensure the project’s success (Weiner, 1962). Indeed, in some cases, the 
structure of local social relations was such that the peasantry were materially and 
                                                 
5 They did, however, use their political influence to secure generous compensation for land lost, 





morally dependant on local landholding elites, discouraging them from actively 
pushing for land redistribution (Herring, 1981). Thus, as Varshney (1995: 46) puts it, 
the project of land reform lacked ‘political microfoundations’. As a hegemonic 
project, land reform lacked the necessary dynamism, due to the dissent of elites and 
lack of active consent (participation) of potential beneficiaries. This provided an 
opening for Nehru’s opponents to introduce technocratic policies as an alternative to 
land reform. The adoption of these policies became known as the Green Revolution. 
 
2.2.1. The Green Revolution 
The term Green Revolution refers to the rapid uptake of a package of agricultural 
technologies and practices, which occurred not only in India, but in various parts of 
the Third World in the mid-twentieth century. At the heart of this package were the 
newly developed high yielding variety (HYV) seeds, which had originally been 
produced by Western agricultural scientists working for American foundations. 
Though promising great increases in yield, the success of HYVs was highly 
dependent upon inputs of synthetic nitrates and larger quantities of water than was 
used by traditional varieties. They thus required modern irrigation systems. 
Generally the new varieties were also more vulnerable to pest attack and disease, so 
synthetic pesticides were also promoted as a part of the Green Revolution 
technological package. This new approach would transform the way agriculture was 
conducted throughout much of the developing world, from the complex and labour-
intensive land management strategies of traditional agriculture, to an approach 
chiefly involving mechanisation and the application of chemical inputs. The adoption 
of this new technological paradigm would also have a huge impact on agrarian social 
relations. In particular, it induced agrarian classes to become more dependent on the 
market.  
The Green Revolution began in Mexico in the 1940s. As was the case in India, 
Mexico’s Green Revolution was introduced in the context of stalled land reforms, 
stagnant food production and economic imbalances between agriculture and industry 




was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, at the request of the Mexican government 
(Brown, 1970). By the late 1940s, a team, led by Norman Borlaug, had developed a 
new, high yielding variety of wheat, which was distributed to wealthy land owners in 
the more extensively irrigated districts of the country (de Alcantara, 1974). To ensure 
the diffusion of the new system of agriculture, the government formed agencies to 
promote it, whilst simultaneously banning the formation of peasant support groups, 
which had helped to ensure that the marketing and distribution needs of communally 
managed farms were met. According to de Alcantara (1974), the result was that the 
communal farms gradually became less competitive and smallholding and 
sharecropping peasants became politically disempowered, while the emergent 
commercial farms became increasingly profitable and politically powerful. For the 
most part, the new technologies did not reach the eighty per cent of Mexico’s farmers 
who worked on small or communally managed properties, as they either could not 
afford them, or they lived in regions where insufficient irrigation made them 
redundant. Thus, while Brown (1970) notes that by the end of the 1960s there had 
been doubling and tripling of production of corn and wheat, respectively, de 
Alcantara (1974) points out that in the rural areas, hunger and malnutrition persisted. 
The increase in food production benefitted the urban population, while the rural 
peasantry, the majority of whom had been left behind by state development policy, 
suffered a decline in purchasing power, preventing them from accessing this new 
food supply. Thus, while Mexico’s Green Revolution was able to resolve issues 
relating to food prices in the cities, it could not resolve the inequalities and tensions 
between urban and rural societies. Similar patterns would later be observed in India. 
The sale of HYVs in Mexico brought huge profits for the Rockefeller Foundation, 
which provided an incentive for them, and others, to replicate these results in other 
parts of the developing world. By the 1960s, Asia became the key target, as the 
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations jointly established the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines for the development of hybrid varieties of the 
Asian staple crop. By the end of the decade, the use of the new seeds and the 
corresponding inputs had spread across the continent, with particularly rapid uptake 
in Pakistan, India and the Philippines, and substantial increases in Iran, Turkey and 




for the rapid uptake. First, corporations, nation states (the US in particular), and 
liberal foundations were quick to invest in research in the field, after witnessing the 
immense profits made from the sale of seeds in Mexico. This allowed HYVs to be 
developed for Asia at a rate much faster than they had been for Mexico. Secondly, 
research groups, the IRRI in particular, had multinational boards with connections to 
research networks throughout the world, allowing their findings to be quickly 
disseminated. Thirdly, multinational corporations worked collaboratively with the 
research groups to ensure that the new inputs (fertilisers, machines, etc.) were 
available to farmers when the new seeds were released. To these factors we can add 
that politicians in post-colonial states saw the new technologies as a means of 
facilitating ‘agrarian transition’ in a way that by-passed the need for politically 
contentious land reform. By increasing food production and thereby reducing prices 
and creating agrarian capital, which could be taxed, states could effectively transfer 
wealth from the agrarian sector to fuel industrialisation. As such, there was a strong 
incentive for post-colonial states to promote the technology within their own 
countries. The net effect of this was that by 1969 several Asian nations had returned 
to food self-sufficiency after a time of dependency, and investors in seed research 
and chemical inputs had made a fortune (Brown, 1970). 
The implementation of the Green Revolution in India, which began in earnest in the 
mid to late 1960s, did not happen overnight. The foundations were laid as early as 
1960, when the government, concerned by the slow pace of land reforms, introduced 
the Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme (IADP). Seven districts were selected 
in the initial stages of the IADP to receive extensive administrative support to adopt 
the new technologies. It was hoped that the technological progress in these districts 
would set the pace for technological development in agriculture throughout the 
country (Desai, 1969). In sharp contrast to the approach taken in Nehru’s land reform 
project, in which backward districts were prioritised, participation in the IADP was 
awarded to districts with extensive irrigation facilities, thus benefitting regions that 
already had relatively high levels of agricultural development (Frankel, 1971: 3-5). 
The IADP was financed by the Ford Foundation (Desai, 1969), who, along with the 
Rockefeller Foundation, had also funded research centres in India in which a large 




the time came to ‘scale up’ the model adopted in the IADP, much of the necessary 
intellectual support was already in place. 
When Nehru died in 1964, a power struggle ensued within the Congress Party 
between those who continued to support land reform and those who favoured a 
technocratic approach to agricultural development (see Varshney, 1995: 48-70). The 
technocrats made the case that using redistribution alone would not allow production 
to increase at the speed necessary to meet requirements. Their case was strengthened 
by the gradual withdrawal of regular food aid from the US and the impact of two 
successive years of drought in the mid-1960s (Cleaver, 1972; Varshney, 1995: 74-5). 
Furthermore, a technocratic approach would be more agreeable to middle to large 
landholders, who had interrupted the land reform process, particularly those who 
were emerging as capitalist farmers and recognised potential profits in the new 
technology (Byres, 1981). Thus in 1965, the government initiated a new scheme, the 
Intensive Agricultural Areas Programme (IAAP), which would extend the approach 
taken in the IADP to 114 of India’s 325 districts (Frankel, 1971: 5). In addition to 
these measures to increase the use of the modern technologies in agriculture, a policy 
was also implemented to provide minimum support prices on certain agricultural 
commodities, which gave farmers an incentive to invest in increasing their output 
(Varshney, 1995). Implementing the programme involved channelling credit and 
inputs to all regions with secure access to irrigation canals or tube wells. State 
governments and various organisations were encouraged to set up demonstration 
farms, which would directly demonstrate the ways in which the new approach could 
increase yields, and any special approaches needed to ensure success in local 
conditions (Sen, 1974).  
The unfolding of the project was guided by hegemonic considerations. The emergent 
capitalist farmers, who had consolidated their political power in the land reform 
process, effectively guided the project towards districts in which they were in 
ascendency (Byres, 1981). With this, and in the development of support price 
policies, their perspectives began to be incorporated within the state and they began 
to articulate hegemony within the agrarian sphere. Further, intellectual infrastructure 




technology. A crucial component of this was the agricultural universities, one of 
which would be established in every state. The agricultural universities had two 
functions: first, to conduct research on HYVs and the chemical agronomic schedules 
best suited to local conditions for each state, and secondly, to conduct extension 
programmes to educate farmers on how to apply the new approaches on their farms 
(Randhawa, 1974). They served to establish consent for the Green Revolution and to 
provide it in the prestige of science. Indeed, as Gupta (1998) argues, the participation 
of peasants in the Green Revolution can in some measure be attributed to the 
circulation of development discourses that these institutions promoted, which 
positioned everything traditional as inferior and the Western approach embodied in 
the new technology as a sign of ‘progress’.  
In the districts targeted by the IAAP, the transformation was rapid. Many of the 
preconditions for the success of the Green Revolution had already been established 
under the British Raj, including the institutionalisation of private property rights and 
the penetration of state bureaucracies to local levels (Ludden, 1999). The two states 
that adopted HYVs most rapidly were Tamil Nadu and Punjab, which by 1970 had 
76 and 96 per cent of their land holdings covered by HYVs, respectively (Sen, 1974). 
This was due largely to the fact that they both had high quality, reliable irrigation 
systems, and fertile alluvial soils. Punjab received further benefits from having 
already undertaken a massive project in land consolidation, having good 
communication networks to allow technology to diffuse rapidly, and a state 
government that was committed to boosting agricultural production by establishing 
various subsidies and other economic incentives for change (Randhawa, 1974; Singh 
& Kohli, 2005). Other regions with established irrigation systems, notably Haryana, 
Western Uttar Pradesh, and several isolated districts in South India, saw radical 
changes.  
In regions where there was no assured access to irrigation, however, change came 
very slowly, if at all. For Sen (1974), this was the major limitation of the Green 
Revolution approach in India. He argues that those who had anticipated far-reaching, 
national change had underestimated the extent to which HYVs depend upon large, 




controlled irrigation. By the 1970s, it was apparent that the potential to expand the 
area under irrigation was extremely limited, due to the dry, semi-arid climate which 
pervades much of the subcontinent.  To this day, there are many parts of the country 
that the Green Revolution has not reached. Given agro-climatic conditions, Green 
Revolution technologies would not be appropriate in those regions. Nonetheless, 
regions in which the technologies were applied were radically transformed, not only 
in terms of agricultural output, but also socially, culturally, ecologically and 
economically. Regional disparities in agricultural production drastically increased, 
such that some regions became ‘food bowls’ for the nation, while others were left 
behind in terms of rural development.
6
 
For the Indian state, the Green Revolution served at least three functions. It was (1) a 
source of capital accumulation, as the new technology made both chemical 
companies and commercial agriculture itself more profitable (at least in the short 
term); (2) a way to increase food production; and (3) as is crucial to the current 
discussion, it resolved a hegemonic impasse for the Indian state, in which the need to 
increase food production had been stalled by the lack of consent of medium to large 
capitalist farmers. In this impasse, the Green Revolution performed a critical 
hegemonic function: it allowed the central government to win the consent of 
emergent capitalist farmers for their approach to rural development. This was critical, 
since this class had considerable and growing influence within the Congress Party 
itself. Indeed, the emergent class of capitalist farmers can be seen as being 
incorporated within the hegemonic bloc within the Green Revolution period.
7
 These 
farmers, and the new intellectual infrastructure of extension services and agricultural 
universities, articulated hegemony at the local level, by enlisting the consent of 
smaller landholders for a form of agrarian development that bypassed land reform 
                                                 
6 The state of Punjab, for example, though representing only 1.5 per cent of the geographical 
area of India, was producing one quarter of India’s grain requirements by the early 1970s 
(Randhawa, 1974: 178). 
7 Indeed, Byres (1981) argues that by the late 1970s, this class had considerable control over the 
state. He describes Prime Minister Charan Singh, who served in office from 1979-1980, as a 
‘rural populist’, whose legitimacy derived from his claims to represent the entire rural 




and yet still provided some benefits to farmers with various sized holdings.
8
 As 
Frankel (1971) details, nowhere in India was this a smooth process, as there were 
various forms of resistance from agricultural labourers and marginal farmers. As 
time passed, however, the process eventually stabilised, with consent crystallising 
around an approach that, in large parts of the country, involved high levels of inputs 
(supported by subsidies) and high levels of output. 
 
2.3. The Contemporary Scenario 
From the late 1960s through much of the 1970s, the Green Revolution created a 
relatively stable hegemonic equilibrium
9
 in India regarding issues of agricultural 
development. While the decade saw the emergence of powerful new farmers’ 
movements, these operated within the context of the new political and institutional 
framework of the Green Revolution, for which there was general consent. As farmers 
became more integrated into the market, their interests coalesced around increases in 
subsidies on chemical inputs and minimum support prices for agricultural 
commodities, and these became the chief demands of farmers’ movements 
(Varshney, 1995; Omvedt, 2005; Gill & Singhal, 1984). More fundamental issues 
were not challenged. There was thus consensus for a general framework, within 
which there was room for negotiation and bargaining, at least for landholding 
farmers. This state of equilibrium has now been upset. The benefits of the Green 
Revolution have largely expired and several side-effects have manifested. These 
                                                 
8 Food regime analysis reveals a more transnational hegemonic function of the Green 
Revolution. By providing Green Revolution technologies as ‘aid’, First World countries were able 
to consolidate loyalty from Third World countries during the Cold War (McMichael, 2009). 
Further, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the US government and multinational 
corporations were all involved in developing consent for the Green Revolution, and benefitted 
from the sale of seeds and chemical inputs. Such transnational analysis, however, is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
9 Note that for Gramsci (1971: 182) hegemony is achieved when ‘the dominant group is 
coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordiante groups, and the life of the 
State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable 
equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of 
the subordinate groups – equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but 




issues have been compounded by the liberalisation of the Indian economy, which 
began in the early 1990s, which has profoundly reorganised the position of agrarian 
classes within the national hegemonic constellation. These developments have called 
into question the legitimacy of the dominant paradigm of agrarian development, and 
raise the spectre of a ‘crisis of authority’ in rural India, in which agrarian classes can 
no longer lend their active consent to the hegemonic leadership. 
 
2.3.1. From Green Revolution to Agrarian Crisis 
Since the early stages of its implementation, there have been concerns regarding the 
impacts of the Green Revolution. From the outset, there were concerns regarding the 
uneven distribution of benefits of the new technology. As Frankel (1971) outlines, 
the profits made by smallholders from the new technology tended to be consumed by 
the increased cost of inputs and living expenses, while for large landholders even 
small increases in output on a per acre basis added up to substantial increases in 
aggregate income. Larger landholders also had more surplus capital when the new 
technologies were introduced, allowing them to invest in tube wells, fertiliser and 
mechanisation, which ensured that the benefits of the new varieties of seeds were 
realised. Smallholders were often unable to invest in the full package of Green 
Revolution technologies and thus made only modest gains. A significant number of 
smallholders became uncompetitive and were forced to sell their land. Large 
landholders were eager to acquire this land to reap higher rates of profit, and their 
demand drove up land prices by as much as 500 per cent in parts of the country, 
making land more inaccessible for the poor majority (Cleaver, 1972).  
Disparities in benefits were even more pronounced in the case of agricultural 
labourers. Frankel’s (1971: 105-9) analysis suggests that while the shift to more 
intensive cropping patterns created more on-farm jobs in the short term, this did not 
lead to increased wages, as may have been expected. Due to the growing regional 
disparities introduced by the Green Revolution, labourers migrated from less 
productive areas, creating ‘surplus labour’ in the areas of high production. The 




increased. Furthermore, while on-farm jobs increased in the short term in intensively 
cultivated regions, as mechanisation increased, jobs became fewer, more seasonal 
and precarious in nature (Byres, 1972). 
These growing social and economic inequalities had political consequences. As 
Bates (2005) observed in Africa, certain agrarian classes had become beneficiaries of 
the new model of agrarian development, removing the potential for any unified 
opposition from the agrarian sector to the state’s overall development strategy. The 
Green Revolution had created a wealthy class of capitalist farmers, who were the 
chief beneficiaries of the process. As this class attained political power from the 
village to the national level, they ensured that the benefits of future policies would 
also flow on to them (Byres, 1972). The political leadership of these classes helped 
to develop consent for the Green Revolution.
10
 As Varshney (1995: 81) puts it, where 
previously agrarian mobilisation occurred on the basis of class, this new leadership 
attempted to mobilise the entire agrarian sector, through demands for more 
favourable subsidies and minimum support prices. At least in the early 1970s, there 
was no effective leadership to unite those disaffected by the Green Revolution 
(Byres, 1972; Cleaver, 1972). Yet for Byres (1972), this hegemonic equilibrium 
could not endure in the long term, as the concentration of political power in the 
hands of wealthier farmers prevented the contradictions of capitalist agriculture from 
being resolved.  
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, it became apparent that the economic gains that 
had occurred in the first ten years of the Green Revolution could not be sustained. 
Long term studies have shown that yields for wheat and rice have stagnated, and in 
some cases, declined, with declines in yield being associated with loss of various soil 
                                                 
10 As is always the case, however, consent was not complete. For example, in the late 1960s, 
communists in East Thanjavur District in Tamil Nadu mobilised landless labourers against the 
decline in wages and increased cost of living that had accompanied the Green Revolution, which 
ultimately resulted in deadly confrontations with landlords and police (Mencher, 1974; 
Alexander, 1975a). While such confrontations did occur in various parts of India in the early 
phases of the Green Revolution, they were mostly localised, lacking national or state level 
organisation or any alternative hegemonic project. West Bengal provides the clearest exception 
to this, where, in response to strong, consistent mobilisations from the rural poor, the 




nutrients (Ladha et al, 2003; Bandhari et al, 2002). It therefore appears that yield 
increases through Green Revolution methods have reached their limit. This has had a 
range of social and economic implications. Since the price of inputs continues to 
increase
11
 and food prices have remained fairly low,
12
 the profitability of agriculture 
as an economic venture has declined over time (Sidhu, 2002a, 2005). Gill (2005) 
notes that even with government subsidies for fertilisers and pesticides, input costs 
are consuming growing amounts of farmers’ disposable income, even in relatively 
privileged regions like Punjab and Haryana. For smallholders, this has made farming 
unviable, and many have been forced to sell their land. This has implications for 
employment, as larger farmers tend to employ fewer workers per acre. For large 
landholders, declining profitability means a loss of capital for investment in rural 
areas, reducing prospects for the creation of employment, both on and off farms 
(Chand, 2009). The development of these issues in Punjab, which was once 
considered the exemplar of Green Revolution ‘success’, has led Sidhu (2002a) to 
argue that the rural development model pursued in the region should now be 
considered a prime example of economic and social ‘non-sustainability’.  
These factors have now developed to such an extent that a number of scholars refer 
to the situation in rural India as one of ‘agrarian crisis’. Jodhka (2012) suggests that 
after a decline in the study of agrarian change in India in the 1990s, from the early 
2000s onwards, ‘crisis’ has emerged as the principal discursive frame through which 
rural India is now interpreted. Jodhka is critical of this trend, as it tends to be applied 
indiscriminately across the entire agrarian sector, and is insensitive to class and caste 
                                                 
11 Synthetic fertilisers depend upon fossil fuels for their production, and so the price of 
fertilisers is highly sensitive to changes in the oil price. The actual cost of fertilisers has risen 
sharply in the last decade, and with the spectre of peak oil, this upward trend is likely to 
continue. For the time being, farmers in India have not directly borne all of this increase, due to 
subsidies on inputs, but the government expenditure on subsidies is beginning to reach 
unsustainable levels (Gopikrishnan, 2012). 
12 Although global food prices have undergone a series of surges since 2006, this has generally 
not led to an improvement of the economic position of farmers. As Headley and Fan (2008) 
argue, much of the food price increase is attributable to the rising oil price, which raises the cost 
of production. Further, they suggest that a large portion of rural households are net food 
consumers, with diversified income, and are thus as vulnerable to food price increases as the 




differences within the sector. In some respects, this critique is misplaced, as some of 
the most prominent studies that have used the frame of agrarian crisis have examined 
the differential impacts of the decline in the agrarian sector on a variety of classes 
(Patnaik, 2003; Reddy & Mishra, 2009a; Walker, 2008; Lerche, 2011). Nonetheless, 
it is true that the term is often used without a great deal of precision, such that it is 
not entirely clear at what point rural India entered into a state of ‘crisis’, and what the 
implications of this crisis are.  
From a macro perspective, India’s agrarian crisis has been interpreted as a growing 
imbalance between rural and urban economies. As Reddy and Mishra (2009a, 2009b) 
outline, while the gap in GDP between rural and urban India has increased, there has 
not been a corresponding shift in employment patterns. In essence, the growth in 
urban and non-agricultural rural employment opportunities has not been fast enough 
to accommodate the growing number of people from rural communities who can no 
longer sustain themselves on agriculture alone. Since the number of people for whom 
agriculture remains the only livelihood option continues to grow, there has been an 
increase in the number of landholdings. Given the reduction in the absolute size of 
cultivated land in India (as a result of urbanisation, land degradation and so on) the 
increase in landholdings has meant a reduction in the average size of landholdings. 
Farmers must produce in more competitive conditions with less land, leading to 
increasing marginalisation.  
This situation has been aggravated by the liberalisation of India’s economy. 
Liberalisation began in 1991, when, following a balance of payments crisis, India 
accepted a US$ 4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund, on the 
condition that it make widespread policy reforms, including the removal of barriers 
to trade, deregulation of the finance sector and the privatisation of public assets 
(Patnaik & Chandrasekhar, 1995). Among the most immediate impacts of 
liberalisation was an increase in rural poverty (Patnaik & Chandrasekhar, 1995: 
3007). Lerche (2011) argues that liberalisation made the Indian economy less 
dependent upon the agricultural sector. Not only did it enable the import of cheap 
food from overseas, but the availability of transnational finance reduced the 




become a lower priority for governments,
13
 and, as is consistent with neoliberal 
ideology, subsidies and support prices have been lowered or removed. The most 
direct consequence of these developments has been a decline in agricultural growth – 
both in terms of GDP and output (Reddy & Mishra, 2009b).
14
 
Patnaik (2003) makes a stronger claim. She argues that it would be a mistake to think 
of the rise in rural poverty as simply being the result of government neglect or as an 
unintended by-product of liberalisation. Rather, rural poverty was the immediate and 
predictable consequence of policies intended to cause deflation, to create a more 
profitable environment for finance capital. In the period from 1995 to 2001, all 
quantitative restrictions on food imports were removed, which, combined with other 
deflationary policies, caused a drop in the price of all agricultural commodities 
(Patnaik, 2003: 40-1). Consequently, the profitability of agriculture fell, as did 
livelihood security. The growth rate in food grains production fell by half during the 
1990s, such that it was below the population growth rate for the first time since the 
introduction of the Green Revolution (Patnaik, 2003: 48). Cropping patterns 
throughout India also shifted, away from the immediate food needs of the local 
population and towards more profitable, export-oriented crops, such as cotton, which 
has had an adverse effect on local food security (Patnaik, 1996).  
The most alarming sign that these developments have brought agrarian India to a 
crisis point is the dramatic increase in farmers’ suicides since the late 1990s. Studies 
of farmers’ suicides provide an insight into cases of extreme desperation experienced 
throughout rural India: as Rao (2009: 111) puts it, they are the tip of the iceberg that 
is rural distress. While the data on suicides is somewhat patchy, and many are 
unreported, official figures show an increase in farmer suicides from an average of 
                                                 
13 This decline in the priority status of agriculture for the Indian government is reflected in 
expenditure on agricultural development, which, after liberalisation, fell from 13.2 per cent of 
GDP to 7.8 per cent (Patnaik, 2003: 48).  
14 ‘[T]he growth rate of agricultural GDP decelerated from 3.08 per cent during 1980-1 to 1990-
1 to 2.57 per cent during 1992-3 to 2005-6… [T]he growth rate in foodgrains… fell from 2.85 per 
cent in the 1980s to 1.16 per cent in the 1990s, lower than the rate of growth of population of 




15,747 per year in the period 1997-2001 to an average of 17,513 per year for 2002-
2006 (Sainath, 2009). Farmer suicides are clustered in certain regions, and studies 
indicate common features. In Andhra Pradesh, where a wave of farmers’ suicides 
caught national attention in the early 2000s, Galab, Revathi and Reddy (2009) found 
that the majority of cases were farmers who had moved from subsistence agriculture 
to cash cropping, in the hope of improving their economic position. Cash cropping 
exposed farmers to considerable risk and many of them sustained heavy losses.  
Another common feature among farmers who committed suicide is indebtedness. 
The declining profitability of agriculture made farmers more reliant on credit and 
less able to repay loans. This came at a time when the rural credit market was being 
deregulated, as part of the liberalisation reforms, reducing poor cultivators’ access to 
official sources of credit and often forcing them into highly exploitative relationships 
with local money lenders (Shetty, 2009). Mishra’s (2009) research on farmers’ 
suicides in Vidarbha, a region in Western Maharashtra with some of the highest 
suicide rates in the country, found that farmers who had committed suicide had debts 
3.5 times higher than control groups. Studies from other parts of the country have 
had similar findings (Gill, 2005; Jeromi, 2007).  
The agrarian crisis also has ecological dimensions, which raises serious concerns 
regarding the long term sustainability of Green Revolution style agriculture. In the 
late 1970s, Yapa (1979) raised concerns that the neglect of ecological issues within 
the Green Revolution paradigm would have serious consequences for the future. He 
suggested that the vulnerability of HYVs to pests would lead to the use of an ever 
new range of pesticides, the strength of which would have to be incrementally 
increased as pests became resistant. Studies from India have confirmed these 
predictions, with high levels of resistance to numerous pesticides being registered in 
various parts of the country from as early as the 1960s, but substantially increasing 
by the 1980s (Mehrotra, 1989). This, in turn, led to an increase in pesticide usage, 
causing further ecological contamination and risking damage to non-target animals, 
including humans. The effect of this has been exceptionally pronounced in regions 
where highly intensive chemical agriculture has been practiced. In Punjab, there is a 




have been found in a variety of foods produced in the state (Tiwana et al, 2009). 
Epidemiological studies have now linked the usage of pesticides to the high rates of 
cancer (Kochhar et al, 2006; Thakur et al, 2008) and reproductive health disorders 
(Thakur et al, 2010) in parts of the state.  
Several other environmental concerns have been raised. Yapa (1979), for example, 
highlighted the potential of damage to soil structure from excessive use of synthetic 
nitrates and loss of biodiversity through mono-cropping of HYVs. In Haryana, which 
has had a similarly intensive cropping pattern to Punjab, a range of environmental 
issues have been observed, including chemical contamination of water systems, 
salinity, soil erosion desertification and water logging (R. B. Singh, 2000). The 
damage to soil can be attributed to the loss of tree cover and the fact that the 
intensive monoculture of the wheat-rice cropping pattern has caused nutrient 
deficiencies and exhausted much of the ground water supplies (R. B. Singh, 2000). 
Indeed, the loss of ground water is becoming an acute issue in Punjab, Haryana and 
Rajasthan, with NASA satellite scans revealing mean declines in the water table of 
up to four centimetres per year (Rodell, Velicogna & Famiglietti, 2009).  
To summarise, judging from its use in the above cited studies, it would appear that 
the term ‘agrarian crisis’ refers to a scenario of pronounced distress in the agrarian 
sector with limited or no prospects of improvement within the current framework. 
Indeed, when one considers both the ecological and economic dynamics of the 
situation, it appears that within the current framework the future trajectory can only 
be downward. It is a ‘crisis’, and not merely ‘decline’, because the social and 
economic constraints, particularly on the lower class strata, currently appear 
intractable. 
 
2.3.2. Agrarian Crisis as ‘Crisis of Authority’ 
The developments outlined above point to an ‘agrarian crisis’ relating to growth 
rates, employment patterns, marginalisation and ecological decline; in this section I 
consider whether this has led to a ‘crisis of authority’, in which these objective 




argued above, the Green Revolution was a source of capital accumulation, food 
stocks and political consent. To a greater or lesser extent, all three of these functions 
have come into a state of crisis throughout much of rural India. The current situation 
can certainly be seen in terms of a crisis for capital, in the sense that the conditions 
for continuous capital accumulation in the agrarian sector have not been sustained. In 
the long term, this may also become a food crisis, as food production fails to keep 
pace with population growth. It is the idea of a crisis in political consent, however, 
that is of most interest to the present study. In the wake of the Green Revolution, 
consent had consolidated around a commercial model of agrarian development, held 
up by support prices and subsidies. Discontent was largely channelled through 
farmers’ movements, led mostly by wealthier farmers, whose demands were for 
increases to these support mechanisms, rather than any fundamental change in the 
system. Yet the developments described in the previous section indicate that the idea 
that the existing system can lead to rural development is losing its plausibility. The 
active consent of the rural population for the status quo is weakening, though no 
clear alternatives have emerged, raising the spectre of a ‘crisis of authority’ in which 
‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born’ (Gramsci, 1971: 210).  
Active consent has become difficult to maintain, as the means of social reproduction 
are under threat. The rates of growth brought about by the Green Revolution had 
provided a temporary solution to what Bernstein (1996) terms ‘the agrarian question 
of labour’ – i.e., how agrarian classes can survive, given capitalism’s uneven growth 
trajectories between agriculture and industry. Now that agricultural growth rates have 
sharply declined, this ‘agrarian question of labour’ re-emerges. The Green 
Revolution has lost its tenacity as a unifying discourse and subaltern groups have a 
new impetus to articulate alternatives. Insofar as the Green Revolution approach 
(complete with its regional disparities) is still practiced, it would appear that this 
approach is merely ‘dominant’ rather than ‘leading’: it remains in place purely for 
lack of perceived alternatives.  
Liberalisation has further disrupted the complex hegemonic balance which formed 
under the Green Revolution. It has undermined one of the crucial factors for 




increasing prices for agricultural commodities, which would allow farmers to invest 
with good prospects for profitable returns. The politics of farmers’ movements had 
centred on improving the terms of trade for agriculture through price increases. 
Farmers’ movements lost much of their bargaining power upon entering a neoliberal 
political environment, which accepted the volatile prices of the global market. In 
response to this, a number of farmers’ movements emerged with an explicitly anti-
commercial, anti-liberalisation agenda, promoting conditions for greater farmer self-
reliance (Omvedt, 2005; Mukherjee, 1998), most notably the Karnataka Rajya Raita 
Sangha, which developed in the 1990s (McHattie, 2000). The demands of these new 
farmers’ movements are less amenable to neoliberal hegemony than those of the 
older breed. Yet theirs is not the only voice in rural civil society – a number of 
farmers’ movements, such as those led by Sharad Jyoshi, take a pro-liberalisation 
stance, believing that Indian farmers are sufficiently versatile and entrepreneurial to 
profit from the new market environment (Omvedt, 2005). Farmers’ movements have 
become highly divided, no longer uniting the agrarian sector as Varshney (1995) 
claims they had in the 1970s. Thus, while discontent exists and is widespread, there 
is no single group in civil society that is capable of uniting and representing this 
discontent, let alone consensus regarding an alternative.  
Neoliberalism represents a reconfiguration of hegemony for rural India. Saull (2012) 
suggests that neoliberalism initiated a new historical bloc, with greater integration of 
all sectors into the global economy. Yet it appears that the hegemony of 
neoliberalism and finance capital operates in a cruder, more dominative
15
 manner in 
the Indian countryside, having less capacity to establish consent for its rule. The 
neoliberal state has prioritised creating profitable conditions for investors. As Walker 
(2008) argues, this has come into direct conflict with rural communities when the 
state has forcefully acquired land from farmers and transferred it, at little or no cost, 
                                                 
15 Howson (2006) distinguishes different usages of the term ‘hegemony’ in Gramsci, contrasting 
‘aspirational’ and ‘dominative’ types. While ‘aspirational hegemony’ is open to negotiation and 
the building of consensus with subaltern groups, ‘dominative’ hegemony relies more on 
coercion, particularly when certain non-negotiable ‘hegemonic principles’ are called into 





to domestic and foreign capital.  While the Indian state has always had the right 
(under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894) to acquire land for use that is in the ‘public 
interest’, since liberalisation the meaning of the term ‘public interest’ has been 
modified, so as to include direct transfer to a private corporation. As such, the rate of 
dispossession has dramatically increased (Walker, 2008).  
The coercive nature of this is particularly apparent in the case of ‘Special Economic 
Zones’ (SEZs). In these geographically delineated sites of between 10-5000 hectares, 
there is no democratic governance, allowing for experimentation with levels of 
liberalisation that would not be possible within an ordinary democratic setting 
(Levien, 2011: 454). Therefore, by their very nature, within SEZs, all democratic 
means of consent building have been suspended, with the implicit acknowledgement 
that such consent would be highly unlikely, or would disrupt investment plans. As 
Levien (2011) outlines, since the legal framework for SEZs was finalised in 2005, 
hundreds have been approved throughout the country. The land for SEZs is 
compulsorily acquired by the state from farmers with little or no compensation, and 
transferred to investors at ‘incentive’ prices.  
Unsurprisingly, there has been widespread opposition from farmers to this coercion 
(Walker, 2008). In parts of Eastern India, in which agricultural underdevelopment 
and rural poverty were already extremely high, land acquisition has provided fuel for 
the now decades long Maoist insurgency. Maoists have forcefully ejected the state 
from districts in West Bengal, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, establishing alternative 
systems of government, and rendered large parts of the country ungovernable 
(Chakravarty, 2008). The Maoist insurgency can be seen as symptomatic of a crisis 
of authority, reflecting the fact that the state is unable to keep up with ground 
realities and re-establish some form of consent for the dominant system, despite the 
fact that such consent is clearly in its own interest. As Levien (2011: 455) notes, a 
number of commentators have now suggested that the opposition of farmers could 
stall India’s growth trajectory. Effectively, neoliberal India’s neglect of consent from 





Intellectual support for the dominant approaches to agrarian development has 
continued to decline, indicating the severing of connections between state and civil 
society which characterises the Gramscian crisis of authority. Both the Prime 
Minister (The Hindu, July 16, 2011) and the President (Indian Express, December 4, 
2010) of India have called for a ‘second Green Revolution’, acknowledging 
problems associated with the first and the urgent need to improve livelihood options 
for the rural poor. Perhaps more tellingly, M. S. Swaminathan (2002), one of the 
leading administrators of India’s Green Revolution has, for several years, been 
calling for an ‘Ever-Green Revolution’, in which agricultural output could be 
sustainably increased without the associated ecological harm. The fact that such 
prominent supporters of the Green Revolution as Swaminathan are no longer able to 
endorse it and are signalling the need for new development strategies suggests that 
the discourse of the Green Revolution is losing its moral authority.  
To an extent, the state appears to have recognised the magnitude of the crisis, and has 
implemented some responses to restore economic and political balance. One of the 
more progressive responses has been the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (NREGS), which was introduced by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
central government in 2005, in recognition that liberalisation had not generated 
livelihood options for the rural poor. The Scheme guarantees rural communities 100 
hours of work per household, per year, at minimum wage. Much of the work 
allocated has been directed to sustainable rural development, such as managing soil 
and water resources, and civil society organisations have played a strong role in 
guiding this allocation (Reddy & Upendranadh, 2010). In this way, the Act not only 
has the advantage of addressing rural livelihood and development issues, but it has a 
dynamic component, responding to issues and needs identified within civil society.
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16 It should also be noted, however, that the NREGS has had its detractors. Wealthy capitalist 
farmers and absentee landlords have objected to the impact of the policy in reducing the 
availability of labour and increasing the cost of wages, and have mobilised to demand the 
scheme be scrapped (Vakulabharanam, et al 2011). Conflict over the NREGS reflects the 




A more conservative response has come in the push for the introduction of 
genetically modified (GM) crops. In 2009-2010, the UPA government sparked 
controversy by opening debate on the commercial release of ‘Bt-brinjal’ – a 
genetically modified eggplant, which produces its own pesticide. Monsanto and 
Mahyco, the companies that produced the organism, argued that it would increase 
production by making plants more resilient against pests and reduce farmer 
dependence on pesticides (Barwale, 2009). Those opposed to the release of Bt-
brinjal, however, have cited a number of risks associated with the technology, 
including the increased cost of seeds and its uncertain health and environmental 
impacts (Kuruganti, 2010). Responding to the controversy, the central government’s 
Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh hosted a series of public consultations, to 
gauge public opinion on the issue. The consultations showed widespread public 
concern regarding the new technology, and Ramesh responded by implementing a 
two year moratorium on its commercial release (The Hindu, Feb 10, 2010). In 
implementing the moratorium, however, Ramesh was fundamentally at odds with 
other forces within the government, who remain committed to technological 
solutions to the agrarian crisis. The Minister for Agriculture, Sharad Pawar, for 
example, has consistently argued that Bt-brinjal is necessary to provide food for 
India’s starving population (Times of India, Feb 23, 2010).  
While the state remains committed to neoliberal principles, it is difficult to 
implement a solution that can address the fundamentals of the agrarian crisis. While 
the NREGS has some merits, the GM ‘solution’ simply appeals to some of the most 
questionable assumptions of the Green Revolution discourse – namely that 
technological innovation will always keep food production in pace with population 
growth. There is an urgent need for a more complex, systemic view of the problem 
and innovative solutions.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
By taking a Gramscian perspective on India’s recent agrarian history, this chapter has 




reflected the hegemonic balance of power. The initial impulse to expand agricultural 
output came from hegemonic interests in transferring resources from agriculture to 
fuel the industrialisation process. The initial project of land reform was incomplete, 
as it failed to secure the consent of powerful rural elites and ascendant capitalist 
farmers. The Green Revolution, though causing significant instability in the short 
term, managed to broker a complex and relatively stable hegemonic balance in the 
1970s, in which farmers’ movements, led by wealthy capitalist farmers, negotiated 
increases in subsidies and minimum support prices. This ensured some benefits of 
development remained in the countryside. The relative stability of this arrangement 
has since been disrupted, as the benefits of the Green Revolution expired and 
liberalisation has precipitated a widespread agrarian crisis. This crisis has 
undermined some of the key instruments for fostering consent among the rural 
population, raising the spectre of a Gramscian ‘crisis of authority’. 
The issues outlined in this chapter are significant to the present study for two 
reasons. First, they highlight the extent of the distress in rural India and the urgent 
need for alternative approaches to rural development. Second, if there has been a 
breakdown of political consent for the hegemonic regime in India, thus constituting a 
crisis of authority, this provides a ‘space’ in civil society in which alternatives can be 
propagated. If discourses of Green Revolution and the old farmers’ movements no 
longer hold influence over the popular imagination, then people may be more open to 
alternatives, particularly those whose experiences have made them disenchanted by 
the Green Revolution and liberalisation. Social groups who had previously been in a 
subaltern position may attempt to take up a leadership position in this context, 
developing consent for alternative approaches. The civil society organisations 
studied in this thesis can be seen as attempts to do precisely that. Yet, at present it 
appears no subaltern groups are able to take up such a leadership position. The 
constraints that certain groups face in building alternatives within civil society that 





3. POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that the current situation in rural India may be 
described as a Gramscian ‘crisis of authority’. Consent for dominant ideologies is 
breaking down, which provides a political opportunity for subaltern groups to assert 
alternatives. Yet, as Gramsci notes, in the analysis of such a crisis, a key factor to 
consider is the balance of power between different groups. Not all groups are equally 
positioned to develop consensus for a new hegemonic formation. Indeed, Gramsci 
(1971: 210) warns of the risk that: 
The traditional ruling class, which has numerous trained cadres, changes men and 
programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the subordinate classes, 
reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp.  
The terrain of civil society, in which consent for new hegemonies is potentially 
established, is infused with power and privilege. If there is a ‘crisis of authority’ in 
the hegemonic approaches to agrarian development, powerful groups may be in a 
better position to respond to it. This issue has been a major focus in the study of civil 
society organisations, particularly social movements. A number of social movement 
scholars draw attention to the disparity between groups in terms of their access to the 
resources required to build and maintain a movement. This provides a useful 
framework for understanding how some subaltern groups are able to begin the 
passage towards articulating and implementing alternatives, while others remain 
voiceless.  
The aim of this chapter is to draw on theory and existing research to demonstrate the 
ways in which power, at various levels, structures people’s capacity to act in civil 
society. It draws attention to those domains that are particularly relevant to the focus 
of this thesis: the way power impinges on rural society, on civil society in developing 
countries (India in particular) and on different forms of civil society organisations 
(social movements and NGOs, respectively). It begins in Section 3.1. by reviewing 
literature on the general constraints faced by groups in forming and sustaining social 
movements. In particular, it examines the resource mobilisation and political process 




their capacity to control resources and respond to political opportunities. While these 
perspectives suggest that relatively well-resourced and connected groups are better 
positioned to raise their voices through social movements, I also consider the 
literature on ‘grassroots movements’, which shows some of the ways in which poor 
people have made use of the limited resources at their disposal to bring about 
substantial changes in their communities. In the latter part of the chapter, I apply 
these theoretical concepts to more concrete issues of interest to this thesis. In Section 
3.2., I consider some of the unique challenges and constraints to mobilising in 
agrarian settings. I show that while there are now numerous examples of rural 
communities organising themselves and asserting their own political perspectives, 
frequently their voice is drowned out by more organised, urban groups, which have 
greater influence over national centres of power. In Section 3.3., I engage with 
literature on civil society in India and show that two prominent issues emerge from 
this literature: (1) Indian civil society provides greater political opportunities for the 
urban middle classes than those with less social and economic privilege; and (2) 
since the 1970s, funded Non-Government Organisations have generally had greater 
influence within civil society than social movements. Formulating an equitable 
response to India’s agrarian crisis is thus to negotiate a highly uneven terrain.  
 
3.1. Social Movements and Civil Society 
In contemporary societies, social movements represent a key moment in the 
organised expression of dissent. To continue in the Gramscian idiom, they represent 
a shift in groups from a subaltern state – in which they can only give their consent to 
the existing hegemony or otherwise rely on other groups to represent their dissent – 
to a condition in which they are organised around achieving their own goals, which 
may differ from those of currently hegemonic groups. Through movements, social 
groups shift from a passive and marginal state to one of conscious self-assertion, 
with the ultimate agenda of in some way altering the hegemonic establishment, 




Defining the term ‘social movement’ is notoriously difficult, as the phenomena to 
which it is applied are quite diverse. The approach taken by Tarrow, which is quite 
influential in the field of social movement studies, provides a useful point of 
departure. Tarrow (1998) situates social movements along a spectrum of ‘contentious 
politics’, which he defines as any challenge posed to existing cultural codes or social 
structures that are launched from outside of established institutions (as opposed to a 
power struggle occurring within such institutions). What distinguishes social 
movements from other forms of contentious politics, such as an isolated protest or a 
riot, is that they develop ‘mobilisational structures’ (i.e., organised social networks 
through which energy, people and resources are mobilised) and frame their issues in 
such a way as to allow for ‘sustained interaction with powerful opponents’ (Tarrow, 
1998: 22-23).  
Although Tarrow’s definition is quite versatile and allows social movements to be 
differentiated from other, related forms of collective action, in some respects, it fails 
to encompass all of the phenomena that are commonly recognised as ‘social 
movements’. The focus on interaction between organised contenders and their 
‘powerful opponents’ (which, for Tarrow, is most often the state), draws attention to 
the more public social movements with overt political agendas. Yet, as Melucci 
(1994: 107) has identified, public encounters with authorities are, in most cases, only 
the outer manifestation of far more pervasive ‘hidden networks’. Such networks 
constitute movements in their ‘latent’ and ‘normal’ phase. The activity that occurs 
within them produces cultural codes and meanings that challenge dominant 
perspectives. Encounters with authorities are often an exceptional occurrence for 
social movements; indeed, in some cases, movements may not encounter authorities 
directly at all, instead enacting their alternative perspective through coordinated 
attempts to promote collective changes in lifestyle (Haenfler, Johnson & Jones, 
2012).  Due to these factors, several prominent social movement theorists have 
emphasised the need to look beyond the more overtly political, public social 
movements to examine other forms of organised, collective challenges to the status 
quo, which may occur in more ‘cultural’ domains (Snow, 2004; Zald, 2000). The 




the state and multinational corporations, however, the bulk of their activity is 
oriented towards collective behaviour change.  
Thus, a more inclusive and satisfactory definition may run as follows: social 
movements are conscious, collective attempts to create social change (whether 
through confrontation with opponents or otherwise) that are sufficiently organised to 
endure over time.  In keeping with Tarrow’s (1998) approach, it is worth re-
emphasising that social movements are launched by those who lack direct access to 
political institutions (or who choose to eschew direct relations with the state), and 
should be distinguished from coordinated state action aimed at promoting change. 
Yet, beyond this broad definition, it should also be acknowledged that social 
movements are socially constructed phenomena. The kinds of activities that are 
recognised as belonging to ‘social movements’ vary, both between and within 
societies. Indeed, it may be a contested term, applied for political reasons, as a way 
of conferring legitimacy. As Tilly (2004: 6) observes: 
[T]he term “social movement” has acquired attractive overtones across the world. 
Consequently, participants, observers, and analysts who approve of an episode of 
popular collective action these days frequently call it a social movement. 
A civil society formation that identifies with the term ‘social movement’ may 
develop its own way of defining what this designation means. Such a definition 
would, theoretically, highlight the favourable qualities of the group in question, or 
qualities reflecting the ways in which they would like to be perceived, or contrasted 
to other, rival groups and initiatives. Some of the ways in which this is done are 
highlighted in the latter part of this chapter, and are explored in more detail in 
Chapter 9.  
 
3.1.1. Resources, Opportunities and the Capacity to Mobilise 
A prominent issue in social movement studies concerns which groups are likely to 
participate in movements, and under what circumstances. An early assumption, held 
by a number of authors, collectively referred to as ‘breakdown theorists’ (see Tilly, 




have been subject to the social disintegration characteristic of modernity (see 
Kornhauser, 1959). Participants in movements would therefore be the alienated, 
disconnected and disadvantaged sections of society, who, to use Smelser’s (1962) 
term, were victims of ‘social strain’. These assumptions were systematically 
challenged by the ‘resource mobilisation’ school, particularly in the work of 
Oberschall. Oberschall’s (1973) point of departure is the assumption that movements 
require various resources in order to function. Resources are here defined broadly, 
and include material resources – including money, labour and time – but also non-
material resources – such as social networks, leadership, enthusiasm and 
commitment. Directly negating the assumptions of the breakdown theorists, 
Oberschall (1978) notes that alienated and disenfranchised people are less likely to 
be in possession of such resources, and therefore less capable of forming movements, 
however strong their grievances may be. From this perspective, movements are far 
more likely to consist of people from groups that are already well-connected and 
resourced, who have the capacity to sustain a movement over time.  
Yet despite the extensive empirical evidence Oberschall uses to back his claims, 
there are many instances in which groups without access to great amounts of 
resources have formed social movements. Having observed this in the many social 
movements that developed in the 1960s in the United States, resource mobilisation 
theorists McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasise the importance of external sources of 
support, which provide under-resourced movements with the resources they lack. For 
McCarthy and Zald, this external support comes predominantly from ‘conscience 
constituents’. These are active contributors of resources to movements who do not 
have any direct benefit to gain from the achievement of the movements’ key goals: 
their support is a matter of ‘conscience’. Conscience constituents are generally in 
positions of material comfort, as they have, by definition, ‘discretionary resources’, 
whether money, labour, time, or access to institutions, which they are able to give to 
a cause that does not immediately affect them. Although, as Jenkins (1983) notes, the 
notion of conscience constituents does not explain the active participation of under 
resourced people in social movements, they do represent an important means by 
which poorer people may overcome their resource deficits and gain the level of 




Yet ‘conscience constituents’ are not without their problems. As McCarthy and Zald 
(1977) note, what conscience constituents provide in organisation and resources to 
social movements, they lack in perceived authenticity, as they themselves are often 
from more privileged positions than those they claim to represent or support. Social 
movements must therefore make strategic decisions in the way they balance the 
presence of direct beneficiaries and conscience constituents. The presence of both of 
these constituents in movements may become a source of conflict, as ‘conscience 
constituents’ are often perceived as ‘outsiders’ (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1231). 
Furthermore, as McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1232) make clear, conscience 
constituents have a tendency to be fickle in their support for particular movements. 
Those who have sufficient ‘discretionary resources’ at their disposal to support one 
social movement on a ‘conscience’ basis are more likely to support multiple 
movements. As such, they are more likely to have conflicting loyalties than those 
who stand to directly benefit from the success of the movement.   
The insights of the resource mobilisation schools of social movement studies 
complicate the common image of social movements as vehicles for marginalised 
groups to promote just and inclusive social change. If well-networked and resourced 
groups are in a better position to form social movements, then their activities may, 
inadvertently, perpetuate the process by which relatively privileged groups have 
greater capacity to affect public debate and social change. The perspectives of more 
disadvantaged groups, who lack resources and powerful contacts, are likely to remain 
marginal, if not completely unarticulated. Conscience constituents may provide such 
groups with resources to make mobilisation possible, but in some cases, they may 
exacerbate the marginalisation, particularly if they presume the capacity to speak on 
behalf of the under-resourced groups. This has been a pronounced issue in India, as 
is discussed in section 3.3. 
The ‘political process’ theory has adopted some of these insights and built them into 
a more comprehensive theory of social movements. In keeping with the resource 
mobilisation perspective, they maintain that social movements are most likely to 
occur where there are existing social networks through which people and resources 




requires an opening in the ‘structure of political opportunities’. This phrase, 
borrowed from Eisinger (1973), implies the various factors in the political 
environment that facilitate or discourage people from taking to contentious politics. 
This may include a change in legislation that removes the threat of repression, a 
newfound sense of the mobilising groups’ power, or a realisation that established 
powers are in some way vulnerable. McAdam (1999) is quick to add, however, that 
these factors only provide a ‘structural potential’ for mobilisation. The decisive 
factor that encourages an inactive group to become active is a shift in consciousness, 
by which the group becomes aware of its capacity to resist.  
Ultimately, the political process theory is not as fatalistic as the ‘resource 
mobilisation’ perspective. While political process theorists such as McAdam (1999) 
and Tarrow (1998) do emphasise the greater likelihood of mobilisation among 
groups who are already well networked and resourced, they also add that as social 
movements gather pace, other groups may become involved. The contentious actions 
of one group, particularly if successful, may provide an inspiration for other groups, 
who are similarly disaffected but perhaps less organised, to become involved in the 
process (Tarrow, 1998: 23-25). In this way, political process theory may provide 
further analytical tools to dissect social movements’ utility in empowering 
marginalised groups. For while it may be true that well-resourced groups are better 
positioned to assert a political challenge in the form of a social movement, the way 
that group chooses to mobilise its resources will determine whether opportunities 
open for less advantaged groups. With the appropriate organisational structure, the 
movement itself may provide an opening for those who have historically lacked 
resources and connections to raise their voices. In the analysis of particular 
movements, therefore, a key issue is whether or not groups provide such an opening, 
or, whether deliberately or for lack of foresight, create ‘insular’ structures, which 
exclude subordinate groups from participating.  
From a Gramscian perspective, the tendency to form ‘insular’ movements is not only 
an issue of equity and representation; it also poses questions of movement efficacy. 
A movement that only represents the interests of a single group and does not 




relatively subaltern position. Without engaging with other groups, recognising 
common interests, forging alliances and collaborating, their potential to articulate a 
new form of hegemony is significantly curtailed. It is more likely that they will gain 
concessions from established powers, but will not mount a meaningful challenge to 
power itself. The movement will be locked in ‘identity politics’, and will not develop 
the necessary connections to become a mass movement. Of course, not all 
movements will aspire to ‘mass’ status: the necessity of enlisting the support of other 
groups will vary from issue to issue. Thus, in the analysis of particular movements, 
one should consider which groups’ consent must be established in order to for the 
movement to effectively achieve its agenda. The literature on ‘grassroots’ 
movements simultaneously addresses the two issues of equity and efficacy of 
movements and attempts to formulate a model through which the participation of key 
stakeholders can be facilitated. 
 
3.1.2. Grassroots Movements 
A number of social movement participants identify with the term ‘grassroots’. The 
term appears to confer legitimacy on a movement, and has connotations of 
authenticity and localism. In India, in the 1980s, Kothari (1984) wrote of the 
emergence of new ‘grassroots movements’, which were defined by their detachment 
from the state apparatus and political parties. This non-political, non-ideological 
connotation appears to be quite commonplace, yet beyond this, the precise meaning 
of the term ‘grassroots’ is often quite unclear.  While much of the social movement 
literature uses the term in this rather imprecise manner, some authors have analysed 
grassroots movements as potential solutions to the problems confronting under-
resourced groups, discussed above.  
A major conceptual issue in the study of grassroots movements is the identification 
of the direct stakeholders of social movements. The work of Batliwala (2002) 
discusses this most directly, highlighting the need to make an analytical distinction 
between those directly affected by the issue which is the focus of a movement and 




directly reflects McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) distinction between direct beneficiaries 
and conscience constituents. Yet Batliwala (2002) goes further, in drawing attention 
to the fact that ‘conscience constituents’, however well-intentioned, may have 
divergent interests to direct beneficiaries, and lack intimate, first-hand knowledge of 
the issue for which they are mobilising. As such, she defines grassroots movements 
as ‘movements of, for, and by people most directly affected by the consequences of 
public policy’ (Batliwala, 2002: 400). For purposes of this discussion, it may be 
necessary to expand this definition slightly by acknowledging factors other than 
those directly attributable to public policy, such as a natural disaster, may also 
facilitate a ‘grassroots’ response from those directly affected. Batliwala is concerned 
by those most vulnerable to changes: those who perceive change most intimately as a 
part of their immediate, material reality. This provides fluidity to the concept of 
‘grassroots’ which prevents it from being attached to any fixed political subject. 
Those who constitute ‘the grassroots’ will vary from issue to issue and movement to 
movement, yet ‘grassroots movements’, in being organised and led by direct 
stakeholders, are less likely to be subject to the kinds of conflicts of interest or 
representational challenges that ‘outsider’ participants introduce. 
A key benefit of grassroots movements is that the issues around which they mobilise 
can better reflect immediate local needs. If grassroots movements are organised and 
led by members of vulnerable communities, the issues which form their focus should 
theoretically be those which communities themselves identify as problems 
(Batliwala, 2002). As Appadurai (2002) emphasises, the key challenge for such 
movements is to recognise the resources which communities already possess, and 
mobilising them in such a way that allows these problems to be addressed. For 
Appadurai, the most significant of these resources is knowledge. By drawing 
exclusively on the knowledge that poor communities already have (accumulated 
through direct experience), grassroots movements are able to build their own distinct 
forms of politics and, in the process, avoid the shortcomings of other types of 
movements that have tried to impose an agenda and model of organising from the top 
down. Further, this may provide a way of breaking the elitism of scientific 
knowledge, and asserting the value of ‘local knowledge’ as a solution to poor 




There are two other noteworthy reasons why this kind of ‘grassroots’ approach may 
be seen as valuable. First, since it is focused on local problems and is a constant 
endeavour to mobilise local knowledge, the methodology of grassroots movements 
promotes ongoing participation. Having roots in the practical problems of daily life, 
they are more likely to remain embedded in local communities, rather than tending 
toward a model in which only an elite group of activists participate (Edwards, 2001). 
Secondly, unlike opposition movements, grassroots movements are less bound to 
singular issues (Dwyer, 2011). They represent an ongoing struggle to find solutions 
to a series of interlinked problems, which are derived from the immediate realities 
faced by poor communities. This makes them more versatile, and less likely to lose 
their sense of purpose in the event that a campaign achieves its agenda: there is 
always more work to be done.  
Grassroots movements are thus autonomous responses of marginalised communities 
to a series of problems relating to the social life-world that they experience directly. 
These responses may consist both of protest and resistance on the one hand, and 
‘constructive work’ (to use the Gandhian idiom) on the other. Grassroots movements 
contrast to other forms of social movements and civil society initiatives, in that the 
focus of their activities is dictated by these direct experiences, rather than being 
dictated in an abstract sense from a revolutionary blueprint, or the vision of 
professionals or donor organisations.  
These concepts have a strong resonance with the literature on ‘participatory 
development’. This approach to development gained currency in the 1980s as a way 
to reposition development workers as facilitators, rather than directors, and to enable 
local people to recognise their own capacity as agents of development (Hickey & 
Mohan, 2004). A particularly influential form of participatory development is 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). Chambers (1997) describes PRA as a cost 
effective approach to rural development that involves local people in data collection, 
planning, implementing and evaluating development interventions. It relies on 
methods of data collection and planning that are accessible to people without formal 
education and can be empowering in showing people how much they already know 




in bringing out the unexpected aspects of people’s local realities and priorities, which 
development professionals often neglect. Notwithstanding this, PRA has not been 
without its detractors. Mosse (2001), for example, notes that in practice, PRA 
‘facilitators’ play a strong role in guiding the agenda of participatory projects, and 
that the ‘participatory’ rhetoric can serve to obfuscate this. Similar issues can be 
identified in the grassroots movements literature. Although Appadurai (2002) asserts 
that, in grassroots movements, professional staff merely play supportive roles, while 
the agenda is set by local people, in practice it may be difficult to separate support 
from influence or de facto leadership. 
The idea of ‘grassroots movements’ as presented in the literature should be seen as 
both descriptive and normative. The literature describes a certain ‘type’ of 
movement, which can be compared to others, but it also prescribes grassroots 
methods of organising as being in some sense ‘ideal’. Social movements should 
endeavour to approximate the example set by grassroots movements, by facilitating 
the leadership of those most directly affected by change, rather than allowing elites 
to ‘lead’ them and speak on their behalf. Yet, an interesting feature of this literature 
is that its most prominent authors (i.e. Appadurai, 2002; Batliwala, 2002; Dwyer, 
2011) have relied heavily on a single case study, the Shack/ Slum Dwellers 
International (SDI), as their primary example of what a grassroots movement is or 
should be. Having its origins in an alliance of grassroots groups and development 
NGOs in Dharavi, Mumbai, SDI has mobilised local resources to address issues such 
as housing, tenancy rights and sanitation.  
The heavy reliance on a single case study from urban Mumbai raises questions as to 
how well the grassroots model could be applied in other settings. SDI has certain 
features that make it unlike a large number of social movements operative in India 
today. The fact that slum dwellers represent some of the most marginalised of the 
urban poor makes it easy to present them as the victims of contemporary urban 
development (and indeed, the displacement of people from the countryside). They 




recognised as ‘grassroots’ in the sense that the literature identifies.
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 Yet, in other 
settings, finding the agents ‘most directly’ affected by change may not be such an 
easy task. To discern the ‘grassroots’ in the context of the Indian agrarian crisis 
would be an immense challenge. At best it would be an untidy amalgam of diverse 
groups (small land-holders, agricultural labourers, women, dalits, etc.) many of 
whom have divergent interests. Furthermore, SDI is an urban-based movement, and 
thus has the benefit of easy access to NGOs, state agencies and other potential 
resource bases. Living in densely populated environments may also provide greater 
opportunities for collaboration. Therefore, in order to better conceptualise the 
possibilities for inclusive mobilisations in response to India’s agrarian crisis, it is first 
necessary to pay closer attention to the unique challenges for mobilisation in agrarian 
settings in general, and in India in particular. 
 
3.2. Mobilisation in Agrarian Settings 
Until the 1980s, scholarly understanding of the conditions for rural mobilisation had 
been foreshortened, due to limiting assumptions within the dominant orthodox 
Marxist perspective. Marx (2005: 131) famously described the French peasantry as a 
‘sack of potatoes’. With this analogy, he implied that while they were relatively 
homogenous in their way of life and were bound together by a single nation state, the 
nature of the peasant economy was not conducive to the kind of cooperation that 
would lead to a coherently articulated political perspective.  
Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient, directly produces most of its 
consumer needs, and thus acquires its means of life more through an exchange with 
nature than in intercourse with society… Insofar as there is merely a local 
interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their 
interests forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among 
them, they do not constitute a class. They are therefore incapable of asserting their 
class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or a convention. They 
cannot represent themselves, they must be represented (Marx, 2005: 130-131). 
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there are power structures within poor communities and that not everyone within them are 
equally vulnerable to change. How can a group like SDI guarantee that it represents the poorest 




Agrarian classes were thus assumed to lack political agency. Independent political 
action was deemed unlikely, due to the lack of a critical resource: dense social 
relations. Kautsky (1988), the Orthodox Marxist par excellence, carried this 
assumption into his more comprehensive theory of agrarian classes, which essentially 
saw the peasant economy as a transient phenomenon, to be replaced with a more 
advanced mode of production. He conceptualised change in the composition of the 
agrarian social structure as a consequence of industrial development in the cities. 
Traditional peasant economies, though capable of meeting subsistence requirements, 
tended to break down as a consequence of the outmigration and inflation that 
industrialisation facilitated. Kautsky presents this process of agrarian change as 
essentially passive, awarding little agency to the peasantry in formulating new social 
relations and new modes of production. They were not granted the historical mission 
of the proletariat, who, it was assumed, would raise the condition of all other classes. 
The assumption that peasants could, at best, rely on working class vanguards for 
political representation continued to feature in Marxist analysis for most of the 
twentieth century. Hobsbawm’s (1973) analysis clearly demonstrates this tendency. 
He asserts that while peasant uprisings have been plentiful throughout history and 
have often been decisive in determining the outcomes of revolutions, the politics of 
these uprisings tend to be inarticulate. They are based either on local issues or a 
vague universal peasant identity. Hobsbawm suggests that the peasant perspective on 
the world is always limited to the region, and that peasants have little understanding 
of (class) interests outside of their own immediate experience. While these 
assumptions have been heavily criticised, it is worth noting how Hobsbawm’s views 
relate to some of the material constraints on agrarian societies. He asserts that 
peasants’ relative lack of education and access to communication technologies means 
that their knowledge of the world outside of their immediate transactions comes only 
through hearsay. As such, it is difficult for them to link the issues which they face 
with those occurring on a national or international scale; national action only comes 
when local struggles are simultaneously pushed in the same direction by some 
external force. While the spread of new communications technologies means these 
barriers are not as decisive as they may once have been, a more pertinent issue that 




constrains peasants’ ability to sustain mobilisations. Farmers and agricultural 
workers are subject to natural cycles. Whereas in a factory, production can be put on 
hold and resumed after political activity takes place, on the farm the sowing of seeds, 
harvesting and maintenance of crops must take place at specific intervals. In the 
South Asian context, agrarian political mobilisation has typically taken place during 
hot and dry conditions of early summer, prior to the monsoon, when it is difficult to 
grow crops and people are off the fields (Ludden, 1999: 17-26).
18
  
These assumptions strongly influenced research on agrarian movements. Drawing on 
a number of historical studies, Oberschall (1973: 140-141) argues that because of 
their resource deficits, rural populations have historically relied on urban 
professionals and intellectuals to support mobilisations. From this perspective, 
conditions are particularly favourable for mobilisation when there are established 
networks and relationships between urban and rural populations. For example, 
Oberschall notes that labourers who migrate from villages to towns for employment 
have historically played a role in disseminating radical ideologies that incited rural 
mobilisations. The view that peasant movements, insofar as they have historical 
significance, follow a revolutionary agenda whose origins are in the cities was 
common amongst the major studies on peasant uprisings in the 1960s and 1970s, as 
was the view that their organisational capacity tends to hinge on the support of urban 
radicals (e.g. Wolf, 1969; Lewis, 1974; Useem, 1977).
19
 
More recent studies of peasant movements, however, have challenged these views. 
While recognising that there are factors that constrain the political and mobilisational 
capacities of rural populations, contemporary studies show there are other factors 
that run counter to these. Though not easily reconciled with a ‘resource mobilisation’ 
                                                 
18 It would be a mistake, however, to assume that political perspectives only form during these 
times of year, when people have enough free time for mass mobilisations. As Ludden (1999: 18) 
notes, the practice of agriculture is infused with politics, with daily struggles occurring over 
issues such as rights of access to land and resources. 
19 Commenting on a more contemporary setting, Farrington and Bebbington (1993) speculate 
that professional, urban NGOs may be able to provide small landholders with the organisational 




perspective, in some respects, the economic and social position of agrarian classes 
facilitate both movement participation and broad political perspectives. Since the late 
nineteenth century colonial expansion, international food markets have been densely 
integrated, making farming communities highly sensitive to the price fluctuations 
that occur whenever there are shifts in the global political economy (Friedmann, 
1978). As such, it is in the economic interest of farmers to be aware of global 
conditions. Organised farmers’ lobbies have thus played a strong role in shaping the 
regulation of food markets to protect them from these fluctuations (Friedmann, 
1993). Furthermore, as Ludden (1999: 32) points out, farming, perhaps more than 
any other economic activity, is intimately bound up in the local environment – 
socially, economically, geographically and ecologically. If outsiders are to have an 
influence on local practices and politics, they will need to engage with the 




Contemporary peasant movements provide abundant evidence that agrarian 
communities are capable of forming their own, politically articulate movements. In 
India, particularly since the 1980s, strong farmers movements have developed, 
levering significant influence on state and national policy (Varshney, 1995; Omvedt, 
2005). The global peasant movement La Via Campesina (LVC) has shown the 
capacity of peasants to produce an internationally coordinated movement against 
neoliberal globalisation and sustain it over a number of decades. Not only has LVC 
formulated a unique ideological perspective based on ‘food sovereignty’ and peasant 
identity and lifestyle, but it has directly challenged the right of urban outsiders to 
lead the movement (Desmarais, 2002, 2007). McMichael (2008, 2009) argues that 
the very factors that orthodox perspectives had assumed restrained peasants’ capacity 
to mobilise have, within LVC, been key factors sustaining the movement. He 
suggests the marginality of the peasantry and the continuous experiences of 
dispossession have put them in a position in which political self-assertion becomes a 
                                                 
20 Ludden (1999) shows that the British, for example, in their attempt to secure a leading 
position in India, needed to devise precise systems of documentation and an extensive network 




means to survival. Indeed, experiences at the margins of the global economy, rather 
than producing a confined political perspective, has enabled peasant movements to 
develop deeper critiques of the destruction wrought by neoliberalism than was 
possible within the framework of orthodox Marxism.  
Other scholars have challenged the orthodox view from a historiographic angle.  As 
Patel (2006: 73) notes, bias in mainstream narratives had led historians to neglect the 
long history of agrarian anti-capitalist movements and the impact these have had on 
more generalised social movements. This bias was systematically challenged by 
Ranajit Guha and the Subaltern Studies School. Focusing on the Indian 
Independence movement, Guha (1982: 2) boldly argued that the histories of the 
movement until that point had been ‘elitist’, focusing on ‘the role of individual 
leaders or elite organizations and institutions as the main motivating force.’ Caught 
up in the spectacle of personalities, such histories overlooked the ways in which 
common people contributed to the development of Indian nationalism, independently 
of elites. Such approaches were ill-equipped to explain the diffusion of nationalism 
throughout the countryside. As a corrective to this elitist historiographic tendency, 
the Subaltern Studies Group drew attention to a parallel history, constituted by the 
actions of the toiling masses – a ‘politics of the people’ (Guha, 1982: 4). A major 
focus in this endeavour was peasant uprisings. Several authors drew attention to the 
fact that peasants not only formulated their own coherent anti-colonial and anti-
landlord agendas in the absence of the elite, urban nationalists, but frequently, they 
were in direct opposition to them (Pandey, 1982; Arnold, 1982; Chatterjee, 1982). 
This was chiefly due to the fact that the leaders of the elite sections of the nationalist 
movement had interests in maintaining the status quo. This implies a substantial shift 
in the focus of analysis for the politics of rural movements. Instead of the capacity to 
form social movements and articulate an ideology, the focus is instead on hegemonic 
power. When given due attention, the historical record shows peasants are capable of 
organising themselves. The issue concerns the unequal capacities of different groups 
to represent themselves in a period of intense mobilisation. The social networks and 
resources of groups will affect their capacity to represent their struggle as having 
historical significance, to implement change in a post-mobilisation or post-




Thus, one should not under-estimate the capacity of agrarian classes to formulate 
their own political perspectives and assert themselves via social movements. It 
should still be noted, however, that better resourced groups may be able to devote 
more time to the purpose of mobilising. For example, they may be able to hire full-
time professional staff to organise movement activities and have better access to 
media. As such, when such groups work alongside peasant organisations in rural 
settings or on agrarian issues, there is always the risk that the former may displace 
the latter’s position in civil society. As the Subaltern Studies Group identified, better-
resourced groups from cities, who have greater proximity and connections to national 
centres of power, may play a hegemonic role in articulating the significance of 
agrarian struggles, and thus influencing outcomes.  
 
3.3. Power in India’s Civil Society 
The question of power in civil society is particularly relevant to research in 
developing countries, where poverty and stark inequalities greatly influence groups’ 
capacities to organise themselves, receive adequate representation and to effect 
change. In India, the issue is particularly complex, as inequalities are 
multidimensional and have complex historical trajectories. This section explores the 
unique power relations within Indian civil society and assesses the impact this has on 
the operation of hegemony.  
The work of Chatterjee engages with the state-civil society debate in a way that aims 
to reflect the realities of the postcolonial world, South Asia in particular. Chatterjee 
(2004) uses the terms ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ in a manner that differs 
from Gramsci’s usage (in fact, it almost inverts it), though there are definite 
continuities in the implications. The terms are used to describe two separate domains 
in which contemporary politics are enacted in ‘most of the world’ (i.e. outside of 
advanced capitalist, liberal-democratic societies). Following Marx, Chatterjee 
equates ‘civil society’ with bourgeois society: it is the domain in which people may 
engage with the institutions of the bourgeois state as citizens. Activities in ‘civil 




media outlets or direct appeals and discussions with politicians and bureaucrats. In 
‘most of the world’, the bulk of the population are not able to engage as ‘citizens’; 
they do not have access to the bureaucratic arenas into which all persons enter as 
equals and have equal rights and capacity to affect the political process. Civil society 
is a domain for the privileged and educated minority, who have cultivated the virtues 
necessary to be ‘worthy’ of participation in the formal democratic process. The rest 
of the population do not have this direct recourse to participation in the state. 
Chatterjee argues, however, that this does not mean that these groups have no 
relation to the state. Rather, their relationship with the state is qualitatively different. 
The state relates to these groups as ‘populations’ – that is, distinct groups who are 
subjected to the tools of governance, but who are not granted the formal political 
agency of citizens. Chatterjee uses the term ‘political society’ to describe this 
domain. It is ‘political’, in the sense that the claims that are made by those within this 
domain constitute genuine political challenges to power – they cannot be subsumed 
within officially established bureaucratic channels.  
Chatterjee’s theoretical framework provides useful tools for the analysis of civil 
society organisations. As with the ‘resource mobilisation’ school, it highlights the 
fact that civil society is not an egalitarian space, as numerous factors limit people’s 
capacity to raise their voice. Yet it gives this insight a Third World relevance, by 
drawing attention to the great disparity between those who are able to have their 
voice channelled through established institutions and those who have no such 
recourse. Caste, community, gender, education and one’s capacity to speak the 
hegemonic language are particularly limiting factors. Rather than leading to complete 
despair for those ‘left behind’, however, Chatterjee’s approach allows a separation of 
different types of power. Those who have access to civil society have a direct kind of 
power. They have the capacity to participate in the deliberative process of policy 
formation. Those who are situated in political society have a more indirect form of 
power. Specific groups may be able to lever changes that are in their interests, by 
putting pressure the state. The state may be concerned about what happens in 




So as to avoid confusion, I do not reproduce Chatterjee’s reworking of the civil 
society/ political society dipole. I continue to use civil society in the Gramscian 
sense, to encompass a broad field of organised social activity, whose significance is 
derived in terms of its creation of consent or dissent with respect to hegemonic 
discourses. Nonetheless, I acknowledge Chatterjee’s substantive observations, and 
consider the ways various factors structure people’s access to institutions in civil 
society and therefore the way in which they can exercise power. Further, I accept 
that, rather than being purely egalitarian and democratic, civil society is frequently a 
space in which traditional power imbalances are reproduced. 
 
3.3.1. A Brief History of Indian Civil Society and Social Movements 
The history of Indian civil society provides insight into these power imbalances and 
the unequal capacities of different groups to initiate and sustain mobilisations. The 
historical developments outlined below are significant to the present study, in that 
they continue to influence the content, form and strategic action of CSOs operating 
in India today.  
It has been argued that India did not develop a ‘modern’ form of civil society until 
the early twentieth century (Watt, 2005). This is not to suggest that it did not have a 
public life, or political activity, but rather it did not have the kind of relatively 
autonomous, organised ‘associational activity’ that could indirectly influence and 
shape the activities of the state in the manner suggested by Gramsci. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, an autonomous civil society emerged in the 
form of voluntary ‘constructive’ organisations on the one hand and the independence 
movement on the other. Watt (2005) demonstrates that, at the turn of the twentieth 
century, a number of predominantly middle class Indians, disgruntled with the 
broken promises of the colonial state, began to form voluntary associations to take up 
constructive work directly. Although they were influenced by the development of 
similar charitable associations internationally (which new communications 
technologies had brought to their attention), Watt (2005) insists that these initiatives 




Traditional Hindu concepts such as dana (charity), seva (devotion, or service) and 
brahmacharya (education and moral training of male youth) were adapted to meet 
the perceived needs of the times, particularly the development of economic self-
sufficiency. To this end, the relatively unstructured religious acts of charity, were 
organised and given focus. Rather than simply giving as a gesture of beneficence, the 
focus within these organisations was developing people’s capacity for self-reliance. 
Watt (2005) argues that within the first two decades of the twentieth century, these 
initiatives had developed as a dense, overlapping grid of associational activities, 
which provided a space for education, personal development, nation building and the 
formation of new political perspectives. As the Independence movement gained 
momentum, such associations were drawn on as a vast political resource and were 
called upon to assist in agitations.  
The Independence movement was by far the most visible and well-organised 
movement of the time. Though highly diverse in its participants, the struggle was 
organised by the Indian National Congress, which had originally been established at 
the instigation of the British in 1885. The primary intention of establishing the 
Congress was to forge better relation between the British administration and their 
more educated Indian subjects. Yet the Congress quickly became more ambitious: 
instead of being a mere tool for British governance, it set itself the goal of swaraj, or 
self-rule for India, and opposed the colonial regime outright. As Omedt (1993) notes, 
the Congress largely consisted of the Indian elite: landlords, feudal bureaucrats and 
wealthy members of the petit-bourgeoisie. They were able to draw on their power 
and resources to mobilise key sections of the population to oppose the British Raj 
and fight for self-rule. These elites not only played a key role in organising struggle, 
but also in articulating the ideologies that would inform the post-colonial state.  
Yet the movements organised by the Congress were not the only movements active 
at the time, nor were all social movements focused on Independence. Ranajit Guha 
(1982) makes an important distinction between the organised, elite movements in the 
pre-Independence context and the less organised, subaltern movements. Even when 
the latter were involved in mobilising for Independence, they were not in a position 




was happy to support the huge peasant movement in Awadh, for example, but only to 
the extent that it undermined British rule. They were not willing to allow them any 
formal representation within the Congress itself, nor would Congress adopt their 
comparatively radical ‘land to the tiller’ ideology (Pandey, 1982).  Omvedt (1993) 
stresses the overt exclusions within the Congress which led to such situations. The 
majority of members of the Congress were averse to the idea of land reform and 
believed in the right of upper-castes to rule India, though they may have made 
concessions to lower castes during the Independence struggle for strategic purposes. 
Power within civil society thus had a substantial impact on the people and ideologies 
that gained representation and were able to exert influence after Independence.  
The period following Independence saw a continuation of the pre-Independence 
patterns for social movements, though this occurred within a new institutional 
context. Due to its role in the Independence struggle, the Congress had been given a 
strong boost in legitimacy. Nehru’s project of national development and 
industrialisation for poverty alleviation was invested with considerable trust by the 
public, including by a large number of social movements. As social movements 
largely accepted and reproduced this Nehruvian frame, Ray and Katzenstein (2005) 
refer to this period in social movement history as the ‘Nehruvian Period’. The most 
prominent social movements at the time were the ‘mass organisations’, which were 
directly linked with the Congress Party or the other leftist parties with which it was 
allied, such as the Communist Party of India (CPI) (Mohanty, 1998). Mobilisation at 
the ground level was designed to secure electoral support for these parties, while in 
return, the movements assumed some direct influence over policy. The mass 
organisations thus represented attempts to reform the system from within, rather than 
exerting pressure from without, and did not challenge the right to rule of the elites 
within the dominant parties. The labour movement was particularly subordinated to 
the interests of political parties, and has remained in this position up until the present 
(Chibber, 2005).  
The CPI came to occupy a leadership position in the expression of dissent and the 
struggle for better conditions for the working class. Yet as Omvedt (1993) notes, 




this dissent. On the one hand, they embraced a narrow view of historical progress, 
which saw the development of a sizable working class within capitalism as a 
precondition for a more just, socialist society. As such, they allied themselves with 
the Congress Party, in the project of industrialisation, subordinating dissent to 
Congress hegemony. Further, they believed in working class vanguardism, and 
although they formed kisan sabhas (farmers’ unions) in order to mobilise the 
peasantry, these were kept under the direct influence of the party, so as to 
subordinate them to working class leadership. This was the extent of the worker-
peasant alliance in India. Other struggles, such as the assertions of dalits, were seen 
as a distraction to the main political project of industrialising and bringing industry 
under workers’ control through nationalisation.  
The contemporary civil society configuration in India emerged in the 1970s as the 
hegemony of the Congress and Communist parties began to break down. Following 
the death of Nehru in 1964, the legitimacy of the Congress party began to erode, as it 
became increasingly apparent that it had not delivered on its core promises of 
poverty reduction. At the same time, the CPI began to break off into splinter parties, 
partly over the issue of its representation of oppressed rural classes (Omvedt, 1993). 
When Indira Gandhi took over the leadership of the Congress Party, she took a 
dictatorial approach to poverty alleviation and relied less on mass organisations for 
support. Ray and Katzenstein (2005) suggest that this marked an important shift: no 
longer did Congress dominate the field of civil society, at least as far as social 
movements were concerned. This created a space in which subaltern groups not 
directly affiliated with the industrial working class could finally raise their voice, 
having struggled to be heard since before Independence. The conditions of the 
emergence of these groups as more influential political actors were thus in the 
breakdown of the hegemonic powers that had dominated civil society until that point: 
the Congress and Communist parties.
21
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In the mid-1970s, public dissatisfaction with Congress became more pronounced. 
Not only had some of the breakaway segments of the CPI started to organise 
peasants to initiate armed revolt in parts of Eastern India, but the social reformer 
Jayaprakash Narayan (more commonly known as JP) was mobilising students and 
the rural poor into a nation-wide, organised social movement opposed to the 
dictatorial style of Indira Gandhi. JP emphasised the importance of lokniti, or ‘people 
power’ as opposed to rajniti, or ‘political power’. He believed that only by 
empowering the people at the grassroots would it ever be possible to eradicate 
poverty and bring about a true revolution in the Indian social structure – such 
changes could not be achieved through representative democracy alone (Samaddar, 
2008). Partially in response to these mobilisations, in 1975 Indira Gandhi declared a 
State of Emergency in which civil liberties and the independent press were 
suspended and Congress effectively ruled by decree. Yet, during this time, 
opposition movements also continued to build. The renewed demands for democracy 
and civil liberties provided a new orientation for social movements, which broke free 
of the ‘mass organisation’ framework of the past (Chandhoke, 2009; Sheth & Sethi, 
1991). 
Following the lift of emergency rule in 1977, there was a decisive shift in the 
orientation of social movements in India. Increasingly the focus was on 
empowerment at the grassroots, rather than mobilising support for political parties 
(Deshpande, 2004, Sethi, 1998). Government support for voluntary organisations, 
working directly with marginalised communities, increased substantially under the 
leadership of the Janata Dal, which briefly replaced Congress  in the central 
government after democracy was reinstated (Kamat, 2002: 9-13).
22
 There were two 
lasting implications of these developments for the subsequent orientation of social 
movements in India. First, the disintegration of the Congress Party leadership meant 
an end to the hegemony of mass organisations in civil society. Indeed, the discourses 
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beginning a period of growth in their numbers which accelerated in the 1990s, as greater 
sources of international funds became available (Kudwa, 2005). This is discussed in more detail 




that have proliferated in Indian civil society since the 1970s have meant that social 
movements that are directly linked with political parties are generally regarded with 
a degree of suspicion. In the place of these organisations, space has opened up for a 
more diverse set of voices and perspectives (Mohanty, 1998). Secondly, movements 
have become more decentralised. Rather than being vertically integrated with parties 
operating at the state and national level, contemporary social movements tend to be 
more focused on local and ‘grassroots’ empowerment, following from JP’s lokniti 
perspective. 
While these developments have provided an opportunity for subaltern groups to form 
social movements, it would be hasty to celebrate them as signs of a more egalitarian 
civil society. First, it must be acknowledged that what they gain in diversity, these 
new forms of activism lack in influence. They are, as Despande (2004: 374) notes, 
‘localised, weak and fragmented’, often lacking in focus and national level 
coordination. More to the point, the decline in Congress and CPI hegemony has not 
meant an end to elitism in Indian civil society. Indeed, the introduction of neoliberal 
policies, particularly over the past two decades, has introduced new inequalities into 
India’s civil society. In some ways, civil society has become more inaccessible for 
the poor and marginalised, and, as is discussed in subsequent sections, recent 
research identifies two groups that have come to dominate public debates: middle 
class activists and non-government organisations (NGOs).  
 
3.3.2. The Role of the Middle Classes 
Research on the participation of the ‘middle classes’ in Indian civil society aptly 
reflects Chatterjee’s (2004) argument regarding the elite structure of civil society in 
‘most of the world’. A number of authors have argued that the economically, socially 
and politically ascendant sections of the Indian middle classes have, in recent 
decades, constructed an exclusive version of citizenship and activism that displaces 
the voices of other, more marginalised groups (Harriss, 2007; Fernandes, 2006; 
Anjaria, 2009). The middle class is a variegated group, in India as much as anywhere 




professional sections of the working class, public sector workers and sections of the 
petit bourgeoisie. The middle class exercise a certain degree of privilege, both 
socially and in terms of their access to higher paying jobs and this privilege is 
maintained largely through their control of ‘cultural capital’: that is, their access to 
educational resources and symbols of social status (Fernandes and Heller, 2008; 
Deshpande, 2003). Fernandes and Heller (2008: 148) argue that because of their 
dependency on cultural capital, the ‘class interest’ of the middle classes lies in 
securing access to cultural capital such as ‘organisational authority and possession of 
scarce occupational skills’, and denying other groups such access. The middle classes 
are thus of great theoretical interest to any research on civil society for at least two 
reasons. First, they have control over the kinds of cultural resources that are essential 
to any effective mobilisation. Secondly, if we accept that the middle classes share an 
interest in excluding other groups from access to social, cultural and political 
resources, the participation of the middle class in civil society may have a direct 
bearing on the capacity of other groups to do so. 
As Deshpande (2003: 129) outlines, the middle classes in India have historically had 
a ‘disproportionate influence on ideological matters’. Under British rule, the middle 
classes were empowered, both as functionaries of the British Empire and as the 
leading figures of the Independence movement. As was highlighted in the previous 
section, through their role in the Congress, the middle classes played a major role 
organising the Independence movement and articulating its demands (Omvedt, 1993; 
Guha, 1982). Following Independence, the middle classes continued to play a 
directive role, but now within the post-colonial state. Consensus had developed 
around the need for a state-led development trajectory. This provided a space in 
which the middle classes could consolidate their role as the administrators and 
technocrats directing the development course of the nation. Deshpande (2003: 139) 
suggests that in this position, the middle classes played the historical role of 
‘articulating hegemony’ – that is, they established consent for state-led capitalist 





The shift from a developmental to a neoliberal paradigm has entailed a dismantling 
of the developmental state on which the middle classes once depended for both 
employment and power. Indeed, this shift has entailed a ‘diversification’ of the 
middle classes (Deshpande, 2003). While some have retained positions in the 
bureaucracy, others have moved to high-paying professional jobs in the private 
sector. Others still have taken up work in NGOs. Yet despite this diversification and 
shift from the state sector, the middle classes continue to perform hegemonic 
functions, albeit in more complex, subtle and indirect ways. In neoliberal ideology, 
the middle classes have been painted as both the chief agents and beneficiaries of the 
liberalisation process (Ganguly-Scrase & Scrase, 2009). Whether or not these 
ideological claims are true, they have important consequences for the construction of 
identity for the middle class, which in turn has hegemonic implications. Fernandes 
(2006) claims that the contemporary middle class, delinked from the developmental 
state, is constituted through its aspiration to lay claim to the benefits of liberalisation. 
For Fernandes, crucial to this process is the construction of boundaries delimiting the 
‘new’ middle class, so that these benefits can be secured. The construction of this 
boundary is done largely through activism in civil society.  Civil society has become 
the key arena through which the middle class reproduces its privilege. This pattern is 
reflected in the growing body of literature on ‘middle class activism’ based in India’s 
metropolitan centres.  
In the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of civil society organisations 
in India’s cosmopolitan cities focused on issues of beautification, urban design, 
access to public space and public hygiene (Fernandes, 2006; Harriss, 2007). As 
several authors have noted, these initiatives are intimately tied to questions of 
aesthetics. They attempt to impose a vision of urban space that reflects the aesthetic 
sensibilities of the middle classes and their understanding of themselves as 
cosmopolitan, globalised citizens (Rajagopal, 2001; Fernandes, 2006; Taguchi, 
2012). This process is not entirely benign, as the imposition of these aesthetic 
standards on urban space frequently entails an encroachment on the lives and 
livelihoods of less privileged groups. For example, a major focus of civil society 
groups’ ‘beautification’ initiatives in Mumbai has been the removal of hawkers and 




Rajagopal, 2001). Likewise, in Delhi, middle class environmental activists’ attempts 
to reduce air pollution in the city have almost exclusively targeted small factories and 
auto-rickshaw drivers, which are major sources of income for the informal working 
class, while middle class sources of air pollution, particularly vehicular pollution, are 
left relatively unchallenged (Baviskar, Sinha & Phillip, 2006; Baviskar, 2011). 
Further, Taguchi (2011) argues that the methods used by middle class activists in 
these kinds of campaigns reflect an elitist attitude. In these urban cleansing projects, 
lower classes are understood as ‘targets’ to be ‘educated’ on clean, hygienic and 
sustainable practices, rather than as fellow citizens with whom they can work 
together to improve local conditions. 
While the major focus of the literature on ‘middle class activism’ in India has been 
urban, there is comparatively little work examining the role of the middle class in 
civil society in non-metropolitan settings. Available evidence suggests that middle 
class activists and professionals have played a major role in organising and leading 
rural struggles. These struggles typically do not affect the middle classes directly, 
being of more direct concern to rural communities. This raises issues regarding 
representation and how adequately middle class activists are able to stand in and 
speak for different social groups. Baviskar (2004), in her study of the movement 
against the Narmada Dam, found that although the movement mobilised a broad 
stratum of farmers, adivasis and environmentalists, the leadership of the movement 
was distinctly middle class. Yet, more crucially, the organisational structure of the 
movement was such that the communities who were in the submergence zone did not 
have any significant input into the movement’s decision-making process. This 
exclusion had a tangible impact on the direction of the movement. The 
environmental focus of the middle class activists translated into a continuing focus 
on outright opposition to the dam. Baviskar (2004) argues that those who would 
eventually be displaced by the dam could have benefited more from a focus on 
resettlement.
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 Shah (2010), in her study of the Jharkhand movement comes to 
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similar conclusions. She argues that while the movement claimed to be about 
protecting the interests of poor adivasis, in practice, the movement was comprised of 
an elite, middle-class stratum of activists, with extensive connections to transnational 
activist groups. These activists had fundamentally different interests to their fellow 
adivasis in villages, and relied on simplistic, romanticised representations of tribal 
culture, which, Shah argues, were ultimately detrimental to the immediate material 
needs of the local adivasi population.  
Of more direct relevance to the present study, Herring (2008) has argued that the 
campaign against bt-cotton in India reflected a heavy middle class bias and was out 
of touch with the experiences of farmers. While urban-based activists like Vandana 
Shiva were talking of the ‘failure of bt-cotton’ for Indian farmers, farmers 
themselves were not only continuing to buy it in huge quantities, but had developed 
(illegal) cottage industries in order to reproduce the genetically modified crop. In this 
case, Herring suggests that the class interests of the activists were fundamentally at 
odds with the interests of the farmers whom they claimed to represent. While the 
activists were dependent upon maintaining connections to global environmental 
activist networks that are overwhelmingly opposed to genetic modification, farmers 
were generally in favour of the new crop, as a potential boost to their profitability.  
To express these findings in Oberscall’s (1973) idiom, the Indian middle classes in 
the current environment have a relative advantage in mobilising resources to sustain 
certain forms of action in civil society. Having greater security in their access to 
material resources, it is easier for the middle classes to participate in social 
movements over an extended period of time, than it is for more subaltern groups. 
Perhaps more crucially, the middle classes have access to important non-material 
resources, such as education, social status and connections – to media, courts, 
politicians and so on. These resources prove most valuable in sustaining an effective 
campaign and building a legitimate reputation for it. Furthermore, to draw on Tarrow 
(1998), the issues with which middle class activists are preoccupied are more likely 
                                                                                                                                          
unheard. The mainstream media, itself dominated by middle class professionals, represented 




to resonate with the neoliberal ‘frames’ of the corporate media than the more radical 
and redistributive claims made by lower class movements. Neoliberal discourse also 
provides a favourable ‘political opportunity structure’ for the middle classes. The 
World Bank, for example, has promoted ‘citizen participation’ in issues of 
‘governance’ – a form of public action that presupposes access to education and 
social capital, which lower classes lack. At the same time, it has maligned more 
politicised and union-based activities, which are in many cases the only means by 
which lower classes find adequate representation (Harriss, 2007, 2008). All of this 
suggests that neoliberalism has created a favourable environment for the mobilisation 
of resources by middle class activists – and that this has had problematic 
consequences for subordinate classes.  
 
3.3.3. The Prominence of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) 
As Desmarais (2007) notes, CSOs in developing countries do not operate in a 
vacuum: they share and compete for space in civil society with a variety of other 
groups and organisations. Particularly prominent amongst these groups are the so-
called Non-Government Organisations, or NGOs.  Often these groups are juxtaposed 
to social movements as two distinct modes of action in civil society. NGOs have 
been problematised for their tendency to use their command over funds and 
connections to hegemonic institutions to dominate public debate. Their presence in 
civil society thus shapes the power structure which activists in India must negotiate. 
There is little consensus regarding a suitable definition for NGOs. After reviewing a 
number of definitions adopted by diverse scholars, Vakil (1997) argues that there are 
three structural features which could, without significant controversy, constitute a 
minimal definition of NGOs.  First, NGOs are self-governing and private 
organisations – that is, they manage their affairs autonomously, free of state control. 
Secondly, although in some cases NGOs may produce and distribute profits, this is 
not their primary aim – they may therefore be classified as ‘not-for-profit’ 
organisations. Finally, NGOs are typically involved in development work. While this 




on research aims, scholars tend to emphasise different defining features. Desmarais 
(2007), for instance, considers the position of NGOs in civil society, and emphasises 
the fact that, in contrast to other civil society organisations such as social 
movements, NGOs receive funds from major national and international institutions in 
order to implement development projects. Based on the fieldwork experience that 
informs this thesis, this is commonly taken as a (if not the) defining feature of NGOs 
by activists working in India. The receipt of funds and a project orientation is 
therefore taken as a key feature of NGOs for the purposes of this thesis. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that internationally, NGOs frequently play a leading 
role in bringing new issues into public awareness and pressuring governments to 
respond to them. This is possible because, like McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) 
‘conscience constituents’, access to funding provides NGOs with the time and 
resources necessary to mobilise. They are less bound by the existing ‘political 
opportunity structure’ and have the necessary ‘discretionary resources’ to organise 
around new issues. Yet the surplus resources these organisations command have led 
other researchers to argue that their presence may also have negative, distorting 
effects on civil society. Desmarais (2007: 21-26) notes that NGO projects must align 
with donor priorities, which may not reflect the immediate needs of communities, let 
alone their political perspectives. Ultimately, the organisations that are able to market 
themselves most effectively to donor organisations receive the most global attention, 
rather than those representing the most worthy causes (Bob 2002). As these groups 
gain public prominence, they come to determine what are perceived as the key social 
and political issues of the times, which may, in turn, affect the activities of social 
movements (Bartley, 2007). It is thought that the growing NGO presence in civil 
society may lead to a softening of political demands over time, and a tendency 
towards deploying discourses that are less confrontational (Petras, 1999).  
The prominence of NGOs in civil society has led to several critiques of their 
structure and methods of operation. Scrambling for funds in a highly competitive 
international environment encourages NGOs to structure themselves around 
responding to funding opportunities, rather than delivering effective outcomes 




material concerns for their own preservation, rather than ideals and values (Sell & 
Prakash 2004). Because of this, they are often highly professionalistic, and as such, 
are seen to provide a platform for educated, middle-class, professional staff, whose 
voices displace those of more marginalised and disempowered groups (Sethi 1998; 
Kamat 2002). Furthermore, the processes by which NGOs receive and report on 
funding makes them accountable primarily to their donors and the state—they are not 
held accountable by their target group or wider society, who have no democratic 
input into the kind of development work that they do (see Gray, Bebbington, & 
Collison, 2006). For social movements, by contrast, the support of a mass base is far 
more critical; if leaders become alienated from members, the movement will quickly 
evaporate. This implies that the proliferation of NGOs can in practice lead to the 
drowning out of grassroots voices, thereby restraining democratic diversity. 
Much of the literature on NGOs has emphasised how, because of these factors, 
NGOs serve state interests and reinforce the status quo. Petras (1999) argues that 
NGOs have become key agents in the promotion of neoliberalism. He notes that 
historically, transnational financial institutions have manipulated NGOs, such that 
they assist in creating an appropriate social environment for multinational 
corporations and develop grassroots consent for the neoliberal regime. Under the 
rhetoric of ‘adaptation’ and ‘creating opportunities,’ they have encouraged NGOs to 
take up projects that facilitate market integration and commodification of commons 
(Ghosh, 2009). Certainly, the World Bank has provided huge financial support for 
NGOs, and the phenomenal growth in the number of NGOs in developing countries 
can be directly attributed to the financial resources that institutions like the World 
Bank have made available (Mercer, 2002). Because the World Bank’s first attempts 
to impose neoliberal reforms on the Third World in the 1970s received substantial 
public criticism, subsequently, in the 1980s, it attempted to give structural 
adjustment a ‘human face’ by funding research on the local and social impacts of 
globalisation (Patel, 2006). This created a terrain in which NGOs could make claims 
to represent certain constituents in the Third World. Yet as Patel (2006: 79) argues, 
institutions like the World Bank will only accept a narrow, depoliticised 
representation of local communities, which, in terms of agrarian politics, means 




Donor influence has been shown to have an effect on the kinds of discourses 
propagated by NGOs. The general tendency has been towards the depoliticisation of 
the discourses prominent in civil society. In the agrarian sphere, donors have shied 
away from funding organisations that prioritise land reform, instead encouraging the 
growth of organisations focused on identity based issues and integrated community 
development (Gerber & Veutheys, 2010; Bretón, 2008). Land reform is a direct 
threat to the sanctity of private property – one of the hegemonic principles of 
neoliberalism
24
 – thus neoliberal donor agencies have no interest in funding groups 
promoting such reform, dismissing them as archaic. There has been a systematic 
attempt to avoid organisations that recognise class antagonism. Indeed, Mohan 
(2002) argues that the focus on ‘community’ is used to promote the idea of a 
homogenous space, in which all members ‘develop’ together, obscuring class (and 
other forms of) conflict, and the unequal benefits of development. 
A key way in which NGOs serve a neoliberal agenda is by providing social services 
in a manner that complements the rolling back of state-led welfare and development 
programmes. As Mercer (2002) identifies, there is a definite irony in the way the 
World Bank and IMF rationalise their support for NGOs as being crucial to the 
strengthening of democracy, while in practice, the organisations they support are 
frequently involved in the provision of welfare services. As such, they are not 
directly involved in the development of democratic voices at all. As White (1999) 
notes, with reference to the development of such welfare NGOs in Bangladesh, a key 
effect of this development has been a reinforcement of the idea that the state is not an 
effective provider of welfare, justifying its decreasing role, particularly in economic 
matters. In turn, as services are being provided through these new sources the state is 
able to renege on its responsibilities to provide for its citizens (Randeria, 2003). 
Legislation in India provides considerable scope for the state to intervene in NGOs’ 
activities if they are deemed politically controversial. During the Emergency period, 
                                                 
24 Howson (2006), drawing on Gramsci (1971) and others, presents his theory of hegemonic 
principles as the key assumptions that give structure and meaning to a particular hegemony, 
which become, to a certain extent, non-negotiable. The state cannot build consensus when its 




Indira Gandhi was particularly concerned about the influence of civil society 
organisations, particularly those receiving financial contributions from abroad, 
which, she argued, had subversive intentions (Kudwa, 2005). In response to this 
concern, the Foreign Contributions (Regulation) Act (FCRA) was implemented in 
1976, placing strict conditions on the receipt of foreign funds. Among the restrictions 
placed on organisations seeking foreign funds is the condition that organisations 
cannot be political in nature. As Kamat (2002: 57) outlines, states have considerable 
scope in defining what is regarded as ‘political’, and often do so in an arbitrary 
manner to suit their interests. Development work, for example, has been interpreted 
as economic and (therefore) non-political, despite the fact that it is often contentious 
and inevitably carries with it a series of political assumptions. As Jalali (2008) 
outlines, successive governments have used the FCRA to exert a subtle influence 
over civil society and silence opponents.
25
  She highlights that while the penetration 
of internationally-funded NGOs into Indian civil society is often taken as a sign of 
the diminishing influence of the nation state over public life, these cases show that 
the state can still exert a powerful influence in controlling which groups ultimately 
receive access to funds. 
Importantly, these general tendencies do not represent the experience of every NGO; 
rather they are an aggregate effect of the policies of major donors. Not all donors are, 
like the World Bank, at the helm of the neoliberal hegemonic project. While 
governments and transnational institutions are important sources of funding, so too 
are charities, churches, unions and other groups that are, in many instances, on the 
left of politics. Further, NGOs respond to more than donor pressures in forging their 
perspectives. As Ghosh (2009) argues, the politics of NGOs are determined not only 
through relations with donors, but also in their relations with social movements. 
NGO workers are often recruited from within social movements, and may retain 
ongoing connections with social movement activists, who will continue to inform 
their ethical perspectives. As such, if NGO workers are in disagreement with the 
                                                 
25 For example, in early 2012, the UPA government cancelled foreign contributions to a number 
of NGOs, in response to their members’ involvement in anti-nuclear protests, citing suspected 




politics of their donor, their relationship may be one of constant negotiation and 
bargaining (Ghosh, 2009). It must be recognised that while Petras’ (1999) 
characterisation of NGO workers as upwardly mobile, middle class, avaricious and 
perhaps even corrupt will undoubtedly apply to some, it cannot possibly incorporate 
the diverse and complex reasons that people choose to become involved in NGOs. It 
is thus highly important to follow the lead of authors like Jakimow (2010), in 
examining the perspectives of NGO workers themselves and developing an 
understanding of the actual processes through which projects are negotiated. 
Importantly, these debates surrounding the impact of NGOs and their position vis-à-
vis social movements are not merely of academic concern. Civil society actors 
themselves have frequently taken a critical stance towards NGOs, and this is 
particularly the case in India, where a strong tradition of Marxism and Gandhism in 
civil society organisations has made activists sceptical of the intentions of 
international donors (Luthra, 2003). This in turn affects the modes in which activists 
represent themselves and the types of organisations in which they are involved. 
Based on interviews with participants in peasant movements, Patel (2006: 79) 
observes that:  
Social movements and their members are keen to position themselves as occupants 
of spaces of unassailable political purity, with NGOs relegated to a far more 
contaminated realm. Criteria, such as membership, funding and location of offices, 
are sometimes used to drive a schematic wedge between social movements and 
NGOs. 
La Via Campesina has been particularly direct in asserting that the strong presence of 
NGOs in international civil society has been, at best, a mixed blessing. At the 1996 
World Food Summit in Rome, LVC representatives challenged the right of NGOs to 
speak on peasants' behalf and sought an acknowledgement of the unequal power 
relations between NGOs and people's movements (Desmarais, 2002: 104). LVC has 
been concerned by the often fraught relations between social movements and NGOs 
and has negotiated a difficult path trying to forge relations with NGOs that would be 
beneficial to its own members. It has prioritised forging relations with those NGOs 
that will provide professional support to an agenda forged by people’s movements 




they showed how the identity of a major social movement was being shaped not only 
through its relations with its opponents, but also with other actors in civil society. 
While some authors have designated the polar opposition of NGOs and social 
movements as ‘unhelpful’ (Pithouse, 2004:10), the case of LVC shows that when 
NGOs’ capacity to represent communities is seen as problematic, social movement 
activists may reassert their greater connection to ‘the grassroots’ as part of their 
identity as ‘social movements’. This may be a crucial way through which movements 
gain moral leverage in civil society: despite having less access to resources than their 
NGO counterparts, social movements may benefit by constructing a sense of their 
own authenticity and grassroots connections.   
 
3.4. Conclusion 
To develop alternatives to the hegemonic through civil society is to negotiate a 
highly uneven terrain. This chapter has considered some of the chief factors 
constraining people’s capacity to mobilise such alternatives in contemporary rural 
India. While social movements are widely recognised as vehicles for the expression 
of popular will, as the resource mobilisation school has shown, some groups are 
better equipped and better positioned to form and maintain a social movement than 
others. In rural settings, it was traditionally assumed that because of their social and 
economic position, peasants lacked the resources and networks required to form a 
coherent ideology and sustain a social movement – at best, they could lend their 
support to revolutions led by urban radicals. While this assumption has been largely 
dismissed by contemporary scholars, who cite the sophisticated peasant movements 
that can be seen operating on the global stage today, it remains the case that rural 
communities have certain disadvantages when attempting to develop alternatives in 
the context of crisis. In particular, their distance from national centres of power 
means that they are less equipped to implement their agenda at a central policy level.  
In India, as in many other countries of the Global South, these issues are further 
complicated. Multilayered inequalities structure people’s capacity not only to raise 




by middle class activists, who have the education and connections to media, courts 
and policy makers required to affect change. In many cases, these activists exert a 
class interest which is at odds with the interests of the poor. Furthermore, within this 
sphere of action, NGOs play an especially prominent role, propped up by local and 
international donors. Because these organisations are primarily responsive to funding 
sources, rather than conditions on the ground, it has been argued that they distort the 
sense of social priorities within civil society. A possible solution to these entrenched 
power imbalances may be gleaned from the literature on ‘grassroots movements’. By 
drawing people’s attention to the resources they already have and building solutions 
to the immediate problems faced by poor communities, it may be possible for this 
model to allow for sustained movements to form that directly engage with the most 
critical dimensions of contemporary crises. In addition to this, it may be possible for 
that by projecting a sense of their moral superiority over NGOs, movements may 






4. SUSTAINABILITY AND THE MOVEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE 
AGRICULTURE 
 
The previous chapter explored the various constraints activists are likely to encounter 
in civil society, particularly regarding access to power and resources. I showed that, 
in Indian civil society in particular, certain agents occupy privileged positions in civil 
society, particularly the urban middle classes. In this chapter, I outline the meaning 
of civil society initiatives for sustainable agriculture and consider the unique 
constraints they experience and their resource requirements.  
In Section 4.1., I begin by examining various definitions of sustainable agriculture, 
highlighting that a concise positive definition is difficult, as the grassroots meaning 
of ‘sustainability’ is contingent on a variety of local factors. I argue that sustainable 
agriculture becomes a meaningful objective to aspire towards when people are 
confronted with the unsustainable features of current practices. I go on to argue that 
the current crisis in rural India has revealed that existing agricultural systems are not 
sustainable. In the context of high indebtedness and rising input prices, the benefits 
of productive, low-input systems come into sharp relief. Making farmers aware of 
such alternatives and supporting them in the transition, however, requires some level 
of social organisation, which is subject to the kind of resource and power constraints 
discussed in the previous chapter. Thus in Section 4.1.3., I draw on theory and 
previous studies to consider the unique requirements and constraints on sustainable 
agriculture as a socially mediated project. 
Section 4.2. outlines the historical context in which sustainable agriculture has 
emerged as both theory and practice in the developing world generally, and in India 
specifically. This history reveals, in a more concrete way, the factors that have 
provided opportunities and constraints for the development of this project. By 
exploring some of the major developments in India and around the world, it 
highlights what is possible, from both grassroots initiatives and NGOs. This section 
is also valuable in establishing the context for subsequent chapters. It shows the kind 
of environment in which the case studies that inform this thesis operate. Section 4.3. 




in rural India. This serves to frame the key theoretical issues that inform analysis in 
the latter part of the thesis. In particular, I highlight two analytical concerns: first, the 
way in which sustainable agriculture activists negotiate their ambiguous position in 
civil society, and second, whether sustainable agriculture is operating as a project 
that is open to input from subaltern groups, or rather one that is inflexibly imposed 
by middle class activists.  
 
4.1. The Meaning of Sustainable Agriculture  
Sustainable agriculture consists of a complex combination of techniques, science, 
philosophy, politics and social movement, not all of which appear together in the 
same historical moment. While acknowledging this complexity, in this section I 
outline the ways in which the various components of sustainable agriculture come 
together and become meaningful in concrete, local settings.  
 
4.1.1. Towards a Sociological Definition of Sustainable Agriculture 
With such diverse approaches being adopted on the ground, a robust definition of 
sustainable agriculture is difficult. As outlined in Chapter 1, in this thesis, sustainable 
agriculture is taken as an umbrella term, encompassing as sub-categories more 
precise systems, such as organic farming, permaculture and agroecology. Yet, it is 
still important to outline the common features that make these diverse approaches 
‘sustainable’. This section addresses this through a general theory of how sustainable 
agriculture is constructed, while Section 4.1.2. goes on to examine how low-input 
agriculture has come to be recognised as sustainable in the context of the current 
agrarian crisis. 
Ludden (1999: 18) defines agriculture as ‘the social organisation of physical powers 
to produce organic material for human use’. Given that this includes food, the ability 
to sustain such systems of social organisation and the ecosystems on which they 
depend has obvious implications for human survival. Ikerd (1993, cited in Rigby & 




maintaining its productivity and usefulness to society in the long run’. Yet, as Rigby 
and Cáceres (2001) note, there is considerable debate over the kind of system 
required to achieve this. Conway (1985) has developed more precise tools for 
evaluating sustainability, by describing it as one of four ‘system qualities’ within 
agriculture, the others being productivity, stability and equitability. While 
sustainability relates closely to stability, which concerns an agricultural system’s 
capacity to produce consistent yields in spite of minor disturbances (such as normal 
climatic fluctuations), sustainability has a more long-term focus. It refers to the 
capacity of an agricultural system to remain productive despite major disturbances. 
Such disturbances may be major, infrequent perturbations, or smaller, more 
consistent sources of stress, which may be cumulative. In the context of the agrarian 
crisis outlined in Chapter 2, the capacity of agricultural systems to endure despite the 
stress of indebtedness, price fluctuations and ecological deterioration will have major 
implications for both poor people’s livelihoods and food production. 
Conway’s (1985) definition of agricultural sustainability is useful for its formal 
precision and the diverse scenarios to which it may be applied. It allows 
identification of the features of a farming system that enable it to be sustained in the 
long term. Yet, from a sociological point of view, it is important to recognise how 
these features are complicated by the contingencies of local contexts. If the analytical 
interest is in the ways in which communities and organisations create change, then 
the views of those who are in a position to make change, particularly farmers, are 
crucial (Gibbon & Jakobsson, 1999). It thus becomes important to understand the 
processes through which a given farming system is identified as ‘unsustainable’, and 
thus in need of change, by various groups of interest. As Tisdell (1999) notes, a 
system may be sustainable in an ecological sense, yet if it is not economically viable 
or seen as socially acceptable by the wider community, then it becomes difficult for a 
given practice or system to be sustained. This requires an approach that recognises 
sustainability not only as a technical criterion for the evaluation of systems, but also 
as a discursive construct which, under certain circumstances, enables critique of 




‘Sustainability’ will only be recognised as a valid criterion with which to assess the 
merit of an agricultural system within certain sociological contexts. As Jodha (1991) 
notes, it is difficult to define the positive features of a sustainable agricultural 
system: in concrete settings, sustainable agriculture will tend to be defined in a 
relative manner, such that the features of a sustainable form of agriculture will be 
recognised through contrast to the unsustainable features of existing systems. This 
also highlights the ambiguous relation between the politics of sustainability and the 
future. Definitions such as Conway’s (1985) are future oriented, relating to the 
capacity to endure hypothetical future disturbances. As such, they involve a great 
deal of uncertainty. A more relativist and constructivist approach recognises that 
although the concept of sustainability involves imagined futures, these futures are 
constructed in the present, in response to current distress or observable, degenerative 
trends. Jodha (1991) attempts to bring the concept into sharp relief through a focus 
on fragile resource zones – such as mountainous or coastal regions – where factors 
such as erosion and salinity make ‘unsustainability’ an everyday reality. More 
relevant to the present study, crises in agriculture and agrarian relations also bring 
the unsustainable features of existing agricultural systems into focus for rural 
communities. In the United States, the farm crisis of the 1980s, in which interest 
rates on rural credit increased and international markets collapsed, was a major 
catalyst for the development of sustainable agriculture, as farmers actively sought 
ways to cut costs through reducing chemical inputs (Buttel, 1993). Buttel (1993) 
argues that this had a lasting impact on the way sustainable agriculture was defined 
in the United States – specifically it led to an equation of ‘sustainable’ with ‘low 
input’ agriculture.  
To a certain extent, a ‘crisis of authority’, in which ‘the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born’ (Gramsci, 1971: 210) always involves the question of sustainability. 
The old hegemonic configuration cannot endure, and it is simply a question of what 
the new configuration of power will be. Yet ‘sustainability’ is only likely to be the 
central organising principle of a new hegemonic formation in cases in which the 
unsustainability of the existing approach is clearly manifest on multiple levels. It is a 
situation in which the horizon of the future appears disastrous, and only an approach 




accepted. To arrive at a situation in which: (a) this is the predominant interpretation 
of a crisis; and (b) there is consensus on the kind of remedy that would be 
appropriate or acceptable, is contingent on a good deal of persuasion and consent-
building in civil society. As was outlined in Chapter 3, whether or not this will occur 
and the manner in which it occurs hinges on the existing balance of power between 
different groups. This highlights that sustainable agriculture is a politicised and 
contested concept – with different groups attempting to define it in ways that reflect 
their interests (Buttel, 1993). As Conway and Barbier (1990) note, what is 
sustainable to one group may be deeply threatening to another, and developing a 
model that is suitable for an entire community will inevitably involve various ‘trade-
offs’.   
To summarise, at a technical level, sustainable agriculture refers to an agricultural 
system that will endure in the long term, which requires that it is capable of 
withstanding both major shocks and long term changes. Yet to implement change 
towards such a model, it is necessary that key decision makers identify a need for a 
sustainable approach, which generally requires direct or indirect experience of the 
unsustainable features of the existing model. At the local level, sustainable 
agriculture will thus tend to be negatively defined, through contrast to these 
unsustainable features. Agrarian crisis, particularly as it manifests as a ‘crisis of 
authority’, provides some of the preconditions under which the unsustainability of 
the existing approach may be recognised, and sustainability may appear as a 
‘solution’.  
 
4.1.2. Sustainable Alternatives in the Context of Agrarian Crisis 
Many of the key factors in India’s agrarian crisis concern issues of sustainability. 
When the economic trajectory is towards higher input costs and deflated agricultural 
commodity prices, the capacity for small holders to sustain themselves into the future 
becomes questionable. One path out of this crisis would be to allow a transition to 
larger land holdings, which would be more profitable, even if less productive on a 




live in the countryside and there are few prospects for growth in non-agricultural 
employment (Reddy & Mishra, 2009b), such an approach is unlikely to be socially or 
economically manageable – let alone capable of winning the political consent of 
those whose way of life would be rendered unviable. Another response would be to 
address the macroeconomic trajectory towards agrarian decline, through shifting 
back to pre-liberalisation patterns of subsidising inputs and providing remunerative 
minimum support prices. These issues have been taken up by some farmers’ 
movements, in what may be seen as a direct challenge to neoliberal hegemony in the 
countryside, which is seen to be the heart of the crisis (Omvedt, 2005). A more 
radical direct challenge to neoliberalism has come from the Maoist movement, which 
not only seeks to reinstate remunerative prices, but also to redistribute land, facilitate 
the development of farming cooperatives and provide women with equal land 
ownership rights (Gupta, 2006). While these movements attempt to lever a long-term 
policy solution to agrarian crisis, a more immediately accessible solution for resource 
poor farmers is to develop means of reducing the inputs required to generate similar 
levels of output. This also addresses the issue of the ecological unsustainability of 
Green Revolution agriculture, which has reached a crisis point in parts of the 
country. It is in these kinds of relatively localised contexts that low-input, low 
intensity agriculture may be recognised as a solution to a crisis of sustainability in 
rural India.  
The development of more ecologically integrated agricultural techniques has enabled 
improvements in yield without the need for expensive and potentially 
environmentally damaging chemical inputs. These techniques integrate naturally 
occurring processes, such as nitrogen fixation and nutrient cycling, into farming 
systems, make more efficient use of locally available resources and manage these 
resources more effectively (Altieri, 2002).  In a review of 208 projects in developing 
countries, Pretty, Morison and Hine (2003) found that such techniques, when 
appropriately implemented, improved yields by an average of 93 per cent. This 
resulted in improved food security, reduced dependency on other regions and 
reduced poverty. It is worth nothing that such increases in yield and the use of 
chemical inputs are not necessarily mutually exclusive. When combined with a 




benefit of allowing farmers to reduce the cost of farming without a dramatic decline 
in yield. Studies of farmers’ decisions to convert to ecological farming techniques 
suggest that, in addition to environmental and health concerns, farmers are often 
motivated by concern over the cost of chemical inputs, and are particularly drawn 
when there is the additional financial incentive of premium prices on chemical-free 
foods (Fairweather, 1999; Darnhofer et al, 2003).
26
 One may speculate that, with 
increasing price volatility and constrained access to cheap rural credit, farmers may 
perceive benefits in reducing their dependency on external inputs. Such relative 
benefits can only increase in the future, with the peak oil affecting input prices and 
projected shifts from subsidised chemical inputs to direct cash transfers to farmers 
(Kapur, 2011). It goes without saying, however, that an approach that merely 
substitutes a chemical input for a more expensive biological input cannot be effective 
in this regard. The logic of ‘input substitution’ is neither able to overcome farmers’ 
dependency on inputs nor can it build the kind of resilient agro-ecosystems to reverse 
the ecological damage of chemical agriculture (Rosset & Altieri, 1997).  
Another major issue that has been highlighted by the agrarian crisis is the lack of 
control that rural communities have over their lives and means of production. The 
radical insecurity resulting from heavy indebtedness, the pressure to integrate into 
global markets and overt state coercion has curtailed possibilities for rural self-
determination. In this context, more sustainable systems, particularly those involving 
low external inputs, have been recognised as means to nutritional security and food 
sovereignty. Farming systems that produce a diversity of crops have advantages over 
monocultures in terms of their capacity to meet the nutritional requirements of 
communities, their resilience to pest attacks and their relative stability in times of 
climatic change (Uphoff, 2002a; Altieri, 2004). Furthermore, by reducing market 
                                                 
26 Issues have been raised, however, regarding the growing number of farmers drawn to 
ecological farming by price incentives. Rigby and Cáceres (2001) express concern over farmers 
who are motivated to convert their farming systems purely on the basis of premium prices and 
do not have any interest in developing integrated and sustainable agro-ecosystems. 
Furthermore, Fairweather (1999) has found that a number of practicing organic farmers 
suggest they would reconsider their decision to convert to organic if there were any changes in 




dependency, low input systems provide farmers with greater scope to determine the 
kind of farming system they want to create. As such, these models have been adopted 
by La Via Campesina and other farmers’ movements as part of their project of ‘food 
sovereignty’ (Altieri & Toledo, 2011; Martínez-Torres & Rosset, 2010: 170). 
 
 
4.1.3. Social Organisation for Sustainable Agriculture 
It is not enough for a low external input system of agriculture to have potential 
material benefits. Organisational and material resources need to be in place to 
facilitate the transition to such a system. Sustainable agricultural systems, while less 
dependent on external inputs, require substantial knowledge, labour and good 
management practices (Uphoff, 2002b: 10). The initial development of these 
resources will typically require some level of organisational support. As was 
discussed in Chapter 3, this presupposes access to various material and social 
resources. Unlike the cases of rural insurgency investigated by Oberschall (1973, 
1978) and other members of the resource mobilisation school, sustainable agriculture 
does not require highly sophisticated forms of national and international 
collaboration. Sustainable agriculture projects tend to operate in a more decentralised 
manner, being most effective as relatively autonomous initiatives, closely attuned to 
local issues, which build sustainable models in response to local realities, rather 
imposing an already developed model (Altieri, 1984; Farrington & Lewis, 1993). 
Nonetheless, resources are needed. The chief requirements to propagate sustainable 
agriculture are knowledge regarding effective techniques, adequate means of 
distributing this knowledge and various forms of support to ensure decent levels of 
productivity are maintained and that farmers have access to markets.  
Within discourses of sustainable agriculture, knowledge is positioned as a complex 
resource, particularly because of the tendency to juxtapose local (or ‘traditional’) and 
scientific knowledge. These two types of knowledge are seen to have different 
though complementary roles. Although scholars have rightly critiqued the notion of 




dispersed fashion across multiple localities (Escobar, 1998; Brodt, 2003), the fact 
remains that people who have worked extensively within a particular locality will 
have a special understanding of its unique features. Knowledge of how to effectively 
farm within the constraints of a particular environment may be passed on from 
generation to generation, thus forming a ‘tradition’. For this reason, it has been 
acknowledged that in developing ecologically sensitive farming models, it is of 
immense practical value to engage with the knowledge of local ecosystems that 
farmers have accumulated through their experience and integrated into their farming 
practices (Altieri, 2004; Pretty 2002). Furthermore, integrating farmers’ knowledge 
into sustainable agriculture projects strengthens the chances of success, as it ensures 
that farmers participate and become involved in innovation and adapting techniques 
in response to changing conditions (Uphoff, 2002b; Pretty, 2002).  
Given the contemporary scenario, however, it is rarely assumed that local knowledge 
can deliver sustainable outcomes on its own. Most practitioners acknowledge the 
need to begin from the foundations of established local knowledge and practices, but 
to augment these with insights from contemporary ecological science (Altieri & 
Toledo, 2011; Uphoff, 2002a). Yet introducing scientific knowledge into sustainable 
agriculture projects may also generate new sources of tension and power dynamics. 
As Ekins (1992) notes, abstract scientific knowledge brings with it modernist 
hierarchies of knowledge, which may position it in antagonistic relation to the 
grassroots knowledge of local communities. Scientific knowledge presupposes an 
expert in possession of such knowledge. Introducing experts, who will generally be 
educated, urban professionals, introduces a potential insider-outsider tension. The 
outcome of such situations largely hinges on how the power imbalance between 
experts and farmers is negotiated. Pretty (2002) stresses the importance of an 
ongoing two-way process of ‘learning’ between farmers and scientists, rather than 
‘teaching’, which implies a hierarchy between those who possess knowledge and 
those who are ignorant. Furthermore, evidence suggests that in the most successful 
projects, ‘scientific knowledge’ does not remain the possession of the elite scientist, 
but is integrated into the collective knowledge of the community. Long term 
evaluations of NGO projects suggest that farmers are most likely to continue to use 




scientific methods of experimentation and basic theoretical scientific knowledge 
(Bunch & Lopez, 2005).
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While knowledge and skills are crucial resources that need to be mobilised to support 
sustainable agriculture initiatives, there are other forms of organisational support that 
are also highly important. Marketing is a particularly important issue for farmers 
converting to more ecologically integrated systems. Biodiverse farmers, in 
comparison to monoculture farmers, may find it difficult to find access to profitable 
markets for all of their produce, making it important to develop suitable marketing 
strategies (Navarrete, 2009; Pretty, Ruben & Thrupp, 2002: 253). Additionally, 
sustainable agriculture can benefit from support at the policy level. Pretty, Ruben and 
Thrupp (2002) suggest a range of policies that can support the development of 
sustainable agriculture, including the redirection of subsidies on pesticides towards 
local development initiatives, support for farmers’ cooperatives, providing market 
information and reducing the costs of entry into markets. Achieving such policies 
presupposes some form of lobbying or campaigning. Of particular importance is the 
defence of sustainable agriculture against other proposed ‘solutions’ to agrarian 
crisis, such as the ‘Second Green Revolution’ – i.e., GM crops. Recognising this, in 
India, NGOs that support sustainable agriculture have been particularly outspoken 
and organised in their opposition to the introduction and commercialisation of GM 
crops (Scoones, 2008).  
These ‘resource needs’ of sustainable agriculture suggest that some forms of 
assistance from ‘experts’ may be helpful, at least during the initial stages. There is 
ample evidence to suggest farmers are capable of organising on their own to develop 
their own knowledge, human resources and marketing capacity (see, e.g., Holt-
Gimenez, 2006). This notwithstanding, it should be acknowledged that such 
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ground-level projects, the focus was on awareness-raising and education, such that members of 
rural communities could become active environmental stewards. By the late 1990s, there were 
thousands of local groups throughout Australia, involving over 30 per cent of Australia’s rural 




collaboration is only likely to be initiated under special conditions. It is more 
challenging when, as is currently the case, farmers are already under considerable 
pressure, and likely to be absorbed in the daily business of making ends meet. Under 
such conditions, the ‘conscience constituents’ described by McCarthy and Zald 
(1977), who have access to the discretionary resources required to facilitate the 
formation of social movements, may play an important role. NGOs, of course, 
represent one way of organising resources to provide farmers with the support they 
need to transition to sustainable agriculture. A number of prominent donor 
organisations provide considerable funding for sustainable agricultural development 
projects, including Oxfam International (2012) and the World Wildlife Fund (2012). 
As described above, such projects are unlikely to be effective if they do not enlist the 
participation of farmers. Indeed, without the development of social capital within 
communities, any gains made through introducing ecologically sensitive 
technologies are unlikely to be sustained (Pretty, 2002; Flora, 1995). If NGOs are to 
be effective, let alone equitable, it is therefore important that they overcome 
tendencies towards hierarchical structures, middle class dominance and alienation 
from communities, which were discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
4.2. The Historical Development of Sustainable Agriculture 
Since early in the development of the modern, chemically intensive agricultural 
paradigm there have been agricultural scientists who have questioned its wisdom and 
sought out alternative approaches. The American agricultural scientist F. H. King, in 
his Farmers of Forty Centuries (King, 1911), contrasted the traditional agricultural 
techniques of Asia, with what he saw as wasteful tendencies within the agriculture of 
his own country. He argued that through thousands of years of returning organic 
material back to the soil, China and Japan had sustained far larger populations than 
Europe or the United States on smaller tracts of agricultural land. Similar conclusions 
were made by British botanist Albert Howard, who had observed that the 
‘laboratory’ approach to agriculture ignored the interests of farmers and, in some 
cases, led to disaster. Howard (1940) argued that modern agricultural science, in its 




made significant breaks with ‘natural law’. He argued that instead agricultural 
scientists should develop an understanding of the scientific principles that have made 
traditional techniques so successful over the millennia, and endeavour to then 
improve upon those techniques. Howard did exactly that during his work in India, 
taking the lead of peasant farmers to develop the ‘Indore Process’ of composting, 
which was subsequently adopted in several parts of the developing world in the first 
half of the Twentieth Century. Howard’s conceptual approach remains an important 
starting point for modern sustainable farming movements. 
These concepts have been translated into social and political practice through the 
formation of civil society organisations. It is difficult to trace the precise origins of 
these organisations, as in the early stages of its development, sustainable agriculture 
tended to be a secondary focus of broader movements and organisations – rarely was 
it the organising principle. For example, Conford (2001) details how, in the mid-
twentieth century, the first social movements in Britain to oppose chemical 
agriculture and advocate what might be termed ‘sustainable’ alternatives, were 
essentially rural populist movements, led by people who were concerned about rural 
decline. These movements, whose ideologies ranged from agrarian socialist to fascist 
(and often blended aspects of the two), argued that the mechanisation of agriculture 
had depopulated the countryside, leading to a collapse of rural industries and 
communities. They also felt that the character of rural society had been lost as a 
result of modern agricultural technologies and industrialisation. In an attempt to 
reclaim this character and reverse the tendency away from the countryside and 
towards the cities, these  leaders attempted to establish model communities based on 
traditional farming practices as an alternative to industrialisation. At the same time, 
they hoped to develop new sources of agricultural growth to overcome rural 
economic stagnation, and were therefore very interested in applying new scientific 
insights to traditional agriculture. A unique combination of science and tradition was 
thus established, which in many ways exists within sustainable agriculture 
movements to this day. Thus, at least in Britain, ideas that have now become 
associated with ‘sustainable agriculture’ were initially politicised in the context of 




Sustainable agricultural practices have been attached to a range of ideologies. Rudolf 
Steiner, founder of the Anthroposophy spiritual movement, designed the basic 
principles of biodynamic agriculture in an attempt to formulate agricultural practices 
that would enable humanity to live according to the rhythms and laws of nature, 
conceived in terms of Paganism and astrology (Steiner, 1958). Similarly, the 
permaculture movement in Australia sought to provide a system of farming that was 
suited to the ideology of a growing counter-culture movement. Bill Mollison and 
David Holmgren formulated the principles of permaculture partially based on their 
observations of subsistence agriculture in Asia, but also as a set of practices that fit 
within a broader political discourse based on bioregional self-sufficiency and 
grassroots democracy (Ball, 2007). In the context of developing countries, the 
capacity of sustainable agriculture to lessen historical inequalities and overcome 
some of the imbalances of Green Revolution and neoliberal approaches to 
development has made it attractive to Left-wing peasant movements in poor 
countries, including the Zapatistas in Mexico (see Solís, 1995; de León, 1995) and 
transnational peasant movements, such as LVC (Desmarais, 2003). Based on this, 
these movements have incorporated principles of sustainability into their 
revolutionary agendas. The variety of movements and philosophies through which 
sustainable agricultural practices have taken form is a major contributor to the 
symbolic and conceptual diversity within the movement today. 
 
4.2.1. Sustainable Agriculture in the Third World 
While in developed countries, sustainable agriculture is often associated with 
lifestyle and identity, in developing countries it comes as a more immediate concern, 
as, in many cases, it relates directly to issues of subsistence and survival.
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 In some 
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of environmentalism into ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ varieties: ‘One is an environmentalism of 
survival and subsistence; the other of access to a clean and beautiful environment for the enhancement 




cases, particularly in Latin America, the state has recognised these benefits and 
facilitated transitions to sustainable agriculture. Cuba, for example, was forced to 
adopt a new approach to agriculture when, in 1989-1990, trade with the Soviet Union 
collapsed and the U.S. trade embargo was tightened. As Rosset and Bourque (2005) 
outline, the country faced a massive decline in their access to imported fuels, food 
grains, agricultural inputs and aid. Given these constraints, the polity embraced a 
new paradigm, which prioritised use of ecological technologies, redistribution of 
land and fair prices for farmers, to incentivise increased per acre productivity. They 
also placed a new emphasis on local production, with notable developments in urban 
agriculture. In adopting this new paradigm, Cuba went from being an importer of 
food in the late eighties to self-sufficient in food by the late nineties (Rosset & 
Bourque, 2005). Similar policies have recently been adopted by the state in 
Venezuela (Cunich, 2012).  
More frequently, however, sustainable agriculture has been taken up within civil 
society, particularly in the development sector. In addition to being integrated into 
the revolutionary imaginations of social movements, as described above, the 
principles of sustainable agriculture have also been institutionalised and applied in a 
number of settings. NGOs and other development organisations began to develop 
paradigms for implementing sustainable agriculture projects in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. These models helped to intervene in the concrete problems that were 
manifesting as a result of the Green Revolution. An important first step was made by 
the ‘Farming Systems Research’ (FSR) school, which recognised that the 
development models imposed on farmers in developing countries were often 
formulated with no holistic understanding of the ground level situation of farmers – 
small farmers in particular (Gilbert, Norman & Winch, 1980). This lack of 
understanding had led to the promotion of technologies that, in the long term, had 
proven to be socially, economically and ecologically inappropriate for local 
conditions. The FSR approach, as outlined by Shaner, Phillip and Schmehl (1981), 
attempted to identify broad categories of farmer along geographical and socio-
economic lines, perform detailed case studies of individual farming systems, and 




within a given region. In this way, it aimed to overcome some of the pitfalls of 
blanket approaches to rural development. 
Many of the most promising features of FSR were clarified and built upon in the 
‘Agroecosystems Analysis’ approach, developed by Gordon Conway. Conway 
(1985), recognising the diminishing benefits of the Green Revolution over time, 
promotes a paradigm through which regionally appropriate sustainable alternatives 
could be developed. He points out that many attempts to resolve issues at the level of 
the individual farm have proved futile, as the problems of the Green Revolution are 
entrenched at a systemic level. As such, individual farmers attempting to change 
their approach tended to encounter difficulties, either because of the ecological 
interconnectivity of farms within a community, or factors relating to the economic 
structure, such as subsidised prices for chemical inputs. Conway’s (1985) approach 
involves identifying agroecosystems, as agricultural zones within which there exists 
a high degree of connectivity, and assessing them on the basis of the four ‘system 
properties’ mentioned above: productivity, stability, equitability and sustainability. 
Where the Green Revolution approach to development had focused predominantly 
on short-term ‘productivity’, Conway’s approach, particularly with its focus on 
sustainability, brought a more long-term perspective. Both FSR and Agroecosystems 
Analysis have provided significant advances in the scientific understanding of what 
‘sustainable agriculture’ could be, by bringing a multidisciplinary perspective on the 
range of social, economic and ecological factors relevant to agricultural 
development. 
The diffusion of sustainable agriculture through civil society initiatives has been 
most pronounced in Latin America. ‘Agroecology’ has been one of the main 
paradigms used there, which, like the approaches described above, builds on the 
traditional systems of small holders and enhances their productivity through 
developing more interconnected, high energy agricultural ecosystems (Altieri, 1984). 
In Brazil, the results have been particularly promising. There, an agroecology 
network called the Assessoria e Servicos a Projetos em Agricultura Alternativa set 
itself the task of setting up training centres within existing agricultural universities, 




occupying positions within the government and administration (Altieri & Toledo, 
2011). Consequently, hundreds of agroecology initiatives have been established 
throughout the country, and sustainable agriculture has become a key part of the 
curriculum in many universities. This demonstrates how effectively networking 
within civil society and working to win consent within existing centres of power can 
have pronounced effects. A more decentralised approach has been adopted in Central 
America, where, since the 1980s, small holders have established horizontal, peasant-
to-peasant networks to exchange knowledge on strategies for sustainable farming and 
resource conservation (Holt-Gimenez, 2006). These networks closely reflect the 
structure of ‘grassroots movements’ discussed in Chapter 3. While such grassroots 
initiatives are most advanced in Latin America, they have also been adopted in Asia. 
For example, the Peasant Union of Indonesia has established peasant managed 
schools for the dissemination of knowledge on ecological agricultural techniques 
(Dwyer, 2011).  
There have been several endeavours to bring together the diversity of the sustainable 
agriculture movement under a common banner. The most globally organised 
example of this is the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
(IFOAM). As Geier (2007) outlines, IFOAM was founded in 1972, when five 
organisations – mostly from developed nations – formed a common body to 
coordinate diverse movements in the interest of common goals. Since then, IFOAM 
has developed considerably, both in terms of the number of member organisations 
and its institutional structures. As of 2012, it consists of over 750 member 
organisations from 108 countries (IFOAM, 2012). Since its inception, it has shifted 
from an organisation composed mostly of farmers and scientists, to a more 
professionalised support and advocacy agency. The federation provides support for 
farmers, engages in lobbying and advocacy and has a special focus on the 
development of certification standards. Through a number of fora they have 
attempted to ‘harmonise’ certification standards globally and define roles for public 
and private certification agencies, in an attempt to minimise conflict within the 




means be said to represent the totality of movements for sustainable agriculture 
globally,
29
 it does reflect the growing influence and co-ordination of the wider 
movement, as well as some of the ways in which it has been integrated within the 
mainstream economy. 
 
4.2.2. Sustainable Agriculture in India 
Compared to the previously mentioned governments in Latin America, the 
Government of India, like those of most developing countries, has been largely 
unsupportive of sustainable agriculture as a potential solution to rural society’s most 
pressing issues. Policies promoting alternatives to chemical agriculture have mostly 
been oriented towards organic certification for sale of produce on international 
markets, which has been of little benefit to small farmers, who have poor market 
access (Scialabba, 2000). Exceptions to this tendency can be found in the policies of 
a few state governments. Kerala has perhaps been the most ambitious. In 2010, the 
communist-led Left Democratic Front government committed to converting thirty 
thousand hectares of land to organic farming in the first phase of its project, which 
aims to bring the entire state’s agriculture under organic cultivation by 2020 (The 
Hindu, May 17, 2010). The policy was formulated after consultation with a number 
of civil society activists who had been raising awareness on these issues. Several 
other state governments have announced their intentions to promote organic and 
sustainable farming, including those of Bihar (Times of India, June 23, 2011) and 
Karnataka (iGovernment, November 15, 2011). Uttarakhand, in its endeavour to 
market itself as an ‘organic state’, has established agencies to make the process of 
organic certification more accessible to small farmers (Tribune News Service, July 
16, 2011). Most state governments, however, remain wedded to the Green 
Revolution paradigm. Ironically, this is even more the case in states where the most 
damage has been caused through the use of chemical inputs. In Punjab, where the 
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excessive use of chemicals has been linked to a range of diseases, the two major 
coalitions in the state engage in a kind of competitive populism to provide the 
highest subsidies for chemical inputs during elections (Kumar, 2007). The rate of 
government expenditure on these subsidies in Punjab has now reached unsustainable 
levels (Roy & Chattopadhyay, 2009).  
Overwhelmingly, the push for sustainable agriculture in India has come from civil 
society. It is difficult to identify a precise moment at which a real ‘movement’ began 
to emerge within civil society for a change in agriculture. Some sources suggest that 
the work done by Gandhian rural collectives prior to Independence could be regarded 
as a form of organic farming (Scialabba, 2000). Alvares (2009: 65-7), who has been 
at the forefront of the organic movement for approximately thirty years, has 
suggested that a turning point came in 1984, when civil society groups with an 
interest in sustainable agriculture first came together under the one platform for a 
national conference. This was followed by a series of national meetings, which 
ultimately culminated in the formation of the ‘Agricultural Renewal in India for a 
Sustainable Environment’ (ARISE) network in 1995. The nascent network benefitted 
from access to experimental agricultural plots at the Auroville commune in Tamil 
Nadu, where international experts in sustainable farming had been active for several 
years. This allowed for demonstrations of the viability of natural farming, even in 
adverse conditions. The ARISE network facilitated several conferences for 
knowledge-sharing (particularly in South India), facilitated communication at a 
national level and established connections with regional centres for the promotion of 
sustainable agriculture.  
Unfortunately, the ARISE network collapsed in the early 2000s. In the wake of this 
collapse, Alvares, who had established contacts all over the country while compiling 
his Organic Farming Sourcebook, was asked to make a new attempt to bring 
together civil society initiatives throughout India. This led to the formation of the 
Organic Farming Association of India (OFAI). OFAI continues the tradition initiated 
by ARISE of maintaining regular contact between natural and organic farmers 
throughout the country with regular meetings, but has also been engaged in much 




formalised organisational structure than ARISE, with regional secretariats co-
ordinating activities throughout India. There are also a number of issue-specific 
national networks that formed in the 2000s that are closely connected to OFAI. The 
Millet Network of India (MINI), for example, promotes the use of millets as a hardy, 
drought-tolerant crop, which provides numerous health benefits relative to wheat or 
rice. MINI was formed in 2008 as a coalition of activists from various sustainable 
agriculture organisations from around the country. It has actively campaigned for 
appropriate research and policy support for millet farming (MINI, 2012). 
These initiatives provide a national platform for networking, knowledge exchange 
and advocacy, yet the vast majority of civil society organisations in this field have a 
regional or state focus. These organisations are highly diverse in their structure and 
mode of operation. There are a number of large internationally funded NGOs 
working on sustainable agriculture in India that have been very successful in 
deploying their resources to reach a large number of farmers. The Centre for 
Sustainable Agriculture in Hyderabad, for example, has partnered with a number of 
smaller NGOs to distribute knowledge on non-pesticide management strategies. 
Their efforts have been highly successful, with 350,000 farmers using these 
techniques in Andhra Pradesh as of 2007 (Ramanjaneyulu et al, 2009), a figure that 
has reportedly increased substantially since then. Other groups are less formal in 
their structure and do not receive large amounts of funding from external agencies. 
There are a number of local initiatives that have the aim of raising awareness and 
exchanging knowledge on sustainable techniques (Pastakia, 1998). There are also a 
large number of small seed saving collectives throughout India, which have taken up 
the task of conserving genetic diversity in ‘seed banks’ (Vijaylakshmi & 
Balasubramanian, 2004). Having diverse crop species at their disposal makes 
communities more resilient to environmental change and less reliant on expensive 
hybrid variety seeds. In some cases, these networks for seed saving, awareness 
generation and knowledge exchange are organised as social movements and also 
incorporate a campaigning element into their work. Such organisations are the focus 




Many Indian sustainable agriculture advocates express themselves in an ideological 
idiom that presents itself as uniquely Indian. India’s agrarian history and identity is 
used as a way of valorising the transition from chemical to sustainable farming. The 
connection between the farmer and nature is depicted as a quintessentially Indian 
relationship. As the respected natural farmer Bhaskar Save (2008: 6) puts it, 
‘Farming runs in our blood’. The emphasis within India’s sustainable agriculture 
movements on the use of panchagavya and other preparations based on cow urine 
(see Natrajan, 2008) emphasises India’s unique relationship with the cow. It also 
highlights the effectiveness of traditional techniques that are indigenous to India, 
having been developed over thousands of years. There are also discernible links 
between the discourses these activists use and Indian philosophical traditions, both 
ancient and modern. There is certainly widespread recognition that sustainable 
agriculture accords with Gandhi’s vision of development, and several leading figures 
within the movement have acknowledged Gandhi as a chief source of inspiration 
(e.g. Save, 2008: 33-34). Gandhi’s philosophy of national development took as its 
starting point agriculture and village life (see Gandhi, 1963). Gandhi advocated the 
development of each village as a self-sufficient economic unit, without any 
dependency upon external resources. Shortly after Independence, Gandhi’s disciples, 
J. C. Kumarappa and Mira Behn, were among the first to oppose the use of chemicals 
in agriculture in India, highlighting the damage it would cause to soil and the impact 
on foreign debt (Guha, 2007: 223-4).  
In the post-Green Revolution period, Gandhi’s ideas of village self-reliance (swaraj) 
took on a new significance, and have been adopted by many figures within the 
sustainable agriculture movement. Subhash Palekar (n.d.), for example, whose books 
on the philosophy and practice of sustainable farming have become highly influential 
in India, argues that the external inputs introduced with the Green Revolution created 
a system of dependency and exploitation. Consequently, for Palekar, the ideal 
agricultural system, which he calls ‘spiritual farming’ should entail no external 
inputs of any kind – whether chemical or organic. The farming methods he advances 
thus rely exclusively on materials available at the village level. Shripad Dobholkar 
(2001) takes these ‘localist’ ideals even further, outlining methods of harvesting the 




social systems to create a more just and prosperous society. Based on his own 
experiences in rural Maharashtra, Dabholkar has developed a series of techniques for 
facilitating local, grassroots movements, with a specific focus on presenting 
knowledge of sustainable techniques in a language that is accessible to those without 
formal education.  
There have also been attempts to emphasise the resonance between natural farming 
and the teachings of the Vedas and other Hindu sacred texts.
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 Palekar (n.d.), for 
example, stresses that the core of his approach to farming is the principle of non-
violence, which he claims is derived from the Vedas, and contrasts to the ostensible 
violence of the Green Revolution. In a somewhat more esoteric vein,  M. S. 
Deshpande (2003) presents an approach to farming based upon ‘cosmic energies’, as 
understood through Hindu scripture. It seems, therefore, that several figures within 
India’s sustainable agriculture movement make use of a religion as a means of 
mobilising interest and support (see also Pastakia, 1998). It should be recognised, 
however, that using such discourses will inevitably have concrete social effects – not 
only on the kind of agricultural practices employed, but also on social relations. 
Some studies indicate a conservative tendency in sustainable agriculture movements 
in India. For example, Sharma (2006) has reported that the watershed development 
project of Anna Hazare, whose ecological consciousness is explicitly linked with 
Hindu ideology, has not only resulted in ‘sustainable development’, but also a 
tightening of the caste system and an exclusion of non-Hindus from the community. 
Similarly, Nanda (2003) argues that certain critiques of the Green Revolution have a 
strong resonance with Hindu nationalism. She suggests that ideas relating to the 
‘harmony’ and ‘ecological balance’ of traditional communities and farming systems 
that was disrupted by the Green Revolution serve to romanticise traditional 
hierarchies and obfuscate class, caste and gender divisions within communities. The 
case studies examined in this thesis also reflect some of the ways in which the 
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philosophical underpinnings of sustainable agriculture have concrete effects on the 
capacity of groups to mobilise, as well as broader effects on social relations. 
Statistics on overall trends in sustainable agriculture in India are somewhat 
ambiguous. IFOAM (2008, 2009), in recent surveys, have indicated a quadrupling in 
the area of certified organic land globally between 1998 and 2008. In India, the 
increase has been particularly rapid, with an increase from 528,171 hectares in 2008 
to approximately one million in 2009. While most of this growth has been fuelled by 
demand from the United States and Europe, IFOAM also reports growing consumer 
demand coming from India’s more cosmopolitan cities, such as Delhi and Bangalore. 
The growth indicated by these figures is certainly impressive, however it is uncertain 
whether it genuinely reflects an increase in the area of land being farmed sustainably. 
It is quite probable that a large portion of the increase can be attributed to increasing 
availability of data, growing numbers of farmers having access to certification and 
possibly shifts in certification criteria. There is also ambiguity in that these figures 
refer only to certified organic land, leaving out the huge number of farmers who can 
be considered ‘organic by default’ – never having had access to chemical inputs.  
If one accepts that there has been a dramatic increase in organic farmland in India, 
IFOAM’s (2009) figures still show that only a very small portion (less than one per 
cent) of India’s total cultivated land is recognised as organic. Indeed, if one looks to 
figures in the growth in chemical agricultural industries, it is clear that in recent years 
Indian farmers have increased their per-acre use of fertiliser at a steady pace and 
continued mechanisation (Singh & Pal, 2010). The Department of Agriculture and 
Co-operation’s (2010) annual report for 2009-2010 shows that while there have been 
some policies directed towards the expansion of the organics industry, far more 
prominent is the thrust to further increase the area under cultivation following the 
industrial model. The report projects strong growth for seed companies and details 
how changes to the Seed Act in 2004 have enabled growth in the sale of HYV seeds. 
As detailed above, these seeds are of little value without substantial inputs of 
fertiliser and water, which again raises sustainability issues. Thus, when considered 
in relation to overarching trends, the position of sustainable agriculture in India 





4.3. Implications for Hegemony in Rural India 
As has been elaborated above, the project of sustainable agriculture does not require 
the kinds of sophisticated forms of collaboration and coordination required for a 
national assault on power. Gramsci’s analysis is mostly focused on these kinds of 
grand historical endeavours. It may therefore appear that a Gramscian analysis is 
somewhat ill-suited to this form of project.  The hegemonic implications of a series 
of loosely connected, but largely anarchic and autonomous development initiatives 
and social movements may appear ambiguous.  
The implications become clearer, however, when these initiatives are situated in the 
context of agrarian crisis. If agrarian crisis becomes more protracted, as all signs 
suggest it will, and if it continues to develop as a ‘crisis of authority’, this will have 
serious consequences for established hegemonic powers. Hegemony will need to be 
re-established in some way or other, lest there be dire consequences for the entire 
polity. In the short term, movements for sustainable agriculture are significant as 
they serve to further sever consent for the Green Revolution paradigm of agrarian 
development, deepening the crisis of authority and creating spaces in which 
alternative development trajectories can be imagined. In the long term, these 
movements could prove to be key agents in brokering an approach to development 
that can achieve broader consent, as the methods they advocate aim to address the 
root causes of agrarian crisis – at both economic and ecological levels. For this to be 
remotely feasible, however, movement leaders and intellectuals must develop 
effective ways of establishing a layer of consent for the practices they advocate at the 
local level. The remainder of this thesis aims to determine whether and in what ways 
such consent-building is taking place, through detailed examination of three case 
studies.  
The previous discussions have highlighted two key issues that inform the analysis of 
the case studies. The first concerns the ambiguous position of sustainable agriculture 
within civil society. On the one hand, sustainable agriculture appears to be a 




then by liberalisation. From this perspective, rural communities are breaking away 
from currently hegemonic discourses on rural development and collaboratively 
articulating a new path. On the other hand, sustainable agriculture also links at 
various points to ‘the state’ (in Gramsci’s sense of the term). As Farrington and 
Lewis (1993) argue, sustainable agriculture initiatives stand to benefit in various 
ways from developing collaborative relations with the state. The state may provide 
useful links to researchers and facilities, and government agencies have the resources 
at their disposal to ‘scale up’ initiatives developed at the local level by grassroots 
movements and NGOs.  
Relations with the state, however, come at the risk of co-option. The state may 
support local sustainable agriculture initiatives as a way of rebuilding damaged 
legitimacy, whilst being otherwise committed to established models of development. 
Further, the state may guide the activities of local initiatives in directions that are not 
threatening to hegemonic interests (Kamat, 2002). There is evidence to suggest that, 
at least in some cases, sustainable agriculture has been guided in a conservative 
direction. Desmarais (2003) highlights that several international institutions, such as 
the United Nations and the World Bank, began to speak the language of ‘sustainable 
agriculture’ in the context of neoliberal structural adjustment. Within these 
institutions, sustainable agriculture has been appropriated and reinterpreted as a 
model that can be successfully integrated into global markets. Further, as mentioned 
before, transnational donor organisations are now providing considerable funds for 
sustainable agricultural projects, raising questions of foreign and neoliberal 
intervention. As Robinson, Farrington and Satish (1993) note, within sustainable 
agriculture initiatives in India, there is considerable distrust of both state-directed and 
foreign-funded initiatives, owing in part to the long tradition of Gandhism and 
Marxism amongst rural development workers. Actors working in this field, therefore, 
are ambiguously positioned. They are often radical in their rejection of commercial 
agriculture, and yet increasingly incorporated into regimes of aid and charity which 
are guided by neoliberal interests. The case studies presented here, therefore, follow 
the lead of prior research (e.g. Luthra, 2003; Ghosh, 2009; Jakimow, 2010) in 
investigating the way in which activists negotiate these competing forces and 




on the current hegemonic balance and the future of sustainable agriculture as an 
alternative development project. 
The other key issue that informs subsequent analysis is the degree of ‘openness’ of 
sustainable agriculture initiatives to democratic input from key stakeholders at the 
grassroots level. This concerns whether activists are open to building consent for new 
approaches in a ‘bottom-up’ fashion, or rather attempt to impose solutions from the 
top down. There are clear ethical implications regarding the way that civil society 
actors conduct themselves on these issues; yet it is also a question of efficacy. As has 
been discussed in Chapter 3, a project of this kind, particularly in the nascent stages 
of its development, must be open to input from key stakeholders, to build the 
necessary consent required to challenge hegemonic approaches to development. This 
chapter has shown that while professional development workers often lead 
sustainable agriculture movements, farmer input is crucial in developing both 
farming models that will be effective and gain popular consent, and wider public 
legitimacy. It is also worth noting that there are other groups that may have an 
interest in developing more sustainable agricultural systems, including women and 
agricultural labourers. In the subsequent chapters, therefore, I analyse the ways in 
which sustainable agriculture projects have attempted to enlist the participation of 
diverse groups. I am interested in whether currently subaltern groups are allowed 




In India, the experience of agrarian crisis, by drawing attention to the unsustainable 
features of existing development strategies, conditions and shapes the meaning of 
‘sustainable agriculture’. With input costs rising and health and environmental side-
effects of Green Revolution technology manifesting, low input systems that can 
deliver acceptable yields represent one method by which farmers can achieve a level 
of security. If these ostensibly more sustainable systems are to be adopted on a wide 




project. While examples from Latin America indicate possibilities for ‘grassroots’ 
movements based on horizontal networking, a more common organisational model is 
the NGO. In India, sustainable agriculture NGOs have proliferated since the 1980s, 
as have a number of more grassroots groups, such as seed bank collectives. Such 
organisations have become well-networked at the national level and are active on a 
number of key policy issues. While such groups and networks provide important 
structures for mobilising knowledge, support and campaigns, questions remain as to 
how effectively they are in responding to the agrarian crisis. Sustainable agriculture 
activists must negotiate an ambiguous terrain, in which their own ambitions (which 
may be quite radical) come into conflict with attempts at co-option by the state and 
international donors. Activists make choices regarding how they negotiate these 
issues, which have implications for the directions their movements ultimately take. 
Furthermore, there are questions on the manner in which the leaders of these 
initiatives, who are often of a professional, middle class background, engage with 
rural communities at the grassroots level. The level of active involvement of 
subaltern agrarian classes in the articulation and development of sustainable 
agriculture may have a large bearing on the future of this alternative development 







Previous chapters have positioned the theoretical and historical significance of 
sustainable agriculture – both as a concept and as an organised social phenomenon. I 
have argued that the meaning of sustainable agriculture in India is largely 
conditioned by experiences of agrarian crisis, and that it has been proffered as a 
potential way out of this crisis. In the process, several key issues have been 
identified. Of particular interest are the ways in which sustainable agriculture 
movements reflect and reproduce existing power structures in Indian society, and 
how the leaders of these movements engage with rural communities to develop 
consent for an alternative model of rural development. The data that is presented in 
subsequent chapters aims to show in a more empirical form how these issues are 
playing out in regional contexts. In this chapter, I introduce the three case studies that 
I draw on to investigate these issues, and outline the methods used for data collection 
and analysis. 
The methodological approach used in this thesis was designed to collect a rich source 
of qualitative data that reflects the views and perspectives of activists, farmers and 
supporters who have in some way engaged with sustainable agriculture 
organisations. I have taken a case studies approach, collecting detailed data from 
three organisations that are explicitly and primarily concerned with promoting a 
transition to more sustainable farming practices. Data was collected between 
December 2009 and April 2010. As I outline in Section 5.1., the case studies 
approach allowed consideration of how a variety of contextual and ideological 
variables have impacted on the activities of the organisations. In Section 5.2., I 
outline the methods used for the collection and analysis of data including participant 
observation, interviews (103 in total) and primary and secondary materials. Using 
mixed methods not only improved the richness of the data, but also its reliability, 
allowing for key findings to be cross-checked. In Section 5.3., I explain the methods 
by which data was analysed and outline the style in which it is presented in the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis. Section 5.4. acknowledges some of the key 




translators and potential observer effects. This latter point opens a discussion on 
positionality, in which the impact of the identity of the researcher on the kind of data 
collected is considered. Finally, in Section 5.5., I outline the key ethical issues 
encountered in the collection and presentation of data, and how these were 
negotiated.  
 
5.1. Research Strategy: A Case Studies Approach 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, agrarian crisis, though manifest throughout rural 
India, is experienced differently across regions. Crisis in highly commercialised 
farming regions, such as Punjab or Haryana, is not the same as in less developed 
regions, such as Chhattisgarh or Jharkhand. To consider the discursive moves that 
activists make in the context of agrarian crisis and how they position sustainable 
agriculture as a ‘solution’ to crisis, thus requires an understanding of regional 
agrarian conditions. Additionally, understanding the issues of power that were 
discussed in previous chapters requires an engagement with factors that vary 
regionally, including the structure of civil society, agrarian power structures, 
relations between rural and urban societies and relations between civil society and 
the state. To do justice to these complex issues requires an engagement with rich 
information on the complex interactions between social actors, institutions and 
various local/ regional contextual factors. The need for such detailed information 
highlights the utility of a case studies approach. As Yin (2009) outlines, this 
approach allows for the collection of rich and variegated data in instances when it 
would not be possible or appropriate to perform a full, comprehensive survey of the 
field of interest. To attempt a complete survey of all organisations involved in 
sustainable agriculture in India would not only be beyond the scope of this research 
project, it would also risk losing focus. Taking a case studies approach has facilitated 
a deeper understanding of the various factors with which movement and NGO 
activists engage. Having time to consider the influences of regional context allows 
the researcher to collect the kind of background information that allows an 




The key methodological challenge of case studies research is the selection of cases. 
Yin (2009) argues that while the ability to generalise based on case study findings is 
important, more crucially, case studies should be selected based on their suitability 
for answering research questions. This thesis engages with questions of how activists 
position sustainable agriculture in the context of agrarian crisis and how their work is 
affected by power structures within civil society. To examine such complex issues, 
case studies should not be further complicated by additional variables. Thus the 
organisations that have been selected do not see sustainable agriculture as merely one 
component of a broader development strategy – it is their primary objective and 
focus. Furthermore, due to the diversity of power relations and agrarian conditions 
between regions, to reduce complexity, organisations have been selected which have 
a focus on a specific region, within which agrarian conditions are somewhat uniform. 
As was noted in Chapter 4, there are several sustainable agriculture organisations in 
India that have a national or multi-regional perspective, but to analyse the diverse 
environments and complex power structures in which such organisations operate 
would risk losing focus. Further, by comparing case studies from different regions, 
one may assess the unique challenges faced in mobilising in different environments.  
Finally, cases have been selected that, at some level, identify as ‘movements’. This 
was reflected either in the name they have adopted or in their promotional materials. 
As is detailed in later chapters, despite this designation, although identifying more 
with movements than NGOs, closer inspection found that each of the case studies 
combined features of social movements and NGOs, behaving as ‘hybrid 
organisations’ (Hasenfield & Gidron, 2005). This made these cases particularly 
useful in addressing the research questions. Although NGOs represent the majority 
of sustainable agriculture initiatives in India (see Alvarez, 2009), these ‘hybrid 
organisations’ bring the issues of power in civil society into sharper relief in two key 
ways. First, unlike more formalised NGOs, these groups are less involved in the 
competitive ‘scramble’ for funds (Cooley & Ron, 2002), theoretically making them 
more responsive to the evaluations of rural communities than to donor agencies. 
Second, these groups have overtly rejected the NGO designation, showing that at 
some level, they recognise problems associated with the NGO model and wish to 




interest, as they show forms of innovation in response to NGO power within civil 
society. Yet, equally of interest is how, despite their concerns, such organisations 
may still reproduce the same issues identified within NGOs. Hybrid organisations are 
particularly useful in showing how activists negotiate these complex issues. 
As Denscombe (2007) outlines, in practice, case studies are selected not only on the 
basis of their theoretical significance, but also on the basis of opportunity. The 
organisations that made up the case studies were initially found via internet searches. 
When cases were found that were well-suited to the theoretical requirements of the 
research, representatives from the organisation were contacted to determine whether 
they would be able to provide suitable data. Their suitability was also cross-checked 
by way of contacts in India who had worked with them in the past. 
Though each case study has a discrete regional focus, the range of cases has been 
selected to reflect the diverse agrarian conditions of contemporary India. Cases were 
based in Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttarakhand, respectively. These three regions 
have highly distinct agrarian structures, which reflect the range of historical 
experiences with Green Revolution technologies. Punjab represents a state in which 
the development of commercial, chemically intensive agriculture is high. The Green 
Revolution was rolled out extensively in this state in the 1960s, and the agriculture 
practiced in the region remains highly intensive in terms of both inputs and cropping 
patterns (Singh, 2009). The implementation was so extensive that the traditional 
agricultural system of Punjab is now virtually extinct. The Green Revolution did 
bring considerable benefits for medium and large land holders in Punjab, and these 
farmers became highly politically influential (Frankel, 1971; Byres, 1981). Thus, one 
may expect that in such a region, the Green Revolution approach remains tenacious - 
farmers are more reluctant to consider alternatives. Yet, the intensity of chemical use 
in Punjab has also led to a severe crisis in ecology (Sidhu, 2002b; Shiva, 1991) and 
public health (Thakur et al, 2008; Thakur et al, 2010), which may provide an impetus 
for some kind of transition. The case study that I draw on in Punjab is the Kheti 
Virasat Mission (Punjabi: ‘Agricultural Heritage Mission’, KVM), a self-proclaimed 
‘people’s movement’, which emerged in its current form in 2005, after failed 




Umendra Dutt, argue that due to the Green Revolution, Punjab now faces a 
‘civilisational crisis’, with ecological, economic and social ramifications. In this 
context, they argue, Punjab must reclaim its agricultural heritage through the practice 
of natural farming – a set of farming methods that do not rely upon any external 
inputs. Data on KVM was collected between December 2009 and January 2010 and 
during a brief visit in April 2010 
Tamil Nadu has had a more mixed history of agrarian development. There, the Green 
Revolution came only to certain districts – specifically those with good irrigation 
systems. In the Cauvery Delta, the region that is the focus of the case study presented 
in Chapter 7, the Green Revolution was adopted extensively, particularly from the 
early 1970s onwards (Frankel, 1971; Sen 1974). It differed from Punjab, however, as 
it did not lead to substantial increases in profitability (Harriss-White & Janakaranjan, 
1997). Further, due to the fact that the Tamil Nadu state government had prioritised 
production increases ahead of equity in the early stages of the Green Revolution, its 
development path led to significant social tensions, which had violent outcomes 
(Mencher, 1974; Alexander, 1975). The case study examined here is the Tamil Nadu 
Organic Farmers’ Movement (TOFarM), led by M. Revathi. Revathi’s efforts began 
in the early 2000s, when, out of concern for the impact of pesticides on local bird 
populations, she sought out information on alternative farming methods. As time 
passed, she became more aware of the economic condition of farmers, and was 
interested in ways that ecological agriculture could also contribute to the alleviation 
on rural poverty. TOFarM’s work became more intensive after 2004, when the 
tsunami hit the coast of Nagapattinam. They used ecological farming techniques to 
restore fields damaged in the disaster, and then provided farmers with support to 
continue practicing such farming. Their work in Nagapattinam led to a series of 
grants for tsunami restoration work around the world. Data on TOFarM was 
collected mostly in Nagapattinam in February 2010. 
Uttarakhand is one of several states that never experienced a Green Revolution as 
such. Chemical inputs and hybrid seeds were promoted on a small scale but never 
became very popular, due to the fact that the small holdings and agro-climatic 




the Green Revolution period had already passed for the rest of the country, in 
Uttarakhand, only 15 per cent of farms had a commercial orientation (Pande, 1996). 
Uttarakhand does, however, have a long history of agrarian movements, in which 
peasants have mobilised to defend their traditional agricultural practices against 
external threats, such as logging (Guha, 2000). The most famous of these was the 
Chipko movement, which combined concerns over environment, livelihood and rural 
development (Weber, 1988; Rangan, 2000). The case study that I draw on from 
Uttarakhand, the Beej Bachao Andolan (Hindi: ‘Save the Seeds Movement’, BBA), 
has its historical origins in the Chipko movement. Its leaders were Chipko activists 
who, after the movement ended, decided to take up the issue of seed conservation in 
their home villages in the Henwal Valley. Their movement has been active since the 
mid-1980s and continues to be active in issues that affect local agriculture.  Data on 
BBA was collected in March 2010, in the Henwal Valley.  
This selection of cases not only allows for contrasts derived from the varying 
agrarian conditions – it also allows for comparisons of different organisational forms. 
Of the cases selected, BBA is focused mostly on campaigning, TOFarM mostly on 
the implementation of projects and KVM a combination of the two. They also have 
different levels and types of participation by farmers. This kind of organisational 
diversity in case studies enabled the development of an in depth understanding of 
how different forms of civil society organisation are forming in response to 
regionally contextual conditions (such as the condition of farmers and farming, state/ 
civil society relations and so on), and the challenges and opportunities that different 
forms of organisation have given rise to.  
 
5.2. Methods 
One of the benefits of a case studies research strategy is that by spending more time 
on a limited number of cases, it is possible to collect diverse forms of data using 
several methods. It also enables flexibility, as methods may be used selectively, as is 
appropriate for the case in focus. My approach, which is described below, has drawn 




and use of primary resources and secondary resources. All of the methods described 
below were used for each of the three case studies, though some were relied upon 
more for particular cases, as was dictated largely by the opportunities available 
during the fieldwork period.  
 
5.2.1. Participant Observation 
While investigating each case, particularly in the initial stages, it was important to 
gain first-hand observations of the work the organisations were performing. This data 
was gathered via participant observation. As Denscombe (2007: 206-225) describes, 
this method provides a number of benefits when combined with other methods, 
enriching data and increasing its reliability. First, it allows the researcher to collect 
primary data on participants’ activities, reducing reliance on information collected 
‘second hand’ through interviews, and secondary materials. This increases the 
reliability of data. Secondly, it allows the reader to simply observe occurrences, 
whilst providing little input regarding their own views and expectations, thus 
minimising observer effects and potential sources of bias. Interview questions 
immediately direct attention to issues that the researcher thinks are of significance. 
By taking a more passive role and observing, there is greater potential for 
unanticipated issues to reveal themselves. Thirdly, it allows the researcher to develop 
an understanding of the everyday activities that groups are involved in, and the more 
quotidian issues that they confront, which may not come up in an interview.  
Participant observation was conducted in several contexts. At the most basic level, it 
involved taking note of the day-to-day activities of people involved in the 
organisations being studied. During my fieldwork, wherever possible, I stayed in the 
homes of movement participants, which allowed me to collect data on how their 
work in the organisation structures their daily lives and perspectives. For the case 
studies in Punjab and Tamil Nadu, I was able to observe some of the background 
work that goes into building organisations and planning for public events, such as 
networking, promotion and fundraising. Participant observation was also conducted 




on a tour of their farm, showing the kinds of changes they had made since becoming 
involved in sustainable agriculture. This provided opportunities for casual 
discussions regarding farmers’ experiences of success and failure, their perceptions 
of the kinds of support they received and so on. A particularly important instance of 
participant observation was my participation in public activities, such as workshops, 
lectures and public meetings. Observing these activities allowed me to develop an 
understanding of how the organisations project their message to the outside world, 
interact with various audiences and network. 
The nature of the data collected via participant observation was unique. It revealed 
the intimate details of the work being done and the everyday challenges involved. As 
Devereux and Hoddinott (1993) note, being embedded within the organisation allows 
one to gain a greater appreciation of the cultural context in which activities occur. 
This was particularly the case in Uttarakhand, where during the course of fieldwork I 
stayed in a village and lived with a farming family who were themselves involved in 
the organisation, BBA. I was able to gain an understanding of the cultural context 
that gives meaning to the more public acts of the organisation. It also allowed greater 
rapport and trust to develop between myself and participants, facilitating the 
communication of more detailed and in-depth data. 
Participant observation requires that the researcher maintain extensive field notes. 
Following Denscombe’s (2003: 204) suggestion, notes were taken as soon after 
observations were made as possible, so that they were not subject to the ‘frailties of 
memory’. Field notes were compiled almost every day during the fieldwork period, 
recording any issues that might be of interest. 
As is often the case with this particular research method, my ability to perform 
participant observation was subject to opportunity and varied from case to case. The 
kinds of observations that it was possible to make also varied, often in ways that 
reflected the nature of the organisation being studied. Examining KVM, for example, 
I had more opportunities to travel with activists and observe their organisational 
activities. Living in the villages whilst studying BBA provided more opportunities to 




the ways in which BBA activists engage with them. While studying TOFarM, there 
were fewer opportunities for participant observation. It was necessary to rely more 
on other methods, though there were some opportunities for farm tours and to 
observe the daily activities of core activists. When it was possible, I collected data by 
participant observation during the early stages of my research on each case and used 
the data collected to help frame interview questions in a manner that reflected the 
key issues with which participants were engaged. Again, this was constrained by 
opportunity. It was often necessary to adjust the research plan in order to conform to 
participants’ schedules.  
 
5.2.2. Interviews 
Interviews provided the most substantive data for the research. They provided 
insights into the thoughts and experiences of those involved in the organisations and 
filled in crucial details on organisational history. In the case of those who may be 
considered ‘activists’ within the organisations, interviews provided further detail on 
the way in which they formulated the messages that they project to the outside world. 
Interviews were also a crucial method of collecting information on past activities or 
those that otherwise could not be observed first hand. It also allowed data to be 
collected on planned events and anticipated challenges and opportunities developing 
in the future. Interviewees were selected based on their knowledge of crucial issues 
relating to the development and strategy of the organisations. Selection was also 
constrained by opportunity. While it would have been valuable, for example, to 
interview members of donor organisations and state agencies who had engaged with 
the organisations being studied, I was unable to establish necessary contact with such 
persons during the fieldwork period. 
Broadly speaking, interviewees fell into three main categories: activists, agrarians 
and professionals. This distinction has been made as each of these groups provided 
unique sources of information. Table 1 shows the number of interviews conducted 
with each of these categories of participants, for each case study. More detailed 




have devoted their time and labour to the organisations themselves, and include 
project workers, volunteers and campaigners. They are involved in activities such as 
organising networks, arranging meetings and workshops, lobbying government, 
convincing farmers to change their practices, teaching new farming techniques, and 
so on. Their interviews are particularly useful in providing information on 
organisations’ discourses, strategies, methods and histories. ‘Agrarians’ are those 
who live in rural communities and whose primary contribution to the development of 
the organisation is their farming practice. Their interviews provide insight into the 
reasons that farmers are adopting new agricultural techniques, their reluctance to 
make further changes, their experiences with sustainable agriculture and with the 
organisations in question. The category of ‘professionals’ incorporates people 
occupying positions such as academics, medical practitioners, lawyers, teachers and 
bureaucrats. These participants are less intimately connected with the inner workings 
of the organisation than activists. Instead they draw on their own professional 
expertise to provide various forms of support. Their input is useful in providing 
outsider perspectives on the organisations and showing how organisations had an 
impact outside of their immediate spheres of influence. It must be noted, however, 
that the boundaries separating these categories of interviewees are often blurry. In 
Uttarakhand, for example, many of the most important activists are also farmers. 
Furthermore, often the people who provided ‘professional’ support are also doing 
important organisational work, and as such could also be categorised as ‘activists’. 









Table 5.1. Interviews conducted in each location 
 Activists  Agrarians Professionals Total 
Punjab 13 14 21 48 
Tamil Nadu31 10 13 1 24 
Uttarakhand 12 15 4 31 
Total 35 42 26 103 
 
It should be noted that interviews varied in their length and level of formality. Some 
were relatively unplanned interactions without any formal structure; others followed 
a more formal course. The vast majority of interviews, however, were semi-
structured.
32
 There were certain interview questions that were prioritised for each 
case study. Individual interviews, however, did not follow a precise schedule. It has 
been observed that taking a rigid structure into interviews can render the researcher 
insensitive to the contingencies of the case setting (Devereux & Hoddinott, 1993). 
Questions were prioritised and adapted according to the participant and the 
information it was anticipated they would be able to provide. Following the semi-
structured approach, a fixed set of priority questions were taken into each interview, 
but interviewees were given some scope to influence the direction the interview 
would take. When an unanticipated issue of interest arose, interviewees were asked 
for clarification and further detail. This facilitated greater sensitivity to the issues 
                                                 
31 In Tamil Nadu, due to restraints in the field, I was unable to work with any one organisation 
for an extended period of time. As such, I collected data from four separate organisations, but 
only data on TOFarM has been presented here. Since the activists from the other groups have 
collaborated with TOFarM activists in the past, and because the issues they are involved in are 
common, the data from the other organisations has still been drawn on to inform the analysis of 
TOFarM. 




which participants themselves felt to be important and left the research less 
vulnerable to confirmation bias.  
The vast majority of interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis, however there 
were two group interviews in Tamil Nadu, as indicated in Appendix 1. Most 
interviews with activists were conducted in English and a majority of those with 
farmers were conducted by way of a translator. Interviews done by way of a 
translator are indicated in Appendix 1. The audio of most of the interviews was 
recorded. When this was not possible or appropriate, notes were taken.  
 
5.2.3. Collection of Primary Materials 
A third method was collection of written materials produced by the organisations 
themselves. For the most part, these were promotional materials, instruction manuals 
for farming techniques and documents stating the organisations’ recommendations to 
policy makers. Often they revealed interesting information about the philosophy of 
the organisations and the manner in which they project themselves to other social 
groups. They also reflected the impact activists hoped to have on farmers and public 
debate. Typically they were composed by members of the organisations themselves 
or by allied groups, such as larger NGOs or donor organisations.  
As a general rule, the statements made in such materials were less reliable than those 
made in interviews. They were more likely to reflect what activists wanted the 
outside world to believe about their organisations and the farming systems they 
promote, rather than the organisations’ actual activities and activists real 
perspectives. As Edelman (2009) notes, these ‘official narratives’ can be of interest 
to researchers. They show how organisations engage with contemporary issues at the 
level of representation. Furthermore, it may be of interest to analyse the gap between 
public image and actual practice, which requires promotional materials to be 
analysed in close conjunction with data collected through other methods. This gap is 
of particular interest to the current project. As previous studies have shown, distorted 
representations of certain issues by activists can have problematic consequences for 




between activists’ representations of sustainable agriculture (in both public materials 
and in interviews) and the experiences of farmers was thus a major focus of analysis. 
Included within this data source were materials collected via groups’ e-lists and 
websites, including articles written by organisations and advertisements for 
upcoming events. It was possible to receive this kind of data prior to the official 
fieldwork period. Collecting such data beforehand was extremely useful in 
developing an understanding of key issues and framing interview questions and the 
overall research agenda.  
 
5.2.4. Use of Secondary Resources 
Secondary resources were used to provide context and meaning to the data, as well as 
a means of cross-checking and validating claims made by people within the 
organisations. They were of three types. First, academic articles were used to give a 
broad understanding of regional context. Factors such as agrarian histories, social 
structure, and contemporary politico-economic and ecological issues were all 
considered. Secondly, local English language news publications were followed 
during the research period. This helped to develop an understanding of the most 
pressing issues in the regions at the time and the extent to which the organisations 
were engaging with those issues. On a few occasions, the organisations themselves 
featured within the local newspapers, which allowed me to gain some perception of 
how they were being represented in the media to the general public. Thirdly, on a 
few occasions, I was able to collect materials written about the organisations in 
question by third parties. These third parties included other NGOs and networks and 
special interest publications, such as magazines. 
 
5.3. Analysis and Presentation of Findings 
Data was analysed in three phases. First, on returning from fieldwork, audio data and 
field notes were coded using NVivo software. This software enables one to code 




of theoretical interest had already been established prior to this process, revisiting the 
data and coding it allowed themes to emerge that might otherwise have not been 
identified. 
Second, data was synthesised into concise, holistic, largely descriptive accounts of 
each of the three organisations. These accounts are presented in Chapters 6-8. Each 
of these chapters begins with a review of literature on the region in focus. These 
sections provide important contextual information on the agrarian structure and 
contemporary issues with which the organisations studied must engage. In 
subsequent sections, the way in which data has been presented varies from case to 
case. The three case studies were quite diverse, and attempting to structure the data 
presented on each of them according to a singular, rigid model would not do justice 
to their uniqueness. Nonetheless, themes that were crucial to addressing research 
questions have been incorporated in the presentation of each case study. These 
include: 
 Why and how the organisation formed; 
 The personal motivations of key activists in forming or joining the 
organisation; 
 The structure of the organisation and how it has evolved over time; 
 The composition of the organisation, particularly the backgrounds of key 
activists, etc.; 
 Conceptualisations of key issues, such as agrarian crisis, Green Revolution 
and sustainable agriculture;  
 The level and nature of participation of rural communities in the organisation; 
 The strategic approach taken and how it has evolved; and 
 The ongoing challenges and participants thoughts on how they might be 
resolved. 
Each of the three case studies are presented in a narrative and chronological fashion, 
identifying key moments that the organisations have passed through during their 
development. Adopting this approach helps to demonstrate how organisational 




made key strategic decisions. This is crucial to this project, given the research 
interest in the ways in which activists attempt to negotiate power structures in civil 
society. The accounts provided in the case study chapters draw heavily on the 
accounts of leading activists within the organisations. Jolly, Russell and Cohen 
(2012) have noted potential methodological benefits of drawing on individual 
narrative accounts. Among other things, they note that individual accounts reveal the 
personal origins of political positions and how these positions play out and are 
reshaped by experience. Such narratives generate ‘situated knowledge’, which is 
sensitive to the material and personal contexts in which activism actually occurs. The 
knowledge thus produced may be tangled and difficult to unpack, but it is closer to 
the realities of everyday life.  
In reporting the findings in Chapters 6-8, I use a coding system to refer to data 
sources. All research participants who provided meaningful sources of data have 
been listed in Appendix 1. Each participant has been given an informant code. 
Wherever I draw on information provided by a particular informant in the coming 
chapters, I refer to them by this code. This method of presentation allows for a high 
level of accountability, as the reader is able to easily track data sources and gain a 
clear sense of the strength and reliability of claims being made.   
In the final phase of analysis, the theoretical concepts discussed and developed in 
previous chapters were applied to the findings of each of the case studies. This was a 
more evaluative process, which has informed the discussions in Chapter 9. Cases 
were analysed specifically in terms of: (1) their effectiveness as a response to 
contemporary agrarian conditions; (2) whether they can be considered participatory, 
or grassroots organisations, that actively develop consent within rural communities 
for alternative models of agrarian development; and (3) how their methods of 
developing and propagating their responses reflect and/ or challenge established 
power. In Chapter 9, I also draw on the data collected, as well as theory, to speculate 
on some of the reasons why certain power structures persist within these 
organisations. Some of the data also provides insights into alternative approaches 





5.4. Research Challenges and Limitations 
A major challenge during the fieldwork period was communicating with non-English 
speakers. For the most part (though not always) activists and professionals could 
speak English fluently and a translator was not necessary. With farmers and 
agricultural labourers, however, this was not the case. Finding reliable translators 
during the research period proved to be a difficult task. In several cases, I had to rely 
on activists from within the organisations being studied to provide translations for 
interviews with non-English speakers, particularly farmers. These activists clearly 
had some incentive to alter their translations, particularly if farmers were critical of 
the organisation they work for or the ideals and farming methods they promote. 
Furthermore, the presence of activists may have led farmers to alter their responses, 
particularly when activists were also translators. In such circumstances, farmers were 
unlikely to make negative comments about the organisation, out of respect for the 
activists. These issues particularly affected interviews conducted in Punjab and 
Tamil Nadu, however I did conduct some interviews with farmers using translators 
who were unaffiliated to the organisations in each of these locations, allowing some 
correction to this potential source of bias. In Uttarakhand, a local translator was 
found who accompanied me during my interviews for almost the entire duration of 
the study. He was not affiliated with BBA and did not appear to bring any personal 
prejudices into translation.  
The potential source of bias in interviews with farmers from Punjab and Tamil Nadu 
has been taken into account in the analysis of data. I have been cautious in drawing 
hasty conclusions based on the perspectives farmers provided in interviews that were 
conducted via activist translators. Nonetheless farmers did provide a lot of 
information that was unlikely to have been strongly affected by the presence of 
activists – including their reasons for converting to natural farming and the role they 
play within the organisation. 
Observer effects also posed some challenges for collecting reliable data. As 




one takes a case studies approach, due to the extent to which the researcher becomes 
involved in their study. Participants may gain a greater sense of what the researcher 
is interested in and craft their responses accordingly, rather than simply ‘speaking 
their mind’. Yet, from another perspective, participant observation methods also 
allow the researcher to develop rapport with participants, making them more at ease 
in speaking openly with the researcher. Spending a long period of time with a 
particular group of participants also provides more opportunities for issues that had 
originally been hidden to surface. In my research, I found that certain contentious 
issues and problems within organisations only began to appear after spending several 
weeks with participants. Caste discrimination within organisations, for example, was 
an issue that took considerable time to surface. The very fact that these issues had 
originally been hidden itself became a source of data. 
Making a realistic assessment of organisations is often difficult when talking to 
participants who are actively involved in the organisation being studied. If people are 
particularly dedicated to their organisation, then the views they provide will naturally 
be favourable towards it. More troublesome is the fact that even if individuals have 
doubts about the way in which their organisation is running, they may still withhold 
these views from the researcher, because they are concerned about tainting the 
organisation’s image. As Jakimow (2010: 552) notes, this issue is magnified when 
working with NGOs, as participants may see foreign researchers as a way of 
attracting donors, thus ‘turning interviews into discussions designed to impress, 
rather than enlighten’. To address this problem, when discussing problems with 
organisations, I tried to frame my questions in such a way that conveyed that 
organisational troubles are normal and expected. 
This raises the issue of positionality. In this kind of research, the researcher should 
always be reflexive on how, during data collection, their identity may have an impact 
on the data they are able to collect. As an educated person from a developed country, 
it was reasonably common for activists to assume that I would have connections to 
activist, research and donor organisations that may be able to directly help them in 
their campaigns. It is normal for researchers to encounter such expectations in 




may lead activists to present themselves in an excessively favourable light, in the 
hope that this will lead to future benefits. To address this, I was quite open with 
participants from the outset that my personal connections were limited and that the 
main benefit that may come from my research, if any, would be through critique. I 
believe that having discussed this with activists, they were more open to providing 
honest information about their work and the strategic challenges they faced. 
Gender also had some impact on the data collected, though this impact varied 
regionally. In Punjab, gender had a strong impact. Punjab is a highly patriarchal state 
and in some rural settings the idea of the researcher, an unmarried, Australian man, 
interviewing women may have been considered objectionable. As a result of this, it 
was difficult to conduct interviews with women during fieldwork in Punjab, with 
only 6 out of a total of 48 participants being female. This imbalance, however, was 
probably less to do with the gender of the researcher than with the lack of female 
participation within KVM. Gender was less of an issue in Tamil Nadu or 
Uttarakhand, where the gender balance of participants was more even.  
 
5.5. Ethical Issues 
Participants took part in the study on a voluntary basis. Interviewees were verbally 
given details regarding the nature of the study and how their participation would be 
of value. They were advised that they were providing information on a voluntary 
basis and that they could withdraw their consent to participate at any time, along with 
any information they had provided. No one withdrew consent throughout the course 
of the study. 
For the most part, interviewees were advised that whatever information they 
provided would be confidential, and that their names or any other identifying 
information would not be published. Where it is appropriate to refer to them by 
name, they have been given pseudonyms. There were a few exceptions to this. Some 
interviewees, particularly the leaders of the organisations, have significant public 
profiles. It was felt that it was redundant to provide them with pseudonyms since, 




with any familiarity with the field. These participants provided written or verbal 
consent for their names to be used. The leading figures of each of the organisations 
provided consent for the organisations’ names to be used in the study. All other 
participants’ anonymity has been preserved. 
A more complex ethical concern relates to the publication of material that may be 
strategically detrimental to the organisations themselves, if made public. As a general 
rule, participants indicated if there were certain things they would not like published 
because it might be harmful to their organisation. It can also be assumed that there 
were certain details that were kept from me as a way of protecting strategic interests. 
Dialogue has been maintained with participants regarding what they would like to 
see published and what they would prefer remained ‘off the record’. Yet ultimately, I 
have had to use my own discretion in balancing the need to present an accurate 
account of the organisations studied against the need to protect organisations and 
participants from any damage undue critical attention might bring. 
This raises the often challenging issue described by Fox (2006) as ‘dirty laundry’ – 
that is, aspects of movements’ work that may be considered morally questionable or 
signs of incompetence. It is important for researchers to consider whether it is 
necessary or appropriate to air this dirty laundry. As Tsing (2005: xii) notes, 
researchers, particularly Western researchers, tend to neglect the local impact that the 
publication of their research may have on peoples’ work. Tsing therefore argues that 
researchers should be sensitive about what they choose to study and report, keeping 
in mind the impact that the publication of critique may have on the reputation of 
activists and movements. She highlights the importance of retaining relationships of 
respect and collaboration.  
Yet other researchers have taken a different view. Shah (2010), for example, 
questions where researchers’ allegiances should lie. Whatever their political 
commitments may be, researchers should not remain silent if they find that the work 
of activists is actually detrimental to marginalised communities. Shah’s own work, 
for example, identifies that the work of middle class activists in the Jharkhand 




communities they claim to represent. In such cases, it cannot be appropriate for 
researchers to endorse activists’ positions. A possible intermediate position comes 
from Scheper-Hughes (1995), who advocates a ‘militant anthropology’. From 
Scheper-Hughes’ perspective, it is important that researchers are engaged in their 
subject matter: she entirely rejects the notion of the aloof researcher who can report 
their observations in a purely objective manner. Researchers should take sides and 
engage with ethical and political issues. Yet when working with social movements, 
this ‘militant anthropological’ approach does not mean an uncritical endorsement of 
the position of the movements with whom one is sympathetic. Critique can be an 
expression of solidarity: it is a sign of mutual commitment to a common cause and a 
willingness to improve through acknowledging weaknesses and building upon them.  
I have attempted to adopt this approach to critique throughout this thesis. 
Weaknesses within particular organisations are identified with an acknowledgement 
of a common goal – namely, the development of farming systems that are both 
sustainable and empowering for the poor. Further, I concur with Hale (2006), who 
argues that the competing accountability criteria imposed by the academic world and 
activists can generate more productive forms of knowledge. Being sympathetic 
towards activists generates a greater awareness of the challenging conditions they 
work under, which the detached academic may neglect. At the same time, working in 
an academic environment provides a kind of ‘critical distance’ that allows the 
researcher to identify when activists unwittingly undermine their own objectives. 
Critiques developed in this thesis relate largely to ways in which sustainable 
agriculture organisations could be more effective and inclusive. It is thus intended to 
be a contribution towards the cause. Critique is not intended to be damning, but is 
done with an interest in developing models of engagement that will serve the 
interests of rural communities, particularly the more marginalised sections of 
communities. It is also worth emphasising from the outset that the work of activists is 
not easy. I hope that by presenting my case studies in a chronological and somewhat 
personal manner, I will have highlighted the difficulties involved in developing 
effective, fair and inclusive methods of intervention. It should become clear that the 




are often pushed towards certain decisions by factors outside of their own control, 




A methodological approach has been developed that is suitable to addressing the 
research questions. To make a serious attempt at understanding how sustainable 
agriculture organisations engage with contemporary agrarian conditions requires a 
detailed understanding of local context. Furthermore, to make an assessment of 
power relations and the participatory/ grassroots nature of organisations requires 
quite a detailed and thorough investigation. For these reasons, a case studies research 
strategy has been used to gain rich and nuanced data on a small number of specific 
organisations. A mixed-methods approach was used to collect data on each case. The 
use of multiple methods not only helped to develop diverse kinds of data, but also 
strengthened the reliability of the study, as data collected via one method could be 
cross-checked by data collected via another. Participant observation was particularly 
useful in revealing what participants in organisations do on a day-to-day basis. It 
provided a clearer indication of the work that is actually done within these 
organisations, rather than what activists claim is done. Interviews provided highly 
detailed data on a wide range of issues, and were particularly important in 
understanding organisational history, strategic thinking, perspectives on key issues 
and experiences of success and failure. Primary materials were important in showing 
the ‘official narratives’ of organisations, while secondary materials were used more 
to provide background information and to cross-check claims made by activists about 
conditions in their region. Once collected, data was analysed in a manner that both 
identified the key issues of relevance to the research, whilst being open to other 
relevant themes, which may not have previously been considered. The results of this 





6. THE KHETI VIRASAT MISSION 
 
This chapter investigates the Kheti Virasat Mission (KVM), an initiative to promote 
‘natural farming’ in Punjab, the heartland of India’s Green Revolution. Though 
formally registered as a trust, from the outset KVM’s executive director, Umendra 
Dutt, has attempted to carve out an organisational identity for KVM as a ‘social 
movement’, contrasting its commitment to the detachment and corruption of NGOs. 
The first half of this chapter explores the way in which KVM has been structured to 
appeal to diverse communities in both rural and urban Punjab, to raise awareness of 
what it sees as a ‘crisis’ situation in Punjab agriculture, and to pose natural farming 
as the solution to this crisis. It examines how KVM’s organisational structure and 
strategy relate to its organisational identity as a social movement. In the second half 
of the chapter, I explore how KVM activists’ experiences in promoting natural 
farming led them to consider restructuring the organisation. The case of KVM 
reveals the challenges of mobilising a movement for sustainable agriculture that 
appeals to diverse communities and the attempts made by organisations to negotiate 





Map 6.1. Punjab districts map, showing main sites of KVM activity. Source: adapted 
from PlaneMad (2007a). 
 
6.1. Punjab History: From Green Revolution to Crisis 
The state of Punjab, in northwest India, was a major focus of India’s Green 
Revolution. In 1960, Ludhiana, in central Punjab, was one of the seven districts 
targeted in the initial phase of the Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme, which 
sought to rapidly disseminate the use of hybrid seeds and chemical inputs. Several 




ensured that it quickly spread from Ludhiana across the entire state.  At the physical 
level, the region has a flat terrain and rich alluvial soils, which had already facilitated 
the extension of agriculture to cover most of the state’s area (Gosal, 2004). Punjab 
also had an efficient and evenly distributed system of irrigation canals, constructed 
during the colonial period, which ensured that sufficient water was available to 
farmers in almost every part of the state to make the new technology gainful (Bhalla 
& Chadha, 1983). Furthermore, the resettlement of displaced landholders after 
Partition had been taken as an opportunity by the state to consolidate and rationalise 
previously scattered landholdings and to construct more efficient road networks, 
easing the development of commercial agriculture (Randhawa, 1974). At a political 
level, the Punjab government was particularly interested in facilitating the uptake of 
the new technologies by building infrastructure and providing farmers with access to 
credit (Singh & Kohli, 2005). Due to these factors, by the end of the 1960s, the vast 
majority of farmers in the state were using the technology and wheat production had 
tripled (Randhawa, 1974). Punjab was established as the ‘food bowl of India,’ a title 
that it retains to this day. With 1.5 per cent of India’s geographical area, Punjab 
produces approximately 20 per cent of its wheat and 10 per cent of its rice (Singh, 
2009: 262).  
From the early stages of its implementation, the Green Revolution brought uneven 
benefits in Punjab and several unwanted consequences. Although there were 
increases in productivity across the board, increases were considerably greater for 
those with larger landholdings (Bhalla & Chadha, 1983). The uneven distribution of 
gains has been attributed to the greater utility of the new technology for larger farms, 
but also the fact that smaller farmers, with less capital and a greater burden of debt, 
had restricted access to the technology (Frankel, 1971). As such, Frankel (1971) 
suggests the Green Revolution was creating social divisions and fuelling class 
conflict. Similarly, Shiva (1991) suggests that Punjab’s Green Revolution fuelled 
communal breakdown and violence, as it eroded existing relations of mutual 
obligation within villages by encouraging greater reliance on the state and the 
market. The loss of communal ties meant that in times of hardship there was less 
support: farmers were more likely to see each other as competitors than to provide 




The new technology facilitated greater levels of class mobilisation, particularly from 
the 1980s onwards. The Green Revolution facilitated a shift to a capitalist mode of 
production in Punjab and transformed the relations between landholders, tenants and 
labourers (Byres, 1981). As Gill and Singhal (1984) note, this created conditions for 
the contemporary farmers’ movements: all farmers, to varying degrees, had been 
integrated into the market and had a shared interest in maintaining low input costs 
and high agricultural commodity prices. Strong disillusionment with political parties 
in the late 1970s led to the formation of independent farmers’ movements, which 
came under the leadership of the Punjab branch of the Bharatiya Kisan Union 
(BKU). The Green Revolution also saw increased mobilisation of agricultural 
labourers, who found representation in the communist parties (Gill, 2000). 
The Green Revolution did bring considerable short-term economic gains in Punjab, 
but by the 1980s and particularly the 1990s, the economic situation turned sour.  
From the early 1990s, growth in yields for the three major crops (wheat, cotton and 
rice) began to stagnate, compromising farmers’ income (Sidhu, 2005; Chand, 1999). 
Since 2000, this tendency has worsened and it appears that yields have reached their 
maximum. Growth in output has been slow or slightly negative in wheat, stagnant in 
rice and negative in cotton (Singh, 2009). As Singh (2009) outlines, this decline in 
growth has become an economic crisis for farmers, as it coincides with a rise in the 
capital costs of farming, including chemical inputs and machinery. Furthermore, 
intensive cropping patterns have depleted soil fertility, meaning that more fertiliser is 
necessary to achieve the same yield. On top of this, pests have developed resistance 
to pesticides, so farmers also must purchase more pesticides. With farmers spending 
more and earning less, their income has gradually diminished. This has been 
particularly damaging to farmers with small holdings, who were already in a 
precarious position. 
In Punjab, perhaps more than elsewhere, the unchecked use of Green Revolution 
technologies has led to a deterioration of ecological conditions. The water table in 
Punjab, as throughout much of North India, is at an alarmingly low level (Rodell, 
Velicogna & Famiglietti, 2009), with many districts registering less than ten per cent 




pumps (Chand, 1999) and the growth of the area of the state under water-thirsty, high 
yielding varieties of rice (Singh & Kalra, 2002). Equally alarming, there is evidence 
that the high concentration of agricultural chemicals in surface waterways and in the 
aquifer is having an adverse impact on human health. In addition to causing 
environmental damage, such as algal blooms in rivers, there is strong evidence of 
increased rates of cancers and reproductive health disorders in Punjab (Thakur et al, 
2008; Thakur et al, 2010). Punjab’s health issues have become a focus of local media 
attention and are a source of significant public concern.  
Importantly, Punjab’s agrarian crisis has not been experienced in the same way by all 
classes. The increasingly capital intensive nature of Punjab agriculture and 
diminishing returns has had a more severe impact on small and marginal farmers. On 
a per hectare basis, marginal farmers are on average three times more indebted than 
large farmers and when this is scaled to income it becomes clear that the stress of 
indebtedness of these farmers is far higher (Singh, Kaur & Kingra, 2008). Gill (2005) 
argues that, due to their precarious economic position, indebted small farmers are 
over-represented in cases of farmer suicides. Declining profitability is making small 
and marginal farms less viable, and the number of farms in this category has 
decreased (S. Singh, 2012). Former small holders now constitute a new ‘reserve 
army of labour’ in Punjab, yet the employment opportunities in agriculture have 
declined dramatically since the 1980s (Sidhu & Singh, 2004) and increasingly 
farmers are seeking to employ more readily exploitable migrant labour (M. Singh, 
2012b). The level of local unemployment in rural Punjab has subsequently increased 
(Singh, Kaur & Kingra, 2008: 130). Though the media focus has predominantly been 
on suicides by farmers, suicide rates among agricultural labourers are also increasing 
(Bharti, 2011). Suicides amongst various rural classes in Punjab, which are above the 
national average and increasing (Singh, 2009), are frequently taken as a strong 
indicator of the ‘crisis’ situation, indicating desperation and a lack of options.  
The ecological and health dimensions of the crisis also have uneven effects across 
classes. As a consequence of the declining water table, only the wealthier farmers 
can now afford to drill tube wells deep enough to access the ground water, with less 




2005). The burden of the health crisis is also felt more profoundly by the lower 
classes. Singh (2010) has found that due to the poor state of public healthcare 
facilities in rural Punjab, many small and marginal farmers have avoided treatment, 
despite a large portion of them suffering from serious illness. For farmers in these 
categories, healthcare expenses were the second most common reason for entering 
into debt, after production costs. 
These changes in material conditions have led to a shift in the way Punjab is 
perceived and represented. Jodhka (1997) suggests that the rise of the Khalistan 
separatist movement in the 1980s represented a turning point in public perceptions of 
Punjab: from the model of agrarian prosperity, Punjab came to be seen as a state with 
multiple problems. Consequently by the late 1980s ‘crisis’ had emerged as ‘the 
dominant mode of representing Punjab’ (Jodhka, 2006: 1530). The response to this 
crisis from the state has been slow in coming. The ruling parties have tended to focus 
on communal issues and shallow populism rather than addressing the socio-
economic dimensions of crisis (Kumar, 2007; M. Singh, 2012a). The disconnect 
between political parties and ground realities had historically facilitated the 
formation of politically independent farmers’ movements (Gill & Singhal, 1984), 
however since the 1990s, these movements have become highly fractured, 
particularly over questions of liberalisation and the nature of their relation to political 
parties (Mukherji, 1998; Gill, 2004). Thus while the Green Revolution approach had 
given focus to development strategies in Punjab in the 1960s and 1970s, the current 
situation closely resembles the Gramscian ‘crisis of authority’. The old way is dying, 
yet, due to lack of leadership, the new cannot be born. 
 
6.2. Kheti Virasat Mission: Origins and Organisational Identity 
More than the other case studies presented in this thesis, members of Kheti Virasat 
Mission see themselves as intervening in a ‘crisis’ situation that is playing out at a 
regional level. KVM proposes ‘natural farming’ as the best solution to the 
multifaceted crisis of Punjab. It reduces the ecological impact of synthetic inputs and 




KVM claim to have reduced their debts. Furthermore, by producing food that 
contains no chemical residues, these methods help alleviate concerns regarding 
Punjab’s health crisis. At a more ideological level, KVM argues that Punjab requires 
a paradigm shift – away from the reductionist, abstract and materialistic perspectives 
of the Green Revolution and towards a position that is more holistic, spiritual and 
within which tradition plays a major role. 
At the centre of KVM is its Executive Director, Umendra Dutt (1.b.). Dutt was born 
into a middle class family in Firozpur district in Southwest Punjab. His professional 
background is in journalism, rather than farming. Politically, he has had a strong 
involvement in the right-wing Hindu organisations of the Sangh Pariwar, particularly 
its anti-globalisation wing, the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch (SJM). For several years, he 
worked in Delhi as editor of SJM’s monthly magazine, Swadeshi Patrika. He claims 
that through this work he was exposed to numerous articles on the impact of 
synthetic pesticides on human health. During his time at Swadeshi Patrika, he was 
also influenced by a number of activists promoting ecological perspectives on social 
issues, most notably Anupam Mishra of the Gandhi Peace Foundation. Mishra had 
gained public attention by espousing India’s traditional water harvesting systems as a 
means of overcoming water shortages. Dutt was inspired by Mishra’s approach, 
which integrated ecological thinking with an appeal to Indian tradition. After regular 
visits with this mentor figure, Dutt began to shift his focus from narrowly defined 
nationalist concerns towards a view that recognised the seriousness of ecological 
decline. Nonetheless, Hindu nationalist ideology continues to influence Dutt’s 
thought and action, though it no longer appears to be his central guiding principle. 
Taking up these issues, in 2000 Dutt founded an NGO called Kheti Virasat (Hindi 
and Punjabi: ‘Agricultural Heritage’). The choice of name reflected Dutt’s belief that 
agriculture, seen in a holistic sense, was at the centre of Indian civilisation and that 
India’s loss of its national heritage and identity was partly attributable to its 
abandonment of thousands of years of tradition when it adopted the Green 
Revolution: 
Ours is a country which has developed agricultural implements about ten thousand 




glory it is very important to revive our agricultural heritage, to know our agricultural 
heritage. Because these days we have somehow forgot the agricultural heritage of ten 
thousand years, and we are following the agricultural science which is only hundred 
years old… And agriculture is not just agriculture. It is a way of life. When I say it is 
a way of life, it is a very holistic view. It includes the agricultural practices, it 
includes economic development, it includes the village management, the governance 
at village level, at district level, our artisans, craftsmen, the skills.  
The organisation aimed to assist farmers in transitioning to less chemically intensive 
farming methods by implementing projects, mostly funded by government 
departments. For example, there were several projects for installing vermicomposting 
and rainwater harvesting units in villages. By this stage, Dutt had brought together 
some eight or nine people for his cause. 
After leading these initiatives for several years, however, Dutt became disillusioned. 
He came to the opinion that the other members of the organisation were not 
motivated by a genuine desire for change, and instead were simply interested in their 
own career paths. The money flowing through the organisation had attracted the 
‘wrong kind’ of activist, in his view. In February of 2005, he resigned from Kheti 
Virasat, and the next day formed Kheti Virasat Mission. For Dutt, adding the word 
‘mission’ to the title indicated some of the factors behind his split with Kheti Virasat, 
and emphasised his commitment. As he puts it:  
[The change of name] is only to differentiate between us. Because that means that… 
their running of the organisation, it was for their employment. It was a job. For me it 
was a mission. That’s why. For them it was ‘we need money, we need the job 
security’. 
Dutt set up office for KVM in the small town of Jaito in Faridkot District, having 
several contacts there from the Sangh Parivar. From the outset, Dutt emphasised that 
KVM would not follow an NGO approach. In the previous organisation he felt that 
this had led to greed and prevented the realisation of key objectives. KVM was to be 
a people’s movement.  
UD: We call ourselves an environmental action group, or you could say it is a 
people’s movement for environment. We work as a movement, not as an NGO.  





UD: Go and see any NGO. You will find there are two or three persons there 
deciding their work. Taking projects and doing work. Here the priorities are entirely 
different. Our priorities are not to take projects, to run for the projects… No. We 
won’t run after projects, and if we take money it is only on our terms. Ok? Secondly, 
we decide what we want and we do that only. Forget about projects, what any 
[donor] will say. We do what is urgent, what is important for the movement. 
Nonetheless, the new organisation was registered as a ‘trust’, which is the typical 
designation under which NGOs of this size would register in India. Registering as a 
trust kept KVM’s options open for certain commercial ventures, such as establishing 
a magazine, and was necessary for the receipt of foreign contributions. As such, 
when Dutt emphatically states that KVM is ‘not an NGO at all’, he does not refer to 
its formal, legal status. It is a rejection of the NGO approach as a model of 
organisation. Dutt asserts that this model leads to a commercial approach to public 
service. He suggests this is closely tied to the culture of contemporary Punjab – that 
all forms of activity, including those in the ‘public interest’, are seen in terms of their 
potential to generate money. Dutt and other KVM members also stress that NGO 
style work ensnares activists in projects, causing them to lose sight of the broader 
cause. They must pander to the needs of donors – and international donations, 
according to Dutt and others within KVM, often come with strings attached. Harmeet 
(1.e.), KVM’s chief field worker, suggests that NGOs are limited in their capacity to 
raise fundamental issues, as they must constantly keep the perspectives and interests 
of their patrons in mind, whereas a ‘movement’ like KVM can ‘[put forward] these 
issues without any hesitation, at every platform’. Uttam (1.k.), a former KVM 
activist, describes NGO workers as subdued, urbane activists, who sit around 
‘sipping tea’, discussing issues and working on their media profile. He preferred a 
model of activism with ‘fighting spirit’, which would engage directly with issues. 
Positioning KVM as a social movement and distancing it from NGOs thus enabled 
its activists to negotiate issues surrounding their freedom as activists, the way in 
which their activism is represented and the influence of donors. Yet, it is worth 
noting that not all of those involved in KVM see the ‘social movement’ structure as 
being so clear-cut. Another of KVM’s core activists, Ashok (1.f.) described the 




and 10 per cent as being for ‘specialised’ and commercial purposes.
33
 Furthermore, 
while it was rare for activists to identify KVM as an NGO, a number of KVM’s 
professional supporters and farmers would casually refer to it as an NGO in 
interviews. In the media, KVM is often described as an NGO, much to Dutt’s 
chagrin. 
KVM has maintained a small, committed team of between five to ten activists, but 
has a much wider network of supporters. The office in Jaito remains the centre of 
activity, but there are small branches in other cities – including Jalandhar, Amritsar 
and Chandigarh. To all appearances, KVM has become the most prominent group 
promoting sustainable agriculture in Punjab. The Organic Farming Sourcebook lists 
KVM as the sole organisation working for this cause in the state (Alvarez, 2009). 
Kheti Virasat, the NGO from which KVM broke away, continues to exist. Their 
representatives did not respond to requests for them to participate in this study, and 
therefore I cannot comment on the extent of their work. Dutt insists it is minimal.
34
 
During fieldwork, I did encounter a small number of development NGOs that had 
included some form of chemical-free farming into their broader development agenda. 
Dutt is particularly scathing of these organisations, which he sees as 
opportunistically responding to donor interest in organic farming. He insists they 
have no long-term commitment to the cause. The presence of these potential 
‘competitors’ to KVM’s moral authority on sustainable agriculture, relatively small 
as they may be, may go some way in explaining KVM’s continued need to 
differentiate itself from them, by emphasising its non-NGO identity. 
 
 
                                                 
33 This final category evidently related to Ashok’s own interest in developing a lab for the 
production of bio-fertilisers under KVM’s umbrella – which had not materialised during the 
fieldwork period.  
34 Kheti Virasat’s website, as of December 2012, did not appear to have been updated since 2004 




6.3. Structure, Discourse and Methods of Engagement 
During its first few years, KVM operated in a largely informal manner. This gave it 
flexibility to develop a broad and active base of followers. Dutt’s approach was to 
involve diverse sections of the community who were concerned by issues in Punjab 
and to encourage them to make their own (largely voluntary) contributions. Rallies 
and demonstrations were organised at opportune times, whenever the need arose. 
Rather than working on ‘projects’ in the manner of NGOs, KVM initiated a series of 
‘campaigns’, focused on generating awareness of specific issues or protesting current 
developments, such as the commercialisation of genetically modified crops. For 
income, KVM relied primarily on donations from individual members and 
supporters, rather than funding bodies. Dutt asserts that travelling from place to place 
and requesting donations has allowed KVM to ‘build a relationship with the masses’. 
Making monetary contributions, he suggests, gives people a greater sense that KVM 
is ‘their movement’, increasing commitment. A majority of individual donations 
come from KVM’s urban supporters. Thus, although KVM’s work most directly 
concerns farming and rural communities, there is a financial need to ensure the 
message is amenable to urban Punjabis, upon whom the organisation depends for 
patronage.  Having said this, the participation of farmers in KVM is crucial to its 
claim to represent the grassroots. Of the seven members of KVM’s executive 
committee, four are farmers. Farmers’ participation in KVM public events is crucial. 
Some of the more passionate natural farmers give talks at workshops and public 
lectures, detailing their experiences with natural farming and the factors that led them 
to convert. Some also provide tours of their farms to interested persons to 
demonstrate the viability of their techniques.  
The central activity of KVM is working in villages, encouraging farmers to adopt 
natural farming techniques. As described in the introduction, natural farming is a 
farming system that does not use synthetic chemicals, and which, in contrast to 
‘organic farming’ does not involve the purchase of any external inputs from outside 
of the village. For KVM, this distinction is particularly important. KVM’s chief 
fieldworker, Harmeet (1.e.), describes the difference as follows: 
[Natural farmers] never use any inputs from the market. But in organic farming, 




But in natural farming, farmers prepare their own biopesticides and biofertilisers 
with the material which is available in their home, or farmyard, or in their field, or 
nearby the village. So this is the biggest difference. According to this difference, 
organic farming is basically market oriented farming…  The products of organic 
farming… they are very costly… Only some people can afford. So basically organic 
farming is a farming with the landlords, but not for marginal farmers.  
Furthermore, KVM activists point out that organic farming is bound up in systems of 
third party certification. Farms are evaluated by independent organisations to verify 
that there are no traces of chemical inputs on the farm, and issue certificates, which 
provide consumers with certainty that the organic food they are purchasing contains 
no chemical residues. The process requires the submission of cumbersome amounts 
of paperwork and is expensive, making it prohibitive for small farmers (Khosla, 
2006). Thus, KVM argues that ‘organic farming’ can only exacerbate the problem, 
placing additional costs on farmers to purchase both organic inputs and certificates. 
Natural farming, by contrast, does not involve excessive costs. 
KVM activists argue that natural farming is the ideal response to the crisis situation 
in Punjab. Since natural farming does not involve the use of synthetic chemicals, it 
addresses the concerns about ecological toxicity and public health. Further, the costs 
involved in natural farming are much less than those in chemical farming, reducing 
the need for farmers to enter into debt. For some farmers, particularly those who 
came to KVM through frustrations with the pressures of contemporary commercial 
agriculture, these ideas had a strong resonance. Farmer Jagmohan (1.r.), for example, 
had spent decades campaigning with Leftist parties and farmers’ movements for 
subsidies and support prices and ultimately became frustrated, perceiving that the 
gains made could never keep up with the growing pressures. Wanting an alternative, 
he sought out NGOs, but found they were all promoting organic farming and new 
forms of commercial ventures, which he was not interested in. When he came upon 
KVM and their natural farming model, he saw a genuine way to break out of the 
cycle of high expenses and indebtedness that commercial agriculture entailed. 
Similarly, Mohan (1.n.), who had come to natural farming for similar reasons, 
suggested that all NGOs in Punjab only promote organic farming, whereas KVM was 




In addition to working in villages, KVM recognises the importance of urban support. 
In order to promote a large scale shift to natural farming, it is necessary to have 
urban consumers of naturally grown produce and to have people willing to advocate 
for changes at the policy level. KVM also has an interest in raising people’s 
awareness of environmental issues throughout Punjab and encourages them to take 
action: whether this is in implementing or supporting natural farming projects, or 
other forms of environmental activities, such as tree planting. KVM receives a 
considerable portion of its income as donations from urban supporters. They have, 
therefore, devoted considerable time to promoting awareness of the ecological and 
health crisis of Punjab in cities as well as in villages. They do this in diverse ways. 
Dutt himself spends a lot of his time travelling Punjab, giving talks about these issues 
at schools, public events, social clubs and so on. Other KVM activists focus on 
media and cultural activities, such as writing songs about the environment.  
In their attempts to promote a shift in agricultural practices in the state, KVM has 
developed its own interpretation of the ‘crisis’ situation in Punjab. Their construction 
of crisis engages with the perspectives of those who have been adversely affected by 
the Green Revolution and who are thus open to considering alternative approaches. 
They emphasise dimensions of Punjab’s ‘agrarian crisis’ that point to the value of 
natural farming as an alternative or ‘solution’ to the crisis. Although engaging with 
the pressures of commercial farming and indebtedness, KVM places particular 
emphasis on the health dimensions of the ‘crisis’ situation in Punjab. Harmeet (1.e.) 
considers health to be the key factor that motivates farmers to change their practices. 
When working in villages, he encourages farmers to think of the toxins to which they 
are exposing their families by allowing them to consume food grown with chemical 
inputs. In his public lectures, Dutt talks predominantly about Punjab’s public health 
situation, focusing on how the accumulation of chemicals in the ecosystem is causing 
a decline in the health and vitality of the people and ecology of Punjab.  
KVM supports grassroots initiatives to raise awareness about health. A prominent 
example of this is their collaboration with Master Harjas (1.jj.), a school teacher from 
a village in Bathinda district. Harjas became concerned about the high incidence of 




on the incidence of cancer. Having found the rates to be very high, he took the issue 
up in the media and with local politicians and administrators.  Believing the cancer 
incidence to be linked to the excessive use of pesticides in the region, he began 
working with KVM to create a local centre for environmental awareness, which 
promoted reducing pesticide usage and taking up natural farming.  
Perhaps more controversial than KVM’s focus on health is Dutt’s frequent claim that 
the situation in Punjab is essentially a ‘civilisational crisis’. Presumably drawing on 
his background in the Sangh Parivar, Dutt argues that India’s religious and farming 
traditions have been gradually eroded by the Green Revolution and that natural 
farming represents a way to ‘reclaim our glory’. There are several dimensions to this 
perspective. On one level, it taps into the notion of sovereignty. Dutt and other KVM 
activists argue that the Green Revolution was an imperialist intervention into Punjab, 
which was designed to benefit multinational seed companies. Similarly, they claim 
that the new push to grow genetically modified crops in Punjab is also part of 
Monsanto’s agenda to control Indian agriculture. They suggest that, in order for 
farmers to avoid this foreign threat, they should embrace natural farming and have 
complete control over what they introduce into their farming system. A strong part of 
the ‘tradition’ that Dutt suggests his ‘mission’ is reclaiming is one in which farmers 
recognise the ‘spiritual’ dimension of farming. Dutt often states that ‘God is 
omnipresent in all of nature and therefore any act that harms nature is violence 
against the God’. As such, he suggests that the ultimate goal of KVM is to awaken 
the people of Punjab to the divine presence in nature, by virtue of which they will 
cease to commit destructive acts. 
Of the natural farmers interviewed for this research, only a small number expressed 
concerns for sovereignty or spirituality as a major factor that motivated them to adopt 
natural farming. The majority were motivated by concerns about health and some by 
economic concerns (indebtedness, etc.). One farmer, Tanvir (1.u.), who did express 
an interest in spirituality, was less interested in reconnecting with ‘tradition’ or God, 
as Dutt promotes, and more interested in the joy that natural farming brings and the 
contrast between the violence of chemical farming and the non-violence of natural 




farming is a destructive work’. It should be noted, however, that even for Tanvir, the 
spiritual dimension of natural farming was not the initial reason for his ‘conversion’. 
As such, this focus on spirituality, sovereignty and the ‘civilisational crisis’ of 
Punjab is not KVM’s most important discursive intervention among farmers, though 
it may provide some incentive for them to continue natural farming once the 
transition has been made. The ‘civilisational crisis’ perspective is more closely 
related to the fact that (a) KVM activists believe in these perspectives, want to 
propagate them and are of the view that after awakening to the agenda of 
multinationals, the people will take the movement to the next level, and (b) KVM’s 
self-representation as a spiritually and politically conscious movement provides 
legitimacy, particularly among its urban supporters, who give it financial backing.   
The economic dimensions of the crisis in Punjab have not been such a strong focus 
for KVM. Certainly, KVM does state that, through reducing their dependence on 
chemicals, farmers can reduce their expenses and overcome their debts, and a section 
of the farmers working with KVM have adopted natural farming techniques 
predominantly for this reason. Yet it is clear that KVM does not see the economic 
argument as their key strength, due to the fact that the practice of natural farming 
usually involves a reduction in yields, at least over the short term. A number of KVM 
members and affiliated farmers mentioned that natural farming would be more 
economically viable than chemical farming if it were not for the policy bias against 
it. The government continues to support chemical farming by paying a subsidy to the 
chemical companies, which reduces the cost of chemical inputs. Several farmers and 
activists claimed that if the cost of this subsidy were given to farmers directly on a 
per acre basis, and chemical inputs were thus allowed to return to their actual price, 
then large numbers of farmers would convert to natural farming. One of KVM’s key 
policy demands is a shift to direct subsidies to farmers, but, as Gurdas (1.d.), a senior 
KVM member, comments, ‘We are working on it, but it’s not the only issue. This 
issue has been taken up by the farmer organisations’. KVM activists are aware that 
farmers’ movements have not been successful in their campaigns for direct subsidies. 
In their view, this is due to the influence of the chemical lobby on policy-makers. 
Consequently, KVM does not have a lot of hope that they can cause a policy shift in 




Agricultural labourers were strikingly absent in KVM’s mobilisational strategy and 
in their discourses on the benefits of natural farming and the ‘crisis’ of Punjab. As 
Avtar (1.bb.), one of KVM’s professional supporters noted, labourers stand to benefit 
from chemical-free agriculture, as it is more labour intensive, increasing employment 
opportunities and thus putting upward pressure on wages. Ashish (1.w.), a natural 
farmer working with KVM, observed that agricultural labourers benefit from natural 
farming, as they are not forced to apply chemical sprays, which are unpleasant and 
damaging to their health. Conceivably, KVM could assist labourers in agitating for 
safer working conditions. Yet KVM has deliberately avoided interactions with 
agricultural labourers, due to concerns that this would alienate farmers, whom they 
consider to be their key constituency. Uttam (1.k.), a former KVM activist with a 
keen sense of justice, ultimately left the organisation, partly over what he saw as a 
disinterest in agricultural labourers within the organisation. He claims that when they 
used to travel to villages activists would never even speak with labouring families, 
and would associate exclusively with landowners. His attempts to hold meetings with 
labourers while he was working with KVM were met with discomfort by other KVM 
activists. Uttam was also concerned that natural farming would increase the price of 
food, which would adversely affect labouring families. KVM’s ambivalence about 
labourers casts doubt on its proclaimed strategy of working with all people whom the 
crisis of Punjab affects and of developing a broad and dynamic intervention into the 
crisis situation.  
This section has provided an overview of the various ways in which KVM puts 
forward its interpretation of the crisis of Punjab and develops its own unique populist 
strategy for the promotion of natural farming as an alternative. These approaches 
have allowed KVM to rally some support for their cause and encouraged a growing 
number of farmers to experiment with natural farming techniques. Though these 
methods of engagement, KVM has mobilised a diverse support base. Despite Dutt’s 
links to the Sangh Parivar, KVM has been able to mobilise across the political 
spectrum, with prominent members from all major political parties of Punjab. This 
political diversity reflects the nature of the ‘crisis of authority’ in Punjab: none of the 
major political parties have been able to address the fundamental issues in the state, 




They work with farmers with various sized holdings, but have a special emphasis on 
small holders, believing that these farmers are most in need of an alternative. In the 
sections that follow, I go into more detail on KVM’s main attempts to focus these 
strategies, first through the use of ‘action groups’ and secondly through the 
Chiranjivi Gram Abhiyan, a funded project that aims to completely convert five 
Punjabi villages to chemical-free farming techniques. 
 
6.3.1. The Action Groups 
A key component of KVM’s overall strategy is forming ‘action groups’. These are 
subgroups within KVM, formed mostly along lines of profession, or on specific 
issues, in which teams of activists and professionals devise strategies to promote 
change within specific domains. Dutt has tried to be sensitive to the various social 
groups that Punjab’s ecological crisis concerns and has encouraged them to organise 
into action groups to facilitate changes in a manner best suited to them. He considers 
it to be of great strategic importance to involve diverse people, perspectives and 
forms of expertise in the movement, in order to make it more dynamic. As of early 
2010, there were five main action groups within KVM: the Environmental Health 
Action Group, Women’s Action for Ecology, Teachers for Ecological Action, the 
Vatavaran Panchayat (Hindi: Nature Councils) and KVM’s anti-GM campaign. 
To bring focus and legitimacy to its endeavours to raise awareness of the health 
scenario in Punjab, KVM has formed an ‘Environmental Health Action Group’ 
(EHAG). The group is composed predominantly of health professionals, who speak 
at public events and to the media about the links between chemical toxicity and 
disease. Because doctors are held in high regard, their voices add legitimacy to the 
claim that Punjab’s health scenario is at a crisis point and that some change in 
approach is necessary. In interviews, prominent EHAG members describe a scenario 
in which harmful chemicals have become omnipresent in Punjab, and in which the 
individual is helpless to protect themselves from deadly diseases: 
The environment of Punjab is now fully, or I would say, over-saturated with 




fungicides – everything. Most of them are very, very toxic. Most of them can be 
found everywhere. They can be found in soil. They can be found in the subsoil water. 
They can be found in breast milk. They are in the food chain. All of us are carrying a 
lot of persistent organic pollutants even in our subcutaneous fat in our body. If you 
take out my fat you will find it in there. So that is how these chemicals have now 
entered the food chain and the entire ecology (Prem, 1.mm.). 
Because sickness has become so dominant in Punjabi houses. Someone is sick. Child 
is sick, somebody, somebody. There is no family which is free from sickness. One 
type of sickness or the other… Sickness has become the way of life (Gurdas, 1.d.). 
Through statements such as these, members of EHAG perform the function of 
‘organic intellectuals’. In contrast to ‘traditional intellectuals, who Gramsci (1971: 5-
23) describes as atomising people through discourses of individualism and social 
divisions, ‘organic intellectuals’ serve to unite the population in solidarity. By 
articulating the interconnectivity of all life in the ecosystem and the common threat 
of ubiquitous exposure to harmful chemicals, EHAG shows that chemical agriculture 
should not only concern farmers – it is an issue for all people who live in Punjab. 
Such a perspective theoretically encourages a collective response. As Gramsci notes, 
organic intellectuals vary in terms of the extent of their connections to the classes 
they represent and unify. EHAG intellectuals, being of an urban middle class 
background, are not extremely well-positioned to express the experience of the rural 
poor who are most affected by the health crisis. Nonetheless, their efforts give voice 
and legitimacy to the everyday social realities of living with chronic disease, and 
their intellectual work provides a language through which this reality can be 
expressed. 
While EHAG relies on the participation of ‘experts’, other KVM action groups 
attempt to promote health awareness through more grassroots strategies. The most 
prominent example of this is Women’s Action for Ecology (WAFE). This action 
group took shape in late 2008 and early 2009, when it was organised largely by an 
urban activist, Ramneet (1.m.). Ramneet spent a lot of time working with women in 
villages near Jaito to promote awareness of the impact of chemical farming on 
health. KVM activists saw several strategic reasons for developing a role for women 
within the movement. On the one hand, this had to do with a view of the traditional 





Family is basically managed by women. Women have the responsibility to feed the 
family. And she has the right to [decide] how and what she [will] feed. And when 
women come with KVM, it will give fast progress to us… When the women join us 
it will naturally go faster and faster (Harmeet, 1.e.). 
So we also thought that, you know, it would be a bit hard to encourage a man [by 
saying] ‘What are you growing for your family? Poison?’ It would be a bit hard. 
Because men are a bit hard [laughs]… But, you know, the kind of connection that a 
mother has with her child, we can encourage women that ‘how can you afford to feed 
your kids with poison?’ If we can build up an atmosphere like this, and if we can 
start up with just kitchen gardening, from kitchen gardening we can shift to the fields 
(Ramneet, 1.m.).  
On the other hand, the rationale for the programme was also based on an apparent 
historical precedent of women’s involvement in development work: 
Another thing is that if we see the development work that is being done in various 
parts of the world, we have seen that wherever the development work has been done 
it has mostly been done by women… You know women, the inherent nature of give 
and care, their energy can certainly be diverted to such work (Ramneet, 1.m.). 
Ramneet had organised meetings and festivals in villages to promote awareness 
amongst women of the relationship between disease and pesticide usage. Rather than 
simply quoting statistics to the women, she would engage in dialogue with them and 
encourage women of different generations to discuss changes in the health of 
communities over the years. Further, at festivals, older women were involved in 
reviving old recipes for pre-Green Revolution crops, particularly drought tolerant 
millets, which KVM feels will eventually make a more sustainable alternative to rice 
for Punjab.  
WAFE was particularly influential in the village of Bhotna, where Ramneet made an 
important local contact, Akashdeep (1.x.). Akashdeep’s husband was already 
practicing natural farming with KVM’s help and through this she had already been 
exposed to KVM’s perspectives. She was convinced of the moral imperative that 
women should not feed chemically contaminated food to their families. To spread 
this message throughout the village, Ramneet and Akashdeep began to organise 
meetings with women to share information and teach them how they could begin to 
grow their own chemical-free vegetables in their courtyards and kitchen gardens. In 
the beginning, there were only a handful of women who came to meetings, but by the 




village had taken up home gardening, and one woman had also started natural 
farming on a small acreage. She also claimed that some of the women had been able 
to convince their husbands to convert a small part of their landholdings to natural 
farming to meet the family’s subsistence requirements. Akashdeep and other women 
in Bhotna were helping their husbands in preparing biological inputs for natural 
farming. It was acknowledged, however, that there were limitations to this, as many 
women in the village were not given the freedom to attend meetings and had various 
other ‘constraints’ in their home environment.  
In late 2009, Teachers for Ecological Action (TEA) was formalised as a new KVM 
action group. KVM had developed a support base of up to 40 teachers, who had been 
involved in promoting ecological perspectives in schools through Eco-Clubs
35
 as 
well as poetry and essay-writing competitions. TEA was formed as an attempt to 
focus this activity. The main organiser of this new action group, Prabhir (1.kk.), 
argues that teachers are particularly well-positioned to help expand awareness of 
ecological issues in Punjab. He suggests this is because they are held in high regard 
in communities, often enjoying the status of ‘Gurus’. Furthermore, they have regular 
exposure to both students and parents alike, in both rural and urban areas, and 
perform the important function of engaging with ideas and bringing them into the 
lives of communities. Crucially, Prabhir argues that teachers have spare time to 
devote to social service which those in other professions lack. TEA was still 
developing during the fieldwork period, however they were already devising 
strategies to bring ecological perspectives into the lives of students, both inside and 
outside of school. Prabhir and others also showed a keen interest campaigning to 
influence the school syllabus to make it more sensitive to the scope of the ecological 
crisis in Punjab, though it was acknowledged that this would be a challenging task 
that would require a high level of organisation.  
                                                 
35‘Eco-clubs’ were a part of the National Green Corps initiative of the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests of the Government of India, which commenced in 2001. Eco-clubs are now 
operating in over ninety thousand schools throughout India. The main objectives are to raise 





The action group through which KVM behaves most like a ‘social movement’ in the 
traditional sense of the term is its anti-GM campaign. Dutt had been involved in the 
movement against GM since his days in SJM. During that time, he came to see GM 
crops as part of an American imperialist conspiracy to control India’s food systems. 
KVM has been able to rally farmers around this cause, particularly those who claim 
to have suffered as a result of the failure of bt-cotton. KVM has held numerous 
rallies protesting the commercial release of GM crops and was particularly prolific 
during public debates on the commercial release of Bt-brinjal.  
 
6.3.2. The Chiranjivi Gram Abhiyan 
In the early stages, KVM’s attempts to promote natural farming in villages simply 
entailed working with farmers who had an interest in experimenting with these 
techniques and providing them with basic support and information. In 2008, they 
began to work in a more focused way, starting on a sponsored project, in 
collaboration with the Centre for Sustainable Agriculture (CSA), a Hyderabad-based 
NGO. The project was called the Chiranjivi Gram Abhiyan (CGA), which roughly 
translates to ‘Sustainable Villages Campaign’. Its aim was to completely convert five 
Punjabi villages to natural farming techniques and thus provide model villages for 
sustainable development in Punjab. To this end, CSA assisted in mobilising experts 
for focused training programs and KVM provided local connections and permanent 
staff. KVM selected the villages to be targeted. Selection of villages was made on the 
basis of proximity to KVM’s office in Jaito, and certain strategic considerations 
(focusing, for example, on villages with high rates of cancer). The villages targeted 
in the CSA also became the focus of several of KVM’s other initiatives, such as 
WAFE. The project was funded by the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust, the charitable 
foundation of India’s most famous capitalist dynasty.  
The day-to-day operations of the project have been coordinated by Harmeet (1.e.), 
who had been an activist with KVM for several years before beginning work on the 
project. Though his formal education was in politics and Hindi literature, he had 




considerable knowledge of effective techniques. When not engaged in other 
campaign work, Harmeet would travel each day to one of the five villages and ensure 
that techniques were being implemented correctly and that farmers were not 
experiencing any difficulty. In each village there was a local coordinator who had 
received intensive training, whose task was to maintain more regular contact with the 
practicing natural farmers, particularly during key phases of the crop cycle. Harmeet 
and the five local contacts were each paid a modest monthly salary for their work. 
The CGA has also organised a series of events to help educate farmers about natural 
farming. At these events, experts and practitioners from around India give lectures 
and workshops on topics such as mixed cropping and the preparation of bio-inputs. 
Many of those who run these workshops either work or are affiliated with CSA, and 
reflect the way in which the CGA project has enabled KVM to more effectively 
mobilise expertise.  
By grafting the CGA onto its agenda, KVM has effectively operated according to 
both social movement and NGO modes in different contexts, behaving as what 
Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005) term a ‘hybrid organisation’. Harmeet viewed this dual 
strategy as being appropriate to the aims of KVM. Regarding the project work, he 
asserts that KVM has a ‘duty’ to educate farmers on natural farming techniques, 
given that they have been so actively promoting them. This requires the kind of 
resources and expertise that an NGO structure provides. Conversely, he suggests that 
KVM’s identity as a ‘social movement’ provides them with legitimacy that 
mainstream NGOs lack. He cites the proliferation of NGOs in Punjab in response to 
funding opportunities as evidence of their inferior moral status. Since KVM has been 
advocating these techniques for many years on a meagre budget and since they still 
devote so much of their time to campaigning, their motives appear less questionable. 
Harmeet does not indicate any tension within KVM in having two different strategic 
approaches and suggests they are simply two different modes of action. In the village 
context, he says, when KVM is engaging with farmers in order to change their views 
on farming, they are working in a ‘movement’ mode; when they educate and try to 





6.4. Restructuring the Organisation: KVM in Transition 
Already, the CGA represented a shift in approach for KVM. Where the group began 
by forging out an identity in strident opposition to NGOs, with the CGA, KVM 
began to take on NGO-style project work. During the fieldwork period, it had 
become apparent that difficulties in implementing these projects had led to a rethink 
of the entire approach taken. KVM was in the process of considering ways to provide 
more formalised structures in the organisation so that it could better implement its 
central agenda – the promotion of natural farming.  
 
6.4.1. The Challenge of Natural Farming in Punjab 
The CGA has had mixed success. During the research period there were between 10 
and 25 farmers practicing natural farming in each of the five targeted villages – 
significantly below targets set by CSA for that phase in the project. Furthermore, the 
majority of farmers practicing natural farming through the CGA were only doing so 
on a small scale. These modest results indicate some of the challenges associated 
with promoting natural farming in Punjab, but also some of the limitations to the 
approach KVM had taken.  
As noted above, although farmers in the CGA are motivated by a variety of factors in 
choosing to adopt natural farming, the overriding reason that farmers cited in 
interviews was health concerns. Knowledge of Punjab’s health issues is quite 
pervasive. Through interactions with KVM, this awareness could be translated into 
new forms of practice. As farmers attend KVM lectures or workshops they are able 
to establish connections between health problems and farming practices and consider 
possible alternatives. Although this had inspired a few farmers to convert all of their 
landholdings to natural farming, the most common pattern observed in all villages of 
the CGA was for farmers to convert 1-2 acres of their property to natural farming 
methods and continue to farm with chemicals on the remaining acreage. Landholders 
and their families would consume food grown without chemicals, while continuing 




CSA who began providing organisational support to KVM in 2008, outlined the 
gains and limits of KVM’s approach as follows: 
In Punjab you will find that farmers are ready to change for that one acre in which 
they grow their own food for their consumption, but not for the market. And that 
happened because you had addressed that problem, to begin with, to say ‘Look, look 
at your health, look at your family, what about your children?’ They understand that, 
they’ve addressed it. Now we will have to take it to another level. But I think that’s 
where you have to begin. You can’t begin in the abstract. 
In terms of taking things to ‘the next level’, most farmers interviewed suggested that 
they would cultivate more of their landholdings using natural techniques, if they find 
that natural farming is equally productive. It seems they have not. During the 
research period, the project had been running for over two years and farmers were 
still only cultivating 1-2 acres without chemicals. 
Despite the claims made by KVM, farmers, with a few exceptions, indicated that 
using natural farming techniques had failed to deliver comparable yields to chemical 
farming. Part of this may be attributable to the techniques themselves. It may have 
been unrealistic to expect that without synthetic inputs, farmers could still achieve 
the high yields Punjab had produced following the Green Revolution. It was also 
apparent, however, that frequently the natural farming techniques were not being 
implemented completely, which points to organisational problems within KVM. It 
was clear from fieldwork experience that local coordinators for each village were 
providing incomplete and inadequate advice to farmers. Harmeet (1.e.) lamented 
these coordinators’ lack of commitment and said that it was difficult to find people at 
the village level with an interest in this kind of work who possessed the appropriate 
skills. Most of those skilled in performing a supportive role for farmers preferred to 
seek white collar work in nearby cities, he claimed. Reflecting on the project, Dutt 
also suggested that KVM had hastily decided on which villages to include in the 
project. Despite being places of ‘strategic importance’, some villages were more than 
an hour’s travel from KVM’s base in Jaito, posing serious logistical challenges for 
KVM. 
After more than two years of being involved in the project, some farmers had 




interview with the researcher, one of the more committed farmers, Ashish (1.w.), 
whose five acre plot had been used as a showcase of biodiversity by KVM, 
complained of the lack of ongoing input:  
Author: Do you feel like you’ve received enough support from KVM? 
Ashish: No sir, very little. The only support we are getting from KVM is knowledge.  
No support to sell produce. No other support. 
Author: Has the [CGA] brought any benefit? 
Ashish: No. We worked for some time under this scheme, but there was no benefit. I 
suggested to them that instead of going with a large number of farmers, that you 
choose five farmers from different parts of Punjab, and let these farmers experiment 
with natural farming. And these farmers should receive all kinds of support from 
KVM. Financial support, manual labour support. Marketing support also. And if it is 
successful, then other farmers will follow that.  
Ashish’s farm had been running at a loss and, in particular, he had struggled to find 
appropriate marketing avenues for his produce. His comments above reflect an 
expectation on the part of farmers that despite their lack of funds, KVM should be 
behaving more like an NGO and giving comprehensive support to farmers as they 
make their transition to natural farming. Other interviewees commented that in 
KVM’s general meetings, other farmers had started to express their disillusionment. 
Some members were concerned that farmers would soon give up and go back to 
chemical farming, which could be disastrous for KVM’s image. The experiences 
with the CGA and the concerns they have provoked were driving KVM to once again 
rethink its strategy and organisational identity. 
 
6.4.2. Towards a ‘Professional’ Approach 
KVM had thus encountered an internal crisis, at least with respect to its work with 
farmers. During the fieldwork period, there was a broad consensus within the 
organisation that it was failing to live up to its mandate to show the viability of 
natural farming in Punjab. The need for a new approach had become apparent in 
general meetings, where farmers expressed their discontent. Dutt made it clear that 
KVM was in a state of transition and that it needed to reorganise its resources to 




professionalism was not new. For Sangeeta (1.l), this had been a priority area since 
she began interacting with KVM in 2008. Her previous experience working with 
CSA, which had successfully implemented sustainable farming projects on a large 
scale, had given her a strong sense of the kinds of organisational structure that could 
effectively deliver and she felt the lack of effective organisation in KVM was the 
cause for its shortcomings in the field. Initiating a shift in approach was challenging, 
however, given strong opinions within KVM regarding its identity as a ‘movement’, 
as Sangeeta describes: 
[M]y objective there was to essentially somehow work a bit on organisational 
systems, because I felt that was where they were the weakest. They could be more 
effective, if only they straightened out some processes in terms of better planning, 
better delivery, you know, being more accountable to what they were doing. And it’s 
always a challenge given that, you know, there are these different perceptions of the 
nature of the organisation and in reality also it’s all of everything. It’s a strange beast. 
It’s a movement. It’s an NGO. You need to do some project kind of work, but you 
also need to allow it to unfold naturally without worrying about deadlines and so 
on… A movement allows you to be accountable to no one else but yourself. 
Movements are always, I would think, less accountable to [pause] anything apart 
from your conscience. Whereas I think NGO style of functioning at least requires 
you to be accountable to your supporters if nothing else. It should not be that way – 
the primary accountability should be to the people you have set out to support and 
help – but at least that force is always at work. You know, deadlines, deliver, do it 
systematically, plan, review, staffing, all those things…  
Sangeeta had made several attempts to introduce a more systematic and accountable 
approach within KVM, but ultimately became frustrated, as improvements did not 
appear to be taking place. As such, she was ambivalent about whether she would 
maintain a role within KVM in the future, despite Dutt’s renewed commitment to a 
more professional approach.  
In conceptualising a new framework for KVM, a particularly important role was 
played by two middle-class farmers, Ravleen (1.c.) and Ram (1.i.), both of whom had 
come to farming from professional backgrounds for a change in lifestyle and to 
reconnect with issues they felt to be important. Their backgrounds were in business 
and engineering respectively and their analysis played a key role in both framing the 
nature of KVM’s problems and prescribing solutions. In interviews, Ravleen and 
Ram presented their views in slightly different idioms and with different emphasis, 




KVM’s leadership had taken on too many tasks, which had become a barrier to 
delivering on their promises of making natural farming systems productive. Between 
2007 and 2008, KVM had considerably expanded its charter. As awareness spread 
about the crisis situation in Punjab, Dutt responded by initiating action groups that 
went beyond the immediate task of facilitating the growth of natural farming. For 
Ram, this represented a failure with respect to the central goals of the organisation: 
There has been a dilution of the original mandate of promoting natural farming, 
because a lot of other issues have come up, which has given KVM an opportunity to 
network with other NGOs in the country. And I think they feel that it’s too good an 
opportunity to pass. So I think the farming aspect has suffered because of extra 
functions being taken on by the same team. And so for the past year, year and a half, 
I think we’ve kind of had a standstill or there’s even been a slight drop in enrolment 
or in the spirits of the members of KVM, because we’ve not been able to get the 
results, production-wise, that we would have liked.  
[…] KVM leadership is now more involved in the other avenues. No person is 
devoted now to actually addressing the problems that have come for the farmers after 
they have been practicing natural farming.  
Ravleen gave a similar analysis, adding that the ad hoc manner in which KVM has 
taken on new roles has been problematic: 
We have expanded our charter very significantly since the organisation was started. 
It started with just sustainable agriculture. Now you've got health issues, 
environment, pollution, GM, soil and loads of other things on our plate. And they 
sort of get picked up ad hocishly and put on the backburner as we see fit. There's 
really no continued momentum that has built up on any one. 
At the same time as KVM’s leadership was becoming involved in new tasks, a 
growing number of farmers were experimenting with the techniques they prescribed. 
It was thus increasingly necessary to maintain contact with a large number of farmers 
and to ensure they were not disappointed with their results. Because of the new 
responsibilities KVM had taken on, it was becoming increasingly difficult to attend 
to the needs of farmers with the kind of dedication that was needed. It is indeed 
ironic that the very factors that had contributed to KVM’s ‘movement’ identity were 
letting it down after it had become more ‘successful’ in convincing farmers to 
practice natural farming.  
During the fieldwork period, several propositions were being discussed on the way 




especially in relation to farming. A key suggestion was employing more professional 
staff. In particular, it was suggested KVM should seek professionals who had 
expertise in ecological agricultural techniques and ideally, had previous experience 
in assisting farmers in adopting these techniques. It was acknowledged that it may be 
difficult to find someone with relevant expertise for this task. In Punjab, there are 
few people with scientific expertise in ecological farming methods as this has not 
been a priority for the major universities. Ravneet and Ram acknowledged it would 
be difficult to find someone who would be willing to move to Punjab and to work for 
what would probably be a low salary.  
Both Ravneet and Ram were clear that devoting more time to natural farming should 
not mean ‘dropping the ball’ on other issues, but rather clearly allocating tasks such 
that work could be carried out more efficiently. In addition to hiring agricultural 
experts, it was suggested that there should be paid staff devoted to each of the key 
campaign areas. As Sangeeta (1.l.) noted with reference to limitations she saw in the 
women’s group, WAFE: 
KVM being dominated by men as it is, and Punjab being what it is, unless if you put 
in special efforts to go on patting the place next to you and go on calling the women 
to come and sit next to you when a group of men are talking. It requires someone to 
go on saying that – ‘Come, come, come, sit’. But, you know, if you’re not even 
exposed to ideas, some talking, some thinking, how do you expect them to get into 
action about addressing something? KVM being an all-male group has not helped at 
all. It means that we need some women activists to be there full time, to be taking 
that forward. It doesn’t happen with part-time efforts, for sure.  
By having paid, full-time staff, in contrast to relying on volunteers, input would 
become more reliable and less ad hoc – campaigns could continually apply pressure 
rather than simply reacting to current events. It would also allow the burden of work 
to be allocated more evenly and sustainably, helping to alleviate the huge amount of 
work Umendra (1.b.) and Harmeet (1.e.) had taken upon themselves. 
Clearly, expanding the number of paid staff would require more money for KVM. 
The need for more funds was expressed by a large number of interviewees, including 
those less directly involved in the debates surrounding restructuring. During the 
research period, there was considerable debate regarding where these additional 




had relied on individual donations. Dutt often collected these himself leading up to 
key events, such as workshops. It was said by some that the system for the collection 
of individual donations should be formalised, through membership fees or some 
system whereby supporters could make regular donations. This suggestion was made 
only by KVM’s urban supporters – it is unclear whether farmers would support the 
idea of membership fees. Others said that KVM should be more open to receiving 
funds from other organisations and from donors, though this issue was particularly 
contentious. It was also said that wherever possible, KVM should be thinking of 
ways it could produce its own sources of revenue and thus become more 
independent. 
For Ravleen (1.c.), at least, restructuring KVM should also involve a rethink of 
factors that had been crucial to its ‘movement’ identity. For example, reflecting on 
the amount of his own time that was being consumed in the work of natural farming, 
he suggests that expecting active participation from farmers in the movement was not 
sustainable: 
I think the sooner we realise that at least an organic farmer will not have that time to 
play an active role, the better off we'll be. A conventional farmer still has more time 
on their hands to be able to do this kind of thing and give time to organisations. But 
an organic farmer, a sustainable farmer, does not have that kind of time. There's way 
too much work on the field to be able to disengage for anything more than a short 
burst. You can ask for short bursts of energy - you know, there is a workshop being 
put together, and you can ask around for people to do just two days of hectic work 
and they will happily do it. To ask them to do it every day for months and years is 
too much. And I think that… we need to get out of that mode and we need to 
acknowledge that. 
Though supportive of, and to some extent driving the restructuring of KVM, Dutt has 
taken a cautious approach throughout discussions on how it should take place. He 
expressed particular concern that putting more resources into workers to demonstrate 
the yield potential of natural farming would, to some extent, mean playing into the 
materialistic mentality that he himself opposes. In KVM meetings, there had been 
discussions of what to do if ‘money-centric’ farmers come to a more prominent 
position within KVM.  It was feared that such farmers would promote the marketing 
of organic produce at premium prices and turn the project into a purely commercial 




those with a commercial mindset should not come to occupy leadership positions 
within KVM. This would retain the purity of its ideological vision. How this could 
be achieved, however, was less clear. There has been ongoing struggle to ensure that 
as new employees come into the organisation, they should not merely be technically 
competent, but also committed to the principles for which KVM stands. As it moves 
forward, KVM must therefore balance the competing needs of professionalism and 




In the initial stages, KVM’s identity as a ‘people’s movement’ allowed it to separate 
itself from some of the negative features associated with NGOs. Particularly, KVM 
activists argued that a ‘movement’ structure allowed them to operate independently 
of the interest of donors, to have greater flexibility and to develop a more direct 
relationship with their constituents. The formation of ‘action groups’ can be seen as 
an expression of this. Action groups allowed KVM to work with various groups that 
Punjab’s ‘crisis’ scenario concerns, enabling them to make their own contributions, 
as is suitable to their position in society. It should be noted, however, that despite 
being flexible and organic, KVM’s strategic approach also showed clear limitations 
and tensions. There was a clear tension between KVM’s reliance on its urban 
supporters (for donations, legitimacy and so on) and its need to work with rural 
communities – particularly land owning men – whose behaviour they were ultimately 
trying to change. It is also noteworthy that, despite their claims to working with all 
communities that are affected by Punjab’s crisis situation, KVM does not work 
directly with agricultural labourers. These themes will be explored in more depth in 
Chapter 9. 
By the time of the fieldwork period, it was clear that the very flexibility and breadth 
of KVM’s mobilisational approach, which had been crucial to its identity as a 
‘movement’ was failing to deliver results with respect to its central mandate of 




within the organisation that there was a need for more formal organisational systems, 
more clearly differentiated projects, more expertise and more access to funds. In 
other words, KVM’s experiences on the ground were pushing it back to a more 





7. THE TAMIL NADU ORGANIC FARMERS’ MOVEMENT 
 
This chapter focuses on the work of two urban activists, M. Revathi and her husband 
R. T. Thiruvenkataswamy (hereafter, Swamy), and their various attempts to promote 
ecological farming in the state of Tamil Nadu. Revathi and Swamy became involved 
in the promotion of ecological agriculture after engaging with issues relating to the 
environmental and social impacts of pesticides. After promoting ecological 
agriculture in an informal manner for several years, they were thrust into a more 
active role in 2004, when a tsunami struck the coast of Nagapattinam District, 
causing loss of life and widespread damage to farmlands. They helped farmers to use 
ecological techniques to restore damaged land. Their work in tsunami restoration 
required them to adopt a more formalised approach. Thus they registered as an NGO 
in early 2005 with the name ‘Tamil Nadu Organic Farmers’ Movement’ (TOFarM).  
The case of TOFarM demonstrates the complex challenges that urban activists face 
in developing a strategy for engaging with rural communities. Throughout their 
history as an organisation, TOFarM has had to consider how to best make use of 
their social position, given that they are from urban, middle class backgrounds. On 
the one hand, they have the time and education required to engage in organisational 
work and produce and distribute materials on sustainable agricultural techniques. 
Although Revathi initially wanted to support the growth of a movement led and 
directed by farmers, in time she came to recognise that farmers, particularly 
ecological farmers, often lack the necessary time and resources to do this. On the 
other hand, being from urban backgrounds, they have at times felt ill-equipped to 
deal with the complex hierarchies and social divisions in rural Tamil Nadu. TOFarM 
recognises the value of having farmers lead the initiatives that are ostensibly in their 
interests. As such, they have taken the approach of acting as a ‘facilitative’ 
organisation – promoting the growth of farmers’ movements, without formally 
leading these movements themselves.  This chapter shows how in consolidating this 
strategic approach, TOFarM attempts to negotiate local and non-local power 





As was noted in Chapter 5, the methodological approach taken in collecting data for 
TOFarM differed from the other two case studies. There were fewer opportunities to 
interview a large number of people affiliated with the organisation. The data 
presented here thus relies in a large measure on a series of extended interviews with 
Revathi (2.a.). This was, to some extent, appropriate, as TOFarM’s organisational 
work is done almost entirely by Revathi and Swamy, and it is this work which is of 
most interest to the thesis. Therefore, except where otherwise indicated, the data on 






Map 7.1. Tamil Nadu districts map, showing locations of significance for TOFarM. 
Source: adapted from PlaneMad (2007b). 
 
7.1. Regional Context 
Geographically and agro-climatically, Tamil Nadu is a diverse state. It features 
several major river systems, mountain ranges and plains. Being the Southernmost 
state on the Indian Peninsula, its climate is tropical, yet the blockage of the north-




the state. There is thus a high vulnerability to drought. Although river systems 
provide a source of irrigation water, these rivers themselves depend completely on 
monsoonal rains, and can be dry for much of the year. Traditionally, rural society in 
Tamil Nadu has been structured by a relatively rigid caste hierarchy. Within the local 
caste ideology, agricultural labour is among the least valued activities, though self-
employed peasants are valued over wage labourers (Alexander, 1975b). Tamil Nadu 
is now a highly urbanised and industrialised state, yet agriculture continues to play 
an important role in its economy. It is the fifth largest producer of rice of all Indian 
states and a major producer of fruit and vegetables. There is a high rural population 
density and average landholdings are relatively low. The precarious position of these 
small holders, along with ongoing caste and religious tensions has led to persistent 
social issues in Tamil Nadu. These factors have played a dynamic role in the history 
of the state’s rural development.  
Due to the pre-existence of irrigation systems and the rich alluvial soil of Tamil 
Nadu, several of its districts were targeted in the early stages of the Green 
Revolution. Thanjavur District, which covered most of the Cauvery Delta at the 
time,
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 had extensive irrigation systems and was one of the initial seven districts 
targeted by the IADP. Subsequently, Green Revolution technologies were promoted 
in other districts with adequate pump well irrigation facilities (Hariss-White & 
Janakarajan, 1997). Large parts of Tamil Nadu, however, practiced rain fed 
agriculture, and so derived no immediate benefit from the Green Revolution 
technologies. As a result, agricultural development in the state has been uneven. In 
non-irrigated regions, rural development often involved state interventions in 
markets to promote the development of small scale industries (see Barbara Harriss, 
1984).  
Compared to Punjab, the uptake of the Green Revolution technologies in Tamil Nadu 
was staggered. In addition to the geographical dimension, described above, there 
                                                 
36 In 1991, Thanjavur district was trifurcated to assist with administration. The coastal region of 
former Thanjavur district is now known as Nagapattinam. This is the district in which TOFarM’s 




were technical issues. At the centre of Tamil Nadu’s Green Revolution were varieties 
of rice initially developed at the International Rice Research Institute in the 1960s. 
As Frankel (1971) documents, farmers were slow to adopt this new variety, as it was 
seen to be a risk. The variety required a large amount of water for an extended period 
of time, which the erratic rainfall pattern in Tamil Nadu often did not allow. In 1964, 
however, local researchers developed a variety that was more appropriate to local 
conditions. This variety was insect resistant – useful, given Tamil Nadu’s pesty 
tropical conditions – and most importantly, it matured quickly, allowing farmers to 
obtain a crop during the narrow period in which rainfall was secure, and opening the 
possibility of double cropping. When the rest of Tamil Nadu was in drought in 1965, 
this variety, grown in Thanjavur, managed to obtain a sizeable yield, which drew a 
lot of attention and led to calls that its use be increased throughout the state. Lags in 
uptake continued, however, as poorer farmers lacked the income to invest in the new 
seeds and technologies of the Green Revolution. Furthermore, the large number of 
tenant farmers in the state lacked any incentive for such investments.  
The agrarian class structure in Tamil Nadu created an additional barrier to the new 
technologies from facilitating the kind of broad social and economic development 
experienced in Punjab. As Harriss (1982) describes, with reference to a district in the 
north of the state, Green Revolution technologies did, to some extent, facilitate the 
emergence of a stratum of capitalist farmers, in the sense that they followed a 
capitalist pattern of investment and were generating a surplus. These farmers, 
however, were often also money lenders and merchants. In the short term, it was 
more profitable for these farmers to invest their surplus in usury and trade than to 
invest back in agriculture, constraining agricultural development. Harriss also notes 
that although the caste structure of society was being questioned in favour of more 
egalitarian ideas, caste remained a prominent source of identity in the region. The 
attachment of poor farmers and agricultural labourers to caste identity stymied the 
potential for more direct forms of class assertion and to a certain extent made the 
status quo appear, if not legitimate, then at least to some degree acceptable.  
The implementation of the Green Revolution in Tamil Nadu generated significant 




implement development in a manner that created as little disturbance to the status 
quo as possible, thereby sidelining questions of distributive justice (Mencher, 1974). 
As Frankel (1971) outlines, Thanjavur District had, and continues to have, a very 
high population density for an agrarian society, with large numbers of smallholders 
and landless labourers. As such, the disproportionate benefit of Green Revolution 
technologies to large landholders was a more pronounced issue. Furthermore, 
because of a surplus of agricultural labour in the region, and an influx of migrant 
labour from poorer districts, wages in Thanjavur remained static after the new 
technologies were introduced. Consequently, landless labourers, who made up a 
majority of families in the district, received no increased monetary benefit, despite 
working greater hours.  
Responding to this situation, labourers began to assert themselves, demanding 
increased wages and more rights. They were encouraged by the Communist Party, 
which had established a strong presence in some of the coastal towns and villages of 
the district and whose secular ideology had undermined the traditional Hindu beliefs 
that encouraged acceptance of existing hierarchies (Alexander, 1975a). Communist 
agitations, such as strikes and collective bargaining, led to increased tension between 
labourers, land owners and police. Since there were examples of labourers winning 
improved conditions in other parts of the state, land owners wanted to repress this 
potential class assertion in Thanjavur (Byres, 1981). Tensions culminated in 
Kilvenmani village in 1969, where land owners and their supporters massacred over 
forty people belonging to the families of landless labourers (Mencher, 1974; 
Alexander, 1975a). The explosion of violence in Thanjavur remains a poignant 
example of how rural growth without some measure of equity can contribute to 
social unrest. 
It is difficult to document the agrarian change that has occurred in Tamil Nadu in the 
time since the Green Revolution, as the state’s development trajectory has introduced 
changes that are both dynamic and complex. Furthermore, the impact of these 
changes has been experienced unevenly across the state, with some districts 
experiencing more rapid and transformative change than others. Some 




of rapid industrialisation, which has occurred not only in the cities, but in rural areas 
as well, with textiles manufacturing being a particularly strong growth area 
(Djurfeldt et al, 2008). Harriss-White and Janakarajan (1997) suggest that industries 
have been drawn away from the cities towards the countryside, attracted by the lower 
rents, cheaper labour and relative ease of tax evasion. Simultaneously, there has been 
an erosion of the state policies that supported agricultural development throughout 
the Green Revolution period, in the interest of creating a ‘free market’ environment. 
Chiefly, this has meant a removal of subsidies for agricultural inputs, deregulation of 
the rural banking sector and a push towards heightening ceilings on landholdings 
(Harriss-White and Janakarajan, 1997).  
The net effect of these policy shifts has been a growing precariousness of agriculture 
as an economic activity. This precariousness, when combined with the process of 
rural industrialisation, has led to a gradual but nonetheless profound transformation 
of Tamil Nadu’s social and economic structure. Small landholders and agricultural 
labourers have increasingly had to rely upon work in the growing non-agricultural 
sector in order to sustain themselves (Harriss, Jeyarajan & Nagaraj, 2010). There has 
been a tendency amongst labouring classes in particular to leave villages in search of 
employment in cities, to engage in seasonal migration and to diversify their sources 
of income by seeking employment in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities 
(Djufeldt et al 2008). Three participants in the present research, Selvam (2.c.), 
Amalan (2.e.) and Shankari (2.f.), noted that the shift away from agriculture poses 
logistical challenges for promoting sustainable agriculture in Tamil Nadu. Activists 
are faced with the double challenge of developing sustainable models and sustaining 
agriculture per se. In this context, it becomes particularly important to demonstrate 
that sustainable agricultural methods can provide viable livelihood opportunities. 
Despite this growing precariousness within the agrarian economy, there are signs of 
increased welfare within Tamil Nadu’s villages. The state has maintained stable and 
successful welfare programs, including an effective Public Distribution System, 
which provides rice rations for low income families. Djurveldt et al (2008) have 
argued that the success of these programs, combined with a well-functioning health 




sufficient security as to not be pushed into highly exploitative relations with wealthy 
landlords and money lenders. There is also evidence of increasing wages for 
agricultural labourers, which Harriss, Jeyarajan & Nagaraj (2010) suggest has come 
partly as a consequence of the success of the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme and the growing political assertion of low caste labourers. 
In stark contrast to Punjab, Tamil Nadu has a diverse range organisations promoting 
sustainable agriculture, making use of various techniques and strategies of 
engagement. The Organic Farming Sourcebook lists 36 organisations that are active 
in promoting sustainable agriculture in the state, and an even greater number of 
farmers who are working informally to distribute information regarding techniques 
they have found effective (Alvarez, 2009). Two participants in the present study, 
Kapilan (2.h.) and Visikaran (2.j.), who have both been active in these movements 
for several decades, attributed the proliferation of initiatives in the state to the 
presence of Auroville, a large commune outside of Pondicherry, which has been 
experimenting with land reclamation and reforestation since the 1960s. Auroville’s 
success in reclaiming severely degenerated land had attracted international attention. 
As Giordano, Satish and Farrington (1993) outline, Auroville received considerable 
support from both government organisations and from abroad, in the form of funds 
and visiting experts. Having these resources at its disposal, Auroville aimed to 
extend its own success by providing professional training to NGOs and research 
institutions, both within Tamil Nadu and throughout India. Locally, they have also 
facilitated the development of farmer-to-farmer networks for the dispersion of 
knowledge and technologies. As Alvarez (2009) notes, Auroville has been a major 
resource centre for the development of sustainable agriculture not only in Tamil 
Nadu, but throughout all of India.  
 
7.2. Tamil Nadu Organic Farmers Movement 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the work and perspectives of M. Revathi 
(2.a.) and her husband R. T. Thiruvenkataswamy (2.b., hereafter, Swamy), who, 




to some of the issues facing rural Tamil Nadu. As should be clear from the previous 
sections, promoting chemical free-agriculture in this state proves challenging since 
(a) farmers have been practicing chemical agriculture in large parts of Tamil Nadu 
for some time now; and (b) many farmers are looking outside of agriculture for 
employment opportunities. They have therefore had to generate a sustained method 
of providing farmers with knowledge of ecological techniques, and of convincing 
them that it represents a viable source of livelihood and income generation. This 
section provides a chronological account of their various attempts to achieve this, 
how they have responded to externally imposed challenges (most notably, the 
tsunami in 2004) and how they have consolidated their strategy in the process.  
 
7.2.1. Origins: Developing a Critical Perspective on Ecology and Farming 
Revathi became involved in activism in a phased manner, having been gradually 
exposed to issues in Indian agriculture over a period of years. Prior to her 
involvement, she had been working as a middle school science teacher in 
Coimbatore. Having had a keen interest in environmental activities such as bird 
watching since her school days, she was interested in raising students’ awareness of 
environmental issues. Thus, in the early 1990s, she facilitated the development of an 
eco-club in her school. This eco-club became very popular among students, and its 
success eventually led to requests from other schools that she establish similar clubs 
for them. Before long, she found that a lot of her spare time was being devoted to the 
establishment of eco-clubs throughout the district. 
Revathi’s success in establishing eco-clubs drew the attention of the Sálim Ali 
Centre for Ornithology and Natural History (SACON), a research and education 
centre based in Coimbatore. Recognising her contribution towards environmental 
education, SACON awarded Revathi associate membership. As a member of this 
organisation, Revathi was exposed to a number of environmental research programs 
being conducted in her region. In particular, she became directly involved in a long-
term research project on bird mortality in India. The project had collected the bodies 




high traces of pesticides such as endosulfan in the heart muscles of the birds, which 
had led to heart attacks and other diseases. This initial exposure to the ramifications 
of pesticide use prompted Revathi to develop a more critical awareness of the 
organic connections between social and ecological issues. She describes her change 
in perspective: 
I [was] born and brought up in city, so my interest was with environment activities. 
But I don't have much knowledge about agriculture in India. Being involved with 
social movements, I know that people are committing suicide – the farmers are 
committing suicide, in large numbers – and a lot of problems are there in agriculture, 
but the exact root cause and how the farmers are suffering, these things I was not 
exposed to. 
After seeing the link between bird mortality and chemical use, Revathi became 
concerned about the impact of these chemicals on human health. She thus registered 
a new research project with SACON to investigate first, the effects of pesticide use 
on humans and, secondly, the reasons for farmers’ dependency on pesticides. 
This research project exposed Revathi to some of the key issues in contemporary 
Indian agriculture that would inform her subsequent work. Revathi and her students 
spoke with farmers from over twenty villages regarding the reasons for their 
pesticide dependency. Speaking directly with so many farmers not only revealed the 
high level of chemical usage, but also the fact that farmers felt hopeless about their 
situation and yet did not see an alternative. Through this research, Revathi learned of 
three key factors behind the high levels of pesticide use. First, that pesticide use had 
become necessary as a consequence of the widespread use of chemical fertilisers, 
whose effect on plants attracted more insects. In turn, the use of fertiliser went hand-
in-hand with the adoption of hybrid seeds, whose success depended upon the 
application of synthetic nitrates. Secondly, farmers could not revert to their 
traditional agricultural systems, because many of the traditional inputs were no 
longer available. In particular, the number of cows had reduced over time, reducing 
the cow manure available for use as an organic fertiliser. Thirdly, farmers believed 
that without chemical inputs they could not obtain high yields. Since indebtedness 
was a pervasive condition, farmers needed high yields in order to repay their loans. 





Revathi later described this exposure as providing a ‘complete picture of Indian 
agriculture’. Through her research participants’ retrospective accounts, she learned 
about the history of the Green Revolution in her state, and the contemporary issues 
that have developed as a consequence. Recognising that this was a problem not only 
of ecology, but of human health and farmers’ livelihoods, she became convinced of 
the need for an alternative approach. 
 
7.2.2. The Search for Alternatives: Technical and Institutional 
After conducting her research, Revathi found several farmers requesting information 
on alternatives. This led her to travel around the state engaging with farmers who had 
been practicing chemical-free farming. She was inspired to hear their stories. 
Farmers told of how they had applied techniques from ecological science in 
combination with traditional practices in order to obtain high yields with locally 
available materials. Revathi felt that, with her scientific background, she was able to 
quickly grasp the biological and ecological bases of the principles they were 
employing. After spending much of her spare time collecting information from these 
farmers, she went back to her research participants to share what she had found. 
When Revathi returned to farmers with her findings, she was received with 
scepticism. She attributed this to farmers’ perception that the techniques were too 
simple to provide the kinds of yields they required to sustain themselves. As she 
explains, 
This is an attitude problem. They thought that “this is risky and it won’t work out”. 
And they thought that even by using more chemicals, DAP,
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 urea, the yield is not in 
a flourishing way. Then if we use cow dung and urine and mixing the bio-solutions 
then how [will] it work out? Because of the simplicity [of the techniques] some of 
the farmers rejected. Most of the farmers.  
A further problem encountered at this stage was the perceived risk involved in 
adopting a new approach. Farmers maintained that shifting to a new paradigm of 
                                                 




farming and not applying any chemicals could severely compromise their income. 
Given the small size of landholdings and the high levels of indebtedness in Tamil 
Nadu, this aversion is not surprising, as it would risk reducing farmers’ only or 
primary source of income. Farmers were unwilling to try Revathi’s suggestion of 
testing the techniques on a small area of land first and extending with success. As the 
average landholding in Tamil Nadu is quite small, opportunities are far more 
constrained for adopting this kind of experimental approach than in, for example, 
Punjab.  
To help farmers develop more confidence in ecological farming and to adopt it on 
their fields, Revathi felt it was necessary to establish a movement. This would be the 
beginning of an ongoing interest in ‘movements’ as a method of organising. 
Revathi’s use of the term indicates that by ‘movement’ she means a kind of 
grassroots association between farmers which is, in the first instance, a platform for 
knowledge sharing. By becoming connected with each other and sharing their 
experiences with different techniques, farmers would be better positioned for 
success. It would also enable chemical farmers who were curious about alternatives 
to visit sustainable farms and see the techniques in action. As Revathi puts it, 
‘farmers’ fields should become a school’. She also asserts that, by coming together, 
farmers would have a stronger ‘voice’ to argue for the effectiveness and importance 
of their techniques to farming communities, media and policy makers, as she 
outlines: 
Because every farmer is suffering and everybody is in need of these techniques. But 
they don't know that another method is available. So to take this to a wider audience, 
these farmers should be united. There is no collective forum. If they are united and 
they have a good voice then we can bargain with the governments. We can show 
them that “see, the results are good, you have to support these kinds of movements, 
this type of agriculture”. 
Despite the fact that there were several NGOs working in the field of sustainable 
agriculture in the state and over a hundred practitioners that she was aware of, 
Revathi found little evidence of any ‘movement’ linking farmers together. There 
were no significant state-wide exchanges between sustainable farmers on the 
techniques they had found to be effective. Revathi pressed farmers to give their 




offered to play a supportive role, in which she would produce and distribute 
materials and facilitate exchanges between farmers. Farmers did not take to the idea. 
The foremost reason given was a lack of time: ecological farming is often a more 
labour intensive practice than its chemical equivalents, and farmers argued they 
could not spend time away from their farms in order to promote the cause 
collectively. This view was backed by interviews with Thileepan (2.p.), Jeevitha 
(2.q.) and Amalan (2.e.), all practicing ecological farmers who had attempted to 
promote their perspectives more broadly but found that the demands of farming 
prevented them from doing this in a sustained manner.  
A further reason for the unwillingness to form a movement was the level of divisions 
amongst those practicing sustainable agriculture in the state. Revathi suggests that 
even a small difference of opinion on the effectiveness of a certain technique was 
enough to prevent farmers from working together. Interviews with leaders of other 
organisations working in Tamil Nadu suggest that these divisions continue, and that 
they relate to factors other than simply techniques. For example, Pandian (2.d.), the 
leader of a small association of chemical-free farmers, expressed his differences with 
other prominent leaders in the state on the basis of their farming methods, their 
methods of organisation, their acceptance of funds and their level of commitment to 
the cause. Several other interviews and fieldwork experiences indicated numerous 
personality clashes within the sustainable agriculture community in the state. These 
have been an ongoing barrier to the formation of a united movement.  
Despite these setbacks, Revathi felt that she had identified both the source of 
farmers’ suffering and a solution. Further, it was a solution that also addressed her 
ecological concerns. She was determined therefore to bring knowledge of the 
techniques she had learned to large numbers of famers. From 2002 to 2003, this 
mainly consisted of relaying information between established organic farmers and 





7.2.3. First Attempts at an Organisation: Refining the Strategic Vision 
In early 2004, Revathi and Swamy registered as a society, named the Organic 
Farmers Trust, with the primary objective of distributing materials. They tried to 
establish a regular newsletter to maintain a constant flow of information to farmers 
about organic techniques. The process was fraught with problems, including in-
fighting amongst contributors and a general unwillingness amongst organic farmers 
to work together. There were also financial problems – farmers were not paying their 
regular subscriptions and almost the entire printing costs were coming from Revathi 
and Swamy’s salaries. This became impossible to maintain and led to a great deal of 
frustration. 
Still strongly committed to the cause, in June 2004, Revathi made the decision to 
devote all of her time to demonstrating and promoting the techniques to farmers. She 
felt that she was well-positioned to bridge the gap between busy ecological farmers 
and chemical farmers who were interested in alternatives, but nonetheless cautious or 
sceptical. Having skills in writing, teaching and communication and sufficient time 
and resolve, she felt she could make an important contribution. Thus, she quit her job 
with the intention of buying land on which to demonstrate a range of techniques to 
interested farmers, to produce materials and to conduct training programs. Her plan 
was to move away from the city and establish a new life among farmers in a village. 
In doing this, Revathi and Swamy’s ambition was to play a ‘facilitative’ role: rather 
than impose their own vision of ecological development on farmers, they remained 
committed to the idea of forming a movement that farmers themselves could lead:   
Even at the time of resigning I thought of starting a movement and supporting it. It 
should be a farmers' movement. I don't take an active role in that. I mean, everyday 
work is done by me, but I don't take a position in that. Like president, or managing 
trustee, or any named position. All the roles are taken up by farmers.  
Before making this long-term commitment, however, Revathi felt that she needed to 
gain a more comprehensive exposure to the agricultural situation in India and an 
understanding of how different organisations were operating. At this point, Swamy 
also resigned from his job in the Indian Navy, and together they travelled the country 
visiting various farmers’ organisations to learn more about their methods and the 




The second half of 2004 thus became a period of intensive education for Revathi and 
Swamy, in which they learned about the forms of farmers’ organisations in existence 
around the country. Through connecting with farmers’ organisations and NGOs, they 
were able to gain access to villages, even in relatively remote areas. In the process, 
they drew inspiration from the organisations themselves. Some were explicitly 
promoting sustainable and organic farming, while others were working on farmers’ 
issues and development more broadly. Farmers’ movements such as the Karnataka 
Rajya Raitha Sagha (KRRS) and the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) were particular 
sources of inspiration for Revathi. She saw in them strong movements in which 
farmers were taking an active role. She was impressed by their capacity to ‘raise their 
voice’ and take their message to the streets, forcing state governments to engage with 
their demands.  
At the same time, Revathi came to see that there were problems and strategic 
challenges within farmers’ movements broadly. She came to the conclusion that the 
power of farmers’ movements had been neutralised by political parties. Parties had 
all set up their own farmers’ branches and divided these into subcategories (irrigated 
farmers, unirrigated farmers, small farmers, large farmers, etc.) as a way of keeping 
the movement divided and preventing farmers from recognising shared interests and 
shared experiences of exploitation:  
They have not [understood] that actually the government is doing like that. 
Separating and making them not unite. Because if they raise the voice collectively 
then any government cannot withstand, because basically India is a farming country 
and seventy eight per cent of the total population is still involved in farming. So 
governments are very clever and political parties, all the parties are same. They had 
separate wings, and for even a very big issue, the parties won't join together. 
In this respect, travelling and liaising with diverse farmer organisations around the 
country provided Revathi with a political education, and sharpened her strategic 
vision. She began to see farmers’ issues in a more political light, seeing farmers 
themselves as a group exploited from all sides, but, due to historical factors, lacking 
the solidarity required to make collective demands in their own interests. 
Travelling also exposed Revathi and Swamy to the wide range of issues in rural 




differential impacts on farmers. At the same, they identified certain problems that 
were common throughout the nation. Revathi claims that everywhere they travelled 
they encountered indebtedness, pesticide resistant insects and a general sense that 
farmers were ‘fed up’ with chemicals. These were sources of great distress for 
farmers. It was at this point that Revathi was really able to clarify that the issues she 
was focusing on were matters of livelihood and food security as well as ecological 
sustainability, and that these socio-economic issues resonated more directly with 
farmers themselves.  
R: Because if you talk simply environment, nothing is going to happen. Environment 
issues like bird watching or nature walking, they are all having some impact, but this 
problem is having a huge potential to operate. Because this is very important because 
this is involved with the food security and our farmers' life. And basically 
environment balance also.  
Author: But you felt environment wasn't enough to mobilise people? 
R: No, it won't work out because most of the people they were concentrating on 
economics only. More than environmental ideology. They are very much worried 
about economics. Whether organic farming will help them to retrieve from their 
problems. That was their question. They are not concerned about ecology. 
Revathi thus began to promote ecological farming as an immediate solution to these 
socio-economic issues, which she claims generated a stronger response. This 
represented a decisive shift in her approach. Instead of defending ‘nature’ in the 
abstract, she would engage with threats to farmers’ livelihood, survival and way of 
life.  
During this period of travel, Revathi made contact with volunteers from the 
Association for India’s Development (AID),
38
 who provided a temporary solution to 
her financial insecurity. Believing in the importance of the work she was doing 
across India, AID provided Revathi with a ‘Saathiship’ award.  These awards are 
given by AID to activists who are recognised as doing highly valuable and creative 
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problematic tendencies within NGOs, AID has given special attention to supporting movements 




work, who would be hampered by being forced to work within formalised NGO 
structures. The monthly allowance that the award provided covered her regular 
expenses and made her less reliant on other sources of income and the generosity of 
host organisations.  
After several months of travel, the initiative had gained a certain momentum. Revathi 
and Swamy began to develop a model for training farmers that they felt was an 
efficient way of making a long-term difference in communities. This involved 
working with a select number of farmers to be trained intensively as ‘master 
farmers’, who would then go on to share their knowledge with others in the 
community. This would become an important model guiding their subsequent 
engagements.  
 
7.2.4. Responding to the 2004 South Asian Tsunami 
On December 26
th
 2004, an earthquake of magnitude 9.3 occurred off the coast of 
Sumatra, triggering a tsunami that had impacts on coastal communities across South 
Asia. While Sumatra itself was the worst affected by the tsunami, there were also 
huge amounts of damage in other parts of South East Asia, India and Sri Lanka. In 
India, Tamil Nadu was the worst affected state in terms of human casualties, with 
7,923 recorded deaths in the immediate aftermath, 6,023 of which were in the district 
of Nagapattinam (Arya, Mandal & Muley, 2006). For India’s coastal communities, 
the tsunami was without a recorded precedent, and as such, there was uncertainty as 
to an effective response. State and Central Governments, NGOs and multilateral 
agencies (such as the UNDP and the World Bank) were all involved in the 
emergency response. While each of these agencies had their own internal methods of 
coordinating action, there was little coordination between them (Achuthan, 2009). 
There were thus multiple, often conflicting responses to the tsunami. Revathi and 
Swamy’s actions to help restore farmland affected by the tsunami must be seen 
against this complex background.  
Upon hearing the tremendous impact of the tsunami in Nagapattinam District, 




they mobilised their research connections to document salt contamination levels. The 
level of salt in soil and ground water was found to be very high. It quickly became 
apparent that while the dominant aid response was directed at fishing communities, 
the contamination of soil and irrigation sources meant that the tsunami would 
precipitate a crisis for farmers as well. Farmers had no previous experience with this 
level of salinity and, therefore, looked to others in search of answers. Meanwhile, a 
consensus developed in the research community that it would take between three to 
five years for the land to become arable again. For farmers, this created much fear 
and frustration, as non-agricultural sources of income were very limited in 
Nagapattinam and it was not clear how they would survive during the interim. Many 
began to sell their land at desperation prices. 
Revathi and Swami were confident that, through use of ecological techniques, it 
would be possible to reclaim contaminated lands. Yet, when they told local officials 
that they were willing to help all farmers in the district to adopt these techniques, 
they were met with doubt. Since the official report had clearly stated that it would 
take years for recovery, officials were sceptical of their claims that ecological 
techniques could have farmers growing a crop within the year. They requested that 
Revathi and Swamy demonstrate that their techniques worked, before they could be 
implemented on a large scale. They took up this challenge and spent the next five 
months in Therku Poigai Nallur, a highly affected coastal village.  
The method they used involved three main techniques. First, they ploughed the salt 
affected layers of soil and dug several trenches in rows through the fields. This 
allowed water to pass easily through the soil when it rained, draining into the trench, 
carrying the salt with it. The salt could then be removed manually from the bottom of 
the trench. The second technique involved burying hard organic material in the soil, 
such as logs and sticks, the slow decomposition of which helped to rebuild damaged 
soil. The third technique was to sow a salt tolerant plant called daincha. Daincha 
requires very little water and quickly provided an organic soil cover. This prevented 
evaporation, which would cause salt to rise back to the top layers of the soil. By 




While promoting this ecology-based response to the crisis, Revathi and Swamy 
clashed with the state government over its response, which they felt reflected a bias 
towards chemical methods. According to Revathi, the main focus of the 
government’s compensation package for farmers, formulated in early 2005, was to 
provide free chemical inputs. In particular, they distributed large quantities of 
gypsum, which was to be used to desalinise the soil. Revathi and Swamy were 
opposed to this, because it only addressed the problem of salinity and not that of 
compacted soil, and because of the potential for gypsum to contaminate the water 
table. Furthermore, the process of using gypsum to treat salt damaged lands is 
complex, and Revathi claims the government provided no technical training to 
farmers in how it should be applied. In response, Revathi and Swamy informed 
panchayats
39
 of the problems associated with using this chemical and the existence of 
alternatives. They also made appeals in the media. This campaigning drew the 
attention of government officials, who sent Revathi a letter informing her that her 
‘anti-government’ stance would bring her trouble in the future. In interviews, Revathi 
clarified that she is not anti-government in principle and that she found the 
threatening undertone of the letter quite shocking. This consolidated the view in her 
mind that the state government of Tamil Nadu was committed to the chemical model 
of agriculture and that it would be in her interest not to confront them directly in the 
future. 
By May of 2005, Revathi and Swamy were able to announce that the lands on which 
they had been working were restored and ready for cultivation. Following this 
announcement, local authorities agreed they could begin work on a larger scale. They 
began by working on some 600 acres of land, applying the same techniques. This 
introduced new organisational challenges. This was the first time that their work had 
required substantial funds. Money was required to finance machines used in the 
removal of salt, sand and mud. They also needed funds in order to train people in the 
techniques. Up until this point, Revathi and Swamy had avoided fundraising and the 
implementation of NGO-style project work. They had been registered as a trust, with 
                                                 




the purpose of providing a supportive role to the development of grassroots 
initiatives. Knowing that funds would be required to expand this work, however, they 
registered as an organisation in March of 2005. Due to the emergency situation, the 
government had waived the usual requirement that an organisation be registered for 
three years before receiving foreign contributions. The name chosen was Tamil Nadu 
Organic Farmers’ Movement, reflecting Revathi’s continued ideological 
commitment to people’s movements as a mode of organisation.  
Through her previous networking with research institutions, Revathi had established 
connections to a German funding organisation called Arbeiter Samariter Bund. When 
the time came to apply for funds, she made contact with their representatives, who 
came to see their work and agreed to fund an expansion. Revathi reports no conflict 
between her vision and that of the funding body, and indicates that they agreed with 
her methods. In the initial stages, there were difficulties in adapting to this new 
organisational model and in fulfilling reporting requirements, as Revathi and Swamy 
had no previous experience in this field. They requested support from AID, who sent 
volunteers to help with budgeting and paperwork. 
After five months working on this project, Revathi and Swamy were again able to 
announce success in land reclamation.
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 Due to the larger scale of their work, this 
time their success attracted very wide attention from national and international 
media, academics, agricultural scientists and politicians. Encouraged by the positive 
response from outsiders, they decided to extend their work to the entire coast of 
Nagapattinam. In order to reach larger numbers of farmers, they worked with other 
NGOs based in the region. They trained NGO workers directly, so that they could 
take the techniques to communities, and followed suggestions from NGOs regarding 
communities that were likely to be responsive to training programs. TOFarM has 
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contentious. Kume, Umetsu and Palanisami (2009), who found that soil and groundwater salt 
concentrations in Nagapattinam had returned to pre-tsunami levels by 2006, argue that the 
reasons for the fast recovery were the heavy monsoon that followed the tsunami and the porous 




documented that they provided training programs for at least 16,000 farmers of 
Nagapattinam District during the latter part of 2005. To ensure their impact was 
sustained, they once again used the ‘master farmer’ training model. After conducting 
two day training programs with larger groups of farmers, a smaller number were 
selected for more intensive training. In Revathi’s words, the idea was to give the 
master farmers ‘to the community as an asset’. There was no cost to farmers to 
receive this training – they were told that their fee was that they should take the 
techniques to others and support them in transitioning to ecological farming.  
By the end of 2005, Revathi and Swamy felt that their work in tsunami restoration in 
Nagapattinam was largely complete. They had attracted a great deal of national and 
international attention for their work, with visits from former U.S. President and 
U.N. ambassador, Bill Clinton, and former President of India, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam. 
Clinton had recommended Revathi and Swamy to governments in Sri Lanka and 
Indonesia, where there was also urgent need for tsunami restoration and both 
governments extended invitations. Thus in January of 2006, Revathi and Swamy 
travelled to Banda Aceh in Indonesia, where they taught similar techniques to those 
used in Nagapattinam for mobilising farmers and restoring damaged land. Most of 
the work was coordinated by a local NGO called Uplink, with Revathi and Swamy 
being sponsored by a German organisation. Then, from early 2007 til May of 2009, 
after a brief period further establishing their results at Nagapattinam (see 7.2.5., 
below), Revathi and Swamy worked on tsunami restoration in Sri Lanka. The Sri 
Lankan program was directed by Oxfam – funds did not go to TOFarM as an 
organisation. Revathi and Swamy, however, continued to play a leading role. They 
began their work with a small number of villages in Ampara District, but as their 
work became recognised by surrounding villages it spread rapidly.  
The tsunami experience highlighted how sites of disaster could also be sites of 
opportunity. As Revathi commented, ‘it was an opportunity for us. Excuse me for 
saying it like that. But because of the disaster it was easy for us to enter and motivate 
more number of people.’ The tsunami gave Revathi and Swamy a reason for entering 
communities. Entering as tsunami restoration workers gave their presence a context 




because farmers were in a desperate position, they were more willing to attempt 
alternative approaches. Though there was already desperation in farming 
communities prior to the tsunami, trying something new was easier, as continuing 
with the old methods had literally become impossible.  
 
7.2.5. Facilitating Grassroots Movements in Nagapattinam 
Between their field trips and in the period following their tsunami work, Revathi and 
Swamy returned to Nagapattinam, where they hoped to consolidate their results and 
continue to facilitate the growth of farmers’ movements. The most noteworthy 
development during this period was bringing together the farmers who had been 
trained in ecological farming into a district level federation. This federation, which 
they called Kadal Oosai Community Resource Centre,
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 became both a means for the 
continued distribution of technical knowledge amongst farmers, and a way for 
ecological farmers to consolidate their position as a stable and cooperative economic 
entity. 
In the initial stages, the network brought together over twenty villages from 
Nagapattinam, who each formed village federations. They also formed specialised 
branches to focus on specific issues, such as marketing and bargaining with 
governments. Revathi either provided training for farmers in these issues herself, or 
brought in others with relevant expertise. Each village federation elected two 
representatives for district level councils, which in turn nominated delegates for an 
executive council. The specialised branches also sent delegates to the executive 
council. The whole program was integrated with TOFarM’s ‘master farmer’ strategy. 
Master farmers had been selected in each village along with nine other farmers with 
whom they would maintain regular contact. This would ensure that knowledge was 
continually being distributed through villages. From within these groups of ten 
farmers, one would be selected to participate in the panchayat level branch of Kadal 
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Oosai, as a way of further facilitating the distribution of awareness regarding both 
technical and politico-economic issues.  
Kadal Oosai gave farmers an opportunity to engage in collective bargaining. The 
marketing branches of the federation were able to take members’ produce and 
bargain for a fair price directly with procurement agencies. Having these collective 
arrangements prevents farmers from entering into exploitative relations with 
middlemen. Revathi claims that by working collectively in this manner, farmers have 
gained more confidence in making political assertions. They have run campaigns in 
the past that are funded by membership fees. Issues raised so far have mostly 
concerned ‘fair pricing’, but Revathi suggests farmers are also becoming more 
assertive on issues surrounding the distribution of water.  
There were few opportunities to verify the success of Kadal Oosai in facilitating 
these kinds of collective action during the fieldwork. There were suggestions that the 
initiative had partial success, from a group interview with three farmers, Mani (2.m.), 
Nithura (2.n.) and Kalaiselvan (2.o.). These farmers had been exposed to TOFarM in 
the aftermath of the tsunami, and after ongoing input had converted all of their 
holdings to ecological farming. Mani (2.m.) had become a ‘master farmer’ and began 
preparing bioinputs at home, which provided an additional source of income. He felt 
that through Kadal Oosai he had become more connected to other ecological farmers 
in the state. He linked to them via training programs, at which he provided 
instruction, and through the sale of bio-inputs, which drew farmers from outside of 
his village. In this way, the network allowed for the dissemination of inputs and 
information, yet Mani (2.m.) suggested that until that point, there were no other 
forms of collective economic activity, such as marketing. Revathi subsequently 
confirmed that Kadal Oosai’s success in this regard had been limited.  
Revathi repeatedly emphasises that the role of TOFarM in Kadal Oosai was 
essentially facilitative. They were not leaders of this federation; they merely 
provided support and suggestions. This reflects Revathi’s initial interest in 
facilitating the development of ‘movements’ in preference to more typical NGO 




formulating their own rules, delegating responsibilities and organising their own 
regular meetings: it is, she says, ‘completely managed by the farmers and the 
landless labourers’. TOFarM’s role has essentially consisted of providing training 
where farmers have requested it, monitoring the development of the federation, 
providing strategic suggestions and keeping organisers abreast of developments in 
the ‘outside world’: 
We are not strictly telling any rules and regulations to them. We tell them, wherever 
there is a need, they have to collectively raise their voice, and collectively purchase 
things and collectively market their products. For these things we gave our training, 
our facilitation, and until today we are supporting them in these aspects. If something 
happens in the external world, for example Bt-brinjal, then these people don't know 
about that. So we will come back here… and we will help them understand the issue 
and how to react when it comes here. And how to motivate people, not to buy this. 
All these things. 
The federation has thus become an instrument through which Revathi maintains an 
influence over farmers and continues to distribute information regarding the benefits 
of ecological farming, while allowing them to ultimately direct the process and make 
their own decisions. At times, however, this ethic of ‘non-interference’ becomes 
ambiguous. It appears that Revathi uses her own moral position within the federation 
to reinforce certain principles as non-negotiable. For example, in order for the 
federation to operate as she had envisioned and distribute knowledge and power 
throughout communities, it is necessary that they be inclusive. As such, she and 
Swamy have attempted to assert the importance of abandoning caste, gender and 
class discrimination within Kadal Oosai:  
Even when we work with them we told them strictly that real involvement of people 
is our aim, so we cannot support the caste system… [W]e told them that we can't 
support the discrimination activities. And we told strictly in the elected bodies like 
the panchayat collective, district resource centre, we cannot exclude people from the 
low caste... They should be given proper space. And women’s participation is also 
very important. They won't allow women to come to the power. We said it is not at 
all possible. So fifty per cent of the space is provided to women. Everything they 
accepted because of our continuous involvement with them for the past three years.  
The commitment to non-interference is ultimately both moral and strategic. Revathi 
clarifies that she does not believe it is her place to make decisions for Kadal Oosai, 
though she will continue to provide input wherever she can. This, she claims, 




ownership over the federation, then as soon as she leaves the whole operation will 
collapse like a house of cards. 
 
7.2.6. The Demonstration Farm: Challenges of Working with Rural Communities 
As a further aspect of their endeavour to facilitate the growth of ecological farming 
along the Nagapattinam Coast, TOFarM wanted to establish a model ecological farm 
to demonstrate the potential for income generation. Unfortunately, they were at a loss 
for sources of funding. The special conditions that had granted them access to 
foreign funds in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami had expired. In order for 
TOFarM to have ongoing access to foreign funds, it was necessary under the Foreign 
Contributions Regulation Act (1976) that they be recognised as having worked for 
the public benefit for at least three years. At that stage, they were not recognised as 
such, since they had only registered specifically as TOFarM in 2005. Despite this 
obstacle, they were resolute in their ambition. In September 2006, they found twelve 
acres of low lying land that was still badly affected by the tsunami, with dense soil 
and stagnating saline water. Revathi persuaded her father to lend her 700,000 rupees 
to purchase and develop this land, and they began work to establish it as a 
demonstration farm.  
The purchase immediately attracted attention. Local people felt Revathi and Swamy 
had paid too much, and that, due to its position and the severity of the damage, they 
would not be able to produce anything of value. Nonetheless, they set to work and 
quickly managed to establish a range of crops. They set up multiple sites to 
demonstrate a range of ecological techniques and the diversity of crops that could be 
grown. Many locals had assumed that only rice could be grown in their region, as, 
particularly since the Green Revolution, rice was the primary crop grown in the 
Cauvery Delta. TOFarM demonstrated that it was possible to grow fruits, vegetables 
and pulses, and even raise freshwater fish and that doing so could be far more 
profitable than growing paddy. Furthermore, growing diverse crops could better meet 




visit the demonstration farm, drawn from TOFarM’s immediate connections in local 
villages, through Kadal Oosai and local NGOs.   
The farm, which they named Annam Amudham,
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 was not a commercial enterprise. 
Its main output was organic seed (i.e., non-hybrid, non-GM), which was given freely 
to farmers on the condition that they would, in turn, give twice as much seed to other 
farmers after their harvest. The farm generated some income through the sale of 
crops at local markets and this was all spent on wages for farm workers and in 
further developing the farm and its facilities. A small number of agricultural 
labourers were employed and provided with housing on the farm, as well as a master 
farmer, Murugan (2.l.), whose role was to manage the farm while Revathi and 
Swamy were elsewhere. Revathi and Swamy prioritised providing fair conditions for 
the labourers on the farm. The low-caste labourers on the farm were being paid 
considerably higher wages than the local rate, which Revathi and Swamy considered 
to be exploitative. Furthermore, female workers were paid as much as male workers, 
which went against local patriarchal customs. Indeed, Revathi preferred not to use 
the term ‘labourers’ for those who worked on her farm, as it came with an attached 
social stigma. Instead she used the term ‘co-producers’. Surplus food was consumed 
by those working on the farm. Adhi (2.k.), a female labourer working at Annam 
Amudham confirmed the positive conditions for labourers on the farm. She was 
particularly happy that, in addition to her wage, she received food, including fruit 
and vegetables, for her labour, which improved her family’s diet. Adhi owned two 
acres of land herself and was able to learn a range of ecological techniques through 
TOFarM to apply on her own land. 
In time, the farm began to cause considerable tension within the local community. 
Revathi claims she received complaints from local farmers who relied on wage 
labourers. They felt that the conditions that TOFarM were providing for labourers, 
women in particular, were setting a bad example and would raise the expectations of 
others. Revathi and Swamy also experienced tensions on their own farm. Revathi and 
                                                 
42 In Tamil, Annam means simply ‘food’, Amudham is the Tamil equivalent of the Sanskrit word 




Swamy’s unfamiliarity with local conditions meant that relations with workers were 
often strained and uncertain. For example, Revathi and Swamy felt unsure what 
labourers were doing with the food surplus when they were away from the farm site 
(which was a considerable amount of the time) and suspected that it was being sold 
without their knowledge on local markets. Furthermore, TOFarM’s insistence on not 
discriminating on the basis of religion created additional tensions. Murugan (2.l.), the 
farm manager, was a Muslim, while the labourers were Hindus and resented taking 
orders from him.  
These communal tensions expressed themselves during fieldwork in early 2010. A 
workshop had been organised, aimed at farmers from around the district, but 
particularly those from the nearby village. The farm workers were asked to go to the 
village and share the invitation with all farming families. When they went to the 
village, however, the workers only spread the invitation within their own 
neighbourhood. Since villages are spatially divided along lines of caste and religion, 
this effectively meant that the workers only invited Hindus, and people of their own 
caste. The potential for communal tension was strongly felt. Although Revathi and 
Swamy were not religious, they were of Hindu background and feared that the 
selective distribution of invitations would be perceived as an affront to the Muslim 
community. Police were notified of the potential for communal conflict and the 
house was kept under security for the night. Although no conflict ensued, the event 
was highly stressful for Revathi and, at the time, she spoke about abandoning the 
farm at Nagapattinam and establishing a farm closer to her home city of Coimbatore, 
where she believed caste and religious issues would not pose such an obstacle to her 
work. She suggested that these kinds of communal considerations always needed to 
be taken into account at Nagapattinam. 
 
7.2.7. Reflections on Strategy and Hopes for the Future 
Reflecting on her experiences, Revathi was able to provide a considered position on 
the strategic approach that she believes in and hopes will guide her work into the 




nature, providing support to the formation of grassroots movements, stating that, ‘We 
are a facilitating organisation. We ourselves are not the movement. Only part of the 
movement, I have to say – or the people behind the movements.’ The fact that 
Revathi has taken this approach may be a tacit acknowledgement that the barriers 
between herself and the communities with which she works are largely 
insurmountable. She is in a position to provide support for farmers, but not to speak 
on their behalf. It is clear from interviews that Revathi also believes in the 
importance of developing multiple organisational capacities among farmers as a way 
of delivering power to rural communities. This can only be achieved through 
facilitating the active participation of farmers, and having them assume leadership 
positions in whatever civil society groups are claiming to work in their interests.  
Another interesting point that Revathi makes is her belief in the strategic importance 
of multiple, small-scale farmers’ movements. This partly reflects a belief in the 
strength that comes through diversity. Each group can take their own organisational 
approach and develop their own strategy. If one group collapses due to a strategic 
error, then it will not affect the broader movement for sustainable agriculture in the 
state, since each group has pursued a different approach. A further reason that 
Revathi provides for multiple, smaller movements is that smaller movements are less 
likely to be recognised by the existing powers and thereby targeted. In particular, she 
refers to ‘politicians’, reflecting caution about the potential for state power to 
neutralise movements. She expressed this view on several occasions.  
And basically we cannot say our organisation is a movement. We are now 
establishing many movements. … Not a single one, a huge one saying ten thousand 
farmers, ten lakh farmers are there. If we are saying like that then it won't be 
strategically wise thing… If you are a big one then, once again, the politicians will 
take care of you. And they won't allow you to be big and remain, and they will make 
you collapse. So more small organisations, and more people representing their local 
level, local locations, it will be better, in these political conditions. That is one of the 
strategies we are using. So we are not saying that we have one lakh members or two 
lakh members… 
Because if I bring all the numbers together under my umbrella, then immediately 
they will say something against our organisation and they will cancel the 
organisation certification. Something happens to us, and then what will you do? All 
the movement, all these things, everything will collapse. So that's why I didn't bring 





Revathi believes that other organisations have failed due to their public prominence 
and size, though she cites no specific examples. These views perhaps derive from 
Revathi’s percepion that she had made a target of herself during the post-tsunami 
period by actively critiquing the government. The small movement strategy is one 
way of going under the government’s radar. If the government does not feel 
threatened by the movement, then they are less likely to use coercive methods, such 
as cancelling their status as an organisation or blocking their access to foreign funds.  
To proceed with her facilitative role into the future, Revathi expressed her desire to 
establish a training centre. This, she felt, would provide a firm foundation for 
facilitating the growth of more movements throughout the state and the country. 
Travelling from place to place to conduct seminars and workshops had already 
become a very tiring and time consuming enterprise. A centre with appropriate 
facilities would allow farmers and activists to be invited in and undergo training on 
how to practice ecological farming and promote the growth of movements within 
their own areas. The farm at Nagapattinam had provided this, to a limited extent; 
however, Revathi felt that it was necessary to learn from the mistakes she had made 
at Nagapattinam and start afresh. She had come to Nagapattinam without an 
understanding of the degree of caste, religious and gender based discrimination that 
existed there. These issues had created barriers towards building a strong, inclusive 
movement and Revathi did not feel that she herself was in a position to overcome 
those issues. Establishing a centre closer to her home at Coimbatore would allow her 
to work in an environment whose social stratification was more familiar to her.  
If funds were available for establishing such a centre, it would be possible to bring in 
a larger number of experts to work there for the cause. This would help to overcome 
another problem that Revathi had identified, namely the fact that she and Swamy 
were playing too central a role within TOFarM. Since all training and facilitation 
depended upon them, the organisation was at risk of collapse if anything happened to 
them. Greater numbers of staff would make the organisation more resilient to sudden 
shocks. At the time of the fieldwork, there were no sources of funding available for 




connections in AID to gain financial assistance to purchase land outside of the city of 
Pollachi, Coimbatore District, on which their centre would be constructed. 
 
7.3. Conclusion 
Rather than implementing a precisely calculated plan, Revathi and Swamy’s 
initiative for ecological agriculture has involved responding to a series of challenges 
often beyond their control. Through their experiences of both success and failure, 
they have refined their strategic approach. The lessons they have learned are of 
central interest to this thesis. I will present the main conclusions here that will be 
further discussed in Chapter 9.  
Of particular interest has been the consolidation of TOFarM’s identity as a 
facilitative organisation. While they are open to receiving funding as an NGO for 
particular projects, their ultimate objective is to facilitate forms of civil society 
activity that transcend the limited realm of possibilities that the NGO approach 
enables. Specifically, they have attempted to facilitate the development of a vast and 
interconnected network of farmers for the exchange of knowledge and politico-
economic solidarity. To some extent, this was achieved with the establishment of 
Kadal Oosai in Nagapattinam. Adopting this strategy reveals Revathi and Swamy’s 
recognition of their social position and the possibilities it enables for them. Being of 
an educated, middle class background, they had the time to devote to organisational 
activities that farmers lacked and the communication skills to compose written 
materials and deliver presentations and workshops. The non-directive, facilitative 
strategy also reflects their recognition of the value of farmers leading the initiatives 
that are ostensibly in their interests.  
Revathi’s belief in the value of multiple, smaller movements is also revealing. This 
defensive strategy has been developed both as a way of increasing the resilience of 
the movement and avoiding the attention of what is perceived to be a hostile state. 
There are certainly ironies and contradictions in this approach. At times, Revathi 
expresses the importance of ‘unified collective voice’ as a means for farmers to 




the BKU, precisely because they have been large, united movements who exert their 
influence on governments directly. Nonetheless, Revathi’s comments on the ‘small 
movements’ strategy are an important strategic insight. Particularly during the early 
stages of movement formation, it may be valuable to allow multiple, complex and 
interconnected movements to develop without attracting the attention of the state or 
other powerful groups or institutions. In that way, by the time the movement 
becomes a force ready to assert itself politically, it will be far more difficult for the 
state to manipulate, control or eliminate them. 
Finally, it is worth considering the role of Revathi and Swamy’s identity as ‘urban 
outsiders’ in their work to date. Revathi’s ‘facilitative’ strategy already contains a 
tacit acknowledgement of the limitations of outsiders in creating change. Since they 
are not from farming families themselves, Revathi and Swamy cannot lead a 
‘movement’ – they can only facilitate the development of farmers’ leadership. The 
problems associated with their ‘outsider’ status came to the fore at the Nagapattinam 
farm, where their lack of familiarity with the gender, caste and religious divisions 
that dominate rural life ultimately jeopardised the success of their endeavours. As 
many of the leading figures promoting sustainable agriculture are themselves from 
middle class, non-rural backgrounds, this issue is particularly noteworthy, as it points 






8. THE BEEJ BACHAO ANDOLAN 
 
Beej Bachao Andolan (Save the Seeds Movement, BBA) is a largely informal 
initiative in the Garhwal Himalaya, in the state of Uttarakhand, which began in 1985. 
Its primary focus is the preservation of traditional varieties of seed. The movement 
has been successful in reclaiming a number of the traditional seeds, whose survival 
was threatened by the Green Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. It has developed a 
seed bank with hundreds of varieties of local seeds and ensures these continue to be 
available to farmers. BBA has also developed many links with other organisations 
with similar focus regionally, nationally and globally, and participates in the 
articulation of the sustainable agriculture discourse at all three levels. It has done this 
while working in a largely informal manner and with very meagre access to funds. In 
this chapter, I outline how BBA has organised itself to date before exploring 
challenges it faces in the contemporary context, as its discourse on local seed 
conservation and traditional agriculture struggles to maintain relevance. I argue that 
its lack of relevance is partly attributable to the fact that the inappropriateness of 
chemical agriculture for the hills is now recognised as common sense. Further, the 
region now faces new challenges, such as climate change and accelerated emigration, 
issues which BBA has struggled to engage with.  
The Beej Bachao Andolan (BBA) is led by Vijay Jardhari, who, unlike the activists 
discussed in previous chapters, was born and raised in a farming community and 
continues to live and work in his home village. His village, Jardhargaon, is situated 
in the more upland reaches of the Henwal Valley, in District Tehri-Garhwal, in the 
state of Uttarakhand.  The movement itself has its most direct connections to rural 
communities within the Henwal Valley itself, though it does have some connections 
to other villages throughout the state. Some of these villages are close to the river 
valley, and have access to irrigation facilities; others are further upland and rely 
entirely on rainfall for their production.  
The core objective of BBA is to convince local farmers to reject hybrid variety seeds. 




extremely rich in biodiversity and well-adapted to local conditions. Concerned that 
hybrid seeds could be the entry point for chemical agriculture more broadly, they see 
this struggle as being crucial to preserving the traditional agriculture and way of life 
of the hills. To this end, BBA are active within their own villages and local 
institutions convincing farmers to continue their traditional system of farming. The 
movement has strong historical connections to the Chipko Andolan, which was a 
major force in Uttarakhand in the 1970s. To explore the manner in which the history 
of Chipko within the region has impacted (and continues to impact) BBA, this 
chapter begins with an exposition of the recent history of social movements in the 





Map 8.1. Uttarakhand districts map, showing locations of significance for BBA. 
Source: adapted from GDibyendu (2009). 
 
 
8.1. Rural Structure and History of Struggle in Uttarakhand 
The state of Uttarakhand was formed from the mountainous section of North-
Western Uttar Pradesh in 1999. It is in the foothills of the Himalayas and more 
sparsely populated than the plains below (Krishna, 2000). The state is divided into 
two regions, Kumaon in the East and Garhwal in the West, which are divided in 




British during the colonial period, whereas Garhwal was ruled by the Raja of Tehri. 
Farming in the region is mostly oriented towards the subsistence needs of local 
communities. Steep slopes provide a barrier to extensive cultivation and fragile soils 
limit the potential for intensive agriculture in the region, constraining the 
development of commercial agriculture (Guha, 2000: 27-28). Indeed, only 15 per 
cent of farmers in Uttarakhand grow commercial crops and this figure is even lower 
in the more mountainous districts (Pande, 1996).  
Due to these factors and a lack of reliable irrigation sources, the region was never a 
major target for development under the Green Revolution. The history of Green 
Revolution technologies in Uttarakhand has been less extensively documented than 
in places in which more intensive development took place – such as Punjab and 
Tamil Nadu. Krishna (2002) notes that there was some attempt to bring the High 
Yielding Varieties Programme to the irrigated valleys of Uttarakhand, but that there 
was never much potential for their application in unirrigated upland areas. Farmers 
interviewed for this research stated that during the 1970s, urea became available in 
shops in small towns and that these continue to be used occasionally by some 
farmers. Dhum Singh Negi (3.d.), a prominent member of BBA, suggests a major 
role was played by cooperative societies, who gave loans to farmers on the condition 
that they take and use urea on their fields. Despite these attempts, evidence suggests 
that the use of hybrid seeds, chemical fertilisers and pesticides remains very low in 
Uttarakhand (Krishna, 2002). In recognition of the fact that many farmers in the state 
were thus ‘organic by default’, in 2001 the state government declared Uttarakhand an 
‘organic state’, and established initiatives to have its produce recognised, certified 
and marketed as organic (Organic Uttarakhand, 2012).  
Uttarakhand has a relatively egalitarian social structure. Guha (2000) argues that this 
is a consequence of the ecological constraints on agriculture, described above. Since 
the food produced in the region is mostly consumed by cultivators and their families, 
there has been little potential for the accumulation of surpluses. In the absence of 
surpluses, there has been little opportunity for any group to acquire large tracts of 
land. As such, the class structure of the region is somewhat flat. Most farms are 




in number. Furthermore, the difficult terrain constrains families’ capacity to provide 
for themselves based on any one economic activity. The family has had to act as a 
versatile economic unit, with all members taking on a variety of roles. Consequently, 
women have taken a more active role in public life, most visibly through their 
participation in agriculture.
43
 Additionally, caste is not easily defined by professional 
markers, as members of all castes participate in most forms of economic activity. 
Guha (2000) suggests that this may explain the lack of caste prohibitions and rules of 
untouchability in the Himalayas relative to the plains.  
Uttarakhand has a rich history of protest. As Guha (2000) outlines, the tradition of 
social movements in Uttarakhand can be traced back to the practice of dhandak 
within the princely state of Garhwal. The dhandak was a process by which peasants 
would refuse cooperation with the local officials whom they felt to be corrupt. In 
some cases, this would end with them rallying to the capital to have their grievances 
heard by the Raja, in the hope that corrupt functionaries would be dismissed. In more 
recent history, protest in the region has largely revolved around access to forests. 
Materials from forests play a huge role in village life in Uttarakhand. It is not only a 
source of firewood for heating and cooking, but also a source of fodder for cattle, 
whose manure is the most important source of soil fertility. British attempts to curtail 
people’s access to forests, which they were exploiting for timber, led to widespread 
social unrest. This kind of protest started in the British era and continued after 
Independence, with locals fighting against the Forest Department, which maintained 
complete control over forest access (Agrawal, 2005). 
The history of protest in Uttarakhand fed into the Chipko movement, which 
developed in the region in the 1970s. The Chipko movement is significant to the 
                                                 
43 It should be noted, however, that participation in the workforce does not translate into 
positive conditions for women in the region. Indeed, in a survey of women’s labour in more 
mountainous districts of the region, Pande (1996) finds that women are not only responsible for 
a majority of agricultural tasks, but have exclusive responsibility for domestic tasks. On average, 
women in the region work between 16 and 17 hours per day, and the drudgery of their tasks 
takes a considerable toll. Further, Pande’s findings suggest that despite their greater 
participation in the economic life of villages, hill women have very limited roles in household 




present case study, as the leading activists of BBA began their activist careers in 
Chipko and continue to be informed by its ethos. Guha (2000) situates Chipko within 
the context of intensifying commercial forestry in the post-Independence period. 
With growing demand for timber as industrialisation gained pace, the hills 
increasingly became a source of raw materials. Yet, regrettably, very little of the 
wealth generated through forestry went back into communities. Forest workers were 
usually non-local and processing occurred in factories on the plains. The ecological 
damage that this intensification was causing came into public consciousness in 1970, 
when a devastating flood hit the region, causing tremendous damage to agriculture 
and loss of human life. Shortly after, the Gandhian activist and local development 
worker Sunderlal Bahuguna began documenting the correlation between irregular 
water flows and deforestation, highlighting the significance of environmental 
damage to local livelihoods in a manner that would subsequently inform Chipko’s 
official narrative (Weber, 1988).  
Despite its devastating impact, neither the flood itself nor the ecological degradation 
it signified were the real triggers for the Chipko movement, which did not commence 
in earnest until 1973. Chipko is often referred to as an exemplar of the 
‘environmentalism of the poor’ (Guha & Martinez-Alier, 1997). Its activists are said 
to be the ‘original tree-huggers’, who, according to mainstream narrative, embraced 
the trees to protect them from loggers. Shiva (1989: 68), for example, describes 
Chipko as being ‘a resurgence of woman power and ecological concern’, derived 
from an essentially female understanding of the holistic value of forests and the 
importance of protecting forests for the survival of communities. Sinha, Gururani and 
Greenberg (1997) are critical of such representations. Asserting that Chipko was 
about the protection of forests purely for subsistence and protecting the traditional 
village unit overlooks the critiques of tradition, the calls for social justice and the 
development aspirations that formed a major part of the movement. Indeed, as Guha 
(2000) relates, the initial impetus for the movement was not forest protection, but 
employment. For several years, a local Sarvodaya
44
 collective had been making 
                                                 
44 The term ‘Sarvodaya’ was coined by Gandhi and first used as the title for his abridged 




requests to the Forest Department to gain access to local forests to establish small 
scale timber cooperatives. After being repeatedly denied, the injustice of the situation 
became clear in 1973, when large scale commercial interests were granted access to a 
forest for which the Sarvodaya collective had unsuccessfully applied, just months 
before. To prevent the commercial foresters from taking what they saw as their own 
resources, villagers took to the forest to prevent the trees from being felled. At the 
suggestion of social activist Chandi Prasad Bhatt, they held the trees to prevent the 
loggers from being able to cut them – a gesture which would become emblematic of 
the movement. 
From this time until the late 1970s, the movement spread throughout the region, as 
both a critique of commercial forestry and as a set of practices of resistance. These 
practices included embracing trees, but also more ‘militant’ tactics such as burning 
forests and timber auction houses (Sinha, Gururani  Greenberg, 1997). Activists 
travelled from village to village to inform people of contemporary developments and 
methods of resistance (Weber, 1988). It should be noted, however, that contrary to 
the mainstream narrative, there was no homogenous vision uniting the movement. 
Guha (2000: 179-184) describes several subtle variations in the analysis, goals and 
tactics of various branches of Chipko, and suggests that different ideologies 
resonated more in different districts and regions. Kumaon’s long history under 
British administration meant that the people were more exposed to ‘modern’ political 
ideologies such as Marxism, and adopted a perspective more centred on local 
employment. In the district of Tehri-Garhwal, by contrast, opposition was expressed 
in an idiom that reflected the history of protest in the form of dhandak. In this 
respect, Sunderlal Bahuguna played a crucial role in articulating the demands of the 
                                                                                                                                          
of all’, though more literally, it could be translated as ‘universal upliftment’. The concept speaks 
to the value Gandhi placed on social work grounded in the ethics of independence, self-reliance 
and village level development aimed at the moral and economic upliftment of all people. Gandhi 
stressed that this goal would not be achieved through development of theory, and encouraged 
his followers to discover the truth of this philosophy through ‘constructive work’ in 
communities. As Kantowsky (1980) outlines, the Sarvodaya movement has its origins after 
Gandhi’s death, as an attempt to unite those engaged in ‘constructive work’ throughout the 
country. In the decades following Independence, Sarvodaya became an umbrella term for these 




movement in a way that resonated with traditional grievances of the local peasantry – 
their concerns about corrupt officials, and so on. Because he spoke in the local idiom, 
Bahuguna’s ideas on a range of topics, including his Gandhism and his views on 
ecology, became influential in Tehri-Garhwal. This is worth noting, as BBA, the 
focus of this chapter, is based in Tehri-Garhwal District and its leading figures were 
very much influenced by Bahuguna (see Section 8.2, below). 
Several authors have suggested that, as Chipko gained momentum, a gap emerged 
between its public and private identity. For Guha (2000: 177-178), Chipko was 
‘inwardly’ a peasant movement, agitating for local access to forests, overcoming 
corrupt officials, gaining greater autonomy and use of local resources for 
employment generation. Yet, to the outside world, Bahuguna and other activists 
projected Chipko as an environmental movement, focused on the ecological 
degradation caused by forestry. As Rangan (2000) argues, with the passage of time, 
this ‘outside’ face became more prominent and influential, such that in 1981, when 
Indira Gandhi declared a moratorium on the commercial felling of trees in the hills, 
the movement was largely considered to be a ‘success’. To locals, this meant the loss 
of employment opportunities that might have come from small scale local forestry 
operations. Further, local control over forests was further diminished, with 
management being further concentrated in the hands of NGOs and the Forest 
Department, though with the stated objective of ‘protecting subsistence needs’ and 
‘maintaining ecological balance’ (Baumann, 1998). Resentment regarding this issue 
led to the formation of a Ped Katao Andolan (Hindi: Cut the Trees Movement), 
which eventually fed into the sentiment driving the demands for Uttarakhand’s 
statehood (Mawdsley, 1998). Though the movement for an independent hill state was 
initially triggered by caste reservations in the Uttar Pradesh parliament, it soon led to 
a resurgence of older issues, such as the lack of development in the state, lack of 
access to basic resources, lack of local employment, alcoholism and environmental 
concerns (Robinson, 2001).  
Chipko has also had powerful effects outside of the realm of social movement 
politics. Mukul (1993) describes how Chipko inspired a large number of local 




purposes. The chief example Mukul provides is the Mahila Mandal Dal (MMD, 
Women’s Group), which have been driving development at the village level in 
various parts of the state since the 1970s. As shall be shown below, these kinds of 
local bodies, the MMD in particular, have had a strong bearing on the development 
of BBA. 
 
8.2. The Origins of Beej Bachao Andolan 
The history of Beej Bachao Andolan is intertwined with that of Chipko. The leading 
BBA activists were actively involved in Chipko and, to a large extent, continue to be 
inspired by its ethos. Yet as has been noted above, Chipko was a diverse movement, 
both in philosophy and tactics. Drawing on interviews with BBA activists and texts 
produced by BBA, this section positions BBA within the diverse traditions of Chipko 
and articulates the influence Chipko has had upon it.  
Vijay Jardhari (3.b.), Sudesha Devi (3.c.), Dhum Singh Negi (3.d.) and Kunwar 
Prasun, all active figures within BBA, had been involved in Sarvodaya since the late 
1960s. Its Gandhian ideals of village level development have remained integral to 
their ideology. Indeed, in relating the history of the Chipko movement, these activists 
tend to place emphasis on the role played by Sarvodaya and Gandhians (though not 
arbitrarily, as Sarvodaya did play a more prominent role in their region, Tehri-
Garhwal). In Seeds for Life, a short, English language booklet distributed by BBA 
relating to its history and philosophy, Dhum Singh Negi and Biju Negi (n.d.) provide 
a genealogy of protest in Garhwal that highlights the influence of the Independence 
Movement – particularly the role of Gandhi. They note that Gandhism was highly 
influential after Independence, emphasising the role of the Sarvodaya Movement in 
redistributing land and combating the practice of untouchability.
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 In speaking about the history of protest in the region, Negi and Negi (n.d.) do not conform to the 
simplistic narratives of ‘new traditionalism’ (Sinha, Gururani & Greenberg, 1997) in giving a 
romantic representation of the traditional hierarchies of Garhwal. They note that the rule imposed by 
the King of Garhwal in the Nineteenth Century was oppressive for the common people and that people 




In the early 1970s, when the Chipko Andolan was just starting, Jardhari (3.b.), the 
founder and leading figure of BBA, owned a bookstore in the small town of Chamba, 
which sits above the Henwal Valley. At the time, Kunwar Prasun was a college 
student and Dhum Singh Negi (3.d.) was working as a teacher in a nearby school. 
Jardhari’s bookstore was something of an intellectual meeting ground and the three 
used to regularly meet to discuss local social issues. They were all influenced by the 
Sarvodaya movement, which had taken root in the region, and were interested in 
local community development. As Dhum Singh Negi described: 
I was involved in Gandhian philosophy and social activities. Because we people in 
this area have very low income. In this way, I recognised that development… should 
not be only a single man’s development. The whole society should be developed. 
This is the Sarvodaya.  
In their discussions they considered methods of improving people’s welfare through 
local action. They were aware of the negative effect that liquor had on local 
communities and became a part of the Sharaab Bandi Andolan (Hindi: Liquor Ban 
Movement) to oppose the sale of alcohol.
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 They held pickets along with local 
people, particularly women, who saw the adverse impact of men consuming all of 
their families’ surplus income on liquor. When the Chipko movement became active 
in the region, the anti-liquor campaign resonated with the Gandhian perspectives of 
some of the Chipko activists. Sunderlal Bahuguna endorsed the demands of the anti-
liquor movement, holding a satyagraha
47
 in the city of Tehri to ban the sale of illegal 
liquor. Jardhari, D. S. Negi and Prasun marched to Tehri in solidarity. According to 
Negi and Negi (n.d.) this was the beginning of a meaningful relationship between 
Bahuguna’s branch of the Chipko Andolan and the Chamba-based group, stating that 
‘[t]hereafter, the [Henwal Valley] group soon became among the keenest followers 
and confidante of Bahuguna’ (Negi & Negi, n.d.: 22). By connecting with Chipko, 
                                                 
46 Opposition to the sale and consumption of liquor has a long history in the region. The issue 
was taken up on a large scale by Sarvodaya activists in the 1960s, who opposed it on moral 
grounds (Pathak, 1985). Within Gandhian thought, the consumption of liquor poses a barrier to 
the social, moral and economic upliftment of the nation (see Gandhi, 1948). 
47 Satyagraha is a term coined by Gandhi, literally meaning ‘truth force’, which refers to his 




they expanded their awareness of the inter-relations between social and 
environmental problems. By the mid-1970s, as Chipko began to gain momentum, the 
trio gave up their professions and became full-time Chipko activists. In his account 
of the Chipko movement, Guha (2000: 161-166) makes note of the trio’s role in 
travelling from village to village, educating people about loggers’ intentions and 
rallying support.  
It was in this way that Sudesha Devi (3.c.) became a major activist in the Chipko 
movement. She recalls Bahuguna, Prasun, Jardhari and Negi coming to her village 
and explaining the work that contractors wanted to do in the nearby forest of 
Advani.
48
 She recalls the activists explaining the value of protecting forest, given the 
important role of forests in village life. Sudesha Devi cites the value of trees, along 
with the fact that the contractors employed to cut the forest were not local, as major 
reasons for her involvement in the movement. She became an active agitator within 
Chipko and rallied people within her village to become a part of the protest 
movement. In the initial stages, they occupied the forest at Advani and held the trees 
to protect them from loggers. She and other women from the village tied rakhis
49
 to 
the trees to highlight their close relationship with them. After several days in the 
forest, they travelled to Narendranagar, where the timber was being sold. She and 
fourteen other members of her village occupied the auction hall, where they were 
confronted by hundreds of police. The fifteen people from her village were arrested 
and kept in gaol for fifteen days.  
Partly through these efforts, the Henwal Valley became an important site of the 
movement, with two major incidents of villagers occupying forests and successfully 
expelling loggers.  Bharat Dogra (2000), a journalist who has written extensively on 
Chipko and its later avatars, argues that the Henwal Valley was also significant for 
                                                 
48 The forest at Advani was one of the major sites targeted for sustained direct action by the 
Chipko movement (Guha, 2000). It is within ten kilometres of the Henwal valley.  
49 Rakhis are red threads which sisters tie around the wrists of their brothers on the Hindu 




having placed particular emphasis on ecological issues. Indeed, one of Chipko’s most 
famous ecological slogans was composed by Kunwar Prasun: 
 
Kya hain jangal ke upkaar, 
Mitti, paani aur bayaar; 
Mitti, paani aur bayaar, 
Zinda rehne ke adhaar 
What gifts does the forest bestow? 
Soil, water and pure air, 
Soil, water and pure air, 
The basis of survival.  
 
The BBA activists’ participation in Chipko seems to have been informed by a 
holistic appreciation of the social and ecological needs of the region. Negi and Negi 
(n.d.) assert that none of the Henwal activists saw Chipko as being exclusively about 
protecting trees. It was also a protest against ‘the new development paradigm and the 
alienating technologies of new agriculture’ (Negi & Negi, n.d.: 22).  
When the Chipko movement began to subside in the early 1980s, Jardhari, Prasun 
and Negi decided not to return to their professional lives in the town, but rather to 
their home villages. Following the Sarvodaya ethos, they would make their local 
villages the focus of their social action, and take up the traditional source of 
livelihood – farming. During an interview, Jardhari (3.b.) related how he was 
particularly surprised to find the inroads that Green Revolution technology had made 
in his upland village of Jardhargaon. He explained that many people in Jardhargaon 
and nearby Nagani (a largely irrigated village by the Henwal river) were using hybrid 
seeds and chemical fertilisers. Jardhari was alarmed by this development in village 
agriculture, feeling that the use of chemicals would cause damage to the soil. 
Uncertain of the role of hybrid seeds in the equation, he conducted an experiment. In 
his first year of farming following his return, he used hybrid seeds and chemical 
inputs on his field. He found that their yields were approximately one and a half 
times that produced by way of traditional varieties. In the second year, however, he 




were very low. He realised the dependency of hybrid seeds on chemicals and that, 
therefore, for non-chemical agriculture to continue to thrive in the region, it would be 
necessary to return to the use of traditional seeds.  
Talking with other villagers, Jardhari (3.b.) found that his concern regarding the 
impact of chemicals on soil was met with a similar concern regarding the loss of 
traditional seeds as the use of hybrids became more widespread:  
So we started to feel that our fields and our crops had become like drug addicts… 
Without the chemicals, they can’t grow. So we went and spoke with the people in the 
village, and said that we feel that this is damaging our soil, and they told us that it’s 
not only that – we used to have so many varieties of seeds… but now that’s all 
finished.  
Jardhari reported that during the time immediately following the conclusion of the 
Chipko movement, hybrid seeds were being used in both irrigated fields in the 
valley, and in the unirrigated fields, further upland. He suggested that scientists and 
the Agriculture Department had been promoting hybrid seeds in the villages, 
particularly a hybrid variety of soy bean. Jardhari said, however, that the use of soy 
bean created considerable discontent, since although those who adopted the seeds 
during the initial phase enjoyed a good harvest, by the second season the sheer 
number of people growing the crop in the region led to over-production at the local 
level and farmers struggled to sell their produce. When Jardhari and Sudesha held 
meetings with local village women, they found that the women were also 
experiencing problems with the soy crop, as unlike wheat and rice, its straw could 
not be used as fodder. Further, it was not possible to produce oil or milk from the soy 
bean at the village level, as this would require a more industrial operation, which was 
neither feasible nor suitable to the village economy. Thus the use of soy bean to meet 
basic subsistence needs was quite limited, when compared to traditional crops.  
For Jardhari, it was evident that a return to the traditional approach to farming was 
necessary. When he tried to find traditional seeds within his own village, however, 
he could only find two varieties of rice in use.  Thus, in 1985, he mobilised his 
friends and contacts from the Chipko movement to form the Beej Bachao Abhiyan 
(Save the Seeds Campaign), as an attempt to re-establish the genetic diversity of the 




of Uttarakhand, which the Green Revolution technologies had been unable to reach, 
in order to collect indigenous seeds. Between 1985 and 1987, they collected 
hundreds of traditional varieties of wheat, rice, millet and rajma (kidney bean). When 
visiting villages, they encouraged people to be on the lookout for local varieties of 
seed, to make an effort to conserve them and, if possible, to pass some on to Jardhari, 
so they could be stored in a collective seed bank. After several years of operating in 
this manner and having influenced many locals to return to traditional seeds and 
traditional agriculture, the participants began to conceive of their initiative as more 
than merely a ‘campaign’ – it had become a movement. At the instigation of 
members, therefore, Jardhari renamed the group as Beej Bachao Andolan (Save the 
Seeds Movement). 
 
8.2.1. Beej Bachao Andolan as ‘Movement’ 
The early history of BBA sheds some light on the importance its activists invest in 
being part of a ‘movement’. In the initial phase, being a ‘movement’ was not 
opposed to being an NGO (as was the case with KVM and TOFarM). It was 
contrasted to the initial form of organisation they had taken, namely a ‘campaign’. 
Biju Negi (3.a.) suggested that by referring to themselves as a ‘movement’ BBA 
activists asserted that their work was part of a more permanent phenomenon with a 
more holistic focus. Furthermore, through using this label to describe themselves, 
Jardhari and others situate themselves within a tradition of andolans. Dhum Singh 
Negi (3.d.) highlights the continuity between BBA and the Chipko movement and 
the movement against the Tehri Dam: 
They are not different. Anti-Tehri Dam Movement, Beej Bachao Movement, Save 
Seeds Movement, Chipko movement, they are of the same thinking, same strategy, 
same planning, future planning, concept of development… Save environment, save 
nature and save the villages, save communities and save humanity. There is one idea 
in all [these movements]: what is development? The development theory that is there 





Thus, all of the local movements are seen to be related to the environment and also to 
the protection of villagers and local livelihoods.
50
 Having said this, however, some 
participants did acknowledge differences between BBA and previous movements in 
the region. Gautam (3.i.), a BBA activist, noted that where the other movements had 
a focus on singular, short term issues, BBA represented a more continuous process: 
Whatever other movements there were, they were all about one issue. That is, after 
the cutting of the forests is done, the forest movement is over. There was the 
[Uttarakhand] State Movement – now we have gained our statehood, so it is over. 
But Beej Bachao Andolan is about the necessities of life and so is a continuous 
movement, just as the necessities of life – the sowing of seeds, the raising and 
feeding of crops – are a part of the continuous process of life. Just as the passing of 
generations. So this is the difference between Beej Bachao Andolan and the other 
movements.  
Due to their focus on the more quotidian aspects of village life, BBA proceeds at a 
slower pace than the other prominent movements in the region. In interview, Sudesha 
(3.c.) brought out this point, observing that ‘There’s not so much agitation; we are 
just trying to make people understand. Meetings, going from village to village for 
meetings.’ The Chipko movement, she says, was hard work, with direct conflicts 
with police and other authorities. Activism in BBA has been more peaceful.  
Though BBA activists don’t overtly contrast their form of organisation to that of 
NGOs (in the manner of KVM), it is clear that they are uninterested in adopting a 
typical NGO structure.  Some of the group’s early experiences with funding made 
them particularly cautious of the NGO approach to promoting sustainable 
agriculture. Jardhari (3.b.) related that, in the late 1980s, he was visited on several 
occasions by a prominent Indian environmentalist, who was impressed with the 
                                                 
50 Having said this, the one movement that BBA activists tend to distance themselves from is the 
movement for an independent state. Though they have no definitive stance that outlines clear 
opposition to Uttarakhand statehood, several interviewees made note of not having participated 
in it and expressed their concerns regarding its content and tone. Dogra (2000) notes that BBA 
activists publically criticised the anti-caste sentiment of the movement. Sudesha (3.c.) was 
critical of their violent tactics which differed from the Gandhian ethics of previous movements. 
One interviewee, Gautam (3.i.), believed that Uttarakhand was better off when it was a part of 
Uttar Pradesh. Other BBA activists, however, including Jardhari (3.b.), also recognised the 
benefits that came with the new state, most notably the establishment of the Uttarakhand 
Organics Board. Jardhari also acknowledged that it was more difficult to influence policy makers 




diversity of seeds he had managed to collect. The environmentalist praised the effort, 
and suggested that Jardhari should receive funding to bring those seeds to other 
villages. She provided some funds for Jardhari to carry out this work, having told 
him that the money was ‘from friends’. After carrying out this work for some time, 
Jardhari was surprised to find that the funding was actually coming from the United 
Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organisation and was a part of a large project. 
Jardhari emphasises that he is not opposed to the receipt of funds per se, but was 
concerned that this money had come from an organisation of which he himself was 
critical. He felt betrayed by the environmentalist’s dishonesty in not disclosing this to 
him.  
We said to her… ‘We are not opposing any project, but if we are a part of this 
project, then it should have been an open project amongst us, open amongst all of our 
friends regarding who is running the project.’  
Further, it was found that when reporting on BBA in the media, the environmentalist 
was referring to BBA activists as ‘my activists’. Jardhari (3.b.) and Sudesha (3.c.) 
both expressed their frustration at this comment, which seemed to imply that their 
work was somehow not their own – that it was all being directed by the 
environmentalist. They thus decided that this project was not in their interests. As 
Jardhari reflected, ‘We felt that this isn’t the right approach – taking this money. We 
will work without any money.’ Dhum Singh Negi (3.d.) states that the former Chipko 
activists made a principled decision not to register as an organisation. They would 
follow the Gandhian injunction to work in villages and rely on agriculture for their 
livelihood. Since that time, BBA has worked more or less autonomously and without 
receiving any major grants. Costs involved in hosting meetings and workshops, 
travel and so on, are covered by activists themselves, through their activities as 
farmers, writers and researchers. More recently, BBA has managed to bring in some 
additional income through the sale of their organic produce and handicrafts at the 
Spirit of Uttarakhand festival, held annually at Dilli Haat, New Delhi. On certain 
occasions, activists are invited to give lectures and workshops in other parts of the 





BBA can also be distinguished from an NGO in terms of its formal structure. In the 
past, BBA was more focused on its central task of collecting and storing seeds. Now 
that a large seed collection has been amassed, this is not so pressing and so the 
movement operates at a slower pace. Biju Negi (3.a.), a Dehradun-based activist who 
serves as a kind of mediator between BBA activists in the Helwal valley and the 
wider world, described the movement as ‘informal’ and ‘fluid’. Meetings are 
generally called as the need arises, such as when a new threat emerges that needs to 
be addressed. To maintain some sense of continuity, however, participants try to 
make contact at least once every two months or so. They also participate in the Mitra 
Mela (Friends’ Festival), an annual convergence of Uttarakhand’s activists. The 
Mela is a key medium through which activists are kept up to date with contemporary 
local issues and struggles. BBA does not have a fixed membership structure, and can 
be seen more as a network of supportive contacts with a mutual willingness to 
collaborate when some activity needs to be coordinated. Biju Negi (3.a.) suggested 
this has been both a blessing and a curse for BBA. It allows flexibility, but the lack 
of formal structure and institutionalised power means that the movement is unable to 
exert strong pressure on people to change – its members can only lead by example. 
Further, the lack of funds means that BBA is unable to develop projects to counter 
the encroachments of Green Revolution style agriculture throughout the region 




8.2.2. The Philosophy of BBA 
As its name suggests, BBA is in the first instance defensive. It aims to save the 
diverse varieties of seeds that are indigenous to the Himalaya from the onslaught of 
corporate agriculture and opposes the use of hybrid seeds.
51
 BBA activists cite a 
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number of reasons for this opposition. First, they argue that hybrid seeds are 
inappropriate for the social, ecological and climatic conditions of the hills. Sudesha 
(3.c.) made several points to illustrate this. She pointed out that hybrid seeds are 
expensive and require farmers to purchase them year after year. They are also 
dependent on chemical fertilisers, which is a further expense. Farmers in the region 
cannot afford such costs. Furthermore, she asserted that the use of chemical 
fertilisers damages the soil, whereas the manure applied in traditional agriculture 
improves soil and allows it to hold moisture. Since the region’s agriculture depends 
heavily on rainfall, which is often unreliable, maintaining the soil’s water-holding 
capacity is particularly important. Sudesha also noted that traditional varieties 
provide a superior source of fodder, particularly when compared to the hybrid soya 
beans that were being promoted in the region. In addition to these issues, Gautam 
(3.i.) mentioned that the supply of hybrid seeds to the hills was unreliable, thus 
making dependency on hybrid varieties and the loss of traditional varieties risky. 
None of the other farmers interviewed for this research used hybrid seeds. When 
asked why they refrained from buying hybrid seeds, they cited the excessive costs 
and/or a view that such seeds would not be effective in the hills.  
A second reason for BBA’s opposition to hybrid seeds is that they displace 
traditional varieties. Jardhari (3.b.) emphasised that the traditional seeds of the region 
are grown in diverse cropping systems, which can better meet the nutritional 
requirements of households than hybrid varieties, which are grown in monocultures. 
Furthermore, he argues that a loss of diversity makes the farming system of the 
region more susceptible to failure in the event of environmental changes, such as 
global warming. BBA activists speak of the importance of traditional system of 
farming in the hills, known as baranaja (from Hindi, barah anaj, ‘twelve grains’). 
This mixed cropping system is today mainly used in rain fed areas during the kharif 
season. It involves sowing up to twelve different varieties of seeds in a single plot, 
each of which is harvested at a different time through the season. The various seeds 
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planted have complementary growth and nutritional cycles, making the system quite 
productive. BBA highlights the importance of baranaja as a system that brings a 
continuous flow of diverse food into the home (as each variety sown is harvested at a 
different time), optimises the use of land and minimises the risk of crop failure. 
Smriti (3.l.), a BBA activist who had promoted baranaja at several academic 
conferences, explains some of the chief benefits of the system, given the extreme 
variations in local climate: 
When there is a drought, the chaulai and mandua [varieties of amaranth and millet 
grown in the baranaja system] have very good production… And in the opposite kind 
of weather, when there are floods, there are some grains that do well… So no matter 
what happens our people are able to save some food.  
By contrast, when mono-cropping with hybrid varieties, variations in weather risk 
the loss of an entire crop.  
A third reason that BBA opposes hybrid seeds is their belief that neither corporations 
nor any individual has the right to sell seeds, since seeds were a gift of nature which 
farmers have bred over thousands of years. Negi & Negi (n.d.) describe the process 
by which farmers traditionally kept aside the best section of a crop, and rather than 
consuming it, used its seed for the following year. In this way, crops were bred to be 
more productive over time. The manufacture of hybrid seeds involves taking these 
very seeds which farmers have improved over millennia and making relatively minor 
manipulations to make them more receptive to chemical inputs. According to BBA, 
seeds cannot be seen as the property of the scientist who manipulated them or the 
corporation that sells them; they are the collective property of humanity and should 
be guarded as such. For Charan (3.bb.), a BBA supporter, corporate ownership of 
seeds is a great danger to the welfare of farmers, as it represents a loss of control 
over their natural heritage and a conferring of all rights to agricultural scientists. He 
suggests that farmers should be recognised for their scientific innovation in 
developing seeds and that whatever scientific experiments are done to improve seeds 





While having this strongly defensive dimension, BBA’s philosophy should not be 
seen as simply a reaction to developments outside of its own control. Their claims 
that hybrid seeds and other Green Revolution technologies are inappropriate for 
village life are rooted in a Gandhian view of village economies and rural 
development, which was propagated in the Henwal Valley with the Sarvodaya 
collectives and later by the Chipko movement. They hold to the ideal that villages 
must develop from the ground up and in a manner that is suitable to local culture. To 
this end, control over seeds serves as a metaphor for controlling the trajectory of 
local development – albeit a metaphor with great practical significance, as seeds are 
central to the reproduction of agriculture and losing control over seeds takes village 
development out of the hands of villagers themselves. As Jardhari (3.b.) said: 
Beej Bachao Andolan’s philosophy is this – the freedom and self-respect of farmers. 
And first of all, this means agriculture – this is our livelihood, nature and culture 
[jeevan, prakriti aur sanskriti]… In India we believe in Dharti Maa [Mother Earth], 
and that we have a moral obligation [vyohaar] towards her. It’s like a child who 
drinks its mother’s milk, and will continue to drink it for six months or, if necessary, 
up to two years, but with the Green Revolution philosophy they want the mother to 
continue to produce the maximum amount of milk. If we continue to artificially take 
the maximum amount of milk it will be bad for both mother and child. The mother’s 
health will be damaged and if the child continues to take all of the milk then what 
will happen? So the relationship between nature and human beings should be like 
that between child and mother. So we believe it’s our responsibility to take care of 
the soil as our mother, so that she will be able to provide not just for ourselves, but 
also future generations. That’s why we want to get rid of the chemicals and return to 
the natural way of doing agriculture, because we saw the violence [himsa] of the 
Green Revolution. Where the earth had sustained life, these chemicals will destroy 
it... Our traditional agriculture is, in a way, non-violent agriculture. And if we 
continue to treat the soil as in the way that a child treats its mother and use our 
traditional seeds, we believe that will provide all of us with our portion for a long 
time. We follow a Gandhian line of thought, and Mahatma Gandhi ji once said a very 
beautiful thing, that the earth can provide everyone with their portion, will give them 
their food, I mean, everything they need for living, but if we think about greed, [the 
earth] can’t give enough to satisfy even one man. 
BBA’s philosophy is thus more holistic than its name might suggest, as Negi and 
Negi (n.d.: 27) outline: 
…Beej Bachao Andolan is not just about saving seeds. It is not even a task or an 
activity. It is a thought. It is a way of life. At the centre of its philosophy is the 
balanced web of life that includes the five elements – earth, sky, water, air and fire – 
that encompass creation. It is about humans, but as much about animals, insects and 




is about food security and food sovereignty. Beej Bachao Andolan is about the 
survival of our being and about the onus of this on man as the caretaker.  
Beyond the concrete practices of seedsaving, BBA are defending an essentially 
Gandhian view of development. Their focus on the productivity of local subsistence 
agriculture attempts to emphasise that development should not be exclusively about 
economic growth and access to an increasing range of modern commodities. Dhum 
Singh Negi (2.d.) argued that the dominant development theory is not sustainable, 
and in interviews, both he and Jardhari (3.b.) cited the Gandhian maxim that ‘nature 
can provide for everyone’s need, but not for anyone’s greed’. Although they are not 
opposed to development per se (Jardhari emphasises that he endorses the increased 
access to health and education facilities that have come with modernity), BBA’s 
model of development places greater emphasis on increasing cooperation and better 
meeting local subsistence requirements.  
 
8.3. Other Activities and Impact of BBA 
Since starting their initiative, BBA activists have held numerous meetings with 
farmers in villages to try to spread their message. This was their initial strategy to 
raise awareness during the late 1980s and early 1990s. They have made use of 
existing organisational structures within villages, such as Mahila Mandal Dals 
(women’s groups), to mobilise local people and organise meetings. Dogra (2000) 
suggests that women were initially more receptive to BBA’s ideas.  He argues that as 
women perform most of the agricultural labour, they recognised the risks involved in 
losing control over seeds, whereas men, who traditionally had the task of buying 
goods from the market, were more directly influenced by seed sellers. It could also 
be argued that since women remain in the villages, while men engage in seasonal 
labour, they had more of a view of the long term issues affecting the village.  
To some extent, BBA’s impact can be seen through current agricultural practices in 
the region. In addition to the BBA activists themselves, 13 interviewees were asked 
about their farming practices. Both male and female interviewees in the Henwal 
Valley were largely uninterested in purchasing hybrid seeds, citing the cost and a 




they are confronted by people from seed companies, NGOs or the Agriculture 
Department, who try to convince them to use hybrid seeds, but they remain sceptical. 
Most farmers interviewed did not use chemical fertiliser, however Madhu (3.s.), Jaya 
(3.u.) and Pawan (3.w.) reported occasionally using urea in their irrigated fields. 
Geeta (3.e.) and Bindu (3.f.), who both have unirrigated fields, said they have 
previously used urea when rains were good. Only one participant acknowledged 
using chemical pesticides, Kusum (3.aa.), who said she uses pesticides when her crop 
appears unhealthy. Thus, while the majority of farmers interviewed were farming 
mostly according to traditional systems, it could not be said that chemical use is 
entirely absent from the region.  
BBA’s impact can also be seen in several local campaigns relating to agriculture and 
subsistence issues and in the philosophy of development and sustainable agriculture 
organisations – both local and non-local. These issues are taken up in the sections 
that follow. 
 
8.3.1. Sustaining a Tradition of Activism 
BBA activists have continued to participate, and often play leading roles, in local 
campaigns against threats to the integrity and sustainability of local agriculture. 
While working for these causes, Jardhari and others may not use the name Beej 
Bachao Andolan, but they bring its philosophy to bear on the issue. Their 
participation in the campaign against the construction of the Tehri Dam in the 1990s, 
which they felt would affect local water flows, testifies to this spirit of collaboration 
between local social movements. BBA activists have also been key participants in 
local campaigns within the Henval Valley itself. There have been three main 
campaigns that demonstrate this: against mining, the construction of large power 
lines and the encroachment of wild animals on agriculture. 
In the late 1990s, a contractor was given a licence to mine limestone in a location 
very close to the village of Kataldi in the Henwal Valley. Geeta (3.e.) and Bindu 
(3.f.), who both became activists to stop the mine, said that when operations started, 




resulted in damage to property and injuries to both livestock and people. Women 
were unable to continue with their farm work during the day, as it was unsafe to 
venture outside while blasting was occurring. Further, it was alleged that the blasting 
had disrupted underground water flows (Kohli, 2004). Geeta initiated a campaign 
through the local Mahila Mandal Dal, and Jardhari (3.b.) attended and participated 
from the first meeting. Geeta said that Jardhari, Dhum Singh Negi, Kunwar Prasun 
and Sudesha Devi provided moral support to the women of Kataldi, telling them that 
they could win, citing their own victories in the Chipko movement. They told them 
to be persistent and shared tactical advice. For Geeta, BBA’s participation was 
important, as there was a division at the local level between the village of Kataldi, 
where the mine was causing disruptions, and other nearby villages, where the mine 
was seen as an employment opportunity. The BBA activists assisted to a certain 
extent in encouraging people from villages outside of Kataldi to show their support 
and arguing that any issue that disrupts agriculture should be taken up by all local 
people. Prompted by BBA, Chandra (3.h.), the leader of the Mahila Mandal Dal in a 
nearby village, mobilised women to participate in the campaign. She says she 
became involved because agriculture is the main source of livelihood for women in 
the region and anything that threatens agriculture is a threat to all of them. The 
Kataldi campaign used direct action tactics and held several rallies. Ultimately, the 
campaign was successful, with a court case being won in favour of the Kataldi 
villagers.  
In 2001, BBA assisted in mobilising opposition to a large development at Advani 
village. There was a proposal at the time to construct large power lines through the 
region to transmit electricity from the Tehri Dam. The construction of the powerlines 
entailed the clearing of forest 85 feet on either side of the lines themselves. The lines 
would pass directly through the forest at Advani, meaning reduced access for 
villagers and a significant loss of forest cover. This was particularly significant, as 
Advani was the site of one of the largest direct actions of the Chipko movement. 
Gautam (3.i.) said that BBA members, among others, mobilised popular anger that 
the forests, which had been protected by their work in the Chipko movement, could 
be taken away from them so easily and without any consultation. BBA helped 




tactics. Ultimately, the campaign was unable to prevent the construction of the power 
lines, but the area of forest felled and the reduction in access were both greatly 
reduced in response to their demands. 
More recently, BBA has mobilised in response to local concerns regarding an 
increase in the number of wild animals in the region. Almost all farmers interviewed 
identified encroachment by wild animals, which have eaten and damaged crops, as 
one of the main issues affecting agriculture in the region. According to Jardhari 
(3.b.), the construction of the Tehri Dam displaced large numbers of wild animals, 
particularly pigs and monkeys, which subsequently moved to the forests close to 
their villages. As the forests were unable to sustain the increase in animal population, 
animals were forced to come to the fields of villagers and consume their crops. In 
2009, Jardhari and others organised a rally at the town of Nagani in the Henwal 
valley, to demand that the government protect their crops and do something about the 
animal problem. They gave voice to local people in demanding the construction of 
electric fences and the employment of a watchman to shoot pigs that encroached 
upon land. Drawing on their Gandhian ideology, however, BBA activists also made a 
‘non-violent’ suggestion that more trees should be planted in the forest that may 
serve as appropriate food for the animals. In that way, the animals would not be 
forced to encroach upon fields. According to Jardhari, the government agreed to 
these demands, but it was unclear whether they were implemented.  
 
8.3.2. Ideological Impact: Local, National and International 
In addition to the concrete impact of collecting and redistributing traditional seeds, 
the ideas of BBA have also had a broader social impact. Several NGOs based in the 
Tehri-Garhwal district, for example, have been strongly influenced by BBA. Badri 
(3.dd.), the leader of a local development NGO, noted that when he and his 
colleagues were forming their organisation, they were struck by the deep divide 
between the development establishment and local people. Because of this perceived 
divide, Badri states that he was more receptive to the ideas of BBA, which he 




tried to impose development models from the top down, BBA’s philosophy, by 
contrast, emphasised the value inherent in tradition. This NGO drew on Jardhari’s 
writings on baranaja, and used this and ideas relating to seed saving to formulate 
development projects.  
A similar impact was felt by Krishnan (3.k.), a local activist and founding member of 
a youth-focused NGO based in the Henval Valley. Krishnan had participated in a 
number of local social movements since his college days in the mid-1990s, most 
notably the movement against the Tehri Dam. In 1998, he met with BBA activists 
and was inspired by their message. He suggested that of all the movements that have 
occurred in the valley, BBA has been the most important, as it directly speaks to 
issues of livelihood, which have direct resonance with villagers: 
This is the main issue. This is the livelihood issue. This is the sustainability issue, I 
think. And they are working for survival… They are fighting for the farmers. Many 
times we will go to the village and women will say to us, ‘we do not want for 
anything, we just want our agriculture. Save our agriculture – from wild animals, 
save our agriculture from climate change.’ This is the sustainability issue, na? 
Krishnan has applied BBA’s ideas directly in his NGO work. He emphasised the role 
that BBA assigns to agriculture in village life, and has attempted to develop 
strategies for making agriculture the central sustainable employment initiative for 
local youth. He has been particularly interested in how small-scale industries can be 
developed that allow value-adding for local crops and forest produce. 
In 2003, the state of Uttarakhand was declared an ‘organic state’. While this is a 
slight misnomer, in the sense that there are no prohibitions on the use of chemicals in 
Uttarakhand, several bodies have been put in place to promote organic produce from 
the state, most notably the Uttarakhand Organics Commodity Board. BBA cannot be 
given exclusive credit these developments, as they were much more a result of the 
work of Binita Shah, the current head of the Board, who initially campaigned for its 
establishment. Nonetheless, the writings of Jardhari and Dhum Singh Negi on the 
dangers of chemical agriculture and hybrid seeds can be given some credit for 
creating the kind of intellectual climate in which there was broad consensus around 
this type of initiative. By the time the Board was established, chemical agriculture, if 




retains a positive relationship with the Organic Commodity Board and is invited to 
its fairs and exhibitions, as a gesture of mutual support. In interview, Veena (3.cc.), 
who works on the Board, commented that Jardhari’s (n.d.) booklet Baranaja is a 
‘must read’ for Board members.  
BBA’s story and philsophy also has a special significance within the sustainable 
agriculture movement throughout India. In Alvares’ (2009) Organic Farming 
Sourcebook, the chapter on organic seed opens with a three page interview with 
Jardhari. It is clear that Jardhari’s story has a particular resonance, as it speaks to a 
number of discourses that the Indian sustainable agriculture movement has tried to 
promote. Scholars have argued that the case of Chipko has been used strategically 
within the Indian environment movement. It serves as a convenient example of poor 
rural communities struggling against modernity to defend the environment, despite 
the fact that this type of mobilisation is less likely in other parts of India, where the 
relation between forests and agriculture is not as pronounced (Sinha, Gururani & 
Greenberg, 1997). A similar process can be observed in the case of BBA. BBA 
brings the binaries that are used within the sustainable agriculture movement into 
sharp relief. For example the binaries of traditional versus modern farming, 
communal versus corporate ownership and biodiversity versus monocultures can be 
clearly observed. BBA makes a relatively unambiguous case for the 
inappropriateness of the modern farming model. In the Himalayas, due to the 
absence of a clear class of capitalist farmers, there would be few clear beneficiaries 
of corporate approaches to agriculture. It thus validates the sustainable agriculture 
discourse, which generally values subsistence systems. BBA’s links to Chipko have 
also added value to its narrative, speaking to the symbiotic relationship between 
farming and forest, which is said to have existed within traditional peasant 
cultivation. Finally, BBA’s focus on millet cultivation has given it a space within the 
growing network to re-establish the value of millets in India. Due to this broad 
discursive resonance, Jardhari and other BBA activists are frequently invited to give 





This discursive appeal of BBA also carries to the global movement for sustainable 
agriculture. Building on their connections within the Pesticide Action Network 
(Asia-Pacific), BBA activists have attended a number of seminars in Penang, 
Malaysia. In 2008, Jardhari (3.b.) presented at a conference on ‘Food Crisis and 
Climate Change’, where BBA was seen as a case of local resilience in the face of 
global ecological turmoil. The value of millets in conserving water in the context of 
climate change and diminished rainfall was discussed. Subsequently, another BBA 
member, Smriti (3.l.), travelled to Penang to speak on the value of baranaja and 
other mixed cropping systems for upland agriculture in Asia.  
Beej Bachao Andolan has thus become well networked among those promoting 
sustainable agriculture, locally, nationally and internationally. This allows them to 
contribute to the development of the discourse of sustainable agriculture. It also 
provides opportunities for learning, as BBA activists, through their travels and 
participation in conferences, are exposed to strategies being deployed elsewhere. 
BBA’s narrative clearly resonates with the national and global community, speaking 
to the possibility of alternatives to corporate agriculture. Sudesha (2.c.), who has 
travelled to various cities in India to give talks on her activism, says the network of 
urban supporters is very important. She says that local people are largely uneducated, 
and working with educated people allows the Chipko and BBA message to be 
conveyed to schools and universities throughout the country. Further, she says that 
because of the network, everywhere they travel they have friends who are able to 
provide them with a place to stay while they give lectures on their experiences.  
 
8.3.3. The Challenge of Sustaining Relevance 
The key challenge for BBA is sustaining the relevance of its core message within the 
Henwal Valley. While recent campaigns opposed to local developments have helped 
to sustain the local tradition of activism, they have not contributed to the further 
development of BBA’s message of seed conservation and the value of traditional 
agriculture. Indeed, in interviews conducted with local farmers, there did not appear 




on BBA, most farmers interviewed (with the exception of those directly involved in 
the movement) responded that they knew of them, but found their message somewhat 
underwhelming. One farmer, Jaya (3.u.), says unenthusiastically, ‘Yes, I met them. 
[They say,] “Traditional seeds are good; scientific seeds are bad”.’ In some respects, 
this challenge of sustaining relevance may be attributed to the very ‘success’ of 
BBA. The use of traditional seeds and farming methods in the villages of the Henwal 
Valley has become common sense. It needs no further emphasis. Indeed, as Jardhari 
(3.b.), Krishnan (3.k.) and Smriti (3.l.), noted in interviews, even the agricultural 
universities and other state institutions, which were formerly hostile to BBA’s 
message, have begun to adopt the view that Green Revolution style agriculture is not 
appropriate for the region. Since there is no strong push for an alternative system 
(‘Green Revolution’), the very notion of the ‘traditional system’ becomes more 
blurred and less politicised. Much of the impetus of BBA is exhausted, at least at the 
local level.  
The decline in relevance is reflected in the difficulty BBA has faced in recruiting 
young members. Most of BBA’s more active members are veterans of older 
struggles, such as Chipko, the Tehri Dam Movement and mining campaigns. Young 
people seem to have found no compelling reasons to become a part of BBA. The 
handful of people under the age of 40 who do consider themselves a part of BBA are 
not particularly active. Young activists such as Krishnan (3.k.), who have tried to 
apply BBA’s message, have done so via other institutions, such as local NGOs. 
Veena (3.cc.), who works on the Organic Commodity Board, suggested that the lack 
of young participants in BBA was preventing it from considering other ways of 
thinking about using agriculture as a means of livelihood generation in the 
contemporary setting, such as gaining premiums through organic certification: 
Veena: Beej Bachao Andolan until now has not been able to bring in its farmers for 
certification, but we’ve [the Organic Commodity Board] always told them this 
government is giving a one hundred per cent subsidy – it’s free, actually, under the 
certification regime. We’ve got a big budget for it and Beej Bachao Andolan farmers 
have been told through Jardhari ji many times that they must come and access the 
services.  




Veena: I don’t know, there is no barrier, really. What I feel now is that Beej Bachao 
Andolan, I think it needs some more younger people in the group, you know, for the 
movement. I think Jardhari is getting old and he is too busy in many other sectors – 
because it’s not just agriculture – it’s anti-mining, it’s legal issues and other things.  
In my final interview with Jardhari (3.b.), I pointed out that several members had 
noted that the declining participation of youth in the movement was an issue and 
asked him if he had any thoughts on how this could be addressed. After a long pause, 
he said that it is difficult to change the attitudes of youth through this movement and 
that such a change requires a change in education. He then added, however, that by 
focusing more on local employment they could appeal more to youth. For example, 
he felt that there was potential for more fruit to be grown locally and more small 
scale food processing. At the time the fieldwork was conducted, however, there was 
little evidence that BBA was taking up these development options.  
The decline in BBA’s relevance creates problems at two levels. First, the fact that 
traditional agriculture has become ill-defined, as it can no longer be contrasted to 
chemical agriculture, opens the possibility for a slow encroachment of unsustainable 
practices. Essentially, within the parameters of the discourse they have deployed 
until now, BBA lacks a clear way of engaging with questions of sustainability into 
the future. As noted above, several farmers interviewed said that they were using 
urea in their farming. Since these farmers are only using a small quantity of 
chemicals, and because these chemicals appear more as an addition to the traditional 
system, rather than a transition to a new system, it is more difficult to express 
critique of the use of chemicals. Secondly, the decline in BBA’s relevance prevents 
them from engaging with some of the most pressing issues affecting local villages. 
Mobilising to gain government support for defence against wild animals corresponds 
with BBA’s pattern of activism; however, engaging with the ways in which 
agriculture itself must adapt to changing conditions has proved more challenging for 
BBA, particularly given that they lack time and access to funds to engage in project 
work.  
Farmers in the Henwal Valley face two major challenges to sustaining their way of 
life into the future. Perhaps the most serious challenge is climate change. All farmers 




this has had in terms of crop failure. Indeed, this was generally the first and most 
emphatic issue which farmers spoke of when the issue of farming was raised. One 
elderly farmer, Pawan (3.w.), said that the local creek, his source of irrigation water, 
had recently dried up for the first time in living memory. Consequently, he had left 
the land fallow. Jardhari (3.b.) and Smriti (3.l.) have used climate change as an entry 
point to discuss the value of millets, which are far more hardy and drought tolerant 
than wheat. Yet, several farmers, Rahul (3.g.), Anil (3.q.) and Jaya (3.u.), claimed 
that in recent years, even the millet crops have performed poorly. Pawan said that the 
previous two years had been so bad that he felt it was impossible for people to 
survive on their own produce alone, at least in unirrigated areas. BBA could 
conceivably be more responsive to this threat to the sustainability of local agriculture 
by focusing more on water conservation strategies. Krishnan (2002) advocated more 
water management programmes and the construction of small dams and tanks to 
overcome water shortages in Uttarakhand. Badri (3.dd.) had been focusing on 
cropping methods that conserve water through his work in a local NGO. For an 
unregistered, unfunded, loosely structured group like BBA, however, it is difficult to 
mobilise resources for such initiatives. 
A further problem affecting agriculture at the time fieldwork was conducted was the 
accelerated out-migration from villages. The inability of the current agricultural 
model to meet basic subsistence requirements has led more people to leave villages 
in search of work in cities, in many cases abandoning agriculture altogether. While 
the seasonal migration of men from villages has been commonplace in the region for 
a considerable time (Bora, 1996), anecdotal accounts provided during fieldwork 
suggested women are now moving with their husbands, rather than staying in the 
village and working on the farm, and that the process has accelerated considerably. 
Bhagwant (3.j.) and Anju (3.z.) note that in their villages many fields have been 
abandoned, as their owners have moved to the cities. When asked about the future, 
villagers are profoundly pessimistic. Pawan (3.w.), for example, suggested that 
within a decade everyone will have either left or died of starvation. This pronounced 
out-migration suggests that many villagers do not see the local economy as being 







In several respects, Beej Bachao Andolan differs from the previous two case studies 
presented. Whereas in the previous examples, the leading figures within the 
organisations were neither farmers nor locals, BBA is led by people from the villages 
in which it is active. Although Jardhari, Prasun and Dhum Singh Negi were 
university educated, as Gandhian activists they had made the decision to work in 
agriculture as the traditional form of livelihood in their communities. This, they 
believed, would keep them sensitive to local issues. Furthermore, BBA, unlike the 
other organizations studied here, does not engage in project work. Their 
organisational structure is largely informal and their work focuses on raising 
awareness about issues that they see as being important to the region’s agriculture 
and lifestyle and agitating to defend village society from what they perceive to be 
destructive encroachments from outside. BBA had made the ‘principled decision’ not 
to register as an organisation or receive funding from external sources, as farming 
and writing were to be their primary sources of livelihood.  
Since the mid-eighties, BBA has taken its message of resistance to corporate 
agriculture to the villages of the Henwal Valley, distributed diverse traditional seeds 
and encouraged villagers to save and share their seeds. Yet as this chapter has 
demonstrated, while BBA’s oppositional activities may have relevance at the 
grassroots, in the contemporary setting, their promotion of traditional agriculture 
does not generate a strong response in local communities. On the one hand, the 
essentials of its philosophy have become common sense. Local people generally 
share BBA’s view that hybrid seeds are inappropriate for the hills and therefore the 
message of rejecting them does not strike most farmers as particularly profound. On 
the other hand, BBA’s message fails to speak to the more urgent issues affecting 
agriculture in the region at present, particularly out-migration and climate change. 
BBA lacks the resources and organisational structure to develop effective and 
coherent responses to these issues, which evidently require methods of farming that 
the traditional system does not provide. Furthermore, it appears that in recent years 




regarding seed conservation and baranaja through local, national and international 
NGOs and social movements, rather than in the villages of the Henwal Valley. 
Responding to these opportunities inevitably shapes the direction of their movement 
and their ideology, guiding them towards messages that confirm the assumptions of 
sustainable agriculture movements in India and abroad.  
This is not to say that BBA activists themselves are irrelevant or detached. Indeed, as 
has been outlined in this chapter, the leadership of BBA have been highly involved in 
more contemporary local struggles, such as the opposition to the mine at Kataldi. It 
may be said, however, that BBA has had difficulty responding to issues relating to 
the productivity and viability of agriculture in a changing ecological, social and 
economic context. This may be attributed (1) to their lack of resources and 
organisational structure and (2) to their Gandhian ideology, which is somewhat 
ambivalent towards local development aspirations and promotes traditional 
subsistence agriculture without acknowledging that the traditional system may need 





9. RECOGNISING POWER IN STRUGGLES FOR SUSTAINABLE 
AGRICULTURE 
 
This chapter draws on the findings of the three case studies and previous research in 
the field to theorise the power relationships that impinge upon sustainable agriculture 
organisations in terms of their organisational structure, strategic approach and 
methods of engaging with rural communities. It begins, in Section 9.1., by briefly 
exploring organisations’ methods of constructing ‘sustainable agriculture’, 
highlighting the tension between local and non-local articulations of sustainability. 
This becomes the basis for a broader discussion of the ways in which power 
structures influence the capacity of sustainable agriculture organisations to meet the 
needs of the rural poor. This discussion takes as its point of departure the literature 
on ‘grassroots movements’, to explore the possibility of rural communities, 
particularly the rural poor, organising themselves to develop and propagate 
sustainable agricultural models that meet their own, unique requirements. After 
exploring the key moments of community participation observed within the case 
studies, I goes on to consider some of the major challenges and limitations to 
grassroots organising in this particular field. I argue that, in most settings, initiating 
and sustaining projects for sustainable agriculture requires full-time activists who are 
able to mobilise the relevant resources. Typically, these activists will be drawn from 
the well-connected, resourced and educated sections of the middle class. All of these 
issues are discussed in Section 9.2.  
When middle class activists become the central agents in sustainable agriculture 
initiatives, this raises another series of issues, which are discussed in Section 9.3. 
Middle class activists find themselves embedded in a network of social relations, in 
which donors, national level activist networks, rural elites and rural subalterns all 
play decisive roles. I consider how activists’ relations with these groups impinge 
upon the ideologies, organisational structure and strategies of sustainable agriculture 
organisations, and show how activists must broker a balance between these often 
competing influences. Section 9.4. develops these themes further, by examining how 




to negotiate these power structures in a way that enables them to retain their 
autonomy, efficacy and values. The two key issues that are examined are activists’ 
strategies in negotiating their relations with non-local sources of influence 
(particularly donors) by positioning themselves as ‘social movements’, and how they 
challenge (or refrain from challenging) power structures within rural communities.  
The chapter ultimately attempts to present a balanced and nuanced perspective on the 
position in which activists find themselves whilst trying to introduce sustainable 
agriculture initiatives into communities. Woven through the discussion are the 
Gramscian concepts of hegemony and the crisis of authority, which keep the 
discussion historically grounded and highlight the broader significance of the 
findings. The chapter demonstrates that while the crisis in rural India provides an 
opening for new alternatives, the ways in which these alternatives develop are 
influenced by existing structures of power and privilege. Nonetheless, these 
structures can be negotiated and challenged. The nature of the relations that activists 
choose to form with donors, other activists, rural elites and rural subalterns strongly 
influence the direction of their organisations, and whether their response to crisis 
opens the way for a progressive and inclusive articulation of the needs of rural 
communities, or rather simply reproduces the existing balance of power.  
 
9.1. Constructing Sustainable Agriculture in Response to Crisis 
As was explained in Chapter 4, the precise features of sustainable agricultural 
systems cannot be determined a priori. Although, broadly speaking, the 
sustainability of an agricultural system may be defined as its capacity to remain 
productive in the long term despite disturbances and change (Conway, 1985), the 
more precise features that distinguish a sustainable system are likely to vary 
according to a range of contextual factors. Indeed, in concrete settings, sustainable 
agriculture is likely to be defined negatively, through confrontation with factors that 
render present approaches unsustainable (Jodha, 1991; Buttel, 1993).  
Although the three case studies examined in this thesis did not often use the term 




meaning through contrast to the unsustainable features of present approaches, 
particularly through the experience of ‘crisis’ or a major disruption. Often, aspects of 
farming models that solved locally experienced crises were taken as the defining 
features of their ‘sustainable’ systems. Thus, in Punjab, a sense of crisis was induced 
by the burden of chemicals on human health and the ecosystem, as well as by the 
economic burden of the increasing cost of inputs. KVM defined its sustainable 
farming model, ‘natural farming’, in terms of its use of no external inputs, 
particularly synthetic chemicals. In Tamil Nadu, Revathi and Swamy made their 
greatest gains in promoting ecological farming in the wake of the tsunami in 2004; 
subsequently, their farming systems were defined primarily through their capacity to 
rejuvenate soils. BBA had its origins in the failure of hybrid soya bean seeds to meet 
local requirements; its focus was thus on the preservation of traditional seed 
varieties. This reaffirms the point that sustainable agriculture is typically defined 
locally and in response to current problems. It is particularly compelling in times of 
perceived crisis. 
While local experiences and trends towards ‘unsustainability’ shaped the 
development of sustainable models, individual sustainable agriculture organisations 
tended to attach their identity to more specific farming models, which often had their 
origins elsewhere. These systems are used in a complex politics of signification. As 
is discussed in the sections that follow, in some cases, this appeared to be a way of 
promoting one’s work to donors: appealing to the models that are fashionable in 
development or activist circles. In other cases, particularly in Tamil Nadu, it 
appeared to be a product of competition amongst local organisations – a way of 
distinguishing oneself from rivals. Distinguishing between different systems could 
also serve to indicate the extent to which one addresses the fundamentals of crisis. 
This was particularly clear in the distinction between chemical, natural and organic 
farming. Chemical farming, of course, referred to the dominant, Green Revolution 
approach. The label itself has negative connotations, and the contrast to natural 
farming serves to define an entire system of farming chiefly in terms of its use of 




was typically used to separate radical from partial solutions to agrarian crisis.
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Organic farming, with its reliance on the purchase of external organic inputs and 
third party certification systems, was framed as being more integrated into the 
current system. Natural farming (and variants thereon), by contrast, is used to signify 
a more radically anti-commercial stance. The natural-organic binary serves to 
emphasise what are seen as the crucial flaws of the dominant agricultural model (i.e., 
dependency on external inputs and lack of local, ecological integration) and also 
confers legitimacy on the organisations promoting them, as they are seen to endorse 
a more ‘radical’ position. 
This highlights an important tension. On the one hand, sustainable agriculture is 
defined and developed in response to local needs; on the other, it is involved in a 
more divisive politics that attempts to promote individual organisations. At times, the 
latter appears to eclipse the former. To understand how sustainable agriculture can 
best meet local needs requires an engagement with the forms of civil society 
organisation through which it is propagated. As the rest of this chapter explains, the 
forms of social organisation that activists adopt have a strong bearing on their 
capacity and inclination to develop sustainable models that adequately reflect the 
requirements of those most in need of change. 
 
9.2. Grassroots Movements for Sustainable Agriculture? 
The key issue of interest here is whether sustainable agriculture is articulated by 
those who need it most. The economic, social and ecological ramifications of India’s 
agrarian crisis are felt most immediately and profoundly by the poor – particularly 
smallholding farmers and landless labourers. Yet in India, these classes have 
historically lacked political representation, lacking access to the institutions of civil 
society through which they might articulate a social and political vision of their own 
(Chatterjee, 2004). If the project of sustainable agriculture is not in some measure 
                                                 
52 Note that although TOFarM’s name indicates an adherence to organic farming, Revathi had 
ambivalent feelings about the term, and indicated in interviews that she really promotes 




articulated by its direct stakeholders, particularly the poor, then it is likely to merely 
sustain existing patterns of privilege. As I outlined in Chapter 3, the literature on 
‘grassroots movements’ appears to offer a model by which poor communities can 
organise themselves and overcome their historical lack of representation. Grassroots 
movements are those directed by people most vulnerable to change, which make use 
of local resources to resolve locally identified problems (Batliwala, 2002; Appadurai, 
2002; Dwyer, 2011; Edwards, 2001). In this way, they avoid some of the issues of 
outside influence and elitism that often emerge within CSOs, and develop responses 
that organically reflect ground realities and actively develop the capacity of poor 
communities to mobilise resources and represent themselves. The idea of a 
grassroots movement for sustainable agriculture seems appealing, particularly given 
the focus in sustainable agriculture literature on bottom-up development (Altieri, 
1984; Farrington & Lewis, 1993) and the value of local knowledge (Altieri, 2004; 
Pretty, 2002). A grassroots sustainable agriculture organisation would facilitate the 
self-organisation of those most affected by the agrarian crisis to develop models of 
agriculture that can sustain local livelihoods into the future. It remains an open 
question, however, whether it is reasonable to expect sustainable agriculture 
organisations to develop along these lines. Thus, in this section, I refer to my case 
studies to evaluate the potential for grassroots methods of organising and identify 
some of the barriers that exist within the confines of currently dominant approaches.  
Although they may not always have used the term ‘grassroots’, activists interviewed 
for this research clearly placed value on grassroots methods of organising. It was 
important to them that their initiatives were seen to represent the needs and 
aspirations of rural communities. Furthermore, they at least endorsed the idea that 
members of rural communities should participate within their organisations, be 
involved in decision making and eventually, occupy leadership roles. On the one 
hand, these claims may be about image. In their relations with donors, the state and 
the broader public, it is crucial for sustainable agriculture organisations to be seen as 
‘authentic’ expressions of grassroots issues. Yet, on the other hand, it is clear from 
interviews with activists that the stated commitment to grassroots organising also 
reflects their values and convictions regarding effective methods of facilitating social 




interpreted as merely an imposition from donors. For some activists, working directly 
with communities relates directly to Gandhian ethics. For example, activists 
associated with BBA believed it to be a matter of principle that, as activists, they 
should live and work in their villages of origin, to remain connected to local realities. 
Effectively, they wanted to ensure that they remained a part of the ‘grassroots’, by 
experiencing local issues first hand. 
Yet to be a grassroots movement entails more than simply endorsing these values: it 
presumes a certain model of organisation. For Batliwala (2002: 400), grassroots 
movements are ‘movements of, for, and by people most directly affected by the 
consequences of public policy’. Such movements are defined by a set of practices 
and processes which ensure sustained and meaningful participation of these direct 
stakeholders. In particular, they are said to have participatory structures (Edwards, 
2001) and mobilise their resources in a way that meets locally articulated needs 
(Appadurai, 2002; Ekins, 1992). It is difficult to say that the cases presented in this 
thesis meet all of these criteria. Although there may be some level of community 
participation in decision making, it could not be said in all cases that communities 
were directing the organisations, due to the far more prominent roles played by core 
groups of activists. Therefore, it is perhaps inappropriate to suggest that these cases 
are examples of ‘grassroots movements’.  
The ‘grassroots movements’ literature itself reveals some ambiguity on this issue. 
Appadurai (2002), Batliwala (2002), Edwards (2001) and Dwyer (2011) all rely on 
the ‘the Alliance’, a Mumbai-based federation of slum dwellers, as their primary 
example of a grassroots movement. As these authors note, however, this organisation 
itself is not entirely governed and managed by the urban poor whom it represents: a 
key member of the Alliance is a professional NGO, which provides managerial 
support and technical knowledge. Appadurai (2002) suggests that the role of this 
NGO is to provide services, while decisions are made by the Alliance’s grassroots 
constituency. Yet, it is unclear how the supportive and directive roles can be 
separated in practice. Studies of similar alliances in other parts of India suggest that 
they are often fraught with tension regarding whether NGOs or community-based 




‘community-based organisations’ are not coterminous with communities themselves 
– often they are dominated by local elites (de Wit & Berner, 2009). Whether 
grassroots movements really exist in the manner suggested by grassroots movement 
scholars may thus be called into question.  
This ambiguity was reflected in the case studies. The groups studied here show that, 
in practice, identifying a certain kind of activity as ‘grassroots’ is far from an exact 
science. Much of the ambiguity relates to which constituents should be identified as 
‘grassroots’ at a given moment. With KVM, this ambiguity was particularly 
pronounced. In projecting themselves as a ‘people’s movement’, KVM implied that 
they directly express the concerns and ambitions of ‘the people’ of Punjab and 
involve them in the process of change. This would imply that KVM is a ‘grassroots’ 
movement, in the sense that the changes they were trying to bring about were 
collective responses from communities to grassroots experiences of the crisis of 
Punjab. Whether or not this claim is valid depends on which groups and perspectives 
are regarded as being ‘grassroots’. From a certain angle, KVM does express an 
authentic grassroots concern for the high rates of disease in the state. The fact that 
KVM’s message regarding the ‘health crisis’ of Punjab has resonated in both villages 
and urban centres alike, shows that there is widespread concern for the issue. In this 
sense, KVM can legitimately be referred to as a ‘grassroots movement’, as it 
mobilises grassroots concern about health. To a lesser extent, KVM also mobilises 
concern about other dimensions of the crisis situation in Punjab, such as 
indebtedness.  
What is more problematic is whether KVM is really grassroots in the manner in 
which it proposes solutions to the crisis. Like so many other sustainable agriculture 
organisations, KVM has its own pre-formulated solution to this crisis: in its case, 
‘natural farming’. This can hardly be said to be an ‘indigenous’ phenomenon and at 
the time the research was conducted, there was little evidence that it was a farmer-led 
initiative. It was, as one participant commented, a ‘hub and spoke’ model, with a 
small team of KVM activists providing all support. Though Dutt and others may 
have wanted to see more Punjab-specific solutions emerging from farmers at the 




understand if they had any of their own solutions. This was evidently motivated by a 
sense that farmers in Punjab are ‘too commercial’, that they have lost their 
‘traditional knowledge’ and would therefore be unable to form a grassroots solution 
that would be compatible with KVM’s ideology. KVM activists certainly have a 
right to put forward their own solution to the crisis situation in Punjab and to try their 
best to demonstrate its potential by working with farmers. But the claim that natural 
farming is a grassroots phenomenon or even that there is a ‘natural farming 
movement’ in Punjab appears to be misplaced.  
To take the issue further, there is a question as to why land owning farmers should be 
considered grassroots. If ‘the grassroots’ refers to those most directly affected by the 
issue in question, then surely agricultural labourers are the most immediate casualties 
of Green Revolution agriculture, at least if one takes health as the focus. While a 
class of agricultural labourers is almost completely absent in Uttarakhand (Pande, 
1996), in Tamil Nadu and Punjab it is labourers who directly apply chemical inputs, 
often without adequate protective equipment. The experience is unpleasant and is a 
major health hazard. Labourers also stand to gain from the development of chemical 
free methods, as they require more labour, thereby creating more job opportunities, 
in turn promoting wage increases. Yet the focus of the sustainable agriculture 
movement, in the case studies presented here and more broadly, has been land 
owners. Furthermore, in a state like Punjab, questions need to be asked regarding the 
position of women vis-à-vis the grassroots. Although it is predominantly male 
farmers and labourers who are immediately exposed to issues of diminishing returns 
in agriculture and indebtedness, this must inevitably have an impact on the domestic 
sphere, and, in turn, women. Although KVM’s attempts to involve women are 
laudable, again, it attempts to involve them in pre-formulated projects. There has 
been little attempt to understand the impacts of agrarian crisis on women (besides 
certain health impacts), let alone to engage with the kinds of solutions that women 
themselves would find appropriate. 
Despite these issues, the literature on grassroots movements does identify an issue of 
theoretical importance: namely, the level of participation of direct stakeholders in 




organisations working with impoverished and marginalised communities to be 
structured along purely grassroots lines, it is still possible to identify ‘grassroots 
moments’ within organisations and to theorise the value of such moments in 
promoting participatory forms of activism and development. In the context of 
sustainable agriculture organisations, such moments may be seen as democratic 
openings in which subaltern groups have opportunities to articulate the kind of 
agrarian models that might sustainably meet their needs. Some examples of these 
‘moments’, derived from my case studies, are presented in the section that follows. 
By examining these moments, it is possible to consider possibilities for ways they 
can be expanded to allow more participatory and grassroots forms of sustainable 
agriculture to develop.  
It should be acknowledged that these case studies were somewhat limited in their 
potential for promoting genuinely participatory and transformative change. I begin 
my discussion, however, by acknowledging what they have achieved, before 
examining the more substantive barriers to grassroots development in 9.2.2. 
 
9.2.1. Moments of Grassroots Development and Activism 
The case studies presented in this thesis show several possibilities for grassroots 
methods to express agrarian crisis and formulate and implement sustainable 
solutions. These can be called ‘grassroots moments’ and are grouped into three 
categories, below: (1) grassroots methods of constructing awareness of problems of 
sustainability, (2) the development of grassroots solutions, and (3) grassroots means 
of organising and sustaining mobilisation for sustainable agriculture.  
The case studies show it is possible to build knowledge of sustainability issues using 
grassroots methods. KVM, for example, facilitated members of rural communities to 
build awareness of the impacts of the Green Revolution. This was particularly 
evident in their women’s group, in which women documented changes in the health 
of their communities. This highlights the possibility of what might be termed 
‘grassroots research’ – community-based initiatives to actively develop knowledge 




parameters of this research were defined by KVM (i.e., a health focus), they show 
one method by which people can be empowered with research skills to document 
changes in their communities. The knowledge thereby produced can be used to 
intervene in public debates.
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 Such endeavours benefit from being directed by local 
people, who have numerous local connections that non-local researchers lack. 
Further, in the process of going from house-to-house to conduct their surveys, they 
build both awareness and social capital, which may in turn assist in the development 
of solutions. Such initiatives require resources, however, at the very least to train 
local people in appropriate research skills. Supportive organisations could link local 
people to researchers to provide training in data collection. Such a commitment to 
building grassroots knowledge could lead not only to a more comprehensive picture 
of agrarian crisis, but also actively engage people in the process of movement-
building and working towards more sustainable solutions.  
There is some evidence of the development of grassroots solutions to problems of 
sustainability within the groups studied. The clearest example of this is BBA’s seed 
saving initiative, which closely conforms to the structure of a ‘grassroots initiative’ 
in the sense that Batliwala (2002) uses the term. It was a collective effort on the part 
of communities to solve problems relating to their own sustainability. Though 
Jardhari coordinated the effort, it remained collectivist in its approach, with farmers 
from throughout the region assisting in gathering traditional seeds and protecting 
local agro-biodiversity. In helping to redistribute local seeds, BBA’s grassroots 
project has brought tangible benefits to communities, some of which had lost access 
to many traditional varieties of seed during the 1970s. Locally managed seed banks 
are a versatile means of enlisting community participation in conserving agro-
biodiversity. Vijayalakshmi and Balasubramanian (2004) have documented a number 
of these initiatives throughout India and suggest that they also encourage farmers to 
experiment with a range of crop varieties in their fields to determine which perform 
best in local conditions. In this way, local people actively participate in in-situ 
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biodiversity conservation and the development of more resilient agro-ecosystems. It 
is not always possible, however, to develop these seed banks in such a participatory 
manner. In Punjab, for example, local varieties of seed have been almost completely 
replaced by hybrid varieties, so there is little scope for community participation in 
the collection and preservation of seed. KVM’s seed bank was managed by one 
farmer, who had obtained the seeds from farmers in other states.   
Sustainable agriculture organisations also provide a medium for horizontal 
networking and knowledge sharing between farmers (see Holt-Gimenez, 2006). 
KVM regularly hosts events in which natural farmers from across India give 
workshops for local farmers, theoretically providing horizontal networks through 
which farmers can exchange knowledge on natural farming techniques. It should be 
acknowledged, however, that these ‘master farmers’ tend to be educated and own 
large tracts of land. Furthermore, although TOFarM developed much of its body of 
knowledge through engaging with practicing ecological farmers, Revathi’s 
experience reveals some of the factors that may limit the potential of horizontal 
networking. The competitiveness she observed between sustainable farmers in the 
state restricted the potential for sharing innovations. BBA was more archetypically 
grassroots in this regard, as it became a forum for actively promoting traditional 
agricultural systems as solutions to emerging problems of climate change and 
declining nutritional security. 
Participatory organisational structures have received comparatively less attention in 
the literature. Both Batliwala (2002) and Appadurai (2002) highlight the value of 
grassroots movements establishing relationships with professionals and NGOs in 
which the latter carry out administrative and research tasks to serve the agendas set 
by grassroots constituents. While these kinds of relationships are valuable, it is worth 
stressing that they will not always be possible. In the absence of supportive 
professionals, grassroots movements should be able to maintain their own internal 
affairs without relying on outsiders. Further, involvement of a movement’s 
grassroots constituents in meetings and decision-making processes is necessary to 




organisation and ensures that the movement continues to directly meet the needs of 
communities.  
TOFarM’s Kadal Oosai initiative was one attempt to facilitate a grassroots 
organisation with participatory structures. It aimed to involve rural communities in 
the development of sustainable agriculture at all levels and also allow the 
marginalised communities on the Nagapattinam coast to collectively solve whatever 
other problems they may have, including marketing, collective bargaining and 
campaigning. In playing a ‘facilitative’ role, Revathi and Swamy provided farmers 
with skills to initiate collective action according to their own collective interests. 
This is in line with the grassroots ethos of ensuring direct stakeholders make 
executive decisions regarding the allocation of skills and resources. The intention 
was for Kadal Oosai to be a completely self-sustaining initiative, though as noted in 
Chapter 7, it was not possible during the fieldwork to verify how successful it was on 
the ground. KVM attempted to involve communities in the movement by having 
several farmers on its Executive Committee and assigning villagers formal roles 
within the organisation. KVM employed primarily people from rural communities to 
engage in fieldwork, though of course, assigning them formal roles does not equate 
to local people ‘directing’ the movement. Essentially, KVM revolved around the 
strategic and ideological vision of its Guruji, Umendra Dutt. In a similar way, BBA’s 
failure to involve the younger generation in the organisation led to some degree of 
alienation between the organisation and the most pressing issues affecting the region. 
 
9.2.2. Challenges and Limitations of Grassroots Organising 
While there may be benefits associated with grassroots methods of organising within 
sustainable agriculture organisations, the case studies highlighted a number of 
challenges and limits to fully implementing these methods. Grassroots organising 
presupposes that the aims and objectives of a movement are formulated by members 
of communities in response to local needs. With the possible exception of BBA, 
however, the aims of the movements studied here were not initially formulated by 




most agrarian settings, sustainable agriculture can emerge from the grassroots, or 
whether it is, rather, a project formulated by outsiders, which can at best 
subsequently enlist the participation of subaltern groups.  
Often, rural communities lack an impetus to organise themselves to promote 
sustainable agriculture. Previous studies of autonomous, farmer-led sustainable 
agriculture initiatives have not shown evidence of communities organising these 
initiatives in response to crises of sustainability within the Green Revolution 
paradigm. The Peasants’ Union of Indonesia, for example, discussed by Dwyer 
(2011), began as a resistance to the threat of land acquisition and only subsequently 
incorporated training centres for sustainable farming methods. By contrast, the threat 
posed by unsustainable farming practices – growing indebtedness, chemical 
contamination, and so on – develops slowly. In this context, it seems likely that 
rather than a collective response, individuals will gradually forge their own means of 
adaptation, such as migration. In Punjab, where the need to look to alternatives to 
chemical agriculture is perhaps most urgent – at least from an ecological and public 
health perspective – the grassroots tendency to experiment with alternatives is quite 
low. Farmers are in a precarious position and are unlikely to experiment with 
practices that may compromise their livelihoods.  
In the grassroots agroecology networks in Latin America (see Altieri & Toledo, 
2011; Holt-Gimenez, 2006), there is an aspiration around which projects revolve – 
namely, a desire on behalf of small landholders to improve production in a manner 
that does not entail the risks involved in more industrial methods. Such aspirations 
are less likely to develop in Green Revolution zones like Punjab, where chemical 
agriculture has already brought production to a high level. Furthermore, even in 
subsistence regions, where production could be reliably increased through ecological 
farming techniques, some form of external intervention may be required to make 
communities aware of these possibilities. In these cases, it should be recognised that 
a purely local, indigenous solution is not always possible, but the urgency of the 




Another major issue impeding the development of grassroots sustainable agriculture 
is rural communities’ lack of access to the necessary resources to sustain projects. 
Grassroots movement scholars, particularly Appadurai (2002), emphasise the 
importance of local people making use of locally available resources to solve 
collective problems. This, it is suggested, will make optimum use of often scarce 
resources and lead to communities gradually, sustainably building their own assets, 
making them less dependent on outside sources and more resilient in the long term. 
Appadurai also suggests that these processes are empowering, as they show 
communities the skills and resources that they already have. Similar perspectives 
were echoed within the organisations examined here. The concepts of ‘natural 
farming’ and ‘indigenous seed saving’ that they promote, encourage farmers to rely 
on local resources and not to depend upon the market. Yet, as the resource 
mobilisation school of social movement studies has shown, the poor, and particularly 
the rural poor, generally lack the kind of resources – such as time, education, and 
relevant connections – to sustain an organisation (Oberschall, 1973, 1978; McCarthy 
& Zald, 1977). The case studies examined in this thesis showed that such resource 
deficits, though not absolutely decisive, did create barriers to mobilisation in the 
sense envisaged by grassroots movement scholars. 
Knowledge regarding effective farming techniques forms a very important resource 
within sustainable agriculture organisations. All of the cases presented, to some 
extent, valorised farmers’ ‘traditional knowledge’, which had evolved over millennia 
in response to local conditions, claiming they should be regarded as a community 
asset. This is a very common perspective within the literature on sustainable 
agricultural development (e.g. Altieri, 2004; Pretty 2002). Yet despite this rhetoric, 
in practice, these groups, particularly KVM and TOFarM, exhibited a lack of faith in 
the potential of local people and local knowledge to contribute to the development of 
sustainable agriculture. People working in these two organisations have stated that 
because of the impact of the Green Revolution, local environmental knowledge has 
declined. As such, in their practical endeavours to find solutions to local problems, 
they rarely appeal to local people. KVM and TOFarM spent far more time promoting 




This raises the question of whether it is even desirable to rely exclusively on what 
local people already know, when technological innovations developed through 
ecological science and within global sustainable agriculture networks hold the 
promise of greater productivity. Such a promise will make sustainable farming more 
attractive to farmers. This is particularly important in regions that have been 
practicing chemically intensive forms of agriculture, such as Punjab, where farmers 
fear that any move away from chemically intensive practices will mean a return to 
pre-Green Revolution yields. Further, as Gupta (1998) has found, in Green 
Revolution areas, discourses have circulated which position everything ‘traditional’ 
as ‘backward’ and ‘underdeveloped’. As such, valorising ‘traditional agriculture’ 
may not be the ideal mobilising strategy. In their interactions with farmers, KVM 
activists attempt to assure farmers that natural farming can provide greater results 
than ‘traditional farming’. By implication, this means relying on more than 
‘traditional knowledge’. At some level, one must acknowledge the benefits of 
scientific and technological development. 
Time is another crucial resource that many members of rural communities lack. One 
of the key challenges TOFarM activists encountered in facilitating grassroots 
movements was that practicing ecological farmers generally lacked time to 
participate in a movement in any sustained, meaningful way. KVM activists 
ultimately reached similar conclusions. Since sustainable farming methods are more 
labour intensive than chemical farming, it became unrealistic to expect farmers to 
participate in organisational work, except for brief periods. BBA activists’ principled 
decision to continue to work in agriculture effectively precluded the possibility of 
sustained, focused project work, which may have aided them in maintaining their 
relevance on the ground. This highlights the importance of full-time activists with 
adequate resources to facilitate sustained action over time, as identified by McCarthy 
and Zald (1977). These activists may enlist the participation of rural communities at 
crucial moments, while not expecting them to occupy themselves with the task of 
building momentum for change in any enduring sense. Revathi and Swamy’s 
adoption of a ‘facilitative’ approach to organising recognises the importance of 




external organisational support. Such organisational support ultimately provides a 
space in which participation can occur.  
Resource mobilisation theorists emphasise social networks and solidarity as crucial 
resources in determining the possibility of sustained mobilisation (see, e.g., 
Oberschall, 1973, 1978). Grassroots movement literature takes for granted the 
solidarity of communities, neglecting the often substantial divisions within them. In 
India, these divisions are particularly pronounced (de Wit & Berner, 2009: 942-3). 
Varshney (1995) considers identity-based divisions within rural India as a crucial 
barrier to effective political mobilisation. TOFarM encountered intense competition 
between practicing sustainable farmers in Tamil Nadu. Divisions were based on the 
efficacy and righteousness of techniques, but also on personality clashes and issues 
of organisational identity. This, they identified as a further barrier to more 
collaborative, collectivist approaches to developing sustainable agriculture in the 
state. Furthermore, the organisations’ unwillingness to work with labourers was a 
further sign of the divisions within communities that prevent solidarity and 
cooperation.  
Thus, while acknowledging the value of grassroots methods, it is important to 
recognise that relying exclusively on bottom-up organising within rural communities 
has its limitations, at least within the current institutional setting. In this context, 
contributions from ‘outsiders’ are particularly important. The issue which then arises 
is the kinds of power relations that form when people from non-agrarian or elite class 
backgrounds intervene in rural affairs, as has, to a greater or lesser extent, been the 
case in all three of the case studies. It is to these questions of power and how these 
civil society initiatives engage with communities that the following section turns.  
 
9.3. Locating Sustainable Agriculture Organisations within Structures of Power 
Although rural subaltern groups are the most vulnerable to agrarian crisis and are 
experiencing high levels of distress, unfortunately, the most distressed groups are not 
always the best positioned to develop a response to a crisis situation. Indeed, as 




certain advantages in the struggle to formulate new hegemonic constellations. They 
have greater access to resources and are more experienced in the hegemonic work of 
consent building. This can be observed within sustainable agriculture organisations, 
which are rarely led and managed by members of the rural communities in whose 
name they work. Rather, their leaders are typically urban, middle class activists, who 
possess the required time, money, contacts, organisational skills and scientific 
knowledge required to successfully implement projects and to sustain their initiatives 
over time. These resources are required for both organisational/ logistical purposes 
and also for discursive ends. As Deshpande (2003: 139) argues, the Indian middle 
classes have historically played the role of ‘articulating hegemony’. Their position in 
education, the media, public administration and so on allows them to define whether 
a given social and economic structure is just or unjust, establishing the basis for 
popular consent. Within sustainable agriculture organisations, middle class activists 
articulate a unique perspective on crisis, undermining consent for existing 
agricultural practices (and the social relations that support them) and articulating 
alternatives. Middle class activists played such a role within KVM and TOFarM. By 
contrast, BBA’s activists, though in many cases tertiary educated, continue to live in 
villages and participate in subsistence farming, and therefore could not be designated 
as middle class. Yet, as is elaborated below, BBA activists are embedded in a nexus 
of relations in which middle class activists play an important role.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, there has been much recent literature examining the 
growing role of the Indian middle class in activism and civil society more broadly. 
The literature has problematized this role, showing how middle class activists have 
used their access to the institutions of civil society to reinforce their own class 
privilege (Harriss, 2008; Fernandes, 2006; Fernandes & Heller, 2008). In other cases, 
middle class activists have agitated for positions that are overtly hostile to the 
working poor, supporting slum demolitions and reducing the presence of the poor on 
the streets of major cities (Anjaria, 2009; Rajagopal, 2001; Baviskar, Sinha & 
Phillip, 2006; Baviskar, 2011). While Dutt and Revathi certainly have urban, middle 
class backgrounds, their politics do not appear to be overtly anti-poor. Nonetheless, 
their middle class identity did create some problems. Specifically, it placed a barrier 




and status, which created some friction that might not have existed had activists been 
from rural communities themselves. In this respect, Revathi and Swamy’s status as 
urban, middle class ‘outsiders’ led them to make several strategic blunders. Their 
failure to grasp the level of communal divisions within rural Tamil Nadu led them to 
assume that certain projects would be far easier than they turned out to be.  
Activists’ middle class backgrounds inevitably bring with them certain value-
attachments. As has been widely acknowledged in the literature, there is a distinct 
tendency in ‘environmental movements’ in India to impose metropolitan aesthetic 
and ideological values on poor communities without a deeper understanding of the 
social and economic issues with which poor rural communities must contend 
(Baviskar, 2005; Shah, 2010).  This was quite clear in the case of KVM, whose 
leading activists, as well as the professionals (doctors, teachers, lawyers) who inform 
its perspective and make up several of its ‘action groups’ are largely (though not 
exclusively) from urban, middle class backgrounds. These urban supporters are most 
directly exposed to the crisis in Punjab agriculture as a health crisis: a crisis which 
KVM attributes to the consumption of chemically contaminated food. This may 
partially explain KVM’s relative focus on health issues over economic issues, despite 
the fact that the economic crisis of Punjab is probably a more immediate concern to 
rural communities. Such a tension between the perspectives of activists and 
communities becomes particularly problematic when activists attempt to play the 
role of leaders within rural communities. Their leadership serves to reinforce the 
subaltern position of the rural poor, by reproducing their dependency on outsiders for 
representation and obscuring any conflict between represented and ostensible 
representatives. At least in this respect, they are more akin to Gramsci’s ‘traditional 
intellectuals’, who reinforce the existing hegemonic order, than ‘organic 
intellectuals’, who give voice to the marginalised and unite the population in their 
collective aspiration for a new society. 
Yet the central problem for the organisations studied here was not so much derived 
from activists’ identity as ‘middle class’, but rather the embededness of activists 
within a particular nexus of social relations. No group is capable of articulating 




others to mobilise appropriate resources and to forge consent for the agricultural 
models they are promoting. These relations have a strong bearing on their ideology, 
organisational identity and strategic decision making. This, in turn, affects how 
successful they are in developing appropriate agricultural models and methods of 
engaging with rural communities. In Figure 9.1., I have attempted to identify key 
social groups who shape the work of sustainable agriculture organisations. 
 
 
Figure 9.1. Key groups influencing the ideology, organisational identity and 





The groups positioned above the sustainable agriculture organisation in Figure 9.1. 
are non-local sources of influence. Donors, whether international or domestic, 
provide funds which, at the very least, enable sustainable agriculture organisations to 
employ staff who can focus on maintaining mobilisations over time. Often they 
monitor the progress of organisations and, to ensure that projects are implemented 
effectively, attempt to impose organisational discipline on activists. For at least one 
interviewee, this was seen as positive, as it is the main mechanism that keeps 
activists accountable and focused on delivering results. For these reasons, there are 
strong incentives for sustainable agriculture organisations to maintain positive 
relations with donors. Yet, as Cooley and Ron (2002) note, this becomes problematic 
when organisations structure their activities around maintaining relations with donors 
and securing access to funds, rather than building relations with target communities. 
To some extent, the adverse impact of financial dependency on donors can be seen in 
the case of TOFarM. Responding to funding opportunities throughout South and 
South-East Asia in the wake of the 2004 tsunami prevented TOFarM activists from 
consolidating their results in any one place. Simply taking up projects wherever 
funds are available does not encourage activists to engage in the kind of committed, 
long-term work required to gain a deep understanding of community needs and 
aspirations.  
A more troubling prospect is that becoming overly reliant on donors may lead 
organisations to place the priorities of donors ahead of those of their target 
communities. This is problematic, as many donors have a neoliberal orientation and 
are antagonistic towards the genuine political empowerment of the rural poor, 
leading organisations to adopt project work that avoids politicisation of the 
development process and is generally harmonious with a neoliberal agenda (Petras, 
1999; Ghosh, 2009; Patel, 2006). It is notable that, particularly within KVM and 
BBA, activists were very much concerned that donors posed a threat to their 
autonomy and made moves to try to keep them at a distance. This issue is taken up in 
more detail in Section 9.4.1., below.    
Activist networks, by contrast, are important sources of non-financial resources, such 




number of active networks in India through which various organisations share ideas 
and collaborate. In the process they generate an India-specific discourse on 
sustainability and sustainable agriculture. These include the Alliance for a Holistic 
and Sustainable Agriculture (ASHA), the Organic Farming Association of India 
(OFAI), the Millet Network of India (MINI) and national anti-GM campaigns. These 
networks connect sustainable agriculture activists working throughout the country 
via annual conferences, e-lists, training workshops and so on. Literature on 
sustainable agriculture, such as the works of Palekar (n.d.), Alvarez (2008) and 
Dabholkar (2001), can also be considered as a part of these networks, as they provide 
a basis for the circulation of ideas across vast areas. These networks are quite 
decisive in setting the tone and focus of the debate on sustainable agriculture in India 
and, furthermore, through them local organisations are connected with international 
activists and perspectives. It is important to note that, while analytically distinct, 
donors and activist networks are highly interconnected. It is often through 
networking within activist circles that access to funding is secured, as was the case 
for both Dutt and Revathi.  
In the absence of strong local/ grassroots structures to make organisations self-
sustaining, connections to these networks become vital to the development and 
survival of organisations.
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 All three of the organisations studied in this thesis relied 
on such networks for various forms of resources, for a sense of legitimacy/ moral 
support and to retain their relevance when this was lacking on the ground. While 
there are many organisations in India that implement large scale funded projects, the 
organisations studied here were less formalised in this respect and did not maintain 
close relations with donors. Perhaps consequently, they were more reliant on activist 
networks to provide information, expertise and contacts to organise the activities that 
provide their organisations with momentum and relevance.  
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Activist networks are not only a source of resources: participation in these networks 
also shapes organisations’ ideologies, values, strategic orientation and ultimately 
their practice. In his study of the anti-GM movement in India, Herring (2008) 
observes that the middle class activists who led the movement ultimately had more to 
gain from being globally connected and producing articulate critiques that resonate 
with existing activist discourses than remaining faithful to the perspectives of the 
farmers whom they claim to represent. Baviskar (2005: 171) makes similar 
observations of the Indian environment movement, which she claims compensates 
for its lack of grassroots appeal by mobilising ‘dispersed metropolitan support in 
India and abroad’. There is an ease of association between activists and these 
dispersed metropolitan supporters, who often share a class position, language and 
worldview. Activists become embedded in dispersed activist networks in multiple 
ways, including using literature, joint campaigning, and hosting workshops with 
participants from other states. Perhaps most decisively, activists may rely on the 
opinions of those within these networks (whose values resonate with their own) for 
their personal sense of moral legitimacy. This may serve to exacerbate activists’ lack 
of grassroots relevance, since, if activists only prioritise networking with each other, 
then their discourses may become insular. Activists may cease to receive input from 
those who directly experience the problems that they are representing (in this case, 
farmers and agricultural labourers) and instead network with those who confirm their 
own worldview. Additionally, prioritising networking with each other also reduces 
the time and resources activists have for mobilising grassroots support. These 
tendencies towards insularity represent barriers to sustainable agriculture operating in 
a more dynamic fashion, being open to negotiate and develop consent amongst rural 
populations.  
It should be acknowledged that the most prominent voices within these networks, 
such as Vandana Shiva, Claude Alvarez and P. V. Satheesh, are all highly educated 
professionals, rather than farmers or other members of rural communities. While they 
do engage directly with communities, and in many cases support what may be 
described as ‘grassroots’ initiatives, their own perspectives are strongly influenced 
by other sources. They are influenced by academic perspectives on ecology and 




networks over recent decades – particularly critiques of development and 
globalisation (Cochrane, 2007). Their analysis tends to favour a focus on 
independence and ecological balance over issues of livelihood and ways in which the 
rural poor can reproduce themselves in the context of agrarian crisis, which Bernstein 
(1996) calls the ‘agrarian question of labour’. Furthermore, it should be 
acknowledged that the bulk of the leading figures in these networks work in NGOs 
and are dependent upon funds from international donors and the state. There is, thus, 
an additional incentive for them to align their perspectives with discourses that have 
currency within the international aid community. As has been clearly shown in 
previous chapters, Dutt, Revathi and Jardhari all speak eloquently on topics of farmer 
sovereignty, development, globalisation, sustainability, ecology and so on, topics 
which, it may be argued, are of more interest within activists communities than in 
villages. Networking with others who speak in the same jargon and share similar 
perspectives is certainly easier than doing so with farmers who may not immediately 
share their perspective or manner of articulation. The case of BBA is perhaps most 
telling. While the origins of BBA were within farming communities rather than the 
middle class, as time passed they prioritised speaking with urban audiences and 
forming relationships with other organisations, whose leaders were typically of a 
middle class background. This has been integral to BBA retaining its image as an 
‘environmental movement’ and a modern avatar of the Chipko movement.  
The links between local initiatives and national and international networks may go 
some way in explaining the ideological ‘purism’ of the local initiatives. By 
remaining stringent in their definitions of sustainable agriculture, local groups 
strengthen their legitimacy among their colleagues in activist networks, even as they 
may reduce their impact on the ground. KVM, for example, is quite rigid in its 
support for ‘natural farming’ and its opposition to ‘organic farming’. This opposition 
to organic farming appears to be influenced by Palekar (n.d.), who, in his influential 
Philosophy of Spiritual Farming, suggests that organic farming is worse than 
chemical farming. KVM claims it prefers natural farming because it makes farmers 
dependent upon only locally available resources and is therefore both more 
ecologically integrated and less dependent upon larger organic industries. They also 




nature and thus develop spiritually. With these arguments, KVM increases its 
legitimacy with at least four separate (though highly interlinked) middle class 
audiences: environmentalists, anti-globalisation activists, Gandhians and sections of 
the Hindu right. Yet, in terms of grassroots realities, the rejection of organic farming 
may reflect a misreading of the ‘crisis of authority’ experienced in Punjab. The 
ecological decline and economic stagnation in Punjab may be a ‘crisis’ for the Green 
Revolution, to the extent that it has led some farmers, and others, to question the 
excessive use and dependence upon chemical inputs. Having said this, it is not a 
crisis of commercial agriculture per se, which has brought the region a great deal of 
material benefits. Organic farming, which allows farmers to obtain certification and 
thus obtain a premium price on their produce, would allow farmers to remove their 
dependency on chemical input whilst remaining profitable. KVM’s hostility towards 
this mentality as commercial and materialistic may have reduced their overall impact 
in reducing chemical consumption.
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The impacts of BBA’s national and international networking on its work in the 
Henwal Valley reveals how, to some extent, activists can become estranged from 
their own communities. BBA’s initial work was a grassroots response to local issues 
and, in some instances, its mobilisations in response to local issues went against the 
grain of what is generally accepted in middle class activist circles. Most notably, 
BBA’s campaign against wild animals demanded the employment of a watchman to 
shoot pigs that had encroached on farmland. While this is ostensibly at odds with 
mainstream environmentalist discourses, activists nonetheless made the demand in 
support of local livelihoods. In other ways, however, BBA’s message has become 
more relevant to distant, middle class audiences. Even the story of BBA’s seed 
saving initiative now appears to be of more interest to educated, middle class 
                                                 
55 Evidence supporting this position may be found in the work of the Centre for Sustainable 
Agriculture (CSA), based in Hyderabad, which prioritised the promotion of non-pesticide 
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cost. The results speak for themselves: 350, 000 farmers were reportedly using these techniques 




activists in metropolitan centres than it does to farmers in the Henwal Valley. 
Jardhari and other BBA activsts, simply by responding to the opportunities that are 
available to them, appear to spend a larger portion of their time travelling India and 
abroad than they do in promoting their cause within local villages. As such, over 
time their message speaks more to the issues that are of interest in current debates on 
sustainable agriculture at a national and global level (seed saving, genetic 
modification, corporate ownership and so on), than to the immediate threats to the 
survival of villages (climate change, emigration and the general lack of livelihood 
opportunities).  
A less direct source of non-local influence is the state. The case studies examined 
here were somewhat informal in structure, which caused them to be less directly and 
strongly influenced by the state than is the case with more structured, formalised 
NGOs. Indeed, in other cases, sustainable agriculture NGOs partner directly with 
government departments (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993), increasing the likelihood 
that their activities will align with state interests. Such direct relations with 
governments could not be observed in my case studies. Indeed, activists often 
attempted to avoid direct interactions with governments, for a variety of reasons, 
including a belief that governments are more favourable towards ‘chemical 
agriculture’ or are simply detached from the fundamental issues of the agrarian crisis. 
It should be noted, however, that in a Gramscian sense, the state refers not only to the 
formal structures of government. It is the organised political activity of the 
hegemonic group, through which it uses both consensus and coercion to articulate 
ideological unity and to organise social and economic activities to suit its own 
interests (Buci-Glucksman, 1980). When hegemony is particularly advanced, the 
state tends towards an organic unity with civil society, influencing popular opinion, 
by both direct and indirect means, to maintain consent. In this sense, there is a strong 
overlap between the state and donors. Donor organisations often link directly to 
transnational capital and attempt to guide civil society in directions that serve the 
interests of globally hegemonic groups. The degree of caution exerted by several 
activists interviewed for this research regarding the receipt of funds, particularly 




At the domestic level, the Indian state attempts to ensure its sovereignty and the 
interests of nationally hegemonic groups by exerting control over the flows of 
foreign funds to local organisations. The state governs the registration of 
organisations and, under the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act, can cancel the 
right of organisations to receive foreign funds, if the organisations are deemed 
‘political’ – which, in practice, may simply mean they are antagonistic towards state 
interests (Jalali, 2008; Kamat, 2002). Concerns regarding the cancellation of foreign 
contributions clearly had some influence on activists’ behaviour, particularly in the 
case of TOFarM. Revathi’s approach was to facilitate the formation of multiple, 
small movements, with only local influence, thereby avoiding undue state attention 
that may lead to the cancellation of foreign contributions. This shows that 
organisations may attempt to hide from the gaze of a state whose interests are 
perceived to be antithetical to their own. Thus, not only do foreign contributions 
often serve to guide the activities of receiving organisations, the threat of cancelling 
these contributions by governments can serve to keep civil society organisations in a 
passive position, refraining from overt, public challenges to hegemonic interests. 
While the project of sustainable agriculture is largely formulated by donors and 
dispersed activist networks, it takes on more specific content as activists attempt to 
establish the consent of farmers and engage with the local realities of agrarian crisis. 
The ‘ideological purism’ derived from national and global discourses of sustainable 
agriculture is thereby balanced against local experiences to articulate a discourse that 
can become operative at a regional level. A key issue at this stage is whether activists 
choose to engage with (and thus be influenced by) local elites or local subaltern 
classes, as there may be conflict between the perspectives and priorities of these 
groups. As indicated in Figure 9.1., appealing to local elites has an immediate 
logistical value, as they are often crucial in bringing about change. Not only are elites 
often large landholders, but they are also influential within villages. A change in 
attitude on the part of elites may thus filter through an entire community.
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 Yet, there 
                                                 
56 Further, elites may have greater incentives and greater capacities to become involved in 
projects. As Mosse (2001) outlines, elites are more likely to recognise opportunities in 




is also value in appealing to the rural subaltern. Having less resources and political 
influence, these groups are more likely to be adversely affected by agrarian crisis and 
thus more open to adopting alternative approaches. Furthermore, if organisations are 
seen to be working with the more disadvantaged sections of the community, this is 
likely to confer upon them greater legitimacy – both within activist circles and in the 
wider public. Indeed, it may be an expectation of donors that organisations work with 
the poor. Thus, ironically, the relations between organisations and non-local sources 
of influence, while problematized above, may help to put moral and financial 
pressure upon activists to broker more alliances with the poor and less with rural 
elites. 
The case studies showed that this balancing act between rural elites and rural 
subaltern groups is a major issue. This was less the case for BBA, which operates in 
a region with a relatively egalitarian class structure, but for the other two 
organisations the need to at least be perceived to be working with disadvantaged 
sections of the community was clearly a priority. Despite the fact that TOFarM 
works primarily with landholding farmers, in interviews Revathi stressed the 
importance of landless labourers (‘co-producers’) and women within her organisation 
and tried to give voice to their perspectives and needs. KVM, while less engaged 
with issues of the landless, attempted to align itself with the perspectives of 
smallholders and decrease the influence of large landholders within the organisation 
(despite the fact that they represent some of its most prominent members). Yet, KVM 
activists were also cautious in their engagements with the rural subaltern, particularly 
landless labourers, out of fear that this would affect their relationship with 
landholding farmers. The need to negotiate these often competing sources of 
influence thus creates numerous challenges. The next section engages with some of 
the ways in which activists attempt to approach this issue.  
 
                                                                                                                                          





9.4. Negotating Power Structures 
Sustainable agriculture organisations are embedded in networks of power relations in 
which various forces impact upon their ideologies and strategic approach. Yet, 
activists are not merely passive observers of these issues. Often they recognise the 
problems of unequal power structures and elite influence. This section discusses 
some of the ways that activists attempt to negotiate these issues. It begins by 
examining how activists negotiate issues of non-local influence by positioning 
themselves as ‘social movements’ and then examines some of the methods used to 
negotiate power within communities. 
 
9.4.1. The NGO/ Social Movement Dichotomy 
As noted above, activists often experience the influence of outsiders as a threat to 
their autonomy. A key finding of this research is that, in order to minimise outside 
influence and retain control over their work, activists may adapt their organisational 
identity and strategic direction. Activists interviewed were particularly sensitive 
regarding the influence of donors. Related to this, activists associated NGO-style 
organisational structure with donor dependency and therefore made efforts to avoid 
the designation as NGOs and the negative organisational features that are associated 
with them.   
As discussed in Chapter 3, within the development studies literature, NGOs have 
been subject to considerable criticism. Though individual NGO workers may retain 
more critical political views, the mechanism of funding is argued to direct their 
projects towards the interests of the state (Desmarais, 2007); indeed, it has been 
argued that the funding mechanism may involve NGOs in the articulation of 
neoliberal hegemony, despite the intentions of NGO workers (Petras, 1999). At the 
ground level in India, researchers have noted that NGOs are largely staffed by 
middle class professionals (Sethi, 1998), who serve to displace the voices of more 
radical, grassroots struggles – the voices of the very people whom NGOs claim to 
represent (Kamat, 2002; Deshpande, 2004). There has been some evidence that, in 




subject to criticism in the media (Ninan, 2007: 236) and are widely regarded as 
corrupt, or overly concerned with making money (Jakimow, 2010: 555-557). Perhaps 
as a consequence of this, there is evidence to suggest that few people would consider 
making use of NGOs to solve local problems, preferring instead to make use of other 
means, such as political parties or local patrons (Harriss, 2008).  
Activists in the field of sustainable agriculture are aware of a decline in the public 
legitimacy of NGOs and respond to this in a number of ways. In the case of KVM, 
activists spoke directly of the public distrust for NGOs due to the perception that 
they are primarily money-making ventures. KVM’s core activists, Dutt in particular, 
were highly resistant to KVM being labelled an NGO. This was reflected in their 
comments in the media, in their engagements with farmers and in interviews. 
Avoiding the tainted NGO label was a particular concern during their interactions 
with farmers. Project workers felt that distancing themselves from NGOs when 
speaking to farmers would encourage farmers to feel they were active participants 
within KVM, rather than simply relying on it as a service. Distancing themselves 
from NGOs is a key strategic move for KVM – an attempt to gain legitimacy. While 
the other two case studies did not make such an effort to construct their 
organisational identity in contrast to NGOs, they also spoke of a general lack of trust 
for NGOs. Such a decline in public perceptions of NGOs has broad implications for 
practitioners in the field in terms of the manner in which they construct their 
legitimacy and organisational identity and how they attempt to build trust and rapport 
with communities.  
Activists were also concerned that following the NGO model would prevent them 
from working as they desired and achieving their goals. At times, this was expressed 
as a moral issue. The money flowing through NGOs was seen by some activists, 
particularly those in KVM, to have a corrupting influence on their work as 
organisations begin to revolve around funding opportunities rather than values. Dutt 
argued that the NGO model is antithetical to KVM’s agenda, as it promotes the kind 
of greed and materialism which, he claimed, KVM is fighting against. Furthermore, 
several activists expressed their concerns in interviews that funding agencies, 




of farming communities. Given that values are an important component of any work 
in the Third Sector (Jakimow, 2010), the suggestion that the NGO model not only 
prevents the realisation of ethical outcomes, but actually propagates bad values, such 
as greed and materialism, is particularly damning. If such critique gains currency 
within civil society, it will undoubtedly have an impact on activists as they make 
decisions regarding the kinds of organisations to which they commit themselves.  
Another position expressed by activists is that NGOs are an ineffective means of 
delivering change. Within all three of the groups studied, activists expressed their 
belief that the formalised approach of NGOs makes them inflexible, stifling their 
freedom to work on issues of great urgency and changing their tactics in response to 
new developments. Revathi and Swamy, when they first began promoting ecological 
agriculture, avoided forming an NGO, feeling that this would force them to settle in 
one place, and hamper their dynamism.
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 Revathi also argued that the NGO approach 
would compromise her strategy of maintaining a ‘low profile’. In publically 
promoting their work to gain the attention of potential donors, NGOs also expose 
themselves to the attention of the state – which is a particular issue when the state is 
hostile to their agenda. Despite this, TOFarM did rely on contributions from foreign 
donors at key moments, particularly in their tsunami mitigation work, but have 
maintained a cautious approach towards donors in general. They recognise some 
value in the work of NGOs, but within narrow parameters and have thus prioritised 
facilitating action in civil society that extends beyond the reach of what any 
individual NGO could achieve. Likewise, BBA activists did not see themselves as 
part of an NGO, but rather as an informal movement. Their experience with funded 
projects revealed issues of transparency and misrepresentation. Furthermore, as 
Gandhians, they believed that authentically representing issues affecting local 
                                                 
57 As noted in Chapter 7, the U.S.-based Association for India’s Development (AID) awarded 
Revathi a ‘Saathiship’, recognising that her dynamic work would be constrained within the 
conventional NGO framework. The Saathiship model, which awards a living allowance to 
activists with a demonstrated history of effective work on social and/ or environmental issues 
to continue with the work they have already been doing, provides an interesting alternative to 





communities requires that they derive their livelihoods from agriculture, rather than 
projects.  As such, since that time they avoided external funding. These cases 
demonstrate the pragmatic approach that activists take in relation to funding and 
donors, drawing on them selectively in the context of a broader struggle and 
dropping funds when they are seen to compromise their work or ethical integrity. 
Activists thus attempt to devise means of getting around the problems associated 
with the NGO model, as they identify them. This occurs even as they ostensibly 
conform to the NGO model by accepting funds and carrying out projects. This has a 
number of implications that should be investigated further. It is possible that if 
activists remain critical of NGO structures, even while they operate within them, 
then this may lead to a gradual evolution of new models of civil society organisation. 
Activists, particularly those with a critical perspective, will continue to seek out 
alternative modes of action. Since they are forced to work within the structures that 
are available, however, it is unlikely that such alternatives will come through 
revolutionary breaks. There are likely to be on-going, piecemeal forms of innovation.  
If the label ‘NGO’ has lost public prestige, one of the ways that activists attempted to 
reaffirm their legitimacy was through adopting the designation ‘movement’. Just as 
Jakimow (2010) observes that a number of groups functioning ostensibly as NGOs 
have showed a preference for being termed ‘voluntary organisations’, it may be the 
case that the groups examined here use the designation ‘movement’ to the same end: 
as a way of distancing themselves from the tainted NGO label. In the case of KVM, 
one can certainly see this dynamic in action: KVM activists are aware that NGOs do 
not command the same kind of respect among farmers as legitimate expressions of 
popular will – hence the almost defensive assertions of KVM activists that they are a 
movement, not an NGO. The label has also allowed KVM to differentiate itself from 
some of its NGO competitors. Such a change ‘in name only,’ however, could at best 
be a short term solution to this issue. If a group were found to be an NGO in 
substance and in practice, while criticising NGOs at a rhetorical level, there may be 
potential for backfire: people would grow sceptical of their constant assertion that 
their mode of organisation is different. Describing themselves as part of a movement 




To be a ‘movement’ had slightly different implications in each of the three case 
studies. For KVM activists, the construction of a ‘movement’ identity was often done 
through direct contrast to the negative and ineffectual features of NGOs. For 
example, a clear contrast was made on the basis of sincerity. Where the countless 
NGOs of India were said to be motivated by funding opportunities, activists claimed 
that movements have a long-term commitment to their cause. By identifying as a 
movement, KVM thus signified its sincerity, commitment and thus its legitimacy vis-
à-vis NGOs. KVM also substantiated its claim to be a ‘movement’ through its focus 
on ‘action groups’ and campaigning, as well as its attempts to actively enlist the 
participation of both farmers and its urban supporters. These methods of promoting 
change are presented as qualitatively different to the NGO orientation towards 
funded projects. In this way, KVM’s construction of its organisational identity 
reaffirms Patel’s (2006: 79) observation that social movements often attempt to drive 
a wedge between themselves and NGOs in order to affirm their own political purity.  
In some ways, relying on such a clear-cut binary between NGOs and social 
movements seems problematic. Despite Dutt’s assertions, KVM did have many of 
the features of an NGO – most notably, the fact that it accepts funds and implements 
projects (though perhaps not as its central or exclusive focus). As Pithouse (2004: 
10) argues, the commonly-made distinction between ‘bad imperialist/co-opting 
NGOs and good rebellious social movements’ is often inaccurate. There is evidence 
to suggest that social movements are equally prone to having their agendas co-opted 
by powerful transnational institutions, albeit in more subtle ways (see Bartley, 2007). 
Furthermore, there are other examples in the literature of organisations, like KVM, 
that combine features of both NGOs and social movements (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 
2005). Yet even if the real world is not so simplistic, this is ultimately a productive 
binary, compelling those who identify with ‘movements’ to deepen their 
commitment to certain principles.  
Though Revathi provided no explicit definition of a movement, her discussions of 
how a movement should operate implicitly recognised autonomy as a key feature. 
Revathi expressed clear sympathies and a high degree of affinity with social 




movement to develop in Tamil Nadu around the cause of ecological farming. Despite 
circumstances causing her and Swamy to take a different route, in interviews the 
term was still an important marker through which they made sense of their 
organisational identity. As a ‘facilitative organisation’, they saw their role as being 
‘the people behind the movements’. They seek to give farmers and landless labourers 
the kinds of skills they require to establish movements of their own, which, once 
established, should be quite autonomous from Revathi and Swami themselves. There 
is an implicit understanding of ‘movement’ here as being an initiative led by people 
from rural communities with a high level of communal support and problem solving. 
Revathi envisaged farmers working collectively on issues such as the exchange of 
knowledge and marketing. Interestingly, there was no necessary oppositional 
connotation to ‘movement’ as Revathi used the term. This was reflected in her 
preference for establishing multiple, small movements that will be ignored by the 
state, rather than establishing structures to lobby or oppose state decisions.  
The case of BBA demonstrates that the meaning of being a ‘movement’ can be 
closely connected to regional history. More than the other two organisations, BBA 
activists unambiguously saw themselves as part of a ‘movement’, as reflected in the 
name of the organisation. The term ‘andolan’ (movement) has a special significance 
in Uttarakhand, due to the region’s rich history of social movements (see Guha, 
2000). For BBA activists, social movements are both a part of their regional history 
and personal biographies. Activists saw BBA as having a continuity with the Chipko 
movement, inasmuch as they both mobilise the public in order to defend their way of 
life against exterior threats. At the same time, however, they recognised that BBA is 
different to the other, more famous movements in the region’s history; it is somewhat 
more subtle and different in emphasis. Its central focus on seeds and agriculture 
meant that this movement was a more continuous phenomenon, rather than being 
fixated on the opposition to any specific threat. Activists are vigilant in opposing 
anything that threatens local agriculture as such, and are also enthusiastic about 
celebrating the cultural and ecological roots of their agricultural and social system, 
which in turn fosters greater levels of public interest and support. This was what 
BBA implied in their shift from identifying as an abhiyaan (campaign), whose focus 




more permanent and holistic in outlook. When BBA activists compare themselves to 
NGOs they emphasise that they are less formalised and more autonomous, which 
may signify some of the other connotations that they associate with movements. 
It is also worth emphasising the ambiguity in identifying these groups as 
‘movements’. This ambiguity was reflected in the media’s continually reporting 
KVM as an NGO, despite Dutt’s protestations. In some ways, this may be related to 
the ambiguous position of sustainable agriculture as a discourse. On the one hand, 
sustainable agriculture, or chemical-free agriculture, is somewhat subversive, being a 
threat to chemical and seed companies and the political and economic interests 
behind them. By positioning themselves as movements, these groups tie into 
discourses of ‘the people against the multinationals’. Being a movement provides a 
way of expressing this antagonistic dimension of organisations’ identity, even when, 
in practice, they are not overtly confrontational. This was particularly the case for 
KVM and BBA, for whom opposition to multinational agribusinesses like Monsanto 
was a key component of their identity and perhaps also their legitimacy. On the other 
hand, sustainable agriculture is not far removed from the international aid and 
development sectors, making it ostensibly ‘part of the system’. The use of chemical-
free, ecological techniques to boost agricultural production is a key component of the 
discourse of sustainable development, promoted, for example, by the FAO. 
‘Sustainable agriculture’ is therefore in the ambiguous position of being both critical 
of ‘the system’, while being connected with it at crucial junctures and in many ways 
depending upon it. This may provide some explanation for why these groups have 
been faced with such ambiguity in defining the nature of their organisations, their 
relation with the state, donors and so on. 
In these various ways, activists use the NGO/ social movement dichotomy as a way 
of signifying deeper issues of power within contemporary civil society. Identifying 
as a ‘movement’ becomes a way of asserting legitimacy, authenticity and autonomy 
from external forces, particularly donors. The meaning ascribed to the term 
‘movement’ is contingent on its positioning relative to other civil society structures, 
in particular NGOs, though also campaigns and other forms of activism. When there 




organisation, then identifying as being part of a ‘movement’ has a politics of its own, 
independent of the political issues taken up within the movement. It may be used to 
signify one’s legitimacy, relative to other civil society actors, as being more 
dedicated, radical, long-term, transformative, organic, flexible, and so on. Some 
movements, like KVM, use it as an explicit way of critiquing and challenging the 
power of NGOs, and asserting a different form of power, which they regard as being 
more bottom-up, or ‘grassroots’.  
It can be difficult to maintain a ‘movement’ identity whilst working for agricultural 
development. This was demonstrated by KVM’s restructuring, which, despite 
KVM’s fierce critiques of NGOs, did appear to be a shift in the direction of a more 
‘NGO-style’ organisation. KVM’s restructure was the outcome of an unstable 
tension between Dutt’s commitment to a ‘movement’ model and the need to deliver 
outcomes for farmers who were experimenting with natural farming techniques. 
While the literature on NGOs has focused on how the project-orientation is imposed 
on NGOs from above by donors and through horizontal connections to other NGOs, 
in what Tvedt (2002) describes as ‘institutional isomorphism’, KVM’s restructure 
demonstrates that the demand for projects can also come from below. KVM’s 
perceived need to professionalise and possibly take on more projects was a response 
to their incapacity to meet the needs and expectations of farmers. Ironically, it may 
be argued that it was KVM’s insistence on working as a movement at the grassroots 
that allowed them to recognise this. One possible interpretation of this grassroots 
demand for projects is that it reflects what Kamat (2002) describes as the 
‘NGOization of civil society’. Rather than wanting to solve their problems 
collectively and autonomously through grassroots networking with other farmers, it 
is possible that farmers in these communities have come to expect that NGOs will 
arrange support. It was clear that farmers expected that if KVM wanted to preach 
natural farming, they should also provide the material support necessary to 
demonstrate results. Furthermore, it is possible that since KVM appeared to operate 
as an NGO in other respects, farmers expected it to provide a corresponding level of 




A final, somewhat cynical, possibility that must be considered is that ‘movement’ 
may be an identity that these organisations draw on while sources of funding are not 
available. While this cannot be said of BBA, which has not collected funds for some 
time now, KVM and TOFarM were most closely aligned with ‘movements’ when 
funding was not available to them. In India, the Foreign Contributions Regulations 
Act requires organisations to be officially registered for a minimum of three years 
before they can receive funding from foreign sources. It is possible that, during the 
interim between registering as an organisation and being able to receive foreign 
funds, these organisations have positioned themselves as ‘movements’ as a way of 
building their legitimacy. This would, in turn, allow them to secure greater access to 
funds in the future. Indeed, as soon as KVM and TOFarM were in a position to 
accept funds and begin work on projects, they did so.  
 
9.4.2. Challenging Power within Communities 
Activists promoting sustainable agriculture must make difficult decisions regarding 
the relations they form with local elites and subalterns. While the former offer 
influence, the latter are more in need of change (and thus may be more receptive to 
new ideas) and confer broader social legitimacy. Donors and activist networks may 
influence activists to lean more on the side of the rural subaltern, yet moving too far 
in this direction may lead to the accusation that activists are out of touch with local 
realities. Activists must develop strategies to negotiate this complex terrain.  
Organisations’ engagement with gender issues provides a clear indication of their 
approach to challenging local hierarchies. Many sustainable agriculture organisations 
attempt to challenge the subordinate position of women within rural communities 
and to enlist women’s participation as a crucial strategy in achieving their objectives. 
This may be attributable to the prominent role of so-called ‘eco-feminism’ within 
sustainable agriculture discourse. Shiva’s (1989) concepts relating to women’s 
intrinsic connection to nature, as well as Agarwal’s (1992) less essentialist argument 
that  women’s position within the village economy exposes them more directly to the 




agriculture networks in India. When combined with the value placed on women’s 
empowerment by both international donors and domestic activists, there are a lot of 
incentives for activists to be sensitive to gender issues. To varying degrees, all of the 
case studies enlisted women’s participation within their initiatives and believed that 
women’s involvement is critical to promoting a transition towards a more 
ecologically sustainable society. It should be noted that the ‘feminism’ in this eco-
feminism is not particularly radical. It is replete with simplistic essentialisms and 
follows what Martinez (2009) terms the ‘women in development’ approach, popular 
in the development sector in the 1970s, which sought the inclusion of women in 
development projects, but without a deeper commitment to women’s emancipation.  
Though not particularly radical, it should be acknowledged that the organisations did 
make some efforts not only to include women, but to improve the position of women 
within communities. TOFarM insisted on paying its female employees an equivalent 
wage to men, despite the resistance this incurred locally for going against traditional 
customs. BBA made demands on the state government to have women’s rights as 
land owners officially recognised. KVM was more reluctant in making substantive 
feminist commitments. Its women’s project merely sought to enlist women’s 
participation in their project of promoting natural farming, but did not attempt to 
focus on issues relating to the highly oppressed position of women in Punjabi 
society. The philosophy of their women’s group closely resembled that of ‘women in 
development’ (Martinez, 2009), as was reflected in activists’ belief that women’s 
participation would ensure their development initiatives were successful. By 
avoiding directly addressing women’s oppression in communities, KVM’s strategic 
approach was to avoid challenging power relations that may create antagonism at a 
local level and this could be observed in their approach to other power relations 
within communities. Further research is certainly required on sustainable agriculture 
organisations’ approach to women’s empowerment; however, for the purposes of the 
present discussion, it indicates some of the ways in which these organisations 
negotiate inter-community power relations. 
The avoidance of mobilising in a way that may create inter-community antagonism 




role within these organisations. While in BBA’s case, this is understandable, due to 
the fact that there are very few landless labourers in the region (Pande, 1996), for an 
organisation working in Punjab or Tamil Nadu, such an exclusion is almost 
inexcusable. Labourers stand to benefit from chemical-free agriculture, as it is more 
labour intensive, increasing employment opportunities and thus putting upward 
pressure on wages. Furthermore, agricultural labourers are most affected by chemical 
agriculture in terms of their health. Potentially, sustainable agriculture organisations 
could assist labourers in agitating for safer working conditions. Yet this rarely 
happens. Indeed, TOFarM did not go beyond tokenistic inclusion of labourers within 
the organisation and KVM deliberately avoided interactions with agricultural 
labourers. Some of KVM’s supporters suggested this was due to the fact that 
labourers do not make decisions regarding chemical usage, yet interactions with core 
activists suggested it was more due to concerns that labourer participation would 
upset farmers, whom they consider to be their key constituency. Nanda (2003) 
suggests that such approaches to gender and class relations within sustainable 
farming movements is a sign that they are inherently conservative, serving to benefit 
rural elites by obscuring and neutralising conflict within communities. Yet these 
cases suggest that, while the benefit may flow to elites, this is less a result of a 
conservative political agenda and more a strategic approach designed to ensure the 
ongoing consent of landholding farmers for their projects.  
Maintaining a deep commitment for justice within communities does come at a cost 
for sustainable agriculture organisations. TOFarM’s challenges in Nagapattinam 
district amply reflect this. Revathi and Swamy insisted on paying labourers what they 
saw as a fair wage and made no discrimination on the basis of caste or religion. As 
facilitators of Kadal Oosai, they advocated full inclusion of women and people of all 
caste, class and religious backgrounds. Although these were relatively modest 
interventions, the backlash from local elites compromised TOFarM’s support base 
and created complications that made their work substantially more difficult. The 
stress this created led Revathi and Swamy to consider selling their farm at 
Nagapattinam and beginning a new project. These tensions are particularly difficult 
to navigate when activists are ‘outsiders’. Not only can it highlight their lack of 




meddling. As such, the decision of many activists to avoid creating disruptions 
within communities becomes understandable. 
The ‘facilitative’ model of organisation that TOFarM activists ultimately settled 
upon, suggests a way in which sustainable agriculture organisations can negotiate the 
challenge of power within communities, particularly when organisations are led by 
‘outsiders’. It should be noted that the idea of development workers as facilitators is 
not particularly new. It is a major component of Chambers’ (1997: 103) model of 
Participatory Rural Appraisal, in which ‘[o]utsiders do not dominate and lecture; 
they facilitate, sit down, listen and learn.’ What makes TOFarM’s approach 
interesting is the context in which it emerged, as an attempt to resolve strategic 
impasses. Revathi and Swami learned the lessons of their prior mistakes and 
developed a model of organising that allowed them to better negotiate their position 
as ‘outsiders’ within communities. Their ‘facilitative’ approach involved offering 
rural communities the tools they need to create their own movements, rather than 
trying to lead any movement themselves. In this way, they make a clear 
acknowledgement of the differences that separate them from their ‘beneficiaries’ and 
maintain a healthy distance between themselves and local elites. By helping to 
develop the leadership capacity of various members of the community, including the 
marginalised, and by promoting emancipatory discourses, TOFarM provides people 
with the tools and perspectives they need to fight their own struggles.  
The facilitative approach does not advocate a complete withdrawal of urban, middle 
class activists from the field. In playing the role of facilitators, Revathi and Swamy 
are able to make use of their educational resources and access to knowledge and 
funds, while not determining the agenda for rural communities to follow. In contrast 
to some authors writing in the field of ‘grassroots movements’ (Batliwala, 2002) and 
the views of La Vía Campesina (Desmarais, 2007: 123), in this model, middle class 
activists are not restricted to merely serving an agenda set by communities. They are 
free to stand up for issues of intra-community justice, which local leaders (if they are 
elites) are liable to avoid. The facilitative model has also enabled Revathi and Swami 
to draw on the more cosmopolitan perspectives that come with the usually maligned 




communities are often divided by hierarchies, and that breaking down these barriers 
and mobilising in a more equitable way ought to be an objective for any social 
movement that claims to place value on social justice.  
One of the problems associated with this method of organising has been the lack of 
certainty it provides regarding the ground level impact. Acting as facilitators requires 
a relatively ‘hands-off’ approach, to allow for local autonomy, which has the 
unfortunate side-effect that monitoring and assessment becomes difficult. It also 
opens the possibility that while local people may agree with activists’ critiques of 
caste, class and gender hierarchies while at workshops, as soon as activists leave, 
traditional hierarchies may come back to the fore. One possible way to address this 
would be to work exclusively with the most marginal members of communities, 
though this is unlikely within the confines of sustainable agriculture, given the fact 
that landholding males are, even in the case of TOFarM, regarded as the main agents 
of change in farming practices.
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 This suggestion is made by de Wit and Berner 
(2009), who argue that projects that attempt to work through existing ‘community-
based organisations’ are unlikely to develop genuine participation or horizontal 
networking, as these organisations are generally dominated by local elites. They 
recognise a more promising model in ‘self-help groups’ amongst the marginalised. 
These groups may be initially facilitated by NGOs, but when based on relations of 
trust and shared experience, can develop independently as important sources of 
security, solidarity and collective action. Essentially, this is the approach that Revathi 
and Swamy attempted to take in working as part of a ‘facilitative organisation’.  
The strategy adopted by activists may influence the development of new power 
relations in the context of the crisis of authority in rural India. KVM’s ‘non-
disruptive’ strategy resembles the model described by Brass (1997), and elaborated 
by Nanda (2003), as ‘new agrarian populism’. Nanda argues that the kind of populist 
rhetoric adopted by the Hindu right has taken root amongst sections of the middle 
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sections of rural society is not unheard of. The Deccan Development Society in Andhra Pradesh, 




peasantry who were economically empowered by the Green Revolution, yet have 
been threatened by the breakdown of traditional caste and gender relations. The 
Hindu nationalist discourses, which naturalise and romanticise traditional 
hierarchies, serve to neutralise potential assertions from subaltern classes. KVM’s 
rhetoric, particularly regarding the ‘civilisational crisis’, certainly resonates with this 
view, and, as discussed above, its approach to promoting natural farming has in some 
ways reproduced traditional hierarchies. Although KVM’s adoption of a ‘populist’ 
approach was more a strategic calculation for effectively promoting natural farming 
rather than a function of ideological conservatism,
59
 it could ultimately serve to 
preserve the privileged position of local landholding elites. Having said this, as the 
KVM case showed, pressure from donors and activist communities is likely to lead 
organisations to distance themselves from large landholders, undermining, to a 
certain extent, the legitimacy of these traditional elites.  
TOFarM’s ‘facilitative’ strategy, by contrast, holds the possibility of a more dynamic 
response to crisis, with various sections of communities collectively developing their 
capacity to resolve current challenges. Although ‘outsider’ activists may need to 
initiate and facilitate these developments, there is potential here for a more ‘bottom-
up’ response to crisis, based on increasing autonomy and reducing dependency. 
While the techniques of sustainable agriculture, to the extent that they are effectively 
implemented, are most immediately empowering for small or indebted landholders 
who cannot afford inputs, activists may also facilitate landless labourers and other 
marginalised groups to articulate their needs and to agitate for them (though this was 
not actively done in the case studies examined here).  Although this may create local 
tension in the short term, in the long term it may help to forge consensus for agrarian 
models that organically reflect local needs and aspirations. 
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This chapter has shown that the project of sustainable agriculture is structured in 
many ways by local and non-local sources of power. While grassroots methods of 
organising appear to offer a way to construct sustainable alternatives in a way that 
does not merely reproduce existing power structures, in practice there are several 
barriers to this kind of action. Although the case studies showed that there are several 
ways in which the rural poor can and do participate in sustainable agriculture 
initiatives, they often lack resources, such as time and relevant knowledge, to direct 
and sustain mobilisations for sustainable agriculture over time. Further, they often 
lack an impetus to start a collective effort for sustainable agriculture – being more 
predisposed towards navigating the challenges posed by agrarian crisis on a more 
individual basis. Thus, I have argued that at least a small team of activists is usually 
necessary to develop these kinds of initiatives in a sustained and effective way. Since 
these activists require knowledge in effective farming techniques, methods of 
community engagement, appropriate marketing avenues and so on, they will 
typically (but not always) be drawn from relatively educated sections of the middle 
class. This immediately introduces a power imbalance within these projects, which 
can play out in a number of different ways, as the case studies have shown. 
Activists find themselves positioned between donors and activist networks, on the 
one hand, and rural communities, on the other. Donors and activist networks provide 
activists with financial resources, knowledge, contacts, possibilities for collaborative 
action and a sense of moral legitimacy. As such, there are numerous incentives for 
activists to embed themselves within these networks. Becoming too involved in these 
networks, however, risks the development of an insular and ideologically purist 
mindset, which can alienate activists from the communities for whom they claim to 
work. Building relations within communities, by contrast, can lead to organisations 
maintaining greater grassroots relevance. Yet, this can lead to activists appealing to 
influential local elites to try to bring about change, rather than appealing to rural 
subalterns, who are most in need of alternatives. In this respect the non-local sources 
of influence, donors and activist networks, can play a positive role, in that they assert 
a degree of pressure for organisations to engage with less advantaged sections of 




these various groups has implications both for their effectiveness in developing 
sustainable agricultural models that will be accepted by communities and the 
structure of power at the local level.  
Activists are not passive in their negotiation of these power structures. In various 
ways, they recognise that local and non-local power structures pose challenges for 
their capacity to work in an effective, ethical and autonomous manner and they 
actively develop strategies to try to manage these challenges. One of the ways in 
which activists attempted to negotiate non-local sources of influence was through 
asserting their identity as ‘movements’ and distancing themselves from NGOs. This 
politics of signification served as a way for activists to manage their public image, 
presenting them as autonomous initiatives that were well integrated with the realities 
of rural India, rather than being beholden to the interests of donors. This also placed 
an onus on activists to engage with communities and thus affected their 
organisational structure and strategic approach. Activists also develop strategies for 
negotiating power at the local level, though not always in the same way. One 
strategic approach, epitomised by KVM, is for activists to work in a way that is not 
disruptive to local power structures. This ensures that they do not offend any section 
of the community who may be of strategic importance (in KVM’s case, landholders) 
in a manner that resembles what Brass (2000) describes as ‘rural populism’. Another 
approach, which was adopted by TOFarM, is for activists to retain a distance 
between themselves and communities and to merely facilitate people, including rural 
subalterns, to organise themselves to struggle for their livelihood and justice. The 
strategic approach that activists choose to adopt may have significant consequences, 
determining whether their ideas are able to influence all sections of communities and 
whether the project becomes genuinely transformative with respect to existing power 




10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Sustainable agricultural development offers a potential solution to some aspects of 
India’s agrarian crisis. It provides livelihood security for farmers, at a time when 
agriculture has become an economically precarious activity. Reducing farmers’ 
reliance on external inputs insulates them, to some degree, from the volatility of the 
market.
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 This was reflected in the experiences of several practicing natural farmers 
who were interviewed in this study, particularly those who had persisted with the 
techniques for some time. In addition to this, as many activists pointed out, the use of 
these techniques may help to avoid future economic and ecological catastrophes, 
such as water shortages, environmental toxicity and dramatic increases in fertiliser 
costs accompanying peak oil.  
If there is, as was argued in Chapter 2, a ‘crisis of authority’ in rural India, this would 
be an appropriate time to put forward sustainable agriculture as a development 
alternative. There is evidence that some of the foundations of consent for the Green 
Revolution paradigm are beginning to erode. The Green Revolution’s promise of 
increased rural prosperity was delivered in some regions in India during the 1960s 
and 1970s. From the mid-1980s, however, it became apparent that these material 
benefits could not be sustained, as production peaked, input costs began to rise and 
side-effects of intensive chemical use, such as environmental toxicity, began to 
manifest. Material incentives for farmers to lend their active consent and support for 
the Green Revolution no longer appear to be present, at least in much of the country. 
Prominent intellectuals, in both the state and civil society, have withdrawn their 
support for the Green Revolution and signalled the need for new approaches. In this 
context, farmers’ imaginations are not constrained by alluring hegemonic discourses 
                                                 
60 Although not the immediate focus of this project, the fact that some farmers, even in Green 
Revolution states of Punjab, are choosing the relative security of subsistence farming over the 
burden of debt and the volatility of the market, should be of interest to scholars of agrarian 
change. A return to subsistence would appear to be one solution to Bernstein’s (1996) ‘agrarian 




and they have little to lose by experimenting with alternatives. The time for an 
intervention would appear to be ripe.  
Sustainable agriculture as an intervention into this crisis must contend with two 
somewhat contradictory realities. First, to have any chance of being adopted on a 
wide scale, sustainable agriculture must reflect the immediate needs and perspectives 
of rural communities, particularly the rural poor, who are most exposed to the ill 
effects of agrarian crisis. Sustainable agriculture must be seen as a solution to the 
material problems experienced by rural communities. This implies that the project 
should be constructed in a ‘bottom-up’ fashion, with farming models being designed 
to meet local requirements. In this way, there will be more active community 
participation and the project will be more dynamic, adaptable, useful and widely 
adopted. Literature on sustainable agricultural development, particularly agro-
ecology, has acknowledged this for some time (see, e.g., Altieri, 1984). Second, it 
must be acknowledged that in the context of a crisis of authority, not all groups are 
able to respond at equal pace. The effects of agrarian crisis retard the capacity of 
rural subaltern groups, who are consumed in the day-to-day task of survival, to 
formulate a collective response. Those most in need of alternatives lack the resources 
necessary to develop a response of their own accord. Some form of external support 
is necessary. A development alternative such as sustainable agriculture needs to be 
organised by people with sufficient time to devote to the cause and appropriate 
resources such as knowledge (relating to farming techniques, marketing, policies and 
so on) and community organising skills. Such people will typically be drawn from 
outside, from the urban middle classes. The tension posed by these two realities – 
between the need for both local participation and outside support – was manifest in 
the case studies examined in this thesis.  
In this chapter, I outline the main conclusions that can be drawn from the case 
studies regarding how sustainable agriculture organisations navigate this tension, 
highlighting their main limitations and pointing to approaches that may better serve 
the needs of the rural poor in the context of agrarian crisis. The research indicates 
that activists promoting sustainable agriculture often exacerbate the tension between 




identity, which can be self-righteous, elitist and detached, but more importantly 
through their relations with other key groups, most notably the state, donors, national 
and transnational activist communities and rural elites. Yet, my research has also 
found that activists are often conscious of this, and devise strategies to negotiate the 
issue, so that they can engage with rural communities more effectively. This was 
reflected in their attempts to position themselves as ‘movements’. In Section 10.1., I 
expand on these key conclusions. The arguments that I develop are predominantly 
critical in nature. This is important. There is a strong need for honest, critical 
appraisals of current approaches to sustainable agriculture and their limitations. By 
learning from critique, we can begin to do things better. In Sections 10.2. and 10.3., I 
reflect on these critical findings and attempt to go beyond them, by reflecting on 
potentials for better approaches that overcome the issues identified in the case studies 
examined here. Section 10.2. considers possibilities for more participatory 
approaches within the context of existing sustainable agriculture organisations, while 
Section 10.3. looks ‘beyond sustainable agriculture’, towards other forms of 
development work and activism that may be more empowering for the rural poor. 
Finally, in Section 10.4., I make suggestions for ways that future research can expand 
upon the present findings, and contribute towards developing organisational 
structures and strategies that are more inclusive, participatory and effective.  
 
10.1. The Limitations of Sustainable Agriculture Organisations 
Organisations of the type investigated in this thesis are an important medium through 
which sustainable agriculture can be propagated. The activists who lead these 
organisations are well-positioned to articulate the nature of the current crisis and why 
some kind of alternative is necessary. Drawing on their educational backgrounds and 
the research they have access to, they are able to provide a more holistic picture of 
the crisis, make future projections and highlight and the availability of alternative 
paradigms. Without such input, rural communities might have continued to struggle 
within the parameters of the existing paradigm or otherwise left agriculture entirely. 
Activists can provide farmers with information on chemical-free techniques that have 




to ensure they gain a good deal in the sale of their produce. When they are backed by 
funding bodies, these organisations are able to provide more ongoing support – 
ensuring that farmers implement sustainable farming techniques effectively and that 
they are able to find markets after harvest. In these ways, they ease the transition 
from unsustainable to sustainable farming models. More to the point, they ensure that 
this transition happens in a quicker and more comprehensive way than might have 
been the case if communities were left entirely to their own devices to respond to 
crisis.  
In several ways, middle class activists are able to make sustainable agriculture a 
more versatile project. By working through their own social networks and mobilising 
middle class support, they are able to strengthen the position of sustainable 
agriculture. For example, the public endorsement of doctors for chemical-free food 
provides sustainable farming with greater legitimacy. It also raises middle class 
awareness of issues associated with chemical contamination and thereby helps to 
create a market for organic produce. The mobilisation of teachers not only helps to 
build consent for sustainable farming amongst the next generation, but also 
encourages students to become involved in research on sustainable agriculture, which 
may make it more productive and durable in the future.  
Yet, sustainable agriculture organisations and their leading activists also have a 
number of limitations. Often, relations with donors pose the most immediate 
challenges for activists in working in their preferred manner. While donors are 
themselves quite diverse, frequently, their preferred methods of change and engaging 
with communities are decidedly more conservative than those of activists. Yet, 
sustainable agriculture organisations are often dependent on donors to provide, as a 
bare minimum, sufficient funding to sustain a core group of activists for enough time 
to get projects started. Donors may exert a high level of control over projects, 
limiting activists’ scope to receive input from rural communities. Often, these 
projects are depoliticised and lack a broader vision for empowering the poor and 
disenfranchised. The activists interviewed for this research often saw maintaining 
relations with donors as challenging and problematic. Donors’ attempts to impose 




autonomy, which could lead them to feel that they are straying from their founding 
values. Further, there is a perception that donors’ visions of what constitute effective 
sustainable farming systems or methods of mobilisation may not be suitable to local 
realities.  
A key finding of this research is that, in response to these issues, activists have 
attempted to distance themselves from NGOs as an organisational form, as these are 
associated with excessive donor influence (amongst other things). Distancing 
themselves from NGOs and asserting their identity as ‘movements’ allows activists 
to assert their autonomy to donors: a way of signalling that although they may accept 
funds, they will do so only on their own terms. It also allows them to signal to the 
broader public that they are authentic expressions of local aspirations and not 
beholden to an agenda imposed from outside. Taking on the designation ‘social 
movement’ or ‘people’s movement’ appears to have given activists a certain freedom 
to experiment with diverse strategies for engaging the public. This freedom is 
undoubtedly appealing to activists, yet in most cases, funding is also necessary for 
activists to commit themselves to a cause in an ongoing capacity. The three case 
studies presented in this thesis have shown some of the approaches activists may take 
to negotiate this tension and the ways in which this has led to the evolution of new 
organisational forms. If NGOs and funded projects continue to decline in legitimacy, 
either to the general public or within the activist community, one might expect 
activists to form new organisational structures in an attempt to find spaces of 
autonomy. Whether this leads to a reduction in ‘outsider’ influence and more space 
for local communities to assert their own needs, or simply more autonomy for 
activists to follow their own political agenda, remains an open question for future 
research to investigate.  
In addition to donors, activists are also influenced by their peers within national and 
international activist networks. These networks are valuable in allowing for an 
exchange of ideas and information, linking activists to funding opportunities and 
organising joint events and campaigns. Yet, this study has found that these networks 
can also restrict the organic development of sustainable agriculture in a manner that 




spend more time pursuing opportunities within these networks than working within 
rural communities. Activist networks provide a community of likeminded 
individuals, who reaffirm each other’s own worldviews. Partaking in these networks 
at the expense of local communities can make activists develop a self-righteous 
attitude and insular ideologies that make them unwilling to adapt their message to 
suit local realities and experiences.  
My research identified several ways in which these networks can influence activists’ 
work on the ground. Events hosted by other organisations within national and 
international activist networks provide activists with a receptive audience that might 
not be available to them in the communities in which they work. By participating in 
these events, activists may be able to spread their message to distant audiences, but 
the time spent on this may translate into less time relating to members of their own 
target communities. Furthermore, when working in communities, activists tend to 
speak narratives about ecology, the Green Revolution and globalisation that reflect 
the language spoken in activist networks. On some occasions, this led to levels of 
ideological purism that prevented a more effective engagement with local needs. 
There are, however, examples of sustainable agriculture organisations that overcome 
this purism. The Centre for Sustainable Agriculture (CSA) in Hyderabad provides an 
example of how organisations can promote sustainable agriculture in a way that 
recognises the immediate needs of rural communities, rather than trying to promote a 
farming system that is most congruent with activists’ ideological positions. CSA’s 
promotion of Non-Pesticide Management in Andhra Pradesh was successful in 
generating a widespread transition away from the use of pesticides (Ramanjaneyulu 
et al, 2009), despite attracting criticism from peers within the broader sustainable 
agriculture networks for implementing ‘half-baked’ solutions. The manner in which 
CSA’s leadership negotiated these issues is worthy of further investigation. 
When organisations more actively enlist the participation of rural communities, 
questions remain regarding the sections of communities with whom they engage. 
Activists’ attempts to build consent for sustainable agriculture may at times bring 
their organisations under the influence of rural elites. Sustainable agriculture 




large landholders, as they are the immediate decision makers regarding whether or 
not to use chemical inputs. Yet, as these farmers become influential within 
organisations they may exclude other key stakeholders from participating – 
particularly women and landless labourers, but also members of marginalised castes 
and communities. One strategy that activists employ in response to this is to avoid 
engagement with these more ‘subaltern’ stakeholders, out of fear of upsetting 
landholders. Such an approach benefits from the fact that sustainable agriculture 
discourses often resonate well with local elites. Their focus on the ‘traditional 
wisdom’ of farmers and the ‘harmony of traditional communities’ that was disrupted 
by the Green Revolution, can operate in the interest of elites by smoothing over 
sources of tension within communities that could threaten elite privilege (Nanda, 
2003). The ironic finding of this research was that this conservative tendency may be 
kept in check by the very activist networks that were problematised above, which 
place emphasis on issues of social justice. Activists compromise their image if they 
are seen to be working in the interest of large landholders and, consequently, may 
feel the need to articulate their discourses in terms of the underdog. Thus, at the very 
least, this pressure from within the activist community is likely to prompt 
organisations to prioritise working with small and marginal farmers, rather than large 
landholders or absentee landlords. Nonetheless, the extent to which this leads 
organisations to work in the interests of the most marginalised appears to be 
somewhat limited, as was evident in the case studies. 
 
10.2. Possibilities for More Grassroots Approaches 
Although I am sceptical of the possibility of sustainable agriculture organisations 
developing in a completely ‘localist’, ‘grassroots’ manner (particularly in the early 
stages), my research has identified several ‘moments’ through which those in need of 
change to their agricultural systems have been able to organise themselves to raise 
awareness and develop their own solutions. The case studies indicate the potential for 
members of rural communities to collect basic data on issues affecting them, such as 
increases in rates of cancer. This kind of ‘grassroots research’ not only allows local 




that when alternative approaches are developed, they are more likely to consider 
issues that local people perceive to be important. The research also showed that rural 
communities can devise their own solutions to problems of agricultural 
sustainability. This was shown in the case of BBA’s seed bank, which was 
essentially a communal attempt to conserve local agro-biodiversity.
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Due to resource deficits within communities, grassroots methods of organising have 
their limitations. Indeed, the examples of grassroots initiatives described above, 
though occasionally organised by local people, typically rely on outside supporters. 
The challenge is how to provide support in a manner that retains local control over 
the aims and objectives of the initiatives. The ‘facilitative approach’, developed by 
TOFarM, provides one suggestion as to how this can take place. TOFarM’s approach 
consisted of setting up structures through which various members of local 
communities could participate. Revathi and Swamy’s work in organising collectives 
and regular meetings and proving access to information made participation easier for 
local people. Yet, at the same time, they retained a distance between themselves and 
the ‘movements’ they facilitated and consciously chose to take a back seat to 
communities in setting the agenda. They did not identify with the movements 
themselves, but merely regarded themselves as ‘movement facilitators’. By retaining 
a distance between themselves and communities, activists can ensure local autonomy 
is preserved, even though activists may provide advice to farming communities that 
reflects their own perspectives and biases. This is a model that many activists may 
find useful in negotiating the often fraught issue of how to intervene without being 
‘interventionist’. In the long term, it also allows activists to better conserve their own 
resources, since, if the collectives they facilitate are embraced by local people, 
increasingly the tasks of organising and management can be taken over by 
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insufficient data, is the ‘Participatory Guarantee Scheme’ of organic certification. This scheme, 
organised by the Organic Farmers Association of India, attempts to remove certification 
agencies from the process of organic certification, by enlisting the participation of local organic 
farmers as certifiers and monitors (see Khosla, 2006). These and other participatory approaches 
ensure that sustainable agriculture develops in a way that reflects local needs and also give the 




communities themselves. Activists can move on to ‘facilitating’ others, elsewhere, as 
Revathi and Swamy eventually did.
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The facilitative approach may not be particularly appealing to donor organisations, as 
it makes for an unpredictable process that is difficult to document and monitor.
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This is yet another tension that arises between donors and those with an interest in 
grassroots empowerment, and shows how the fiscal powers of conservative donors 
can limit the transformative potential of sustainable agriculture. Donor organisations, 
insofar as they do have progressive intentions, should acknowledge that the process 
of social and political change is itself unpredictable. If they are sincere in their 
commitments to participation and grassroots democracy, then they should be open to 
experimenting with these organisational structures, despite the evaluative difficulties. 
It is not enough for NGOs to merely form partnerships with local organisations in a 
token gesture of ‘local participation’. Such organisations are often dominated by 
local elites (see de Wit & Berner, 2009). It is necessary to create new participatory 
structures, for the generation, sharing and dissemination of knowledge and 
formulating agendas for new development strategies, collective bargaining and so on. 
The potential for these structures being hijacked by elites is always present, which 
suggests the need for ongoing monitoring. The focus would then be on monitoring 
procedures, rather than outcomes (which become impossible to evaluate if the 
agenda is truly democratic – i.e., not set in advance). If sustainable agriculture really 
is in the interest of rural communities, then simply providing communities with the 
relevant resources and information and allowing them to set their own agenda, 
should be an effective way to ensure the rapid dissemination of sustainable farming 
techniques.  
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power relations still exist between participants and facilitators and the rhetoric of facilitative 
organisations may serve to obscure this reality. 
63 This may explain why Revathi, though she acknowledges the impossibility of documentation, 





While the case studies do provide some examples of sustainable agriculture’s 
potential to provide grassroots solutions to agrarian crises, perhaps more importantly, 
the limitations identified in these case studies suggest possibilities for alternative, 
more transformative approaches. There are some concrete ways in which sustainable 
agriculture could be made more responsive to the immediate needs of rural 
communities, particularly the rural poor. A major problem in current approaches is 
that activists tend to work with fairly rigid models of agricultural sustainability. 
Agrarian crisis highlights the unsustainability of current approaches to rural 
development, but this unsustainability has many dimensions. Activists in sustainable 
agriculture organisations have tended to focus primarily on ecological sustainability. 
Within this, there is a narrow focus on the use of chemical inputs. While reducing 
chemical consumption certainly has value, focusing exclusively on this can result in 
sidelining the range of social and economic factors that are rendering rural India 
unviable. To adequately serve the needs of rural communities in a time of crisis 
requires getting beyond the limiting binary of ‘natural farming’ versus ‘chemical 
farming’. More engaged responses will recognise that a truly sustainable agriculture 
is one that meets a diversity of local economic, social and ecological needs, and will 
build a correspondingly broad platform to achieve this. 
As was discussed in Chapter 9, the rigidity of activists’ models can be largely 
attributed to the social relations that they enter into in order to promote their cause. 
In particular, activists tend to forge relations with likeminded others in activist 
networks dispersed throughout the country. When these others become the primary 
source of input on ideological and technical matters, it can lead to insularity and a 
self-righteous attitude. By engaging directly with communities and relying less on 
outsiders for moral affirmation, activists can develop approaches that more directly 
reflect the needs and interests of those they claim to be serving. There should be a 
greater effort on the part of activists to break down their own status as ‘middle class 
outsiders’, rather than reinforcing the binary through self-righteousness. Insofar as 
activist networks will inevitably have some impact on activists’ sense of identity and 
purpose, there should be greater consciousness within these networks of the kinds of 
values that are circulating. Rather than focusing on the righteousness of particular 




closely listening to the needs of communities and engaging with the most 
marginalised in participatory and democratic ways.  
Finally, activists should be more cautious in the relations they forge with local elites. 
Allying with those who have power and influence at the local level may have short-
term, tactical value, but in the long term it may serve to alienate potential subaltern 
allies and lead to elitist and conservative orientations within organisations. 
 
10.3. Beyond Sustainable Agriculture 
While sustainable agriculture has the potential to address aspects of India’s agrarian 
crisis, it also has inherent limitations. Despite the rhetoric of activists and supportive 
scholars, it is particularly limited as a participatory and democratic project, for three 
main reasons. First, sustainable agriculture comes, in most respects, as a pre-
formulated project. Although the precise features of the farming models adopted may 
be modified in accordance with local conditions, there are certain issues that are non-
negotiable, particularly concerning the use of chemicals. These non-negotiable issues 
become more stringent in the case of the specific schools of sustainable farming 
(natural farming, permaculture, and so on), for which most sustainable agriculture 
organisations have a preference. If agrarian classes have preferred solutions to the 
agrarian crisis that go in fundamentally different directions, these are excluded from 
the outset. The limited success of the organisations studied here suggests that their 
pre-packaged models currently do not reflect local aspirations. Secondly, under 
current institutional settings, sustainable agriculture generally requires middle class 
support, which brings with it the influence of donors and activist networks. As the 
case studies have demonstrated, these forces ultimately have greater influence over 
the unfolding of the process than do the people most in need of change. Thirdly, 
organisations are compelled to appeal to donors and the general public for support, 
which requires that they represent themselves as legitimate, authentic, virtuous, 
effective and so on. In time, this kind of self-promotion may overshadow and distort 
the initial agenda of sustainable agriculture organisations and preclude possibilities 




Rather than imposing pre-formulated projects, activists wishing to improve the social 
and environmental situation in rural India should begin by engaging with the ground 
realities of agrarian crisis. Yet, working with rural subalterns to develop solutions to 
agrarian crises that meet their unique requirements is certainly no easy task. While 
imposing pre-formulated solutions is highly problematic, there is also no simple way 
to determine what the rural poor ‘really want’. Subaltern groups have long histories 
of exclusion and oppression and are, therefore, naturally sceptical of outsiders’ 
attempts to facilitate change (Vincent, 2004). Additionally, the risks associated with 
publically stating the problems with the status quo provide a further incentive to 
remain silent (Masaki, 2010). Masaki (2004) suggests, therefore, that those 
attempting to facilitate change that genuinely empowers subaltern groups should 
begin with close, ethnographic studies of local situations. Activists should attend to 
the multiple forms of what Scott (1985) terms ‘everyday acts of resistance’, 
specifically, the ways in which those who are too marginalised to explicitly challenge 
existing relations engage in subtle strategies to ensure their own survival and get a 
better deal for themselves. The sheer weight of agrarian crisis means that the rural 
poor, out of necessity, are already resisting their situation. Activists should look to 
these strategies that are already in practice, consider ways in which they can be 
expanded upon and engage in honest discussions about alternative strategies and the 
potentials and risks involved. Masaki (2004, 2010) argues that such strategies will be 
more effective than attempting to impose a development plan from above, as it 
activates and expands on practices that are not foreign to local people, being already 
immanent in local social relations.  
In some instances, such strategies may require rural activists to look beyond 
agriculture altogether and recognise that the survival strategies of the rural poor also 
involve non-agricultural forms of economic activity. As Ferguson (1994) identifies, 
development institutions use representations of an isolated, unchanging, backward, 
intractably agricultural rural society as a means of depoliticising rural populations 
and justifying certain forms of intervention. Similarly, in representing India as an 
essentially agricultural nation and defending agriculture for its own sake, the 
organisations studied in this thesis neglected that the wider struggles of the rural poor 




agricultural options. A serious contribution towards these struggles may require a 
wider conception of livelihoods and a more inter-sectorial perspective.  
Critical studies of participatory development suggest ways in which activists can 
intervene in agrarian settings that avoid domination. Several critics have rightly 
pointed out that enlisting the participation of subaltern groups in development 
projects is not enough to ensure emancipation. Frequently, participation is 
manipulative, serving to co-opt local people into processes that actually serve the 
interests of other, more powerful groups (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Cooke, 2004). As 
Hickey and Mohan (2004) note, simply focusing on participation as an end-in-itself 
ignores the fact that development is not only a series of discrete projects, but also a 
much broader historical process. Enlisting participation may appear to empower the 
poor, but the broader development process ultimately serves a different agenda. In 
the present case, sustainable agriculture might empower the individual farmer who 
adopts the techniques, but he or she has little control over the formulation of the 
project itself, let alone the broader development trajectory of which it is a part. 
Hickey and Mohan (2004) argue that a truly transformative participatory 
development must bridge the gap between these two aspects of development. This 
requires that projects occur in the context of a broader agenda for institutional 
change. While engaging in work on the ground, activists should also attempt to build 
the popular agency of oppressed groups, such that they are better equipped to 
meaningfully challenge the dominant institutional arrangements (Mohan & Hickey, 
2004; Williams, 2004). In this way, oppressed groups can emerge from their 
subaltern position and build vertical power to address the structural causes of 
agrarian crisis and challenge currently hegemonic arrangements. 
Sensible as these suggestions may seem, it is worth bearing in mind that they are 
quite ambitious within the current institutional environment. Sustained, focused 
activism of this sort generally requires funds. Accessing such funds integrates 
activists into a development system that is often hostile towards actively developing 
the political capacity of the poor and which has limited patience for detailed, 
ethnographic engagements with local conditions (Cooke, 2004). Nonetheless, such 




democratic and effective forms of activism than those that currently pervade the 
Indian countryside. 
 
10.4. Trajectories for Future Research 
This thesis has drawn on detailed case studies to explore a large and diverse network 
of organisations that are spread throughout India and have links to broader networks 
throughout the world. It is a network whose activities have significant implications 
for rural development. Further studies are required to develop a more complete 
profile of this growing movement, to understand its impact, potential and limitations. 
Such research should identify crucial centres of influence, and explore more of the 
diversity of organisations working on the ground. While this research has focused on 
organisations that identify as ‘movements’, developing a more comprehensive 
perspective on the sustainable agriculture community in India would require 
cataloguing some of the more ‘normal’ organisations, particularly NGOs and self-
help groups.  
While I have identified a number of broad factors that distort the objectives of 
sustainable agriculture organisations, future studies could go into greater detail on 
more specific factors. I have argued that activists are strongly influenced by non-
local forces, including the state, donors and dispersed activist networks. It is worth 
noting that these forces are all highly heterogeneous – something that it was not 
possible to explore with due sensitivity in this research. The impact of different kinds 
of donor organisations, governments and ideological clusters within activist networks 
on the potential action of local organisations should be explored in greater detail. 
Furthermore, there is a lot of scope for more detailed studies of local power 
structures. While class and land ownership were a key focus of this research, it was 
only possible to scratch the surface on other structures, including gender, caste and 
religion. Gender, in particular, overlaps with the activities of sustainable agriculture 
organisations in a great variety of ways, and deserves more focused attention in 




These are fertile grounds for research, with diverse channels to explore. In this thesis, 
I utilised detailed, qualitative data on a small number of case studies. This enabled 
me to begin to theorise some of the various ways in which activists can be influenced 
by their position within a network of social relations, and how this, in turn, affects 
their organisational identity and strategy. My focus and methodology enabled me to 
evaluate certain organisational structures in terms of the ways in which they prompt 
the participation of rural communities and identified some of the levels at which this 
participation can be valuable. The findings of this research could be complemented 
with quantitative, comparative and interdisciplinary data to evaluate the efficacy of 
various methods of engaging with communities in terms of the uptake of sustainable 
practices and the propagation of democratic collective structures. Such studies would 
be of great value in suggesting ways in which sustainable agriculture organisations 
can become more participatory and more effective. In the meantime, activists are 
likely to continue to make their own innovations, developing new strategies for 
engaging with communities and promoting their preferred farming methods. 
Sustainable agriculture networks, being composed of multiple agents, are dynamic 
and constantly shifting in response to activists’ ground level experiences. Further 
studies on the ways in which activists reflect upon and respond to existing limitations 
will provide insight into how such networks develop and evolve.  
Building a research agenda on these networks as dynamic phenomena would be of 
immense value. Developing a more comprehensive understanding of existing 
approaches to sustainable agricultural development, complete with their flaws, will 
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APPENDIX 1. TABLE OF INTEVIEWEES 
 
Note: Participants marked with an asterisk agreed to have their names used for the 
purposes of this study. All other names given are pseudonyms.  
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of current total 










M Farmer Practicing 
natural farming 
on a small 
portion of 
holdings (1.5 of 




contact for Jidda 










M Farmer Practicing 
natural farming, 
with KVM’s 
support, on 11 




















on 2 acres of his 
land out of total 
holdings of 17 
acres; a vocal 
advocate of 
natural farming 
in his village; 
travels with 
KVM to speak 
of his results at 
events; invites 
farmers from 





and tour of 
farm, 
31/09/2009 
1.t. Upkaar Abohar M Farmer Attended KVM 





1.u. Tanvir Abohar M Farmer Practicing 
natural farming 
with a diversity 








tour of farm, 
10/01/2010 
1.v.  Navraj Abohar M Farmer Practicing 
organic farming 
on 25 acres of 





tour of farm 
10/01/2010 




M Farmer Practicing 
natural farming 
on 4 acres of 
land (his total 
holdings); 
speaks at many 
KVM events; 







and tour of 
farm, 
17/01/2010 



















M Farmer Practicing 
natural farming 







1.z.  Hardev Jaito, Dist. 
Faridkot 
M Farmer Practicing 
natural farming 











M Farmer Practicing 
natural farming 
on 1.5 out of a 
total of 20 acres 
(the rest of 






































































1.gg. Jaskaran Jaitu M Journalist Moral and 
intellectual 
support; writes 
articles for local 
newspapers in 

















1.ii.  Jaskeerat Abohar M Teacher Technical and 
organisational/ 
strategic advice; 











M Teacher Played an 
important role in 
documenting 
cancer in Jajjal 
and has worked 
with KVM to 
bring this to 
media attention; 
a key contact for 
KVM in Jajjal 
Interview 
21/12/2009 


































1.mm. Prem Bathinda M Public health 
professor 





several events to 
raise awareness 
of the impact of 
the Green 
Revolution on 
public health; a 









1.nn. Jodh Jaitu and 
Hyderabad 
M Soil scientist Delivered 
lectures and 
workshops for 















1.oo. Gurtej Firozpur M Public servant Involved in the 
organisation of 
literary festivals 
with KVM; a 
prominent writer 
of nature poetry 
Conversation 
13/01/2010 








relating to the 
medical impact 







1.qq. Gurkirat Kotkapura M Journalist Attends KVM 
events; reports 
on issues 
relevant to KVM 










tour of farm 
20/01/2010 

















































Role/ Connection with 
the organisation 







































Plays key roles in 
organising TOFarM 
events, technical 










2.c. Selvam Tiruchirappalli  M NGO 
worker 
Team leader of an 
NGO and convenor of 










Has been promoting 
sustainable agriculture 
as leader of a local 
association; an 
educator who uses his 
farm for demonstration 
purposes; was a 
















silviculture on a 33 
acre farm; delivered 
workshops on 
silviculture and water 
management as part of 
a local sustainable 
agriculture association; 
translated materials 
from English to Tamil 
for local farmers; 
previously published a 
magazine on ecological 
agriculture. 
Interview and 

















Manages of a farm 
owned by a local NGO 




of farm and 
local village 
16/02/2010 
2.h. Kapilan Vaiyampatti, 
Dindigul Dist. 
M Activist Has been promoting 
ecological agriculture 
through various 
platforms for several 
decades 
Interview and 
tour of farm 
17/02/2010 
2.i. Kajan Vaiyampatti, 
Dindigul Dist. 
M Activist Promoting ecological 
agriculture through a 
local organisation; 








2.j. Vasikaran Online  M Activist Has been promoting 
and educating people 




,   
 
Agrarians 
2.k. Adhi Nagapattinam F Marginal 
farmer and 
labourer 
Works on Revathi’s 




2.l. Murugan Nagapattinam M Farm 
manager 
Manages Revathi’s 
farm in Nagapattinam 





2.m. Mani Nagore 
Village, Dist. 
Nagapattinam 
M Farmer A ‘master farmer’ in 
ecological farming, 
practicing ecological 
farming on 2 acres; 
makes bio-inputs at 
home and distributes 
locally; provides 
support for those 
interested in ecological 
farming at a local level.  









2.n. Nithura Nagore 
Village, Dist. 
Nagapattinam 
F Farmer Practicing ecological 
farming on her 2 acres 
of land (though 









M Farmer Practicing ecological 













farming on a 30 acre 
plot; owns a small lab 
which produces bio-
inputs; uses farm as a 
demonstration for other 
farmers interested in 
organic farming 
Interview and 
tour of farm 
12/02/2010 








farming on a 30 acres 
of land; owns a small 
lab which produces 
bio-inputs; uses farm 
as a demonstration for 
other farmers 
interested in organic 
farming 
Interview and 













Growing a range of 
crops using natural 
farming techniques 
(Fukuoka) on 50 acres 
of land; Farm has been 
designed as a 
demonstration farm 
with numerous signs 
for demonstration 
purposes; collaborates 
with TOFarM  
Interview and 




M Farmer Practicing organic 
farming on 5 acre 
farm; has developed a 
unique method of 




and sells worms. 
Interview, tour 








M Farmer Practicing organic 






M Farmer Practicing organic 




2.v. Vadivel Podukottai 
Dist. 
M Farmer Practicing organic 
farming on 7 acres of 




















Advises farmers on 
organic farming 
































































F Farmer Directly involved 
as spokesperson, 
activist, organiser 































3.e. Geeta Kataldi 
village 
F Farmer Led a campaign 
against a local 
mine; participates 
local Mahila 









3.f. Bindu Kataldi 
village 
F Farmer Participant in 
campaign against 
a local mine; 
participates local 
Mahila Mandal 













support for BBA; 
coordinates a 





and tour of 
local area, 
13/03/2010 





of Mahila Mandal 
Dal, active in her 






3.i.  Gautam Khadi M Farmer 
and 
activist 
Active in most 
major 
mobilisations in 





supporter of BBA 
Interview, 
19/03/2010 
3.j. Bhagwant Nahikalan M Farmer 
and 
activist 
Participated in a 
number of BBA’s 
campaigns and 






























efforts to take 
BBA’s message 
and the method of 
baranaja to other 








3.m.  Arun Rampur 
village 




with Hindi and 
Garhwali 
speakers; as a 
resident of the 
Henwal Valley, 






3.n. Deepa Rampur 
village 
F Farmer Mostly an 
informant on 
local conditions 
and attitudes; had 
attended BBA 













3.p. Padma Rampur 
village 
F Farmer Former Chipko 
activist; indirect 






3.q. Anil Rampur 
village 
M Farmer Mostly an 
informant on 
local conditions 
and attitudes; had 
attended BBA 





3.r. Anita Rampur 
village 






3.s. Madhu Rampur 
village 






3.t. Narendra Rampur 
village 






3.u. Jaya Rampur 
village 






3.v. Babita Rampur 
village 

































3.z. Anju Patudi F Farmer Participates in 








3.aa. Kusum Patudi F Farmer Participates in 
Mahila Mandal 







3.bb. Charan Chamba M Journalist Has participated 
in BBA events 
for several years; 
writes articles 
relevant to BBA 





3.cc. Veena Dehra Dun F Public 
servant 







with BBA in 
organising a 
number of events 
Interview, 
23/03/2010 
3.dd. Badri Dehradun M NGO 
worker 
Was inspired by 
the work of BBA 






3.ee. Ajit New Tehi M Journalist Participated in a 
number of BBA 
campaigns 
Interview 
30/03/2010 
 
